## Horayot Daf 4a

###### Horayot 4a:1
[Horayot 4a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/4a:1)

וְלָא מִבַּעְיָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר צִבּוּר מַיְיתֵי, דִּמְפַרְסְמָא מִלְּתָא. אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר בֵּית דִּין מְבִיאִין, דְּלָא מְפַרְסְמָא מִלְּתָא – אִי הֲוָה שָׁאֵיל, הֲווֹ אָמְרִין לֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And it is not necessary** to state this **according to the one who said** that the **congregation brings** the offering, **as** in that case **the matter,** that the court reversed its ruling, **is publicized** among the congregation. **But even according to the one who said** that the **court brings** the offering, **where the matter is not publicized** that the court reversed its ruling, **if he had asked, they would have told him** that the court reversed its ruling. Therefore, it could be said that he associated his action with himself and did not associate it with the court, and he is liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering.


###### Horayot 4a:2
[Horayot 4a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/4a:2)

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר אָבִין, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר זְבִידָא: מָשָׁל דְּסוֹמְכוֹס לְמָה הַדָּבָר דּוֹמֶה? לְאָדָם שֶׁהֵבִיא כַּפָּרָתוֹ בֵּין הַשְּׁמָשׁוֹת, סָפֵק מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם נִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ, סָפֵק מִשֶּׁחָשֵׁכָה נִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ, שֶׁאֵין מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yosei bar Avin, and some say Rabbi Yosei bar Zevida, says:** There is **an analogy** to illustrate the opinion **of Sumakhos. To what is this matter comparable?** It is comparable **to a person who brings his atonement** offering during **twilight,** which is a time when there is uncertainty whether it is day or night, and there is **uncertainty** whether the offering **atoned for him while it is still day,** and the atonement was effective, and there is **uncertainty** whether **it atoned for him after nightfall,** and the atonement was not effective. The *halakha* is **that he does not bring a provisional guilt-offering.** Although typically one is liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering in a case where there is uncertainty whether he performed a transgression for which he is liable to bring a sin-offering, in this case, since the uncertainty relates to twilight, which is an uncertainty that can never be resolved, it is not a typical uncertainty and one is not liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering.


###### Horayot 4a:3
[Horayot 4a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/4a:3)

וְלָא מִבַּעְיָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר בֵּית דִּין מְבִיאִין דְּלָא אִפַּרְסְמָא מִלְּתָא, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר צִבּוּר מְבִיאִין, דִּמְפַרְסְמָא מִלְּתָא, וַהֲווֹ אָמְרִינַן לֵיהּ, דְּהָכָא בְּסָפֵק מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם סָפֵק מִשֶּׁחָשֵׁכָה, אִי שָׁאֵיל לָא אַשְׁכַּח אִינָשׁ דִּמְשַׁיֵּילֵּיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And it is not necessary** to state this **according to the one who said** that the **court brings** the offering, which is the case **when the matter is not publicized** that the court reversed its ruling; **but** it can be stated **even according to the one who said** that the **congregation brings** the offering, which is the case **when the matter is publicized** that the court reversed its ruling, **and** if he had asked **we would have said to him** that the court reversed its ruling. This is **because here, in** a case where there is **uncertainty** whether it atoned for him **while it is still day** and there is **uncertainty** whether it atoned for him **after nightfall, if he asks he would not find a person whom he** could **ask.**


###### Horayot 4a:4
[Horayot 4a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/4a:4)

אָמַר לוֹ בֶּן עַזַּאי: מַאי שְׁנָא מִן הַיּוֹשֵׁב כּוּ׳. שַׁפִּיר קָאָמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לְבֶן עַזַּאי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches that **ben Azzai said to** Rabbi Akiva: In **what** way is this person who went overseas **different from one who sits** in his house? Rabbi Akiva said to him: The difference is that with regard to one who sits in his house it would have been possible for him to hear of the court’s reversal, but with regard to that person who went overseas, it would not have been possible for him to hear of the court’s reversal. The Gemara asks: **Rabbi Akiva said well to ben Azzai.** How did a scholar of the caliber of ben Azzai fail to understand that distinction?


###### Horayot 4a:5
[Horayot 4a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/4a:5)

אָמַר רָבָא: הֶחְזִיק בַּדֶּרֶךְ אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ, לְבֶן עַזַּאי חַיָּיב – דְּהָא בְּבֵיתֵיהּ אִיתֵיהּ, לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא פָּטוּר – דְּהָא הֶחְזִיק בַּדֶּרֶךְ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said:** The reference is not to one who already went to a country overseas; rather, it is a case of **one who set out on the way** but has not yet left his city in which **there is** a practical difference **between them. According to ben Azzai** he is **liable, as** it is **in his home** city where **he is** located at this time and there is no difference between him and one who is sitting in his house. **According to Rabbi Akiva** he is **exempt, as he** has already **set out on** his **way.** Even though he is still in his home city, he is preoccupied with his travels and his status is like one who has already gone overseas.


###### Horayot 4a:6
[Horayot 4a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/4a:6)

הוֹרוּ לוֹ בֵּית דִּין לַעֲקוֹר אֶת כָּל הַגּוּף. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״וְנֶעֱלַם דָּבָר״ – וְלֹא שֶׁיֵּעָקֵר הַמִּצְוָה כּוּלָּהּ. כֵּיצַד? אָמְרוּ: אֵין נִדָּה בַּתּוֹרָה, אֵין שַׁבָּת בַּתּוֹרָה, אֵין עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה בַּתּוֹרָה, יָכוֹל יְהוּ חַיָּיבִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְנֶעֱלַם דָּבָר״ – וְלֹא שֶׁתִּתְעַלֵּם מִצְוָה כּוּלָּהּ. הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ פְּטוּרִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches: In a case where the judges of the **court issued** an erroneous **ruling to abolish the entire essence** of the mitzva, that is not a valid ruling, and the court is exempt from bringing an offering. **The Sages taught:** The verse states: **“And the matter is hidden** from the eyes of the congregation” (Leviticus 4:13), from which it is derived that there is liability only when a single matter is hidden **but not** in a case **where they will abolish the entire mitzva. How** so? If the court **said: There is no** prohibition against engaging in intercourse with **a menstruating woman** written **in the Torah,** or **there is no** prohibition against performing prohibited labor on **Shabbat** written **in the Torah,** or **there is no** prohibition against engaging in **idol worship** written **in the Torah,** one **might** have thought that the judges **would be liable.** Therefore, **the verse states: “And the matter is hidden,” and not that** the **entire mitzva will be hidden.** Accordingly, if the judges issued that ruling, **they are exempt** from bringing an offering.


###### Horayot 4a:7
[Horayot 4a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/4a:7)

אֲבָל אָמְרוּ: יֵשׁ נִדָּה בַּתּוֹרָה אֲבָל הַבָּא עַל שׁוֹמֶרֶת יוֹם כְּנֶגֶד יוֹם פָּטוּר, יֵשׁ שַׁבָּת בַּתּוֹרָה אֲבָל הַמּוֹצִיא מֵרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים פָּטוּר, יֵשׁ עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה בַּתּוֹרָה אֲבָל הַמִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה פָּטוּר – יָכוֹל יְהוּ פְּטוּרִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְנֶעֱלַם דָּבָר״ וְלֹא כָּל הַגּוּף.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But** if the judges **said: There is** a prohibition against engaging in intercourse with **a menstruating woman** written **in the Torah, but one who engages in intercourse with** a woman **who observes** a clean **day for a day** she experiences a discharge is **exempt;** or if they said: **There is** a prohibition against performing prohibited labor on **Shabbat** written **in the Torah, but one who carries out** objects **from the private domain to the public domain** is **exempt;** or if they said: **There is** a prohibition against engaging in **idol worship** written **in the Torah, but one who bows** to the idol but did not sacrifice an offering is **exempt,** one **might** have thought that the judges **would be exempt.** Therefore, **the verse states: “And the matter is hidden,”** from which it is derived that there is liability only for a matter, a single detail, **but not** for **the entire essence.** In this case, since they ruled to abolish only a detail of the mitzva, the judges are liable.


###### Horayot 4a:8
[Horayot 4a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/4a:8)

אָמַר מָר: יָכוֹל יְהוּ פְּטוּרִין. וְאִי בְּקִיּוּם מִקְצָת וּבִיטּוּל מִקְצָת פְּטוּרִין, וּבַעֲקִירַת כָּל הַגּוּף פְּטוּרִין – בְּמַאי חַיָּיבִין? תַּנָּא הָכִי קָא קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ, אֵימָא: ״דָּבָר״ כּוּלַּהּ מִילְּתָא מַשְׁמַע! תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְנֶעֱלַם דָּבָר״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara analyzes the latter clause of the *baraita*. **The Master said:** One **might** have thought that the judges **would be exempt.** The Gemara asks: **But if in** a case of **sustaining a portion** of the mitzva **and nullifying a portion** of the mitzva the judges are **exempt, and in** a case of **abolishing the entire essence** of the mitzva the judges are **exempt,** as explained in the first clause of the *baraita*, **in what** case would they be **liable?** The Gemara answers: **This** is what is **difficult for the *tanna*: Say** that the term **“matter” is referring to the entire matter,** and the judges are liable even if they ruled to abolish the entire mitzva. Therefore, **the verse states: “And the matter is hidden [*venelam davar*].”**


###### Horayot 4a:9
[Horayot 4a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/4a:9)

מַאי מַשְׁמַע? אָמַר עוּלָּא: קְרִי בֵּיהּ ״וְנֶעֱלַם מִדָּבָר״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **From where** is this **inferred? Ulla said: Read into** the verse as though the letter *mem*, the last letter in the word *venelam*, is also appended to the beginning of the word *davar*, resulting in the phrase: ***Venelam middavar*,** meaning: Part of the matter is hidden, from which it is derived that there is liability for nullification of part of the matter, and not for abolishing the entire matter.


###### Horayot 4a:10
[Horayot 4a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/4a:10)

חִזְקִיָּה אָמַר, אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְעָשׂוּ אַחַת מִכׇּל מִצְוֹת״, ״מִכׇּל מִצְוֹת״ – וְלֹא כׇּל מִצְוֹת. מִצְוֹת תַּרְתֵּי מַשְׁמַע! אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: ״מִצְוַת״ כְּתִיב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Ḥizkiyya said** that **the verse states: “And they performed one of all the mitzvot”** (Leviticus 4:13), from which it is inferred that one is liable for nullification for a portion **of all the mitzvot and not** for nullification of **all the mitzvot.** The Gemara asks: The term **mitzvot** is plural, which **indicates** at least **two.** If that is the source, there should be liability even if the judges issue a ruling abolishing the entire essence of one mitzva, as one mitzva is a portion of two mitzvot. **Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:** Although the word is vocalized in the plural, as mitzvot, the word ***mitzvat* is written,** without a second *vav*, as though it were in the singular.


###### Horayot 4a:11
[Horayot 4a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/4a:11)

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: יָלֵיף ״דָּבָר״ ״דָּבָר״ מִזָּקֵן מַמְרֵא, דִּכְתִיב בֵּיהּ בְּזָקֵן מַמְרֵא: ״כִּי יִפָּלֵא מִמְּךָ דָבָר... לֹא תָסוּר מִן הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר יַגִּידוּ לְךָ יָמִין וּשְׂמֹאל״, מָה מַמְרֵא – ״מִן הַדָּבָר״ וְלֹא כׇּל דָּבָר, אַף בְּהוֹרָאָה – ״דָּבָר״ וְלֹא כָּל הַגּוּף.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ashi said:** The *tanna* **derives** a verbal analogy, learning the meaning of the term **“matter”** written in the context of the erroneous ruling **from** the term **“matter”** written in the context of the **rebellious elder. As it is written with regard to** the **rebellious elder: “If there shall be a matter [*davar*] too hard for you…You shall not turn aside from the matter [*haddavar*] that they shall declare unto you, to the right nor to the left”** (Deuteronomy 17:8–11). **Just as** one becomes **a rebellious** elder only when his dispute with the Sages is with regard to a portion **of the matter and not an entire matter, so too, with regard to** an erroneous **ruling** of the court, the error of the judges must be with regard to a portion of the **matter and not the entire essence** of the matter.


###### Horayot 4a:12
[Horayot 4a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/4a:12)

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵין בֵּית דִּין חַיָּיבִין עַד שֶׁיּוֹרוּ בְּדָבָר שֶׁאֵין הַצַּדּוּקִין מוֹדִין בּוֹ. אֲבָל בְּדָבָר שֶׁהַצַּדּוּקִין מוֹדִין בּוֹ – פְּטוּרִין. מַאי טַעְמָא? זִיל קְרִי בֵּי רַב הוּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rav Yehuda says** that **Shmuel says: A court is not liable** to bring an offering **unless it issues** an erroneous **ruling concerning a matter with which the Sadducees do not agree.** The Sadducees do not accept the Oral Torah, and they interpret the Written Torah literally. The court is liable only for a matter that is not explicitly written in the Torah or that does not clearly stem from that which is written in the Torah. **But with regard to** an erroneous ruling concerning **a matter with which the Sadducees agree,** the judges are **exempt. What is the reasoning** for this exemption? It **is** a topic that you could **go learn** in **a children’s school.** Since the matter the judges ruled upon is so obvious, their ruling simply exhibits ignorance, and is not deemed a ruling.


###### Horayot 4a:13
[Horayot 4a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/4a:13)

תְּנַן: יֵשׁ נִדָּה בַּתּוֹרָה, אֲבָל הַבָּא עַל שׁוֹמֶרֶת יוֹם כְּנֶגֶד יוֹם פָּטוּר. וְאַמַּאי? שׁוֹמֶרֶת יוֹם כְּנֶגֶד יוֹם, הָא כְּתִיב ״וְסָפְרָה לָּהּ״, מְלַמֵּד שֶׁסּוֹפֶרֶת אֶחָד לְאֶחָד!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara cites proof against the statement of Rav Yehuda, citing Shmuel. **We learned** in the mishna: The judges are liable if they said: **There is** a prohibition against engaging in intercourse with **a menstruating woman** written **in the Torah, but one who engages in intercourse with** a woman **who observes** a clean **day for a day** she experiences a discharge is **exempt.** The Gemara asks: **And why** should they be liable in that case? The *halakha* of a woman **who observes a day for a day** that she experiences a discharge **is written** in the Torah with regard to a woman who experiences a discharge of blood during the eleven-day interval between menstrual periods: **“And she shall count for herself”** (Leviticus 15:28); this **teaches that she counts one** clean day **for one** day that she experiences a discharge. Since it is written in the Torah, even the Sadducees would agree.


###### Horayot 4a:14
[Horayot 4a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/4a:14)

דְּאָמְרִי: הַעֲרָאָה שַׁרְיָא, גְּמַר בִּיאָה הוּא דַּאֲסִירָא. הָא נָמֵי כְּתִיב: ״אֶת מְקוֹרָהּ הֶעֱרָה״!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: The judges did not issue an erroneous ruling with regard to the *halakha* of a woman who observes a day for a day. Rather, the mishna is discussing a case **where they said: The initial stage of intercourse [*ha’ara’a*]** is **permitted** with a menstruating woman; **it is the completion of** the act of **intercourse that is prohibited.** The Gemara asks: **That *halakha* is also written: “He has uncovered [*he’era*] her fount”** (Leviticus 20:18), indicating that the first stage of intercourse with a menstruating woman is also prohibited.


###### Horayot 4a:15
[Horayot 4a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/4a:15)

דְּאָמְרִי: כְּדַרְכָּהּ – אֲסִירָא, שֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ – שַׁרְיָא. הָא כְּתִיב: ״מִשְׁכְּבֵי אִשָּׁה״!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara says: Rather, it is a case **where they said:** Intercourse with her **in the typical manner** is **prohibited,** but intercourse **in an atypical manner,** i.e., anal intercourse, is **permitted.** The Gemara asks: **Isn’t it written: “The manners in which one lies with a woman”** (Leviticus 18:22), in the plural, indicating that both intercourse in a typical manner and intercourse in an atypical manner are manners in which one lies with a woman?


###### Horayot 4a:16
[Horayot 4a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/4a:16)

דְּאָמְרִי: כְּדַרְכָּהּ – אָסוּר אֲפִילּוּ הַעֲרָאָה, בְּשֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ – גְּמַר בִּיאָה הוּא דְּאָסוּר, אֲבָל הַעֲרָאָה שַׁרְיָא. אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ נִדָּה נָמֵי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara says: Rather, it is a case **where they said:** With regard to intercourse **in a typical manner, even the initial stage of intercourse** is **forbidden.** With regard to intercourse **in an atypical manner, it is completion of** the act of **intercourse that** is **forbidden, but the initial stage of intercourse** is **permitted.** The Gemara asks: **If so,** then **even** in a case where they issued a ruling permitting the initial stage of intercourse in an atypical manner in the case of **a menstruating woman,** the judges should **also** be liable. Why does the mishna cite the case specifically with regard to a woman who observes a day for a day?


###### Horayot 4a:17
[Horayot 4a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/4a:17)

אֶלָּא לְעוֹלָם כְּדַרְכָּהּ, וּדְאָמְרִי: הַעֲרָאָה בְּאִשָּׁה דָּוָה הוּא דִּכְתִיבָא. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא, דְּאָמְרִי: זָבָה לָא הָוְיָא אֶלָּא בִּימָמֵי, דִּכְתִיב: ״כׇּל יְמֵי זוֹבָהּ״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara says: **Rather, actually,** the reference is to a ruling permitting the initial stage of intercourse **in a typical manner, and** the judges **said:** In the case of the prohibition of **the initial stage of intercourse, it is with regard to an afflicted woman,** who experienced the discharge of blood during her menstrual period, **that it is written,** not with regard to one who experiences the discharge during the eleven days between the end of one menstrual period and the expected start of another. **And if you wish, say** instead **that they said:** A woman assumes the status of **a *zava*,** i.e., one who experiences a discharge of blood for three consecutive days during those eleven days, **only** if she experienced the discharge **during the day,** not at night, **as it is written: “All the days of her discharge”** (Leviticus 15:26).


###### Horayot 4a:18
[Horayot 4a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/4a:18)

תְּנַן: יֵשׁ שַׁבָּת בַּתּוֹרָה, אֲבָל הַמּוֹצִיא מֵרְשׁוּת לִרְשׁוּת פָּטוּר. וְאַמַּאי? הוֹצָאָה הָא כְּתִיבָא: ״לֹא תוֹצִיאוּ מַשָּׂא מִבָּתֵּיכֶם״!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara offers proof against the statement of Rav Yehuda by citing Shmuel. **We learned** in the mishna: The judges are liable if they said: **There is** a prohibition against performing prohibited labor on **Shabbat** written **in the Torah, but one who carries out** objects **from** the private **domain to** the public **domain** is **exempt.** The Gemara asks: **And why** should they be liable in that case? With regard to **carrying out** into the public domain, **isn’t it written: “Neither carry a burden out of your houses** on Shabbat” (Jeremiah 17:22), and the Sadducees agree to that prohibition.


###### Horayot 4a:19
[Horayot 4a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/4a:19)

[דְּאָמְרִי הוֹצָאָה הוּא דְּאָסוּר, הַכְנָסָה מוּתָּר. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא], דְּאָמְרִי: הוֹצָאָה וְהַכְנָסָה הוּא דַּאֲסִירָא, מוֹשִׁיט וְזוֹרֵק שְׁרֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: It is a case **where** the judges **said:** It is **carrying** an object **out** to the public domain **that is prohibited,** but **carrying** an object **into** the private domain is **permitted. And if you wish, say** instead **that** the judges **said: It is carrying** an object **out** to the public domain **and carrying** an object **into** the private domain **that is prohibited.** But **passing or throwing** an object from domain to domain is **permitted.**


###### Horayot 4a:20
[Horayot 4a:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/4a:20)

תְּנַן: יֵשׁ עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה בַּתּוֹרָה, אֲבָל הַמִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה פָּטוּר. וְאַמַּאי? הַמִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה הָא כְּתִיבָא, דִּכְתִיב: ״לֹא תִשְׁתַּחֲוֶה לְאֵל אַחֵר״!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara cites proof against the statement of Rav Yehuda, citing Shmuel. **We learned** in the mishna: The judges are liable if they said: **There is** a prohibition against engaging in **idol worship** written **in the Torah, but one who bows** to the idol but did not sacrifice an offering is **exempt.** The Gemara asks: **And why** should they be liable in that case? With regard to **one who bows** to an idol, **isn’t it written** in the Torah, **as it is written: “You shall not bow to another god”** (Exodus 34:14)?


###### Horayot 4a:21
[Horayot 4a:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/4a:21)

דְּאָמְרִי: כִּי אֲסִירָא הִשְׁתַּחֲוָיָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ, אֲבָל שֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ – שַׁרְיָא. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא, דְּאָמְרִי: הִשְׁתַּחֲוָיָה גּוּפַהּ כְּדַרְכָּהּ הוּא דַּאֲסִיר, דְּאִית בַּהּ פִּשּׁוּט יָדַיִם וְרַגְלַיִם, הָא הִשְׁתַּחֲוָיָה דְּלֵית בַּהּ פִּשּׁוּט יָדַיִם וְרַגְלַיִם – שַׁרְיָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers that the reference is to a case **where** the judges **said: When bowing is forbidden** is when it represents **the typical manner** of worship of that idol. **But** when bowing is **not its typical manner** of worship, it is **permitted. And if you wish, say** instead that the reference is to a case **where** the judges **said:** With regard to **bowing itself,** it is when it is performed **in its typical manner that** it is **prohibited.** What is the typical manner of bowing? It is bowing **that has in its** performance **extension of the arms and legs,** as it was practiced in the Temple. **But bowing that does not have in its** performance **extension of the arms and legs** is **permitted.**