## Jerusalem Talmud Gittin Chapter 6

###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:1:1
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:1:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:1:1)

**משנה:** הָאוֹמֶר הִתְקַבֵּל גֵּט זֶה לְאִשְׁתִּי אוֹ הוֹלֵךְ גֵּט זֶה לְאִשְׁתִּי אִם רָצָה לְהַחֲזִיר יַחֲזִיר. הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁאָמְרָה הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִּיטִּי אִם רָצָה לְהַחֲזִיר לֹא יַחֲזִיר. לְפִיכָךְ אִם אָמַר לוֹ הַבַּעַל אֵי אֶיפְשִׁי שֶׁתְּקַבֵּל לָהּ אֶלָּא הוֹלֵךְ וְתֵן לָהּ אִם רָצָה לְהַחֲזִיר יַחֲזִיר. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר אַף הָאוֹמֶרֶת טוֹל לִי גִּיטִּי אִם רָצָה לְהַחֲזִיר לֹא יַחֲזִיר.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**MISHNAH:** Somebody who says, accept this bill of divorce for my wife, or bring this bill of divorce to my wife, may retract if he wants to retract¹. If a woman said, accept the bill of divorce for me, he² cannot retract even if he wants to retract. Therefore, if the husband said, it is not possible for me that you accept for her but bring and deliver it to her, he may retract if he wants to retract³. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, even if she says, take my the bill of divorce for me, he cannot retract even if he wants to retract⁴.

footnotes:
¹ If the husband appoints an agent, he may annul the agency any time as long as the bill was not delivered.
² The husband cannot retract the bill of divorce once it has been delivered to the wife’s agent whose hand acts for her hand.
³ The husband may refuse to recognize the messenger as the wife’s agent but appoint him as his own agent. Then the messenger acts uniquely as the husband’s agent.
⁴ Even if the wife’s agency was not spelled out clearly.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:1:2
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:1:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:1:2)

**הלכה:** הָאוֹמֶר הִתְקַבֵּל גֵּט זֶה לְאִשְׁתִּי כול׳. בְּכָל אָתָר אַתְּ אָמַר. הִתְקַבֵּל כִּזְכֵה. הָכָא אַתְּ אָמַר. הִתְקַבֵּל כְּהוֹלִךְ. שַׁנְיָיה הִיא שֶׁזָּכִין לוֹ לְאָדָם שֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו. הָתִיב רִבִּי שַׁמַּי. הַגַּע עַצְמָךְ שֶׁהָיְתָה צוֹוַחַת לְהִתְגָּרֵשׁ. אֲנִי אוֹמֵר. שֶׁמָּא חָזְרָה בָהּ. הָא תַנִּינָן. הִיא עַצְמָהּ מֵבִיאָה אֶת גִּיטָּהּ. חָשׁ לוֹמַר שֶׁמָּא חָזְרָה בָהּ. תַּמָּן הִיא חָבָה לְעַצְמָהּ. בְּרַם הָכָא חוֹב לָהּ.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**HALAKHAH:** “Somebody who says, accept this bill of divorce for my wife,” etc. Everywhere you say that “accept” is the equivalent of “obtain,”⁵ but here you say that “accept” is the equivalent of “bring”⁶? There is a difference, for one can obtain something for a person without him being present⁷ 11a, *Yebamot* 118b, *Qiddušin* 23a, 24a, *Eruvin* 81b, *Baba Meṣi‘a* 12a, *Ḥulin* 63a): “One may give a benefit to a person without his knowledge but one cannot put a detriment on him without his knowledge.” Since a divorce is considered detrimental to the wife, the husband has no power to appoint an agent to receive the bill for his wife; his instruction has to be re-interpreted to mean that he has to deliver the bill to the wife.. Rebbi Shammai objected: Think of it, if she was shouting to obtain a divorce⁸? I say, maybe she changed her mind. But did we not state⁹: “A woman herself may bring her bill of divorce”? Could you say that she may have changed her mind¹⁰? There, she is damaging herself¹¹ 118b), quoted by *Nimmuqe Yosef* (on Alfassi *Yebamot*, end of Chapter 15).; here it is to her detriment.

footnotes:
⁵ If A says to B: “accept this gift for C”, then if B has accepted the gift it is C’s property and A cannot retract the gift. Why can the husband annul the bill of divorce when he empowered the agent to receive the bill of divorce for his wife?
⁶ The divorce takes effect only by delivery of the bill into the woman’s hand.
⁷ In the language of the Babli (11b, Ketubot
⁸ Then the divorce would be a benefit to her.
⁹ Mishnah 2:8, Note 139.
¹⁰ If the husband hands the bill of divorce to his wife and stipulates that the divorce become valid only at the moment she brings the bill to the court at her place of residence which is not his place, can she change her mind, return to her place, and not showing the bill, being then married to her husband without his knowledge?
¹¹ By accepting to be her husband’s agent, she accepted the obligation to become divorced; this is with her knowledge and cannot be compared to the agency of a third party. This interpretation is by Rashba (on Yebamot


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:1:3
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:1:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:1:3)

רַב נַחֲמָן בַּר יַעֲקֹב אָמַר. אָמְרָה. הֲבֵא לִי גִיטִּי. וְהָלַךְ וְאָמַר לוֹ. אִשְׁתְּךָ אָמְרָה. הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִיטִּי. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהִגִּיעַ לְיָדָהּ אֵינוֹ גֵט. שֶׁהוּא סָבוּר מִדַּעַת הַשָּׁלִיחַ מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת. וְהִיא אֵינָהּ מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת אֶלָּא מִדַּעְתָּהּ. הָתִיב רִבִּי הוּנָא בַּר חִיָיה. וְהָא דְתַנִּינָן. הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁאָמְרָה. הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִיטִּי. אֵינוֹ גֵט עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ גֵּט לְיָדָהּ. מֵעַתַּה אֲפִילוּ הִגִּיעַ גֵּט לְיָדָהּ אֵינוֹ גֵט. שֶׁהִיא סְבוּרָה שֶׁהִיא מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת מִדַּעַת הַשָּׁלִיחַ. וְהִיא אֵינָהּ מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת אֶלָּא מִדַּעְתָּהּ. בְּיוֹדֵעַ הֲלָכָה לוֹמַר. הִתְקַבֵּל וּזְכֵה כְּהוֹלִךְ. וְהָתַנִּינָן. קְטַנָּה שֶׁאָמְרָה. הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִיטִּי. אֵינוֹ גֵט עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ גֵּט לְיָדָהּ. מֵעַתָּה אֲפִילוּ הִגִּיעַ גֵּט לְיָדָהּ אֵינוֹ גֵט. שֶׁהִיא סְבוּרָה שֶׁמָּא לְדַעַת הַשָּׁלִיחַ הִיא מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת. וְהִיא אֵינָהּ מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת אֶלָּא מִדַּעְתָּהּ. בְּיוֹדֵעַ שֶׁאֵין הַקָּטָן עוֹשֶׂה שָׁלִיחַ.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
¹² Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said: If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he went and said to him¹³, your wife said, accept the bill of divorce for me¹⁴, even after the bill came into her hand it is not a valid bill of divorce, since he¹⁵ thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance¹⁶. 24:1 requires that the husband put the bill of divorce into the wife’s hand, it is a biblical requirement that both husband and wife know the moment of divorce. In the case before us, the defect of the divorce is biblical and cannot be remedied except by a new bill.. Rebbi Huna bar Ḥiyya objected: But did we not state that if a woman said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand¹⁷ her bill of divorce and the husband instructs him to *deliver* the bill into her hand.? Then even if the bill came into her hand it should not be a valid bill! For she thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that practice is that “accept” and “obtain” mean “bring”¹⁸. But did we not state¹⁹: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” Then it should not be a valid bill even if the bill of divorce reaches her hand. For she thinks that maybe she is divorced by the acceptance of the agent, but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that a minor cannot appoint an agent²⁰ by marriage (*Ketubot* 4:2, Note 42), she can become an adult only by reaching the age of puberty. If she is divorced while being underage, she becomes “an orphan during her father’s lifetime” and will need an adult guardian to execute legal acts in her behalf. The husband in this case has to empower the agent to deliver the bill; he cannot rely on the underage wife’s instructions..

footnotes:
¹² A similar discussion is in the Babli, 62b–63a, quoting the same authors but in a different setting. (In the Babli, the husband shows that he does not quite believe the agent; here the husband acts on the agent’s word.)
¹³ The wife’s agent speaking to the husband.
¹⁴ Since the wife can empower an agent to accept the bill of divorce for her, “accept” in this context must mean “acquire”. The agent violated the terms of his agency.
¹⁵ The husband.
¹⁶ Since Deut
¹⁷ The quote is elliptic; most probably it refers to a text close to Tosephta 4:2 where the wife appoints an agent to receive
¹⁸ While the wife can appoint an agent to legally receive the bill in her stead, the husband cannot appoint such an agent and, as explained in the preceding paragraph, for him “receive” means “deliver”. The husband is free to interpret the wife’s instructions in terms of his own vocabulary. {The Babli, obviously dissatisfied with this solution, holds that the husband’s instructions must be followed to the letter but since the wife can be divorced against her will, the husband’s instructions override those of the wife and the latter’s instructions were given only subject to the husband’s approval.}
¹⁹ Mishnah 6:3.
²⁰ While an underage girl becomes emancipated from her father’s potestas


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:1:4
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:1:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:1:4)

רַב הוּנָא בְשֵׁם רַב. אֵין הָאִשָּׁה עוֹשָׂה שָׁלִיחַ לְקַבֵּל גִּיטָּהּ מִשְּׁלוּחֹה שֶׁלְּבַעֲלָהּ. שְׁמוּאֵל שְׁמָעָהּ מִינֵּיהּ וְלָעֲתָהּ בַּתְרֵי אַרְבָּעִים זִימְנֵי.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: A woman cannot appoint an agent to accept her bill of divorce from her husband’s agent²¹. Samuel heard this from him and repeated after him forty times.

footnotes:
²¹ Quoted in the Babli, 63b, and opposed there by the Galilean R. Ḥanina. Rabbinic practice follows R. Ḥanina. The Babli conjectures that a possible reason for Rav’s statement is that if the wife refuses to accept the bill from the husband’s agent but appoints her agent to receive the bill, she does this only to hinder the husband’s agent to fulfill his mission to deliver the bill to her. In that case, the wife would be entitled to appoint her agent if her appointment precedes her husband’s. Another conjectured reason is that there is a very remote possibility that things can go wrong if the bill is not actually delivered from hand to hand but deposited on her (or her agent’s) property. The basis for the possible complication is a rule which is not alluded to in the Yerushalmi and, therefore, should not be used to explain a statement in that Talmud.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:1:5
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:1:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:1:5)

רִבִּי זְעִירָא בָּעֵי. עַד כְּדוֹן בְּשֶׁאָמְרָה. הֲבֵא לִי. וְאָמַרה לוֹ. הִתְקַבֵּל לִי. אָמְרָה. הִתְקַבֵּל לִי. וְהוּא אָמַר לוֹ. הֲבֵא לִי. אַשְׁכָּח תַּנֵּי עַל תְּרַוֵּיהֹן. הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט וְאִם רָצָה לְהַחֲזִיר לֹא יַחֲזִיר. וְהָא תַנִּינָן. וְנָתַן בְּיָדָהּ. אֵין לִי אֶלָּא בְיָדָהּ. מְנַיִין בְּיַד שְׁלוּחוֹ בְּיַד שְׁלוּחָהּ מִשְּׁלוּחוֹ לִשְׁלוּחָהּ מִשְּׁלוּחָהּ לִשְׁלוּחוֹ מְנַיִין. תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר וְנָתַן וְנָתַן. מַה תַנֵּי אֵי אֶיפְשִׁי. רִבִּי. דְּתַנֵּי. אָמְרָה. הָבֵא לִי גִיטִּי. וְהָלַךְ וְאָמַר לוֹ. אִשְׁתָּךְ אָמְרָה. הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִיטִּי. הוֹלִיכוֹ לָהּ וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ זָכָה לָהּ וְנִתְקַבֵּל לָהּ. אִם רָצָה לְהַחֲזִיר לֹא יַחֲזִיר. דִּבְרֵי רִבִּי. רִבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר. הוֹלִיכוֹ לָהּ וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ. אִם רָצָה לְהַחֲזִיר לֹא יַחֲזִיר עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר לוֹ. אֵי אֶיפְשִׁי שֶׁתְּקַבְּלוֹ לָהּ אֶלָּא שֶׁתּוֹלִיכוֹ לָהּ. וִקַשְׁיָא עַל דְּרִבִּי. הֵילָךְ מִן דִּיבּוּרִי אִם רָצָה לְהַחֲזִיר יַחֲזִיר. וִקַשְׁיָא עַל דְּרִבִּי נָתָן. הֵילָךְ לִדִיבּוּרָהּ אִם רָצָה לְהַחֲזִיר יַחֲזִיר. רַב הוּנָא אָמַר. נַעֲשֶׂה שְׁלוּחוֹ וּשְׁלוּחָהּ. אַסִּי אָמַר. כָּל הֵיכָא דְאָמַר. שְׁלוּחוֹ וּשְׁלוּחָהּ. מְגוּרֶשֶׁת וְאֵינָהּ מְגוּרֶשֶׁת.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
²² 4:7, Notes 118–129. Since the introduction is different and some essential passages are missing here, it is clear that this passage is derivative. But since the text has suffered some rearrangement, it cannot be a direct copy (as noted in the Introduction.) Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: So far if she said, bring me, but [the agent] said [to the husband] “receive for me”²⁴. If she said, receive for me but [the agent] said [to the husband] “bring me”? If was found stated in both cases, this is a bill of divorce and if he wants to retract he cannot retract²⁵. But did we not state²⁶. 24:1,3 is missing in other sources; cf. Halakhah 8:1. The Babli, *Qiddušin* 41a, derives the possibility of divorce by agent (שָׁלִיחַ) from the expression וְשִׁלְּחָהּ in *Deut*. 24:1 For the general principle that “an agent takes the place of a principal” cf. *Qiddušin* 2:1 (62a 1.41), Babli 41b. It is not trivial that a bill of divorce can be delivered by an agent since *ḥalîṣah* cannot be performed by an agent.: “He shall deliver into her hand,” that includes not only her hand, from where through his agent’s hand, into her agent’s hand, from his agent to her agent, and from her agent to his agent; the verse says, “he shall deliver, he shall deliver.” Who said, “it is impossible for me”? Rebbi! ²⁷, Notes 120 ff. The quote in *Ma’aser Šeni* is from Tosephta *Giṭṭin* 4:1; the text here, while almost identical, has a totally different meaning. In the Tosephta, the husband instructs the agent to act for him; in the text here, the husband does not say anything but gives the bill to the agent who delivers it to the wife. It then is stated that the act of delivery validates the divorce. As it was stated: “If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he said to him, your wife said, accept my bill of divorce for me: If he brought it to her, gave it to her, he acquired it for her, it was received for her; if he wants to retract, he may not²⁸ retract, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Nathan says, ‘bring it to her, give it to her,’ ²⁹, missing here but essential for an understanding of the text. The omission from להחזיר to להחזיר is easily explained.[if he wants to retract, he may retract; ‘acquire it for her, receive it for her’, if he wants to retract, he may not retract. Rebbi says, in any of these cases] he may not retract except if he says, ‘It is impossible for me that you accept it for her, but give it to her.’³⁰” It is difficult for Rebbi, “here you have it from my word”, if he wants to retract, he may retract³¹. It is difficult for Rebbi Nathan, “here you have it from her word”, if he wants to retract, he may retract³²! Rav Ḥuna said, he becomes his and her agent³³. Assi said, everywhere we have stated “his and her agent”, she is both divorced and not divorced.

footnotes:
²² The major source of this paragraph and the next is in Maʻaser Šeni
²⁴ Since the agent was not appointed by the husband, he cannot legally deliver the bill.
²⁵ Probably a text similar to Tosephta 4:2 (Babli 63a) following the three main sources of the Tosephta (a text rejected by S. Lieberman.) While the bill is considered delivered only when the wife receives it, the agent is not empowered to return it to the husband. The Babli, 63a, explicitly states that the divorce is valid from the moment the agent receives the bill.
²⁶ This inference from the repetition of the expression וְנָתַן בְּיָדָהּ in Deut
²⁷ Here starts the text from Maʻaser Šeni
²⁸ In the Tosephta mss., “not” is missing.
²⁹ From the text in Maʻaser Šeni
³⁰ If the husband explicitly appoints the agent as his own.
³¹ If the husband gives the bill and tells the agent to deliver, it should automatically invalidate the wife’s commission and let him retract.
³² If the husband tells the agent to do for him what the wife instructed him to do, he did not accept the agent as her agent and should be able to retract.
³³ In either case mentioned here, it is not clear whose agent he is; the divorce is questionable and does not permit the wife to remarry. (Babli 63b, Rav Huna in the name of Rav).


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:1:6
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:1:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:1:6)

אָמַר רִבִּי חַגַּיי קוֹמֵי רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. וְאַתְיָין אִילֵּין פְּלוּגָתָא כְאִילֵּין פְּלוּגָתָא. דְּתַנִּינָן תַּמָּן. הָיָה מְדַבֵּר עִם הָאִשָּׁה עַל עִיסְקֵי גִיטָּהּ וְקִידּוּשֶׁיהָ וְנָתַן לָהּ גִּיטָּהּ וְקִידּוּשֶׁיהָ וְלֹא פֵּירַשׁ. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר דַּייוֹ. רִבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר. צָרִיךְ לְפָרֵשׁ. וְאַתְיָא דְּרִבִּי כְרִבִּי יוֹסֵי. וּדְרִבִּי נָתָן כְּרִבִּי יוּדָה. אָמַר לֵיהּ וְאַתְּ מַה בְיָדָךְ. דְּאָמַר רִבִּי זְעִירָא אָמַר רִבּי חִיָיה בַּר אָבִין אָדָא בַּר תַּחְלִיפָא בְּשֵׁם רִבִּי הוֹשַׁעְיָה. מַה פְלִיגִין. עַצְמוֹ לְעִנְיָינוֹת אֲחֵרִים. אֲבָל אִם הָיָה עוֹסֵק בְּאוֹתוֹ עִנְיָין גֵּט הוּא. וְהָכָא אֲפִילוּ בָעוֹסְקִין בְּאוֹתוֹ עִנְיָין הִיא מַחֲלוֹקֶת.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Is not this disagreement the same as that disagreement, as we have stated there³⁴ 4:7.: “If a man was talking with a woman about her bill of divorce or her preliminary marriage and gave her the bill of divorce or [some valuable for] preliminary marriage and did not spell it out³⁵, Rebbi Yose says it is sufficient³⁶; Rebbi Jehudah says he has to be explicit.” Then Rebbi follows Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Nathan Rebbi Jehudah. He³⁷ said to him, what do you have in your hand, did not Rebbi Zeïra, Ḥiyya bar Abin, Abba bar Taḥlifa, say in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, when do they differ? [If they thought about] other things but if he still was on the same subject, it is a bill of divorce³⁸ 6a, this is the concurrent opinion of Rav and Samuel.. But here, even if they are still on the same subject there is disagreement.

footnotes:
³⁴ Mishnah Maʻaser Šeni
³⁵ There were two witnesses present but the man did not alert them that he was going to divorce or marry, neither did he warn the woman that he was now going to act on his word.
³⁶ It is sufficient that everybody involved understood what was going on.
³⁷ R. Yose to R. Ḥaggai.
³⁸ Even R. Jehudah will agree that if two witnesses are present during the writing of a bill of divorce they do not have to be alerted for the delivery. But this has no implications for our case where the question is the due form of the appointment of an agent. In the Babli, Qiddušin


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:1:7
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:1:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:1:7)

רִבִּי זְעִירָא בָּעֵי קוֹמֵי רִבִּי מָנָא. אַף לְעִנְיָין מַתָּנָה כֵן. אָדָם עוֹשֶׂה שָׁלִיחַ לְקַבֵּל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ. אָמַר לֵיהּ. תַּמָּן הַתּוֹרָה זִיכָּת אוֹתָהּ בְּגִיטָּהּ וְהִיא עוֹשָׂה שָׁלִיחַ לְקַבֵּל דָּבָר שֶׁהוּא שֶׁלָּהּ. אִית לָךְ מֵימַר בְּמַתָּנָה. אָדָם עוֹשֶׂה שָׁלִיחַ לְקַבֵּל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ. וְעוֹד מִן הָדָא דְּאָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵה וְרִבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר זַבְדִּי רִבִּי אַבָּהוּ בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. אָמַר לִיתֵּן מַתָּנָה לַחֲבֵירוֹ וּבִיקֵּשׁ לַחֲזוֹר בּוֹ חוֹזֵר בּוֹ. קָם רִבִּי יוֹסֵי עִם רִבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר זַבְדִּי. אָמַר לֵיהּ וְהֶן הוּא הִין צֶדֶק. אָמַר לֵיהּ. בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁאֲמָרוֹ הִין צֶדֶק הָיָה.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: Is it the same for a gift? Can a person appoint an agent for anything that is not his? He said to him, there the Torah gave her the right to a bill of divorce and she appoints an agent to receive what is rightfully hers. Can you say in regard to a gift that a person can appoint an agent for anything that is not his? In addition, from what Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan said, if somebody said to give a gift to another and he wants to retract, he may retract. Rebbi Yose stood near Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi and said to him, is that a just “yes”³⁹. 19:36: “Your *hîn* shall be just”. The הִין is a liquid measure (half a *se’ah*). But since biblical כֵּן “yes” became rabbinic הֵן, the verse is interpreted to mean that in money matters any “yes” has to be honest. The formal argument is that the verse already mentioned the *ephah* as correct measure; therefore the smaller *hîn* requires symbolic interpretation. [This learned pun is in the name of R. Yose ben R. Jehudah in the Babli, *Baba meṣiʻa* 49a, *Bekhorot* 13b; *Sifra Qedošim Pereq* 8(7)].? He said to him, at the moment he said it, it was a just “yes”.

footnotes:
³⁹ Lev


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:1:8
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:1:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:1:8)

אָמַר לוֹ. הוֹלֵךְ גֵּט אִשְׁתִּי גֵּט בִּתָּהּ גֵּט אֲחוֹתָהּ. וְהָלַךְ וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ. אֵינוֹ גֵּט. תְּבָעוֹ הַשָּׁלִיחַ וְאָמַר לוֹ. תֵּן גֵּט לְאִשְׁתּוֹ. אָמַר לוֹ. הֵילָךְ גֵּט אִשְׁתִּי גֵּט בִּתָּהּ גֵּט אֲחוֹתָהּ. וְהָלַךְ וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ. הֲרֵי זֶה גֵט. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בֵּירִבִּי בּוּן וְרִבִּי אָבִין בְּשֵׁם רִבִּי שַׁמַּי. זוֹ דִבְרֵי רִבִּי. אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים. בְּאוֹמֶרֶת. יְהֵא לִי בְיָדָךְ.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
If [the husband] said to [another person]: Bring my wife’s bill of divorce, or her daughter’s, or her sister’s, then he went and delivered it to her, it is no divorce⁴⁰ or *his*) daughter’s or (*your* or *his*) sister’s, and he went and delivered it to her, it is no divorce since the third party was never appointed an agent for delivery. But if a woman appoints an agent, who goes and requests a bill of divorce from her husband and receives the bill without being appointed the husband’s agent of delivery, it is a perfectly valid divorce the moment the agent takes possession of the bill. (According to Rav Huna, this situation is preferable to one in which the agent also becomes the husband’s agent, unless the husband explicitly invalidates the wife’s commission.). But if [the other] said: Give a bill of divorce to his wife, and [the husband] said, here is my wife’s bill of divorce, or her daughter’s, or her sister’s, and he went and gave it to her, it is a divorce. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Avin in the name of Rebbi Shammai: These are Rebbi’s words. But the Sages say, only if she says, it should be mine in your hand⁴¹.

footnotes:
⁴⁰ The text is not in good condition. A similarly corrupt text is in Tosephta 4:2, but from both texts the original can be approximated: If the husband said to a third party: Bring my wife’s, or (your
⁴¹ Rebbi accepts an implicit commissioning while the rabbis require an explicit statement.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:1:9
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:1:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:1:9)

אָמַר רִבִּי חֲנִינָא. הֲלָכָה כְרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל. וְהוּא שֶׁאָמְרָה לוֹ הִיא טוֹל לִי. יְהֵא לִי בְיָדָךְ. חַד בַּר נַשׁ שָׁלַח גֵּט לְאִיתְּתֵיהּ. אָמְרָה לֵיהּ. יְהֵא לִי בְיָדָךְ. אָתָא עוֹבְדָא קוֹמֵי רַב. אָמַר. אִם בָּא לְהַחֲזִיר לֹא יַחֲזִיר. מַה וּפְלִיג. שַׁנְיָיא הוּא יְהֵא בְיָדָךְ שַׁנְיָיא הוּא יְהֵא לִי בְיָדָךְ. אָמַר רִבִּי חִזְקִיָּה. אֲנָא יְדַע רֵישָׁא וְסֵיפָא. אִשָּׁה אַחַת עָשָׂת שָׁלִיחַ לְקַבֵּל גִּיטָּהּ מִשְּׁלוּחֵי בַעֲלָהּ. אָתָא עוֹבְדָא קוֹמֵי רַב. אָמַר. אִם רָצָה לְהַחֲזִיר לֹא יַחֲזִיר. מִחְלְפָה שִׁיטָּתֵיהּ דְּרַב. תַּמָּן אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בְשֵׁם רַב. אֵין הָאִשָּׁה עוֹשָׂה שָׁלִיחַ לְקַבֵּל גִּיטָּהּ מִשְּׁלוּחֵי בַעֲלָהּ. וְהָכָא הוּא אָמַר הָכֵין. אֲנִי אֹמֵר. אַחַר הַדֶּלֶת הָיָה עוֹמֵד וְשָׁמַע אֶת קוֹלָהּ.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
Rebbi Ḥanina said, practice follows Rabban Gamliel⁴²: if she said “take for me, it should be mine in your hand.⁴³” A man sent a bill of divorce to his wife. She told [the agent]: “It should be mine in your hand.” The casecame before Rav, who said, if he wants to retract he cannot retract⁴⁴. Does he disagree⁴⁵? There is a difference between “it should be in your hand” and “it should be mine in your hand.⁴⁶” Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, I know the beginning and the end. A woman appointed an agent to accept her bill of divorce from the husband’s agents. The case came before Rav, who said, if he wants to retract he cannot retract. Rav’s opinion has switched! There, Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: A woman cannot appoint an agent to accept her bill of divorce from her husband’s agent²¹, and here, he says so? I say, he was standing behind the door and heard her voice⁴⁷.

footnotes:
⁴² This should read: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.
⁴³ Not only the expression טוֹל לִי mentioned in the Mishnah but any equivalent expression is sufficient to appoint an agent for the wife. The Babli agrees, 63b.
⁴⁴ Since the bill was never delivered into the wife’s hand, the husband then claimed that there was no divorce; but Rav decided that the appointment of the husband’s agent as the wife’s agent represented delivery of the bill.
⁴⁵ It is not quite clear with what Rav is supposed to disagree. A similar story is told in the Babli, 63b, about a woman whose hands were dirty and who told the husband’s agent to keep the bill, that it should be in his hand. Rav Naḥman, in the generation after Rav, decided that this was no delivery.
⁴⁶ The second version is clearly an acceptance of the bill whereas the first one is not.
²¹ Quoted in the Babli, 63b, and opposed there by the Galilean R. Ḥanina. Rabbinic practice follows R. Ḥanina. The Babli conjectures that a possible reason for Rav’s statement is that if the wife refuses to accept the bill from the husband’s agent but appoints her agent to receive the bill, she does this only to hinder the husband’s agent to fulfill his mission to deliver the bill to her. In that case, the wife would be entitled to appoint her agent if her appointment precedes her husband’s. Another conjectured reason is that there is a very remote possibility that things can go wrong if the bill is not actually delivered from hand to hand but deposited on her (or her agent’s) property. The basis for the possible complication is a rule which is not alluded to in the Yerushalmi and, therefore, should not be used to explain a statement in that Talmud.
⁴⁷ The relations between husband and wife were so bad that not only did the husband not want to deliver the bill to his wife who was nearby but the wife did not even want to receive it from the husband’s agent. Since the appointment of an agent by the husband under these circumstances was intended as an insult to his wife, her appointing her own agent was an adequate response. Since the husband was present during the entire proceedings, he must have agreed with his wife’s appointing her own attorney and there could be no reason to invalidate the proceedings. The statement of Rav Huna can be applied only to cases where not both parties are present.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:2:1
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:2:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:2:1)

**משנה:** הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁאָמְרָה הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִּיטִּי צְרִיכָה שְׁנֵי כִיתֵּי עֵדִים. שְׁנַיִם שֶׁאוֹמְרִים בְּפָנֵינוּ אָמְרָה וּשְׁנַיִם שֶׁאוֹמְרִים בְּפָנֵינוּ קִיבְּלָהּ וְקָרְעָהּ אֲפִילוּ הֵן הָרִאשׁוֹנִים וְהֵן הָאַחֲרוֹנִים אוֹ אֶחָד מִן הָרִאשׁוֹנִים וְאֶחָד מִן הָאַחֲרוֹנִים וְאֶחָד מִצְטָרֵף עִמָּהֶן. נַעֲרָה מְאוֹרָסָה הִיא וְאָבִיהָ מְקַבְּלִין אֶת גִּיטָּהּ. רִבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר אֵין שְׁתֵּי יָדַיִים זוֹכוֹת כְּאַחַת אֶלָּא אָבִיהָ מְקַבֵּל גִּיטָּהּ בִּלְבַד. וְכָל שֶׁאֵינָהּ יְכוֹלָה לְשַׁמֵּר אֶת גִּיטָּהּ אֵינָהּ יְכוֹלָה לְהִתְגָּרֵשׁ. קְטַנָּה שֶׁאָמְרָה. הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִיטִּי. אֵינוֹ גֵט עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ גֵּט לְיָדָהּ. לְפִיכָךְ אִם רָצָה הַבַּעַל לְהַחֲזִיר יַחֲזִיר שֶׁאֵין הַקָּטָן עוֹשֶׂה שָׁלִיחַ. וְאִם אָמַר לוֹ אָבִיהָ. צֵא וְהִתְקַבֵּל לְבִתִּי גִיטָּהּ. אִם רָצָה לְהַחֲזִיר לֹא יַחֲזִיר.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**MISHNAH:** A woman who said, accept my bill of divorce for me, needs two groups of witnesses⁴⁸; two who say that she appointed in their presence and two who say that in their presence he received it and tore it up⁴⁹, even if the first ones are the latter ones, or one of the first together with one of the latter and a third person is associated with them⁵⁰. A preliminarily married adolescent girl⁵¹ 10:1, Note 1. Since she is over 12 years of age, she is able to act in law. But since she is not definitively married, she is still under her father’s authority., or her father, can accept her bill of divorce. Rebbi Jehudah says, no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce. Any female⁵² who cannot take care of her bill of divorce cannot be divorced.
If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand. Therefore, if the husband wants to retract he can retract since an underage person cannot appoint an agent. But if her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.⁸⁰

footnotes:
⁴⁸ Since a divorce is a public act it must be executed in front of at least two witnesses. The agent certainly needs two witnesses for the delivery since the woman herself must receive the bill in front of two witnesses. It is only natural that the agent needs two witnesses to legitimize his status (or be appointed by a duly witnessed document.)
⁴⁹ It is not necessary that the bill be torn up after delivery; this clause is added only to show that the divorce is valid even if the document never reaches the wife because it was torn up after delivery. (This has nothing to do with current rabbinic practice to cut up the bill of divorce after delivery in order to prevent outsiders from questioning the validity of the document.)
⁵⁰ There do not have to be four different people; there may also be two or three.
⁵¹ Between the ages of 12 years and 12 years and six months; cf. Nedarim
⁵² This statement is independent of the preceding one; it deals with an insane woman or an underage girl who was definitively married and, therefore, is emancipated from her father’s power. If she is too young to understand the meaning of divorce and the need to keep the document until she has collected all the monies due her, she cannot be divorced and the husband cannot escape the obligation to feed and house her.
⁸⁰ This was explained in the preceding Halakhah.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:2:2
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:2:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:2:2)

**הלכה:** הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁאָמְרָה הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִּיטִּי כול׳. שְׁנַיִם שֶׁאָמְרוּ. בְּפָנֵינוּ אָמְרָה. וּשְׁנַיִם שֶׁאָמְרוּ. בְּפָנֵינוּ קִיבֵּל וְקָרַע. וְהוּא מוֹדֶה. יִצְטָרֵף הַשָּׁלִיחַ. תִּיפְתָּר שֶׁהָיָה קָרוֹב. הָדָא אָמְרָה שֶׁהַקָּרוֹב נַעֲשֶׂה שָׁלִיחַ.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**HALAKHAH:** “A woman who said, accept my bill of divorce for me,” etc. Two say that she appointed in their presence and two say that in their presence he received and tore it. But if he⁵³ agrees, the agent should be able to be added. Explain it, it he was a relative⁵⁴. This implies that a relative can act as agent.

footnotes:
⁵³ The husband. The wife only needs testimony that the bill was delivered in order to be able to remarry. Why does the Mishnah not state that the agent together with another person can testify in her behalf?
⁵⁴ A close relative who is inadmissible as witness.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:2:3
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:2:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:2:3)

נַעֲרָה מְאוֹרָסָה הִיא וְאָבִיהָ מְקַבְּלִין גִּיטָּהּ. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר. כְּמַחֲלוֹקֶת בְּגִיטִּין כָּךְ מַחֲלוֹקֶת בְּקִידּוּשׁין. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. הַכֹּל מוֹדִין בְּקִידּוּשִׁין שֶׁאִמָּהּ מְקַדְּשָׁהּ וְלֹא הִיא. מוֹדֶה רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ בְּנִישּׂוּאִין. לֹא הַכֹּל מִמֶּנָּה לְהַשִּׂיא אֶת עַצְמָהּ וּלְהַפְסִיד מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ לְאָבִיהָ. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי יוֹחָנָן אֵין לָהּ דַּעַת אֶצֶל אָבִיהָ וְאֵינוֹ עוֹשָׂה שָׁלִיחַ. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ יֵשׁ לָהּ דַּעַת אֶצֶל אָבִיהָ וְהִיא עוֹשָׂה שָׁלִיחַ. מַתְנִיתָא פְלִיגָא עַל רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. הָאִישׁ מְקַדֵּשׁ בּוֹ וּבִשְׁלוּחוֹ וְהָאִשָּׁה מִתְקַדֶּשֶׁת בָּהּ וּבִשְׁלוּחָהּ. פָּתַר לָהּ בִּגְדוֹלָה. וְהָתַנִּינָן. קְטַנָּה שֶׁאָמְרָה. הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִיטִּי. אֵינוֹ גֵט עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ גֵּט לְיָדָהּ. פָּתַר בִּיתוֹמָה. וְהָא תַנִּינָן. אִם אָמַר לוֹ אָבִיהָ. צֵא וְהִתְקַבֵּל לְבִתִּי גִיטָָּהּ. אִם רָצָה לְהַחֲזִיר לֹא יַחֲזִיר. פָּתַר לָהּ לִצְדָדִין הִיא מַתְנִיתָה. רֵישָׁא בִיתוֹמָה וְסֵיפָא בְּשֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ אָב. מַתְנִיתָא פְלִיגָא עַל רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ. הָאִישׁ מְקַדֵּשׁ אֵֶת בִּתּוֹ כְּשֶׁהִיא נַעֲרָה בּוֹ וּבִשְׁלוּחוֹ. פָּתַר לָהּ כְּרִבִּי יְהוּדָה. דְּרִבִּי יְהוּדָה אָמַר. אֵין שְׁתֵּי יָדַיִם זוֹכוֹת כְּאַחַת. דְּאָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. חַד רַב נְפַק מִבֵּית וַועֲדָא אֲמַר. נְפַק עוֹבְדָא כְּרִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. וְסָמְכִין עֲלוֹי. לָא הֲוָה צְרִיכָה מִיסְמוֹךְ עֲלוֹי אֶלָּא דַהֲוָת מִן יַמָּא לְטִיגְנֵי.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
⁵⁵ 2:1; the readings there are noted **ק**.“A preliminarily married adolescent girl⁵¹ 10:1, Note 1. Since she is over 12 years of age, she is able to act in law. But since she is not definitively married, she is still under her father’s authority., or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage⁵⁶ 43b–44a.. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that [her father]⁵⁷. The text here has “mother”; but the mother has no say during the father’s lifetime. contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings⁵⁸ 4:6. One must assume that R. Simeon ben Laqish holds that the girl must deliver to her father any valuables she received for her preliminary marriage.. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father⁵⁹ and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she has legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: ⁶⁰ 2:1.“A man contracts a preliminary marriage by himself and through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage by herself and through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state⁶¹ 6:3.: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.⁶²” He explains it about an orphan⁶³. But did we not state⁶¹ 6:3.: “If her father⁶⁴ said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. ⁶⁰ 2:1.“A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.⁶⁵” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah⁶⁶ 44a., since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan⁶⁷. Can one rely on that⁶⁸? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan⁶⁹ 4:5, Note 233; Babli *Qiddušin* 44a..

footnotes:
⁵⁵ A parallel is in Qiddušin
⁵¹ Between the ages of 12 years and 12 years and six months; cf. Nedarim
⁵⁶ The rabbis allow the adolescent girl to contract a preliminary marriage; R. Jehudah reserves this right to the father. The same discussion is in the Babli, Qiddušin
⁵⁷ Reading from Qiddušin
⁵⁸ Since the father has the right to his adolescent unmarried daughter’s earnings, Mishnah Ketubot
⁵⁹ But an orphan girl or a definitively married one becomes able to act in law (and appoint agents) once she reaches the age of 12 years and one day.
⁶⁰ Qiddušin
⁶¹ Mishnah Giṭṭin
⁶² While the Mishnah confirms that the girl cannot appoint an agent, it seems to contradict the statement that the adolescent has no standing in law since she is able to accept her bill of divorce.
⁶³ Including an “orphan during her father’s lifetime”, cf. Note 20.
⁶¹ Mishnah Giṭṭin
⁶⁴ If the Mishnah speaks about an orphan, there could be no father.
⁶⁰ Qiddušin
⁶⁵ Since this is a sentence in the same Mishnah which stated that a woman may agree to a preliminary marriage, the absence of any mention of the power of the girl implies that she cannot enter a preliminary marriage on her own.
⁶⁶ The Babli agrees, Qiddušin
⁶⁷ The court denied the right of an adolescent girl to marry on her own initiative.
⁶⁸ There is no name attached to this information; it is impossible to check the standing of the informant in the legal hierarchy.
⁶⁹ The statement was made immediately after judgment was rendered. For the expression “from the sea to the frying pan” cf. Berakhot


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:2:4
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:2:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:2:4)

חֲבֵרַיָיא אָמְרִין. בֶּחָצֵר וּבְאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת פְּלִיגִין. רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר. יֵשׁ לָהּ חָצֵר וְיֵשׁ לָהּ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר. אֵין לָהּ חָצֵר וְאֵין לָהּ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת. רִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אָמַר. בֶּחָצֵר פְּלִיגִין וְאֵין לָהּ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת. מִי אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן בְּפִשּׁוּט יָדַיִם. רִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר שָׁאַל. חֲצֵירוֹ שֶׁלַּשָּׁלִיחַ מָהוּ שֶׁתֵּיעָשֶׂה כְיָדוֹ.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
The colleagues said, they⁷⁰ 10b. This paragraph really refers to Mishnah 3. disagree about courtyard⁷¹ 11a, explains in the name of the Galilean R. Yose ben R. Ḥanina, a fenced-in property acquires for a person even if he is not aware of it. For example, if somebody lost an article without distinguishing marks on somebody else’s fenced-in courtyard, that article becomes automatically the courtyard owner’s property since it cannot be reclaimed by the person who lost it. Nobody else is allowed to take it.
In the Babli, the disagreement between R. Joḥanan and R. Simeon ben Laqish is explained to the effect that R. Joḥanan considers the courtyard as an extension of its owner’s hand. Since Mishnah 3 states that a minor legally can receive her bill of divorce, she has a “hand” and, therefore, her courtyard acquires for her. R. Simeon ben Laqish holds that the courtyard is its owner’s agent and since the minor cannot appoint an agent, her courtyard cannot acquire for her. and four cubits⁷² 3:9). The question is whether this rule extends to emancipated underage females (it certainly does not extend to underage males.). Rebbi Joḥanan said, she has both courtyard and four cubits. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, she has neither courtyard nor four cubits. Rebbi Eleazar said, they disagree about the courtyard but she has no four cubits. What⁷³ did Rebbi Joḥanan say about outstretched hands⁷⁴? Rebbi Eleazar asked, does an agent’s courtyard act as his hand⁷⁵?

footnotes:
⁷⁰ R. Joḥanan and R. Simeon ben Laqish disagree about the legal standing of a minor. The corresponding discussion in the Babli is Baba Meṣiʻa
⁷¹ As the Babli, Baba Meṣiʻa
⁷² If a person stands still in the public domain and nobody else is within 8 cubits from her, anything found or delivered to her at a distance of at most 4 cubits belongs to her (cf. Mishnaiot 8:2, Yebamot
⁷³ מִי is a Babylonian Aramaic particle used as a general question mark. In Galilean Aramaic, it should be מַה.
⁷⁴ In Halakhah 8:2, R. Joḥanan states that an adult woman standing in the public domain is divorced if the husband throws her the bill (in front of two witnesses) and it lands close enough for her to take it up without moving her feet. According to R. Eleazar, who states that R. Joḥanan agrees that an underage girl has no 4 cubits, it is questionable whether throwing the bill within the reach of the underage wife’s hands is delivery in the meaning of the verse. The question is not answered.
⁷⁵ Following R. Joḥanan, is a woman divorced if the husband throws the bill into her agent’s courtyard in the presence of two witnesses? This question is not answered either.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:2:5
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:2:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:2:5)

נִישֵּׂאת הִיא לֹא אָבִיהָ. קְטַנָּה אָבִיהָ לֹא הִיא. נִיסֵּית בֵּין הִיא בֵין אָבִיהָ. אִם יֵשׁ בָּהּ דַּעַת הִיא לֹא אָבִיהָ. אֵי זוֹ הִיא קְטַנָּה שֶׁהִיא צְרִיכָה לְהִתְגָּרֵשׁ. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. כָּל שֶׁנּוֹתְנִין לָהּ גִּיטָּהּ וְדָבָר אַחֵר עִמּוֹ וְהִיא מוֹצִיאָה אוֹתוֹ לְאַחַר זְמָן.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
⁷⁶ If she is definitively married, she but not her father⁷⁷. An underage girl, her father but not she⁷⁸; if she is definitively married, both she and her father⁷⁹. If she has understanding, she but not her father. Who is an underage girl who needs to be divorced [by herself]? Rebbi Joḥanan said, any female who is given her bill of divorce together with something else and she produces it after some time.

footnotes:
⁷⁶ This paragraph is explained by R. Nissim Gerondi, Commentary to Alfasi Chapter 6, #510.
⁷⁷ The Mishnah which gives the father the right to receive the bill of divorce of his adolescent, preliminarily married daughter, excludes the definitively married daughter over which the father has no power and who can be divorced only by direct delivery of the bill to her.
⁷⁸ To divorce a preliminarily married underage girl, the bill must be delivered to the father.
⁷⁹ The definitively married underage girl who lacks understanding (as defined in this paragraph by R. Joḥanan) cannot be divorced since her standing is the same as her father’s. Since her father cannot receive her bill of divorce because by definitive marriage she became emancipated from him, so she cannot receive her bill of divorce, as explained in the Mishnah.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:3:1
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:3:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:3:1)

**משנה:** הָאוֹמֵר תֶּן גֵּט זֶה לְאִשְׁתִּי בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר פָּסוּל. הֲרֵי הִיא בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר כָּשֵׁר. הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁאָמְרָה הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִיטִּי בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי וְקִיבְּלָהּ לָהּ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר פָּסוּל. וְרִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר מַכְשִׁיר. הָבֵא לִי גִיטִּי מִמָּקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי וֶהֱבִיאוֹ לָהּ מִמָּקוֹם אַחֵר כָּשֵׁר.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**MISHNAH:** If somebody says, deliver this bill of divorce to my wife at place X⁸¹ and he delivered it at another place, it is invalid. But if he said, she is at place X, and he delivered it at another place, it is valid.
If a woman says, accept my bill of divorce at place X, and he accepted it at another place, it is invalid, but Rebbi Eleazar⁸³ declares it valid. Bring my bill of divorce from place X and he brought it from another place, it is valid.

footnotes:
⁸¹ This is formulated as a condition of the appointment. In the next sentence, the place is mentioned only as an indication.
⁸³ Who in Mishnah 5 holds that instructions about delivery are not binding on the agent. The Babli disagrees (65a) and holds that R. Eleazar (the Tanna) considers the husband’s instructions as binding, but not the wife’s.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:3:2
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:3:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:3:2)

**הלכה:** קְטַנָּה שֶׁאָמְרָה. הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִיטִּי כול׳. מַתְנִיתָא דְּלָא כְרִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר. בְּרַם כְּרִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר לְעוֹלָם אֵינָהּ מְגוּרֶשֶׁת עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר לוֹ. אַל תְּגָרְשֶׁנָּהּ לִי אֶלָּא בְמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי. הֲרֵי הִיא בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי. וְהָלַךְ וְגֵירְשָׁהּ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר. הֲרֵי זוֹ אוֹף רִבִּי לָעְזָר מוֹדֶה שֶׁאֵינוֹ אֶלֵּא כְמַרְאֶה לָהּ מָקוֹם. אוֹף רַבָּנִין מוֹדֵיי שֶׁאֵינוֹ אֶלֵּא כְמַרְאֶה לָהּ מָקוֹם.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**HALAKHAH:** “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me,⁸²” etc. The Mishnah does not follow Rebbi Eleazar⁸³. But following Rebbi Eleazar she is (not)⁸⁴ 2:4) show that this word has to be deleted. divorced unless [the husband] tells [the agent]: Do not divorce her except at place X⁸⁴ 2:4) show that this word has to be deleted.. “If he said, she is at place X and he delivered it at another place,” Rebbi Eleazar agrees that he only indicates a place; the rabbis agree that he only indicates a place.

footnotes:
⁸² The reference should be to Mishnah 4, not 3.
⁸³ Who in Mishnah 5 holds that instructions about delivery are not binding on the agent. The Babli disagrees (65a) and holds that R. Eleazar (the Tanna) considers the husband’s instructions as binding, but not the wife’s.
⁸⁴ The context and the parallel about preliminary marriage by agent (Qiddušin
⁸⁴ The context and the parallel about preliminary marriage by agent (Qiddušin


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:4:1
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:4:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:4:1)

**משנה:** הָבֵא לִי גִיטִּי אוֹכֶלֶת בַּתְּרוּמָה עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ גֵּט לְיָדָהּ. הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִיטִּי אֲסוּרָה לוֹכַל בַּתְּרוּמָה מִיַּד. הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִיטִּי בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי אוֹכֶלֶת בַּתְּרוּמָה עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ גֵּט לְאוֹתוֹ מָקוֹם. רִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹסֵר מִיַּד.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**MISHNAH:** “Bring my bill of divorce”, she may eat heave until the bill is delivered to her. “Receive my bill of divorce,” she is immediately forbidden to eat heave. “Receive my bill of divorce at place X,” she may eat heave until the bill arrives at that place; Rebbi Eleazar forbids immediately⁸⁵.

footnotes:
⁸⁵ As the Halakhah explains, since R. Eleazar permits the agent to pick up the bill anywhere, he might have received it as soon as he left the house.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:4:2
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:4:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:4:2)

**הלכה:** הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁאָמְרָה הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִיטִּי כול׳. מַה טַעֲמָא דְּרִבִּי לָעְזָר. אֲנִי אוֹמֵר. אַחַר הַדֶּלֶת מְצָאוֹ. תַּמָּן תַּנִּינָן. הָאוֹמֵר לְמִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן [עַל] הַמַּעְשְׂרוֹת. קַח לִי מִמִּי שֶׁהוּא נֶאֱמָן מִמִּי שֶׁהוּא מְעַשֵּׂר. אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן. תַּנֵּי. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר. אֲפִילוּ לֹא אָמַר לוֹ. מִפְּלוֹנִי. אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר לוֹ. קַח וַאֲנִי נוֹתֵן מָעוֹת. מַה טַעֲמָא דְּרִבִּי יוֹסֵי. אֲנִי אוֹמֵר. אֶחָד קָרוֹב מְצָאוֹ וְלָקַח מִמֶּנּוּ. אַתְיָיא דְּרִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר כְּרִבִּי יוֹסֵי וּדְּרִבִּי יוֹסֵי כְּרִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֵּירִבִּי יוֹסִי. וְלֹא מוֹדֶה רִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר שֶׁאִם אָמְרָה לוֹ. אַל תְּקַבְּלֵהוּ לִי אֶלָּא בְמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי. שֶׁהִיא אוֹכֶלֶת בִּתְרוּמָה עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ הַגֵּט לְאוֹתוֹ מָקוֹם. וְהָכָא אֲפִילוּ אָמַר לוֹ. מִפְּלוֹנִי. אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר לוֹ. קַח וַאֲנִי נוֹתֵן מָעוֹת. מַאי טַעֲמָא דְּרִבִּי יוֹסֵי. אֲנִי אוֹמֵר. אֶחָד קָרוֹב מָצָא וְלָקַח מִמֶּנּוּ.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**HALAKHAH:** ⁸⁶ (**ד** Notes 81–85). Except for the omission of a sentence, the differences in readings are explained by the Babylonian spelling in *Giṭṭin*. The reference should be to Mishnah 6.: “If a woman says, accept my bill of divorce,” etc. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? I say that he found it behind the door. There, we have stated: “If someone tells a person who is not trustworthy, buy for me from somebody who is trustworthy, or from somebody who tithes, he is not trustworthy. It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, even if he specified, from X, he is not trustworthy unless he said, you buy and I will pay.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him. It turns out that Rebbi Eleazar is like Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Yose is like Rebbi Eleazar (ben Rebbi Yose.)⁸⁷. [Rebbi Yose says more than Rebbi Eleazar;]⁸⁸, cf. the variant readings. does not Rebbi Eleazar agree that if she says to him, do not accept it except at such and such a place, she continues eating until the bill of divorce reaches that place? But here, even if he says, only from X, he is not trustworthy, except if he said, you buy and I will pay. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him.

footnotes:
⁸⁶ This is essentially Halakhah 4:7 in Demay
⁸⁷ The Tanna R. Eleazar is R. Eleazar ben Šamua’. The addition here is a corruption of the following sentence from Demay
⁸⁸ From Demay


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:5:1
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:5:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:5:1)

**משנה:** הָאוֹמֵר כִּתְבוּ גֵט וּתְנוּ לְאִשְׁתִּי גֵּרְשׁוּהָ כִּתְבוּ אִיּגֶרֶת וּתְנוּ לָהּ הֲרֵי אֵילּוּ יִכְתְּבוּ וְיִתְּנוּ. פִּטְּרוּהָ פַּרְנְסוּהָ עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כַּנּוֹמוֹס עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כְּרָאוּי לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה הָיוּ אוֹמְרִים הַיּוֹצֵא בַּקּוֹלָר וְאָמַר כִּתְבוּ גֵט לְאִשְׁתִּי הֲרֵי אֵילּוּ יִכְתְּבוּ וְיִתְּנוּ. חָזְרוּ לוֹמַר אַף הַמְפָרֵשׁ וְהַיּוֹצֵא בַּשְּׁיָירָא. רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן שְׁזוּרִי אוֹמֵר. אַף הַמְסוּכָּן.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**MISHNAH:** If somebody says: “Write a bill of divorce and deliver to my wife, divorce her, write a letter⁸⁹ and deliver to her”, they should write and deliver. “Discharge her, provide for her, treat her according to the law⁹⁰, do what is necessary;” he did not say anything⁹¹. Earlier, they said that if somebody was led away in a neck-iron⁹². While, in general, the instruction to write a bill of divorce does not include an instruction to deliver, it was decided that the court had the authority to wave the separate instruction for delivery in an emergency situation when it is clearly implied. when he said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, they should write and deliver. They reconsidered and said, also one who leaves on a ship or in a caravan. Rebbi Simeon from Shezur said, also the dangerously sick.

footnotes:
⁸⁹ In Mishnah 9:3, the bill of divorce is called “letter of abandonment”.
⁹⁰ Greek νόμος.
⁹¹ These expressions are unspecific; they do not have to be interpreted as instructions for a divorce.
⁹² Latin collare


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:5:2
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:5:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:5:2)

**הלכה:** הָאוֹמֵר כִּתְבוּ גֵט וּתְנוּ לְאִשְׁתִּי כול׳. הָאוֹמֵר. תְּרָכוּהָ. כְּאוֹמֵר. גֵּירְשׁוּהָ.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**HALAKHAH:** “If somebody says: “Write a bill of divorce and deliver to my wife,” etc. If somebody says in Aramaic “divorce her,” it is as if he said in Hebrew “divorce her.⁹³”

footnotes:
⁹³ The statement is also quoted in the Babli, 65b. In the Tosephta, 4:5, in a parallel to the Mishnah, תרכו is used as substitute for גרשוה. It should be obvious that the command to write a bill of divorce can be given in any language understood by husband, scribe, and witnesses. The statement implies that in the Aramaized Hebrew of the educated person in Palestine, a mixture of Hebrew and Aramaic terms was completely acceptable.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:5:3
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:5:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:5:3)

פִּטְּרוּהָ פַּרְנְסוּהָ עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כַּנֵּימוֹס עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כְּרָאוּי לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. אֲנִי אוֹמֵר. לִמְזוֹנוֹת.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
“ ‘Discharge her⁹⁵, פְּטָרוּהָ, “discharge (my obligations towards her), provide for her”, and *pi‘el* פִּטְּרוּהָ “get rid of her, discharge her (from the marriage)”., provide for her, treat her according to the law, do what is necessary;’ he did not say anything.” I say, he meant sustenance.

footnotes:
⁹⁵ The Babli, 65b, wants to make a difference between the meaning of פטר in qal


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:5:4
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:5:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:5:4)

אָמַר רִבִּי מָנָא. וְלֹא סוֹף דָּבָר בְּקוֹלָר שֶׁלַּסַּכָּנָה אֶלָּא אֲפִילוּ בְּקוֹלָר שֶׁלְּמָמוֹן. שֶׁכָּל הַקּוֹלָר בְּחֶזְקַת שֶׁלַּסַּכָּנָה. רִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר שָׁאַל. מַתָּנָתוֹ כְּמַתָּנַת שְׁכִיב מְרַע. רִבִּי נַחְמָן בְּשֵׁם רִבִּי יַעֲקֹב אַרְמֵנַיָיא. מַה דְהִיא צְרִיכָה לְרִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פְּשִׁיטָא לְרִבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָה. דְּתַנִּינָן תַּמָּן. הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁנֶהֶרְגָה נֶהֱנִין בִּשְׂעָרָהּ. בְּהֵמָה שֶׁנֶהֶרְגָה אֲסוּרָה בָהֲנָיָיה. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָה. בְּאוֹמֶרֶת. תִּינָּתֵן כְּבֵינָתִי לְבִתִּי.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
Rebbi Mana said, not only a neck-iron of mortal danger⁹⁶ but also a neck-iron of money⁹⁷ (I, 28b, Note 154).. For every neck-iron is a mortal danger. Rebbi Eleazar asked: Does his gift follow the rules of the gift of a sick person⁹⁸ 3:9; Babli *Baba batra* 146b ff.? Rebbi Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jacob the Armenian: That which is a problem for Rebbi Simeon⁹⁹ (who reads “R. Jacob the Red” instead of “R. Jacob the Armenian”.) is obvious for Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina, as we have stated there¹⁰⁰ 1:4.: “One may have use for the hair of a woman who was executed¹⁰¹ 5:12 (45b 1.4), Babli 29b], this does not include the hair which is a dead part of the living body. but an animal which was executed is forbidden for all use¹⁰². 21:28; Mekhilta dR. Ismael (Horovitz-Rabin) p. 282, dR. Simeon ben Ioḥai (Epstein-Melamed) p. 179]..” Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, if she said, my bonnet should be given to my daughter¹⁰³ 7b), R. Yose ben R. Ḥanina is quoted as questioning whether in this case a wig worn by the woman at her execution can be inherited by her daughter..

footnotes:
⁹⁶ The chain put on a person condemned to death.
⁹⁷ If the person arrested can expect to have to pay a fine. The Babli disagrees in the interpretation of Rashi (on the Mishnah, 65b) but not in that of Sefer haʻIṭṭur
⁹⁸ Some formal rules of gifts are waived for a person on his deathbed. If a sick person directs that gifts should be given and he dies, the gifts are valid even though no act of acquisition was performed for the benefit of the recipients. But if he recovers, his instructions are void in the absence of a formal act of acquisition; cf. Peah
⁹⁹ It seems that one should read “R. Eleazar”; this is Rashba’s reading in his Novellae
¹⁰⁰ Mishnah ‘Arakhin
¹⁰¹ Even though a human corpse is forbidden for all usufruct [‘Avodah zarah
¹⁰² An animal which is stoned because it has killed a human becomes forbidden, together with its hide and hair, not by stoning but by the sentence passed upon it by the court [Ex
¹⁰³ In the Babli (‘Arakhin


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:5:5
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:5:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:5:5)

כְּהָדָא. גָּנִיבָה אִתְאַפַּק לְמִקְטְלָה. אָמַר. יָבוּן לְרִבִּי אַבּוּנָא זוּז מִן חַמְרָא דִכְפַר פַּנַּיָיא. וְלָא יָבוּן לֵיהּ. חָשִׁין לְהָא דְרַב. דְּרַב אָמַר. הַיּוֹרֵשׁ כִּמְשׁוּעֲבָד. כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאֵין מִלְוֶה בְעֵדִים נִיגְבֵּית מִן הַמְשׁוּעֲבָד כָּךְ אֶינָהּ נִגְבֵּית מִן הַיּוֹרְשִין. וְלָא יִתְנוֹן לֵיהּ מִשּׁוּם חוֹב יִתְנוֹן לֵיהּ מִשּׁוּם מַתָּנָה. חָשִׁין לְהָא דְרִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר. דְּרִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר שָׁאַל. מַתָּנָתוֹ כְּמַתָּנַת שְׁכִיב מְרַע. אַיְיתֵי דְּרִבִּי זְעִירָא לְרִבִּי יִצְחָק עֲטוֹשָׁיָא וְתַנּוֹן לֵיהּ. כְּגִיטִּין כֵּן מַתָּנָה. אָמַר לֵיהּ רִבִּי בָּא. אוֹ מַה גִיטִּין אִם לֹא נָתַן בְּחַיָיו לֹא נוֹתֵן. אַף מַתָּנָה אִם לֹא נָתַן בְּחַיָיו לָאו שְׁמָהּ מַתָּנָה. אָמַר לֵיהּ. הָכָא אָתָא רִבִּי מַפְקַה חָכְמְתָה וּמַפְסְדָה לְרִבִּי אַבּוּנָא זוּזֵי. לֵית יְכִיל. דְּתַנִינָן תַּמָּן. תְּנוּ מְנָה לְאִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי. וּמֵת. יִתְּנוּ לְאַחַר מִיתָה. כְּרִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. דְּרִבִּי יוֹחָנָן פְּלִיג יָבוּן לֵיהּ. דָּמַר רִבִּי אַבָּהוּ בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. מִלְוֶה בְעֵדִים נִגְבֵּית מִן הַיּוֹרְשִׁין וּבִלְבַד יוֹרְשִׁין קַרְקַע. אָמַר רִבּי יוֹסֵה. הָדָא דְתֵימַר בְּהֵן דַּהֲוָה קָאִים גַּבֵּיהּ עַד שָׁעָה דְמִית. בְּרַם אִם עֲלִיל וּנְפִיק אֲנָא אֲמַר. כְּבַר יְהִיב לֵיהּ. מִילְּתֵיהּ דְּרִבִּי חֲנִינָה אֲמַר דְּלָא יְהִיב לֵיהּ. רִבִּי חֲנִינָה הֲוָה מִישְׁתָּעֵי אָהֵן עוֹבְדָא. לֵוִי פְרִיסָא הֲוָה עֲבַר מִן אֲתַר לַאֲתַר. נַפְקִין קְּרִיבֵיהּ דְּגָנִיבָה מֵיכוּל עִימֵּיהּ. אֲמַר. יֵיבוּן לְרִבִּי אַבּוּנָא זוּזֵיי וְאִיתְגָּרוּן לַחְמָא.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
As the following: Ganiba was lead out to be executed¹⁰⁴. He said, One should give money¹⁰⁵. It seems that R. Abuna was Ganiba’s only student (*Ḥulin* 44a,50b). He also was Rav Huna’s student. to Rebbi Abuna from the wine of Kefar Panaya¹⁰⁷. They did not give him¹⁰⁷; they were considering what Rav said, “an heir is like the buyer of encumbered property.” Just as a loan before witnesses cannot be collected from encumbered property, so it cannot be collected from heirs¹⁰⁸ 10:1 (7b 1. 39), *Baba meṣi‘a* 1:6 (8a 1.26)] to Rav is quoted as common to Rav and Samuel (i. e., established Babylonian practice) in *Baba batra* 175b.. If they did not give it as payment of a debt, they should have given as a gift! They were considering what Rebbi Eleazar said, for Rebbi Eleazar asked: Does his gift follow the rules of the gift of a sick person⁹⁸ 3:9; Babli *Baba batra* 146b ff.? Rebbi Ze‘ira¹⁰⁹ brought Rebbi Isaac from Atosha who stated for him: A gift is like a bill of divorce¹¹⁰. Rebbi Abba said to him, perhaps like bills of divorce which one cannot deliver if not delivered during his lifetime, so a gift is not called a gift if not delivered during his lifetime? He said to him, here comes the rabbi with sophistication to let Rebbi Abuna lose money! You cannot, for we have stated there¹¹¹: “Give a mina to X; then he died. One shall give after death.” Following Rebbi Simeon. For Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees, they should give him, as Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A loan before witnesses can be collected from the heirs¹¹² 175b. on condition that they inherited real estate. Rebbi Yose said, that is, if somebody was with him until the moment of his death¹¹³. But if he goes in and out, I am saying that already he gave him. The word of Rebbi Ḥanina implies that it¹¹⁴ was not given since Rebbi Ḥanina reported this fact: Levi Parisa¹¹⁵ 3:4 (6a 1. 63), he is called Levi Sarisa. He may be Levi ben Sisi, known as a commuter between Galilee and Babylonia. was going from place to place when Ganiba’s relatives came to eat with him. He said, the money should be given to Rebbi Abuna; they started quarelling with him.

footnotes:
¹⁰⁴ It seems, by the Persian government as a political trouble maker. (Babli 7a).
¹⁰⁵ In the Babli, 65b, 400 zuz
¹⁰⁷ In the Babli, 66a, the heirs were forced to pay by Rav Huna.
¹⁰⁷ In the Babli, 66a, the heirs were forced to pay by Rav Huna.
¹⁰⁸ Cf. Chapter 3, Note 146. The opinion ascribed here [and in 3:7, Baba qama
⁹⁸ Some formal rules of gifts are waived for a person on his deathbed. If a sick person directs that gifts should be given and he dies, the gifts are valid even though no act of acquisition was performed for the benefit of the recipients. But if he recovers, his instructions are void in the absence of a formal act of acquisition; cf. Peah
¹⁰⁹ In the Babli, he counsels R. Abina to appeal to Rav Huna.
¹¹⁰ Which is valid without formality if ordered by a person sentenced to death.
¹¹¹ Mishnah 1:6.
¹¹² Quoted as opinion shared by R. Joḥanan and R. Simeon ben Laqish (i. e., common Galilean practice) in Baba batra
¹¹³ Who can testify that from the moment of the gift to the donor’s death nothing was given to the recipient of the gift.
¹¹⁴ Ganiba’s gift.
¹¹⁵ In Šabbat


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:5:6
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:5:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:5:6)

תַּנֵּי. אַף הַחוֹלֶה. רִבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אִידִי בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹנָתָן. הֲלָכָה כְרִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הַשְּׁזוּרִי בִּמְסוּכָּן. מַה בֵין מְסוּכָּן מַה בֵין חוֹלֶה. חוֹלֶה כְדֶרֶךְ הָאָרֶץ. וּמְסוּכָּן כָּל שֶׁקָּפַץ עָלָיו הַחוֹלִי. דֶּרֶךְ הָאָרֶץ הַקְּרוֹבִים נִכְנָסִין אֶצְלוֹ מִיַּד וְהָרְחוֹקִים לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשָׁה יָמִים. וְאִם קָפַץ עָלָיו הַחוֹלִי אֵילּוּ וְאֵילּוּ נִכְנָסִין אֶצְלוֹ מִיַּד. דֵּלֹמָא. רִבִּי הוּנָא רִבִּי פִינְחָס רִבִּי חִזְקִיָּה סָלְקוֹן מְבַקְּרָא לְרִבִּי יוֹסֵי בָּתָר תְּלָתָא יוֹמִין. אָמַר לוֹן. בִּי בָעִיתוֹן מְקַיְימָה מַתְנִיתָא.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
It was stated: Also the sick person. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: Practice follows Rebbi Simeon from Shezur about the dangerously ill¹¹⁸ 55a) agrees in the name of R. Jonathan.. What is the difference between a dangerously ill and a sick person? A sick person is a normal case; any who gets sick suddenly is dangerously ill. ¹¹⁹ 3:9 (**פ**), Note 155. In a normal case, the relatives visit him immediately; unrelated persons visit him after three days. If he falls ill suddenly, everybody visits him immediately. An example: Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Phineas, and Rebbi Ḥizqiah went to visit Rebbi Yose after three days. He said to them: Do you want to sustain the *baraita* in my case?

footnotes:
¹¹⁸ The Babli (Ketubot
¹¹⁹ From here on, the text is from Peah


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:6:1
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:6:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:6:1)

**משנה:** מִי שְׁהָיָה מוּשְׁלָךְ בַּבּוֹר וְאָמַר כָּל הַשּׁוֹמֵעַ אֶת קוֹלִי יִכְתּוֹב גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי הֲרֵי אֵילּוּ יִכְתְּבוּ וְיִתְּנוּ. הַבָּרִיא שֶׁאָמַר כִּתְבוּ גֵט לְאִשְׁתִּי רָצָה לְשַׂחֵק בָּהּ. מַעֲשֶׂה בְבָרִיא אֶחָד שֶׁאָמַר כִּתְבוּ גֵט לְאִשְׁתִּי וְעָלָה לְרֹאשׁ הַגַּג וְנָפַל וָמֵת. אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל. אָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים אִם מֵעַצְמוֹ נָפַל הֲרֵי זֶה גֵט. אִם הָרוּחַ דְּחָאַתּוּ אֵינוֹ גֵט.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**MISHNAH:** If somebody was thrown into a cistern¹¹⁹ 3:9 (**פ**), Note 155. and said, anybody hearing my voice should write a bill of divorce for my wife¹²⁰, they should write and deliver¹²¹. If a healthy person said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, he wants to make fun of her¹²². It happened to a healthy person who had said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, that he went on the roof¹²³, fell down, and died. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, the Sages said that if he jumped, it is a bill of divorce¹²⁴; if the wind pushed him, it is no bill of divorce.

footnotes:
¹¹⁹ From here on, the text is from Peah
¹²⁰ Naturally, he has to declare his and his wife’s full names as well as their place of residence. The people hearing him do not have to ask for further identification.
¹²¹ Even though he did not say that the bill should be delivered.
¹²² Since he did not instruct anybody to deliver the bill, it is invalid.
¹²³ After the bill had been written and (erroneously) been delivered to the wife when he was still alive.
¹²⁴ The bill of divorce of the suicide retroactively becomes an emergency bill and is valid.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:6:2
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:6:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:6:2)

**הלכה:** מִי שְׁהָיָה מוּשְׁלָךְ בַּבּוֹר כול׳. אָמַר רִבִּי חֲנִינָה. לִימְּדָנוּ רִבִּי יוֹנָתָן. וְהֵן שֶׁרָאוּ בּוּבְיָיה שֶׁלְּאָדָם. תַּמָּן תַּנִינָן. מְעִידִין לְאוֹר הַנֵּר וּלְאוֹר הַלְּבָנָה וּמַשִּׂיאִין עַל פִּי בַת קוֹל. וָמַר רִבִּי יוֹנָתָן. וְהֵן שֶׁרָאוּ בּוּבְיָיה שֶׁלְּאָדָם. רִבִּי אָחָא בַּר חֲנִינָה בְשֵׁם רִבִּי חֲנִינָה. הָדָה דְתֵימַר בַּשָּׂדֶה. אֲבָל בָּעִיר אֲפִילוּ לֹא רָאוּ בּוּבְיָיה שֶׁלְּאָדָם. וְהָתַנִּינָן. מִי שֶׁהָיָה מוּשְׁלָךְ בַּבּוֹר. וְאָמַר רִבִּי יוֹנָתָן. וְהֵן שֶׁרָאוּ בּוּבְיָיה שֶׁלְּאָדָם. אָמַר רִבִּי אָבִין. הַמַּזִּיקִין הָיוּ מְצוּיִין בַּבּוֹרוֹת כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁהֵן מְצוּיִין בַּשָּׂדוֹת.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**HALAKHAH:** “If somebody was thrown into a cistern,” etc. ¹²⁵ 16:6, Notes 117–124. Rebbi Ḥanina said, Rebbi Jonathan taught us, only if they saw a man’s shadow. There we have stated: “One testifies by the light of a candle or by the light of the moon and one permits to remarry on the basis of a disembodied voice”, and Rebbi Jonathan said, only if they saw a man’s shadow. Rebbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina, in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: That means, in the fields, but in town even without a man’s shadow. But did we not state: “If somebody had been thrown into a cistern,” and Rebbi Jonathan said, only if they saw a man’s shadow? Rebbi Abin said, damaging spirits were¹²⁶ text (which is an insert of the corrector, not a text by the original scribe), nor in the text quoted by Rashba (*Novellae* to 66a) The Babli definitely believes in evil spirits. The sentence is quoted by Tosaphot (*s*.*v*. וליחוש, 66a) as מְצוּיִין הֵן בַּשָּׂדוֹת “they are found in the fields.” But that text is not usable as witness since it is thoroughly babylonized, using תימא for תימר, בבואה for בובייה. as frequent in cisterns as they are frequent on the fields.

footnotes:
¹²⁵ This text essentially is from Yebamot
¹²⁶ This disclaimer of the current existence of spirits is not in the Yebamot


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:6:3
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:6:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:6:3)

סָפֵק מֵעַצְמוֹ נָפַל סָפֵק הָרוּחַ דָּחַתּוּ. נִישְׁמְעִינָהּ מִן הָדָא. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר. אִם עַל אָתָר נָפַל הֲרֵי זֶה גֵט. וְאִם לְאַחַר זְמָן נָפַל אֵינוֹ גֵט. וְהָהֵן עַל אָתָר וְלֹא סָפֵק הוּא. הָדָא אָמְרָה. סָפֵק מֵעַצְמוֹ נָפַל סָפֵק הָרוּחַ דְּחָיַיתּוּ הְרֵי זֶה גֵט.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
If it was doubtful whether he jumped or the wind pushed him? Let us hear from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if he fell down immediately, it is a bill of divorce; if he fell after some time it is no bill of divorce. But is “immediately” not a case of doubt whether he jumped or the wind pushed him? This implies that in case of doubt whether he jumped or the wind pushed him, it is a bill of divorce¹²⁷.

footnotes:
¹²⁷ The different versions of the Tosephta seem to disagree with the Yerushalmi (the topic is not treated in the Babli). Tosephta 4:7 (Lieberman) “If a healthy person said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, climbed on a roof, and fell down, one writes and delivers as long as he still is alive. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if he jumped, it is a bill of divorce; if he fell down after some time, it is no bill of divorce since I may say that the wind pushed him.” Tosephta 6:9 (Zuckermandel): “If a healthy person said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, climbed on a roof, and fell down, one writes and delivers as long as he still is alive. If he fell down after some time, it is no bill of divorce since I may say that the wind pushed him.” Tosephta (quote of Rashba): “If a healthy person said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, climbed on a roof, and fell down, one writes but does not deliver since I may say that the wind pushed him.” A discussion of the different versions is in J. N. Epstein, 2מבוא לנוסח המשנה, p. 600–601.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:6:4
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:6:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:6:4)

שְׁחָטָהּ לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ לָעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וּלְהַקְטִיר חֶלְבָּהּ לָעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר. הַמַחֲשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אוֹמֵר. אֵין הַמַחֲשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת. הָתִיב רִבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אִידִי קוֹמֵי רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ. וְהָתַנִּינָן. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר. קַל וְחוֹמֶר הַדְּבָרִים. מַה אִם בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁהַמַּחֲשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בַּמּוּקְדָּשִׁין וכו׳. וּפִיגּוּל וְנוֹתָר הַמַּחֲשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת. אָמַר לֵיהּ. פִּיגּוּל וְנוֹתָר אִין הַמַּחֲשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת. אֲבָל אִם שְׁחָטָהּ לִזְרוֹק אֶת דָּמָהּ לָעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וְלִקְטוֹר חֶלְבָּהּ לָעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה אֵין הַמַחֲשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת. שְׁחָטָהּ וְזָרַק דָּמָהּ לָעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וְהִקְטִיר חֶלְבָּהּ לָעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. זֶה הָיָה מַעֲשֶׂה בְקַיְסָרִין וְלֹא אָמְרוּ לֹא לְאִיסּוּר וְלֹא לְהֵיתֵר. רִבִּי חֲנִינָה בְשֵׁם רַב חִסְדָּא. זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת לֹא חָשׁוּ. אִין תֵּימַר חָשׁוּ. הָיָה לָהֶם לְהוֹרוֹת אִיסּוּר. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בְשֵׁם רַב חִסְדָּא. זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת שֶׁחָשׁוּ. אִין תֵּימַר לֹא חָשׁוּ. לֹא הָיָה לָהֶן לְהוֹרוֹת.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
If somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry¹²⁸. 13:18., Rebbi Joḥanan said, the intention invalidates¹²⁹, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the intention does not invalidate¹³⁰. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Did we not state¹³¹ 2:7: “If somebody slaughters for a Gentile, his slaughtering is valid, but Rebbi Eliezer declares it invalid. Rebbi Eliezer said: Even if he slaughtered it only for the Gentile to eat the appendage of its liver, it is invalid since the Gentile’s thoughts are always for idolatry. Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion *de minore ad majus*. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, everything is determined by the person who officiates; in the case of profane food which cannot become invalidated by thought, it is only logical that everything depend on the slaughterer.”
It is forbidden to eat from a sacrifice after its appointed time (*piggul*) or outside the appropriate sacred precinct. If the slaughterer intends the sacrifice to be eaten at the wrong time or place, the entire sacrifice becomes invalid. But if the owners had the same idea, their intentions are irrelevant; they could invalidate the sacrifice only by actually using it at the wrong time and at the wrong place. R. Yose argues that profane slaughter cannot have rules more strict than sacrificial slaughter. If the owner’s intentions are irrelevant for sacrificial slaughter, they must be irrelevant also for profane slaughter.: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion *de minore ad majus*. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for *piggul* and leftover¹³². He said to him, truly thought invalidates for *piggul* and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate¹³³ 39a/b).. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite¹³⁴ 39b): It was slaughtered and after that [the slaughterer] expressed an intention [of idolatry]., there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive¹³⁵. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case¹³⁶.

footnotes:
¹²⁸ Any idolatrous sacrifice is forbidden for any use; Deut
¹²⁹ If the slaughter were for idolatry, everybody would agree that the meat is forbidden for consumption. But here the slaughter is not intended for idolatry, only that later part of the blood and fat would be used for idolatrous purposes, for instance, if the animal is a Gentile’s property; cf. Note 131.
¹³⁰ Only an action can trigger the prohibition. If the Gentile takes part of the animal for himself for idolatrous purposes after he had sold most of the meat to Jews, there is no reason why the meat should be forbidden to Jews.
¹³¹ Mishnah Ḥulin
¹³² A sacrifice not eaten during its appointed time becomes forbidden as leftover even if it was not intended from the start to be eaten out of its time.
¹³³ He holds that only for Jewish sacrifices does the wrong thought at slaughter invalidate the act; for all others the wrong thought invalidates the act but is not transferable to others. If the slaughter was for idolatry, the entire meat is forbidden. If the slaughter was for using part of the blood or fat for idolatry, that blood or fat becomes forbidden by being used; it has no influence on the other parts. (Babli Ḥulin
¹³⁴ In the Babli (Ḥulin
¹³⁵ In the Babli, the reference is to the opinion of Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel in the Mishnah, who holds that a later action indicates a prior thought. If suicide can validate a prior bill of divorce then idolatrous practice can invalidate a prior slaughter. Since this also explains the insertion of the paragraph here, it has to be accepted as explanation.
¹³⁶ A rabbi could have dismissed the case without bringing it to the attention of the full court. But what they really said was that the scrupulous should not eat from the meat; those who did eat did not sin.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:7:1
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:7:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:7:1)

**משנה:** אָמַר לִשְׁנַיִם תְּנוּ גֵט לְאִשְׁתִּי אוֹ לִשְׁלֹשָׁה כִּתְבוּ גֵט וּתְנוּ לְאִשְׁתִּי הֲרֵי אֵילּוּ יִכְתְּבוּ וְיִתְּנוּ. אָמַר לִשְׁלֹשָׁה תְּנוּ גֵט לְאִשְׁתִּי הֲרֵי אֵילּוּ יֹאמְרוּ לַאֲחֵרִים כְּתוֹבוּ מִפְּנֵי שֶׁעֲשָׂאָן בֵּית דִּין דִּבְרֵי רִבִּי מֵאִיר. וְזוֹ הֲלָכָה שָׁלַח חֲנַנְיָה אִישׁ אוֹנוֹ מִבֵּית הָאֲסוּרִין מְקוּבָּל אֲנִי בְּאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלֹשָׁה תְּנוּ גֵט לְאִשְׁתִּי שֶׁיֹּאמְרוּ לַאֲחֵרִים כְּתוֹבוּ מִפְּנֵי שֶׁעֲשָׂאָן בֵּית דִּין. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי נוּמֵינוּ לַשָּׁלִיחַ אַף אָנוּ מְקוּבָּלִין שֶׁאֲפִילוּ אָמַר לְבֵית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל שֶׁבִּירוּשָׁלֵם תְּנוּ גֵט לְאִשְׁתִּי צָרִיךְ שֶׁיִּלְמְדוּ וְיִכְתְּבוּ וְיִתְּנוּ. אָמַר לַעֲשָׂרָה כִּתְבוּ גֵט לְאִשְׁתִּי אֶחָד כּוֹתֵב וּשְׁנַיִם חוֹתְמִין. כּוּלְּכֵם כְּתוֹבוּ אֵֶחָד כּוֹתֵב וְכוּלָּן חוֹתְמִין. לְפִיכָךְ אִם מֵת אֶחָד מֵהֶן הֲרֵי זֶה גֵט בָּטֶל.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**MISHNAH:** If one said to two persons, give a bill of divorce to my wife¹³⁷, or to three persons, write a bill of divorce and deliver to my wife, they should write and deliver¹³⁸. If he said to three persons, deliver a bill of divorce to my wife, they shall ask others to write since he appointed them as a court, the words of Rebbi Meïr. This instructions for practice did Ḥananiah¹³⁹ 1:2 (18d last line) he is called Ḥanina; in Babli sources Rebbi Ḥanina. from Ono send from jail: I know from tradition that if someone said to three persons, deliver a bill of divorce to my wife, they shall ask others to write since he appointed them as a court. Rebbi Yose said, we told the messenger that we also know from tradition that even if he said to the Supreme Court in Jerusalem, deliver a bill of divorce to my wife, they shall learn¹⁴⁰, write, and deliver. If he said to ten persons, write a bill of divorce for my wife, one writes and two sign. All of you shall write, one writes and all sign. Therefore, if one of them died, the bill of divorce would be void.

footnotes:
¹³⁷ Since the husband did not authorize a scribe, the appointed persons themselves have to write the bill of divorce.
¹³⁸ Since he specifically asked them to write, they cannot constitute themselves as a court and direct the scribe of the court to write the bill but must write it themselves.
¹³⁹ In Sanhedrin
¹⁴⁰ If they do not know how to write a document.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:7:2
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:7:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:7:2)

**הלכה:** אָמַר לִשְׁנַיִם. תְּנוּ גֵט לְאִשְׁתִּי כול׳. מַתְנִיתָא דְּרִבִּי מֵאִיר מִן דְּבַתְרָהּ אָמַר לִשְׁלֹשָׁה. וְאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא. טַעֲמָא דְרִבִּי מֵאִיר. מַה מָצִינוּ בְכָל מָקוֹם אֲחֵרִים כּוֹתְבִין וּבֵית דִּין חוֹתְמִין. וְהָכָא אֲחֵרִים כּוֹתְבִין וּבֵית דִּין מְחַתְּמִין.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**HALAKHAH:** “If one said to two persons, give a bill of divorce to my wife,” etc. The Mishnah follows Rebbi Meïr¹⁴¹, not as agents. There really is no doubt that the Mishnah is R. Meïr’s, since it is stated explicitly. The question is only what is R. Meïr’s reason in opposing R. Yose. It seems that R. Yose will agree that a court can cause the bill to be written if the husband in so many words appoints three persons *as a court*; he does not accept R. Meïr’s position that the appointment of at least three joint agents automatically constitutes them as a court; he does not admit that a person can appoint others (in any number, but not a formal court) to act as agents to have a document written for him (Babli 66b)., from the next sentence: “If he said to three persons;” and Rav Ḥisda said, the reason of Rebbi Meïr is that we find everywhere that others write and the court signs, also here others write and the court affixes their signatures.

footnotes:
¹⁴¹ The problem discussed is hinted at in Halakhah 7:2 but made explicit only in the Babli (66b, also 29a,71b,72b). R. Yose (ben Ḥalaphta, the Tanna of overriding authority) holds that “words cannot be delivered to an agent.” Therefore (Mishnah 7:2), if a sick person says to the (at least three) persons attending him, write a bill of divorce to my wife; if they ask a scribe to produce the bill and then they all sign, the bill is invalid since the order to write the bill cannot be delivered through an agent. This contrasts with the Mishnah here, which states that if three persons were appointed, they can be considered a court and have the authority to order the document to be drawn up as a court


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:7:3
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:7:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:7:3)

רִבִּי הִלֵּל בַּר וָולֶס בְּעָא קוֹמֵי רִבִּי. מָה רָאוּ לוֹמַר. הֲלָכָה כְרִבִּי יוֹסֵי. אָמַר לֵיהּ. שֶׁלֹּא רְאִיתִיו. רִבִּי כַּד הֲוָה בְעֵי מַקְשֵׁייה עַל דְּרִבִּי יוֹסֵי אָמַר. אֲנָן עֲלִיבַיָיא מַקְשַׁיָיא עַל דְּרִבִּי יוֹסֵי. שֶׁכְּשֵׁם לְבֵין קָדְשֵׁי הַקָּדָשִׁים לְבֵין חוּלֵי חוּלִין כָּךְ בֵּין דּוֹרֵינוּ לְדוֹרוֹ שֶׁלְּרִבִּי יוֹסֵי. אָמַר רִבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בֵּירִבִּי יוֹסֵי. כְּשֵׁם שֶׁבֵּין זָהָב לְעָפָר כָּךְ בֵּין דּוֹרֵינוּ לְדוֹרוֹ שֶׁל אַבָּא.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
Rebbi Hillel ben Valens asked before Rebbi: What reason did they have to say that practice follows Rebbi Yose¹⁴² 3:1, Note 23).? He said to him, because I never met him. If somebody questioned statements of Rebbi Yose, Rebbi said, we miserable ones asked against Rebbi Yose, for as there is a difference between the most holy and the most profane, so is there a difference between Rebbi Yose’s generation and ours. Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose said, the difference between my father’s generation and ours is like that between gold and dust.

footnotes:
¹⁴² There is no doubt that in the Mishnah, practice has to follow R. Yose even if the opinion of Ḥanania from Ono might have the authority of R. Aqiba behind it (cf. Terumot


###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:7:4
[Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:7:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/6:7:4)

אָמַר לַעֲשָׂרָה. הוֹלִיכוּ אֶת הַגֵּט הַזֶּה. אֶחָד מוֹלִיךְ עַל יְדֵי כוּלָּן. כּוּלְּכֶם הוֹלִיכוּ. כּוּלָּם מוֹלִיכִין וְאֶחָד נוֹתֵן עַל יְדֵי כוּלָּן. לְפִיכָךְ אִם מֵת אֶחָד מֵהֶן הֲרֵי הַגֵּט בָּטֶל. רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן בְּשֵׁם רִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר דְּמִן רוֹמָא. הַמְזַכֶּה כְּאוֹמֵר. כּוּלְּכֶם.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
¹⁴³“If somebody said to ten persons, ‘bring this bill of divorce’, one transports in the name of all of them. ‘All of you shall bring’, they all transport and one delivers in the name of all of them; therefore, if one of them died, the bill of divorce becomes invalid.” ¹⁴⁴ I, 29d (Note 186). Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Eleazar from Rome: The one who awards¹⁴⁵ it like one who says “all of you”.

footnotes:
¹⁴³ Tosephta 4:13; Babli 67b.
¹⁴⁴ Babli 67b; quoted in the name of the Yerushalmi but in Babli language in Sefer Ha‘Iṭṭur
¹⁴⁵ It is difficult to understand what it means to “award” the right to deliver a bill of divorce. The Babli version (also ascribed to the Yerushalmi, Note 144), reads: “The one who counts is like one who says ‘all of you’,” which according to Rashi means that the husband says: you, 1, 2, 3, 4 (pointing at persons and counting the number of persons he appointed) shall deliver. One could try to explain the version of the text if the husband is a very well known personality and it is an honor to be his representative. Then, if he appoints his representatives by name without indication of any preferences between them, they all have equal rank and all are appointed jointly but not separately.