## Jerusalem Talmud Gittin Chapter 9 ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:1:1 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:1:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:1:1) **משנה:** הַמְגָרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ וְאָמַר לָהּ הֲרֵי אַתְּ מוּתֶּרֶת לְכָל אָדָם אֶלָּא לְאִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי רִבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מַתִּיר וַחֲכָמִים אוֹסְרִין. כֵּיצַד יַעֲשֶׂה. יִטְּלֶינּוּ מִמֶּנָּה וְיַחֲזוֹר וְיִתְּנֶנּוּ לָהּ וְיֹּאמַר לָהּ הֲרֵי אַתְּ מוּתֶּרֶת לְכָל אָדָם. אִם כְתָבוֹ בְּתוֹכוֹ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁחָזַר וּמְחָקוֹ פָּסוּל. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** **MISHNAH:** If somebody in divorcing his wife says to her: Herewith you are permitted to any man except Mr. X, Rebbi Eliezer permits¹ but the Sages prohibit. What should he do? He should take the document back from her and deliver it again while saying, herewith you are permitted to any man. If he had written the condition² in the document it would be invalid even if he had later erased it. footnotes: ¹ He permits the wife to remarry; the Sages prohibit since they reject the possibility of a divorce which permits control of the divorced wife by the former husband. ² Which restricts the divorcee in the choice of her future husband. ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:1:2 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:1:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:1:2) **הלכה:** הַמְגָרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ כול׳. אָמַר רִבִּי אִילַי. טַעֲמָא דְרִבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר. וְיָצְאָה מִבֵּיתוֹ וְהָלְכָה וְהָיְתָה לְאִישׁ אַחֵר. אֲפִילוּ לֹא הִתִּירָהּ אֶלָּא לְאָדָם אַחֵר. שְׁמוּעָתָא רוֹבָא מִמַּתְנִיתָא. מַתְנִיתָא אָמְרָה בְּשֶׁהוּתְּרָה לַכֹּל וְאָסְרָהּ לְאָדָם אַחֵר. שְׁמוּעָתָא אָמְרָה בְּשֶׁאָסְרָהּ לַכֹּל וְהִתִּירָהּ לְאָדָם אַחֵר. מַה טַעֲמָא דְּרִבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר. מִיתָה מַתֶּרֶת וְגֵט מַתִּיר. מַה מִיתָה מַתֶּרֶת וּמֶחֱצָה אַף הַגֵּט מַתִּיר וּמֶחֱצָה. מַה טַעֲמוֹן דְּרַבָּנִין. וְיָצְאָה מִבֵּיתוֹ וְהָלְכָה וְהָיְתָה לְאִישׁ אַחֵר. הַקִּישׁ הֲוָיָיתָהּ לִיצִיאָה. מַה המיתה יְצִיאָתָהּ אֵין לָהּ יְצִיאָה אֶצֶל אַחֵר. אַף הֲוָיָיתָהּ אֵין לָהּ הֲוָיָיה אֶצֶל אַחֵר. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** **HALAKHAH:** “If somebody in divorcing his wife,” etc. Rebbi Ilai⁴ other man’s”. said, the reason of Rebbi Eliezer: “She left his house, went, and became another man’s⁵. 24:2.”, even if he did permit her only to one other man. This argument proves more than the Mishnah⁶, R. Ilai’s argument proves nothing.! The Mishnah said if she was permitted to all but forbidden to one other man; the argument is that he forbade her to all but permitted her only to one other man. What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer? Death permits and divorce permits. Since death permits only partially⁷, so the bill of divorce permits only partially⁸. What is the reason of the rabbis? “She left his house, went, and became another man’s”; it brackets marriage and divorce. Since her divorce is without participation of a third party, so her marriage must be without participation of a third party⁹. footnotes: ⁴ In the Babli (82b) this is ascribed to R. Yannai. There, the objection is that “she became another man’s” could be interpreted as “she became any ⁵ Deut ⁶ By the mathematical principlequi nimium probat nihil probat ⁷ The pool of possible marriage partners available to a widow is smaller than the pool which was available to the same woman before her marriage since she is forbidden any close relatives of her deceased husband. ⁸ Since the divorce does not remove the incest prohibitions, it seems possible that the husband can add prohibitions of his own. ⁹ If the former husband could impose marriage restrictions on his former wife, her remarriage would be subject to the former husband’s edict. This would create a kind of polyandry. ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:1:3 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:1:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:1:3) לְאַחַר מִיתָתוֹ שֶׁלְּרִבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר נִכְנְסוּ אַרְבָּעָה זְקֵנִים לְהָשִׁיב עַל דְּבָרָיו שֶׁלְּרִבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר. רִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה וְרִבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגָּלִילִי וְרִבִּי טַרְפוֹן וְרִבִּי עֲקִיבָה. אָמַר לָהֶן רִבִּי יְהוֹשְׁעַ. אֵין אַתֶּם מֵשִׁיבִין אֶת הָאֲרִי לְאַחַר מִיתָה. הֵשִׁיב רִבִּי טַרְפוֹן. הֲרֵי שֶׁאָמַר לָהּ. הֲרֵי אַתּ מוּתֶּרֶת לְכָל אָדָם חוּץ מִפְּלוֹנִי. וְהָלְכָה וְנִישֵּׂאת. מֵת בְּלֹא בָנִים הֵיאַךְ זוֹ מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת. לֹא נִמְצָא מַתְנֶה עַל הַכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה. וְכָל הַמַּתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה תְּנָאוֹ בָטֵל. מֵעַתָּה לֹא יִשָּׂא בַּת אָחִיו שֶׁלֹּא יַתְנֶה עַל הַכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בֵּירִבִּי בּוּן. סְבָרָא טַעֲמָא. תַּמָּן הַתּוֹרָה אָסְרָתָהּ עָלָיו. בְּרַם הָכָא הוּא אָסְרָה עָלָיו. הָתִיב רִבִּי חֲנַנְיָה בְשֵׁם רִבִּי פִינְחָס. נִיתְנֵי שֵׁשׁ עֶשְׂרֶה נָשִׁים כְּרִבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר. אָמַר רִבִּי מָנָא. כְּבָר אִיתְמַר טַעֲמָא. תַּמָּן הַתּוֹרָה אָסְרָהּ עָלָיו. בְּרַם הָכָא הוּא אָסְרָה עָלָיו. רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה בָּעֵי. הֲרֵי שֶׁאָמַר לָהּ. הֲרֵי אַתּ מוּתֶּרֶת לְכָל אָדָם חוּץ מִפְּלוֹנִי. וְהָלְכָה וְנִיסֵּית לְאָחִיו וּמֵת בְּלֹא בָנִים. הֵיאַךְ זֶה מַתִּיר מַה שֶׁאָסַר הָרִאשׁוֹן. מִילְּתֵיהּ אָמְרָה. שֶׁמִּיתַת וְגֵירוּשִׁין ומַתִּירִין בָּזֶה מַה שֶׁאָסַר הָרִאשׁוֹן. אָמַר רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה. לֹא אָמַר אֶלָּא שֶׁמִּיתַת וְגֵירוּשִׁין. הָא נִישּׂוּאִין לֹא. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** ¹⁰ Deut. 269. After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death¹¹. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who]¹² died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage¹³. 24:1 is called “scroll of cutting loose” the wife from the husband’s power. This really refers to the rabbis’ argument, Note 9.)? Does it not turn out that he¹⁴ stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah¹⁵.). Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him¹⁶ is devoted to cases where levirate marriage is impossible.. But here, he forbids to him¹⁷! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer¹⁸ 1:1 enumerates 15 categories of women who are forbidden levirate and, in the opinion of the House of Hillel, automatically free their co-wives from levirate. According to R. Eliezer, should one not add the woman who married the brother of a man forbidden to her by divorce stipulation?? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him¹⁷! Rebbi Jeremiah¹⁹ asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade²⁰. It seems that one has to read with the Tosephta: “She went and married an unrelated person who then divorced her unconditionally”, i. e., the second husband by his divorce annulled the condition of the first divorce.? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited²¹. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage²². footnotes: ¹⁰ Different versions of the following discussions are in the Babli, 83a/b, Tosephta 7:1–5, Sifry ¹¹ He rejects all the following arguments (as does the Babli, except an argument attributed to R. Eleazar ben Azariah not mentioned in the Yerushalmi.) ¹² Missing in the text; to be added from the parallel attributed to R. Jeremiah. ¹³ If the prohibited man was the only brother of the deceased husband, the widow should have to marry him but she is prohibited by the former husband’s stipulation. In the Babylonian sources (Note 10) the conclusion is stated explicitly that “this is no cutting loose” (referring to the bill of divorce which in Deut ¹⁴ The first husband would in effect stipulate that his ex-wife cannot fulfill the commandment of the levirate marriage. ¹⁵ If the uncle married to the niece died childless, the widow clearly is forbidden to marry her own father in levirate. But the possibility of a marriage of the niece to the uncle is one of the doctrines of Pharisaic Judaism, in contrast to the Sadducees (cf. Introduction to Tractate Yebamot ¹⁶ In fact, the greater part of Tractate Yebamot ¹⁷ The first husband forbids levirate marriage to the brother of the second husband. ¹⁸ Mishnah Yebamot ¹⁷ The first husband forbids levirate marriage to the brother of the second husband. ¹⁹ It seems that this has to read “R. Simeon ben Eleazar” (Tosephta 7:5.) ²⁰ This is a non sequitur ²¹ The condition “except Mr. X” according to R. Eliezer refers only to the next marriage of the divorcee. If the divorcee married according to the stipulation and then the second marriage is dissolved either by divorce or by the husband’s death, the widow or divorcee is free to marry anybody she wishes. The Babli agrees with this interpretation, 83a, which shows that R. Tarphon’s objection cannot be sustained. ²² R. Eliezer, who declares the divorce valid, will insist that the first remarriage satisfy the first husband’s condition. ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:1:4 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:1:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:1:4) אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגָּלִילִי. מָצִינוּ בַּתּוֹרָה. הָאָסוּר לָזֶה מוּתָּר לָזֶה וְהַמּוּתָּר לָזֶה אָסוּר לָזֶה. אָסוּר לְאֶחָד אָסוּר לְכָל אָדָם מוּתָּר לְאֵֶחָד מוּתָּר לְכָל אָדָם. הֵשִׁיב רִבִּי עֲקִיבָה. הֲרֵי שֶׁהָיָה זֶה שֶׁנֶּאֶסְרָה עָלָיו כֹּהֵן וּמֵת הַמְגָרֵשׁ. לֹא נִמְצֵאת אַלְמָנָה לוֹ וּגְרוּשָׁה לְכָל אֶחָיו הַכֹּהֲנִים. וְכִי בְּמָה הֶחֱמִירָה תוֹרָה. בִּגְרוּשָׁה אוֹ בָאַלְמָנָה. הֶחֱמִירָה הַתּוֹרָה בִּגְרוּשָׁה יוֹתֵר מִן הָאַלְמָנָה. וּמָה אִם גְּרוּשָׁה חֲמוּרָה לַכֹּל לֹא נֶאֶסְרָה מִמַּה שֶׁהוּתָּר בָּהּ מִצַּד גֵּירוּשִׁין שֶׁבָּהּ. אַלְמָנָה קַלָּה אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁתֵּיאָסֵר מִמַּה שֶׁהוּתָּר לָהּ מִצַּד אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ שֶׁבָּהּ. אֲפִילוּ אֶצְלוֹ נָגְעוּ בוֹ גֵירוּשִׁין. וּמָה אַלְמָנָה וּגְרוּשָׁה נֶאֶסְרָה מִמַּה שֶׁהוּתָּר לָהּ מִצַּד אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ שֶׁבָּהּ. גֵּירוּשִׁין חֲמוּרִין לֹא כָּל שֶׁכֵּן שֶׁתֵּיאָסֵר מִמַּה שֶׁהוּתָּר לָהּ מִצַּד גֵּירוּשִׁין שֶׁבָּהּ. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody²³. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim²⁴ 21:7) except the Cohen to whom she was forbidden since for him she is a widow who is forbidden only to the High Priest. (One might ask why a man would forbid his divorcee to a Cohen since she is forbidden to him anyhow.)? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow²⁵? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce²⁶, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman²⁷? Even him did the divorce touch²⁸. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden²⁹ even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect³⁰ that was permitted by her divorce. footnotes: ²³ His argument is the same in the Babylonian sources (Note 10). It is difficult to accept the statement at face value. ²⁴ The situation would be paradoxical in that the divorcee would be forbidden to all Cohanim (Lev. ²⁵ The lengthy amplification refers to the prior case that the person whom the divorcee could not marry was a Cohen, forbidden to her in any case. ²⁶ As a married woman she was forbidden to everybody except her husband; as a divorcee she is permitted to most men. ²⁷ This is an involved argument repeating the paradoxical situation described in Note 24. ²⁸ The arguments of Notes 24, 27 are to be rejected. A divorcee who cannot be married is still a divorcee; the argument of R. Aqiba is invalid. ²⁹ To the High Priest. ³⁰ Forbidden to the rank-and-file Cohen. The sentence is an amplification of the argument of Note 28. ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:1:5 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:1:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:1:5) דָּבָר אַחֵר. הֲרֵי שֶׁאָמַר לָהּ. הֲרֵי אַתְּ מוּתֶּרֶת לְכָל אָדָם חוּץ מִפְּלוֹנִי. וְהָלְכָה וְנִיסֵּית לְאַחֵר וְיָלְדָה מִמֶּנּוּ בָנִים. וּמֵת וְהָלְכָה וְנִיסֵּית לְאוֹתוֹ. לֹא נִמְצְאוּ בָנֶיהָ מִן הָאַחֲרוֹן מַמְזֵירִין. מִילְּתֵיהּ אָמְרָה שֶׁאֵין גֵּירוּשִׁין מַתִּירִין מַה שֶׁאָסַר הָרִאשׁוֹן. אָמַר רִבִּי שַׁמַּי. מָצִינוּ אִשָּׁה בַּתְּחִילָּה אֵין חַיָיבִין עָלֶיהָ מִשּׁוּם עֶרְוָה וּבַסּוֹף חַיָיבִין עָלֶיהָ מִשּׁוּם עֶרְוָה. אָמַר לֵיהּ רִבִּי מָנָא. לְמָה זֶה דוֹמֶה. לְאֶחָד שֶׁאָמַר לְאִשְׁתּוֹ. הֲרֵי זֶה גִיטֵּיךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁתִּיבְּעָלִי לְאִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי. בַּתְּחִילָּה הוּא אָסוּר לְבְעוֹל. עָבַר וּבָעַל הוּתָּר הַגֵּט לְמַפְרֵעַ. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** Another argument³¹: “Assume that he said to her, ‘you are permitted to every man except Mr. X;’ she went and married another and had children by him. Then her [second] husband died³²; she went and married Mr. X. Will not her children by her second husband become bastards³³?” His argument implies that divorce does not permit what the first husband had forbidden³⁴. Rebbi Shammai said, do we find that a woman was not originally forbidden to a man because of adultery and then retroactively became forbidden as adulterous³⁵? Rebbi Mana said to him, to what can you compare this? To one who told his wife, “this is your bill of divorce on condition that you sleep with Mr. X.” At the start, he is forbidden to have sexual relations with her. If he transgressed and slept with her, the divorce was retroactively validated³⁶ *ad* 84a.). footnotes: ³¹ In the Babli, 83a, this argument also is attributed to R. Aqiba. ³² In the Babli: “died or divorced her.” This is implied by the sequel here also. ³³ The third marriage violates the conditions of the first divorce. If the first divorce is invalidated, the second marriage retroactively becomes adulterous and the children bastards. The argument does not disprove R. Eliezer’s position; it shows that from a practical point of view, that position should not be tolerated. ³⁴ Contrary to what was asserted in the name of R. Eliezer (Note 21), a later divorce or widowhood does not eliminate the conditions of the first divorce. ³⁵ He doubts that anybody can agree that the second husband, who contracted his marriage within the parameters of the first divorce, can become an adulterer without his knowledge by an action of the wife after his death or after a divorce. ³⁶ Even according to the Babli which holds that any expression “on condition that” means “from today, on condition that”, Mr. X is barred from marrying the divorcee as long as he had not slept with her since she is not yet divorced and, therefore, unable to contract any marriage. Therefore, when he goes to bed with the divorcee, it is an adulterous act. But at the moment of penetration, the condition of the divorce is satisfied and the aspect of adultery has disappeared. This is just the opposite of the situation which caused discomfort to R. Shammai. (Rashba, Novellae ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:1:6 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:1:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:1:6) אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. הֲלָכָה כְרִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר הִיא. דְּרִבִּי שֶׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר אָמַר. לְעוֹלָם אֵינוֹ גֵּט עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר בִּשְׁעַת מַתָּנָה. הֲרֵי זֶה גִיטֵּיךְ. רִבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אָחָא בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יַנַּאי. אַף רֵיחַ פְּסוּל אֵין בָּהּ. כַּהֲנָא אָמַר. זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת לֹא חָשׁוּ. אִין תֵּימַר חָשׁוּ. עַד שֶׁהוּא בְיָדָהּ דְּאָמַר לָהּ. הֲרֵי אַתְּ מוּתֶּרֶת לְכָל אָדָם. אָמַר רִבִּי אָחָא. זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת שֶׁחָשׁוּ. אִין תֵּימַר לֹא חָשׁוּ. כָּל מַה שֶׁבְּיָדוֹ לְגָרֵשׁ יְגָרֵשׁ. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** Rebbi Joḥanan said³⁷, the practice follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said³⁸ it never is a bill of divorce unless he declares at the moment of delivery: “This is your bill of divorce.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yannai: There is not even a hint of invalidity on her³⁹. In Babli terminology (86b), there is “no hint of a bill of divorce” *on the document* (רִיחַ הַגֵּט אֵין בּוֹ).. Cahana said, this implies that they did not worry⁴⁰. If they did worry, might he not have said “you are permitted to any man” when it was still in her hand⁴¹? Rebbi Aḥa said, this implies that they did worry⁴². If they did not worry, could he not divorce by any power he has to divorce⁴³? footnotes: ³⁷ Here starts the discussion of the statement by the Mishnah, that the husband cannot simply annul the condition he had imposed but has to take the bill back and bodily deliver it while declaring his ex-wife free to marry any man she chooses. ³⁸ Chapter 8, Note 27; Babli 78a. ³⁹ An imperfect bill of divorce will nevertheless make the woman a divorcee according to the rules of the priesthood. Only a bill which clearly is null and void does not have this consequence (and if the woman became a widow before a corrected version could be delivered to her, she would be able to marry a Cohen.) In Yerushalmi language, the invalid bill implies no “hint of invalidity” for the woman ⁴⁰ The Tanna of the Mishnah accepts the statement of R. Yannai that the document delivered with the exclusion of a possible marriage partner is null and void. (In the Babli, 84b, R. Joḥanan in the name of Cahana adopts the position here described as R. Aḥa’s.) ⁴¹ If the delivery were valid to disqualify the woman from marrying a Cohen, it also should be valid for a full divorce upon a public disclaimer by the husband of the condition imposed. ⁴² The Tanna of the Mishnah must reject the statement of R. Yannai. The Babli agrees, 84b. ⁴³ He also rejects the determination of R. Joḥanan that the Mishnah follows R. Simeon ben Eleazar. The fact that the Mishnah requires the husband to retake possession of the bill after the wife already had it in her hand means that the wife already had acquired the bill, became forbidden to a Cohen, and, therefore, a simple statement by the husband would be invalid. (Rashi’s explanation, 84b). ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:1:7 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:1:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:1:7) אָמַר רִבִּי זְעִירָא. תַּנֵּי שִׁילָא בַּר בִּינָה. כָּל שֶׁאִילּוּ בִתְנַיי עַל מְנָת פָּסוּל. כָּל שֶׁאִילּוּ נְתָנוֹ עַל מְנָת פָּסוּל. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** Rebbi Ze‘ira said: Shila bar Binah stated: Anything which is invalid containing a condition if delivered on condition is also invalid⁴⁴. footnotes: ⁴⁴ This refers to the last statement in the Mishnah, that the condition written in the bill of divorce invalidates the bill. It is stated as a general principle that any condition, which written in the bill will invalidate it, also invalidates if not written but imposed orally at the time of the delivery. (The Babli, 84b, takes the opposite track: A written condition invalidates if and only if it invalidates if imposed orally. The Babli invalidates any condition formulated using the term “except” but validates every “on condition that”. This is foreign to the Yerushalmi.) ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:2:1 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:2:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:2:1) **משנה:** הֲרֵי אַתְּ מוּתֶּרֶת לְכָל אָדָם אֶלָּא לְאַבָּא וּלְאָבִיךְ לְאָחִי וּלְאָחִיךְ לָעֶבֶד לְנָכְרִי וּלְכָל מִי שֶׁאֵין לָהּ קִידּוּשִׁין עָלָיו כָּשֵׁר. הֲרֵי אַתְּ מוּתֶּרֶת לְכָל אָדָם אֶלָּא אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל גְּרוּשָׁה וַחֲלוּצָה לְכֹהֶן הֶדְיוֹט מַמְזֶרֶת וּנְתִינָה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְנָתִין וּלְמַמְזֵר וּלְכָל מִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ עָלָיו קִידּוּשִׁין אֲפִילוּ בַעֲבֵירָה פָּסוּל. גּוּפוֹ שֶׁלַּגֵּט הֲרֵי אַתְּ מוּתֶּרֶת לְכָל אָדָם. רִבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר וְדֵן דְּיִהְוֵי לִיכִי מִינַּאי סֵפֶר תֵּירוּכִין וְאִגֶּרֶת שִׁיבּוּקִין לִמְהָךְ לְהִתְנָסְבָא לְכָל גְּבַר דְּתִצְבַּיִין. גּוּפוֹ שֶׁלַּגֵּט שִׁיחְרוּר. הֲרֵי אַתְּ בֶּן חוֹרִין הֲרֵי אַתְּ לְעַצְמָךְ. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** **MISHNAH:** “You are permitted to any man except to my father and your father, to my brother and your brother, to a slave, a Gentile,” or anybody she is unable to contract a preliminary marriage with⁴⁵, it is valid. “You are permitted to any man except as a widow to the High Priest, a divorcee or one having received *ḥalȋṣah* to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite girl to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a a bastard or a Gibeonite⁴⁶ 2:4.,” or anybody she could contract a preliminary marriage with even if it is sinful⁴⁷ 2:4., it is invalid⁴⁸. The essence⁵¹ of the bill of divorce: You are herewith permitted to any man. Rebbi Jehudah says: This shall be for you from me a divorce scroll and a letter of abandonment, to enable you to marry any man you desire. The essence of the bill of manumission: You are a free person, you are on your own. footnotes: ⁴⁵ An unmarried woman can contract preliminary marriage with any Jewish man except those connections forbidden as incestuous relations which are deadly sins. Marriage is also impossible with Gentiles and slaves. A divorce stipulation which forbids no marriage possible under the law is empty. ⁴⁶ All these are subsumed under “holiness prohibitions”, enumerated in Mishnah Yebamot ⁴⁷ Including common law “commandment prohibitions,” Mishnah Yebamot ⁴⁸ Since for the rabbis who oppose R. Eliezer, any bill of divorce is invalid if it restricts the pool of legal marriage partners of the divorcee. ⁵¹ The required text. ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:2:2 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:2:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:2:2) **הלכה:** גּוּפוֹ שֶׁלַּגֵּט הֲרֵי אַתְּ מוּתֶּרֶת לְכָל אָדָם כול׳. רִבִּי אָחָא אָמַר. כְּרִיתוּת לֹא הִתְפִּיסָה הַתּוֹרָה שֵׁם כְּרִיתוּת אֶלּא עֶרְוָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ הֲוָיָיה. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** **HALAKHAH:** “The essence of the bill of divorce: You are herewith permitted to any man,” etc. Rebbi Aḥa said: “Cutting off”, the Torah did not choose the term “cutting off” except to refer to a person with whom a marriage is possible⁵². 24:1,3. If marriage was not possible, it cannot be dissolved.. footnotes: ⁵² This really refers to Mishnah 2 and explains why the prohibition of impossible relations does not invalidate the bill of divorce. The bill is called “a scroll of cutting off” in Deut ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:2:3 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:2:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:2:3) אָמַר רִבִּי מָנָא. וּבִלְחוּד דְּלָא יֵימַר. וְדִין. רִבִּי מָנָא בָּעֵי. הֲרֵי אַתְּ בִּרְשׁוּת עַצְמָךְ. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בֵּירִבִּי בּוּן. צָרִיךְ שֶׁיֹּאמַר. הֲרֵי אַתְּ בֶּן חוֹרִין. הֲרֵי אַתְּ שֶׁלְּעַצְמָךְ. מַתְנִיתָא אָמְרָה כֵן. הֲרֵי אַתָּה בֶּן חוֹרִין הֲרֵי אַתָּה שֶׁלְּעַצְמָךְ. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** Rebbi Mana said: He has to be careful not to say “וְדִין”.⁵³ Rebbi Mana asked: “You are on your own”⁵⁴? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one must say: “You are a free person, you are on your own.⁵⁵” The Mishnah said so: “You are a free person, you are on your own.” footnotes: ⁵³ While the usual spelling of “this” is דֵין, in the divorce document the spelling must be defective so it cannot be read as וְדִין “by law” implying that the husband would not consider a divorce unless forced by some law. This would invalidate the divorce. The Babli, 85b, has a long list of similar spelling rules. ⁵⁴ Is that an acceptable formula for a divorce? The obvious negative answer is not given. ⁵⁵ In a bill of manumission, both expressions are required. The Mishnah (with a very slight change in wording) supports this by stating both expressions in parallel, not connected by “or”. ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:3:1 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:3:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:3:1) **משנה:** שְׁלֹשָׁה גִיטִּין פְּסוּלִין וְאִם נִישֶּׂאת הַוְולָד כָּשֵׁר. כָּתַב בְּכְתָב יָדוֹ וְאֵין עָלָיו עֵדִים יֵשׁ עָלָיו עֵדִים וְאֵין בּוֹ זְמַן יֵשׁ בּוֹ זְמַן וְאֵין בּוֹ אֶלָּא עֵד אֶחָד. הֲרֵי אֵילּוּ שְׁלֹשָׁה גִיטִּין פְּסוּלִין וְאִם נִישֵּׂאת הַוְולָד כָּשֵׁר. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** **MISHNAH:** Three kinds of bills of divorce are invalid⁵⁶, but if she married, the child is legitimate: If he wrote in his own handwriting but it was not signed by witnesses⁵⁷; it was signed by witnesses but is not dated⁵⁸; it is dated but only one witness signed it⁵⁹. These are three invalid kinds of bills of divorce, but if she married, the child is legitimate. footnotes: ⁵⁶ They are invalid only because they violate customary rules, not because of biblical precepts. The woman is forbidden to remarry on the strength of such a bill, but if she did marry, the second marriage and its offspring are legitimate. ⁵⁷ The witnesses which validate the divorce are those present at the delivery. For the document itself, one can apply the principle valid for I.O.U’s: “The signature of the debtor is worth 100 witnesses.” ⁵⁸ According to all opinions, the dating of a bill of divorce is a rabbinic requirement (cf. Chapter 2, Note 32, Chapter 4, Note 64). ⁵⁹ Even if the document was in the husband’s handwriting, one witness alone is not sufficient to let the divorcee remarry without trouble. ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:3:2 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:3:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:3:2) **הלכה:** הֲרֵי אַתְּ מוּתֶּרֶת לְכָל אָדָם כול׳. לֵית כָּאן סְפֵק גֵּירוּשִׁין אֶלָּא גֵּירוּשִׁין מַמָּשׁ. כֵּיצַד סְפֵק קִידּוּשִׁין. כַּיי דְּתַנִּינָן תַּמָּן. זָרַק לָהּ קִידּוּשִׁין. סָפֵק קָרוֹב לָהּ סָפֵק קָרוֹב לוֹ. זֶהוּ סְפֵק קִידּוּשִׁין. וְהָכָא הוּא זָרַק לָהּ גִּיטָּהּ. סָפֵק קָרוֹב לוֹ סָפֵק קָרוֹב לָהּ. זֶהוּ סְפֵק גֵּירוּשִׁין. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** **HALAKHAH:** “You are permitted to any man,” etc. ⁴⁹There really is no questionable divorce here. What are questionable *qiddušin*? As we have stated there: If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, those are questionable *qiddušin*. And here, if he threw the divorce document to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that is a questionable divorce. footnotes: ⁴⁹ The entire Halakhah is copied from Yebamot 3:9, Notes 122-136 (י). It is inserted here at the wrong place since its topic is Mishnah 4, as explained in detail in Yebamot. The text here was copied negligently. ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:3:3 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:3:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:3:3) רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן בְּשֶׁם רִבִּי חֲלַפְתָּא דְמִן חוח. וְכוּלָּן אִם נִיסֵּית לֹא תֵצֵא. שֶׁלֹּא לְהוֹצִיא לִיזָה עַל בָּנֵיהָ. בִּתּוֹ שֶׁנִּיסֵּית לַשּׁוּק בְּגֵט זֶה לֹא תֵצֵא. כְּדֵי לִיזּוּק צָרָתָהּ לְאָבִיהָ. צָרָתָהּ שֶׁנִּישֵּׂאת לַשּׁוּק בְּגֵט זֶה תֵצֵא. בִּתּוֹ שֶׁנִּישֵּׂאת לְאָחִיו אֲפִילוּ לְאָבִיהָ לֹא תֵצֵא. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ḥalaphta from Haifa: Any who were married on the basis of such a document should not leave¹²⁶ 163b, forbids *any* space between signatures and confirmation, not even one line. in order not to give a bad reputation to her children. His daughter who was married outside on the basis of such a document should not leave in order to damage her co-wife to her father. Her co-wife who was married outside on the basis of such a document has to leave. His daughter who married his brother [on the basis of such a document has to leave. Her co-wife who was married to his brother]⁵⁰, missing here. on the basis of such a document, or even to her father, should not leave. footnotes: ¹²⁶ Judicial confirmation of the genuineness of a document does not have to be written immediately below the signatures of the witnesses; it can be anywhere on the document. The Babli, Baba batra ⁵⁰ Necessary text added from Yebamot ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:3:4 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:3:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:3:4) תַּנֵּי שְׁלֹשָׁה שְׁטָרוֹת הַלָּלוּ גוֹבֶה מִבְּנֵי חוֹרִין וְאֵינֹה גוֹבֶה מִן הַמְשׁוּעֲבָדִין. אָמַר רִבִּי בָּא. הָדָא דְתֵימָר בְּשֶׁלֹּא הוּחְזַק שְׁטָר בְּיַד הַמַּלְוֶה. [אֲבָל הוּחְזַק הַשְּׁטָר בְּיַד הַמַּלְוֶה גוֹבֶה. רִבִי יוֹסֵה בָּעֵי. אִם שֶׁלֹּא הוּחְזַק הַשְּׁטָר בְּיַד הַמַּלְוֶה] אֲפִילוּ מִבְּנֵי חוֹרִין אֵינוֹ גוֹבֶה. אֶלָּא כֵן אֲנָן קַיָימִין בְּשֶׁהוּחְזַק שְׁטָר בְּיַד הַמַּלְוֶה. וְלָמָּה אֵינוֹ גוֹבֶה. רִבִּי בִּיסְנָא אָמַר. מִפְּנֵי קֳינוֹנִיָא. רִבִּי אָבִינָא אָמַר. מִפְּנֵי פְּסוּל. וְהָכָא מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא פָסוּל. הָתִיב רִבִּי אָבִין. עַד כְּדוֹן בְּשֶׁלָּוָה הַזָּקֵן. שִׁיעְבֵּד הַזָּקֵן. הָכָא אִית לָךְ מֵימָר מִפְּנֵי קֳינוֹנִיָא. לֹא מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא פָסוּל. הָתִיב רִבִּי אָבוּן. וְהָתַנֵּי אַף בְגִיטֵּי נָשִׁים. אִית לָךְ מֵימָר מִפְּנֵי קֳינוֹנִיָיא. לֹא מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא פָסוּל. וְהָכָא מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא פָסוּל. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** It was stated: [A claim based on] any of these three types of documents can be collected only from unincumbered property, not from mortgaged property. Rebbi Abba said, that means, if the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed. [But if the document in the hand of the lender has been confirmed, he may collect. Rebbi Yose asked: If the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed,]⁵⁰, missing here. he should not be able to collect even from unincumbered property! But one must deal with a document confirmed in the hand of the lender. And why can he not collect? Rebbi Bisna said, because of action in partnership. Rebbi Abina said, because it is invalid And here, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abin asked, so far, if the old man took the loan [and the old man mortgaged. But if the old man took the loan and the son mortgaged,]⁵⁰, missing here. can you say because of a conspiracy? No, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abun asked, was it not stated: The same holds for bills of divorce? Can you say there, because of action in partnership? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid. footnotes: ⁵⁰ Necessary text added from Yebamot ⁵⁰ Necessary text added from Yebamot ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:3:5 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:3:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:3:5) שְׁלֹשָׁה גִיטִּין פְּסוּלִין כול׳. רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יַנַּאי. וְכוּלָּן בִּכְתָב יָדַיִם. רִבִּי לָעְזָר שָׁאַל. עֵדִים יֵשׁ כָּאן. בִּכְתָב יָדַיִם מָה אֲנִי צָרִיךְ. רַב יִרְמְיָה בְשֵׁם רַב. וְכוּלְּהֶם בִּכְתָב יָדַיִם חוּץ מִשֶׁעֵדָיו עַמּוֹ. אָמַר רַב הַמְנוּנָא. הַלָּלוּ חוֹבֵיהוֹן עַל גַּרְמֵיהוֹן. דְּאִינּוּן שֶׁקִּיבְּלוּ עֲלֵיהֶן לְשַׁקֵּר לַחֲתוֹם בְּגֵט שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ זְמָן. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** “Three kinds of bills of divorce are invalid,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: All in handwriting⁶⁰. Rebbi Eleazar asked: There are witnesses; why do I need handwriting⁶¹? Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: All in handwriting except if its witnesses are with it⁶². Rav Hamnuna said, they testified to their own sin since they agreed to lie by signing on an undated bill of divorce⁶³. footnotes: ⁶⁰ The bill can only be used in an emergency if it was in the husband’s handwriting in all three cases. ⁶¹ He questions why the middle case of a signed but undated bill needs to be the husband’s autograph to be valid. He is reported in the same sense in the Babli, 86b. ⁶² Supporting R. Eleazar. A similar statement is in the Babli, 86a/b. Samuel’s opinion, that the husband’s autograph is needed only in the first case, has no parallel in the Yerushalmi. ⁶³ He supports R. Joḥanan. The witnesses who signed the undated document impeach themselves; their testimony can be accepted only in an emergency. ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:3:6 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:3:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:3:6) רִבִּי בָּא בַּר הַמְנוּנָא רַב אָדָא בַּר אָחָא בְשֵׁם רַב. דְּרִבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא. מֶה חָמִית מֵימַר כֵּן. אָמַר רִבִּי מָנָא. בְּגִין דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא בְשֵׁם רַב. כָּל הָהֵין פִּרְקָא דְּרִבִּי מֵאִיר חוּץ מִשִּׁינָּה שְׁמוֹ וּשְׁמָהּ שֵׁם עִירוֹ וְשֵׁם עִירָהּ. דְּלָא תִסְבּוֹר מֵימַר. קַיְימֵיהּ דְּרִבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא תַנְנָיֵיהּ דְּרַבָּנִן. לְפוּם כֵּן צָרִיךְ מֵימַר. דְּרִבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. בְּגִין דְּרַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל תְּרֵיהוֹן אָמְרִין. הֲלָכָא כְּרִבִּי לָעְזָר. דְּלָא תִסְבּוֹר מֵימַר אוֹף הָכָא. לְפוּם כֵּן צָרִיךְ מֵימַר. דְּרִבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** Rebbi Abba bar Hamnuna, Rav Ada bar Aḥa⁶⁴ in the name of Rav: This is Rebbi Meїr’s⁶⁵. Why did you have to say this? Rebbi Mana said, since Rav Huna said in the name of Rav⁶⁶: “This entire Chapter is Rebbi Meїr’s except for ‘if he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city.’ ” You should not come to say that the first is Rebbi Meїr’s, the second the rabbis’⁶⁷. Therefore it is necessary to say that this is Rebbi Meїr’s. Rebbi Yose said⁶⁸, since Rav and Samuel both say that practice follows Rebbi Eleazar, that you should not be led to say the same here. Therefore it is necessary to say that this is Rebbi Meїr’s. footnotes: ⁶⁴ These names are not known from any other source. It seems that one should read: Rebbi Aḥa, Rav Hamnuna, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa. ⁶⁵ The Babli agrees, 86a. ⁶⁶ Chapter 8:5, Note 71. ⁶⁷ One should not think that only Chapter 8, Mishnah 5 ff. follows R. Meїr but all of Chapter 9 follows the rabbis opposing R. Meїr (who are represented by R. Eleazar in Mishnah 9:5) who hold that all bills of divorce are validated by the witnesses to the delivery, not the signatures on the bill. ⁶⁸ The explanation of R. Mana is far-fetched. ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:4:1 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:4:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:4:1) **משנה:** רִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין עָלָיו עֵדִים אֶלָּא שֶׁנְּתָנוֹ לָהּ בִּפְנֵי עֵדִים כָּשֵׁר וְגוֹבָה מִנְּכָסִים מְשׁוּעֲבָדִים. שֶׁאֵין הָעֵדִים חוֹתְמִין עַל הַגֵּט אֶלָּא מִפְּנֵי תִיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** **MISHNAH:** Rebbi Eleazar says, it⁶⁹ is valid even if there are no signatures of witnesses on it if only he delivered it in the presence of witnesses; and she can use it to collect from encumbered property⁷⁰. Cf. Mishnah 4:3.. For the witnesses sign on the bill of divorce only for the public good⁷¹. footnotes: ⁶⁹ One of the irregular bills of divorce mentioned in the preceding Mishnah. ⁷⁰ The testimony of the witnesses to the delivery will enable the divorcee to request the court to foreclose property if the husband is unwilling or unable to pay her ketubah ⁷¹ The public good is that the divorcee is much less likely to become a burden on public charity if her claims on her ex-husband are documented rather than dependent on the testimony of witnesses who may or may not be available to testify. ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:4:2 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:4:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:4:2) **הלכה:** רִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין עָלָיו עֵדִים כול׳. רַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל תְּרֵיהוֹן אָמְרִין. הֲלָכָה כְּרִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר. רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יַנַּאי. דִּבְרֵי חֵכָמִים פָּסוּל. אָתָא עוֹבְדָא קוֹמֵי רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן בְּכוֹהֶנֶת וּבְעָא לְמֵיעֲבַד כְּהָדָא דְרִבִּי יַנַּאי. כַּד שְׁמָעוּן דְּרַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל פְּלִיגִין. אָתָא קוֹמוֹי אֲפִילוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל. וְשָׁמַע מִינָּהּ. רִבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי אָמַר. דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל. כָּשֵׁר. וְהָא רִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אָמַר. כָּשֵׁר. וְרַבָּנּן אָמְרִין. פָּסוּל. מַה בֵּינַיְהוּ. רִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אָמַר. כָּשֵׁר וְגוֹבָה מִנְּכָסִין מְשׁוּעֲבָדִין. וְרַבָּנִין אָמְרִין. פָּסוּל וְגוֹבָה מִנְּכָסִין בְּנֵי חוֹרִין. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** **HALAKHAH:** “Rebbi Eleazar says, it is valid even if there are no signatures of witnesses on it,” etc. Rav and Samuel both say that practice follows Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: The words of the Sages: It is invalid. There came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan about a Cohen’s wife and he wanted to act on Rebbi Yannai’s statement⁷² when it was heard that Rav and Samuel disagreed. There came before him [another case] involving an Israel, and he listened to that⁷³.. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, in the opinion of everybody it is valid. But did not Rebbi Eleazar say, it is valid⁷⁴, and the rabbis say, it is invalid? What is their disagreement? Rebbi Eleazar said, it is valid and she can collect from encumbered property⁷⁵ and if he sold real estate during the marriage, the wife’s lien on that real estate was not broken by the sale and she can foreclose from the buyer.. The rabbis said, it is invalid and she can collect only from unencumbered property⁷⁶. footnotes: ⁷² He wanted to declare the bill of divorce as nonexistent and permit the divorcee to return to her Cohen husband. ⁷³ He accepted the unsigned bill of divorce as valid and empowered the wife to collect her ketubah ⁷⁴ If a name is attached to the statement it proves that it cannot be a unanimous opinion. The opposing, unnamed, rabbis must hold that the bill is invalid. ⁷⁵ If the husband is unable to pay her ketubah ⁷⁶ The bill of divorce is not usable in money matters; the divorcee’s claim does not have the status of a prior mortgage, which can also be enforced against the innocent buyer, but that of an undocumented loan which on the testimony of witnesses can be enforced against the debtor (in this case, the ex-husband) but not against a buyer of real property (who could not have discovered the existence of the debt by a title search.) ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:5:1 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:5:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:5:1) **משנה:** שְׁנַיִם שֶׁשִּׁילְּחוּ שְׁנֵי גִיטִּין שָׁוִין וְנִתְעָרְבוּ נוֹתֵן שְׁנֵיהֶן לְזוֹ וּשְׁנֵיהֶן לְזוֹ. לְפִיכָךְ אִם אָבַד אֶחָד מֵהֶן הֲרֵי הַשֵּׁינִי בָטֵל. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** **MISHNAH:** If two men sent two identical bills of divorce⁷⁷ which became mixed up⁷⁸, one delivers both to both women. Therefore, if one of them was lost, the second became unusable. footnotes: ⁷⁷ Two men, both called X ben Y, living in the same town, divorce their wives, both called Z bat U, living in the same town. ⁷⁸ They were written be the same scribe and entrusted to the same agent. ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:5:2 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:5:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:5:2) **הלכה:** שְׁנַיִם שֶׁשִּׁילְּחוּ שְׁנֵי גִיטִּין שָׁוִין כול׳. רִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֵּירִבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּעָא קוֹמֵי רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. כְּמַה דְאַתְּ אֲמַר. גֵּט אַחַר גֵּט פָּסוּל בִּשְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים. וְדִכְוָותָהּ וְהוּא שְׁנֵי גִיטִּין פְּסוּלִין בִּשְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים. אָמַר לֵיהּ. וְכֵינִי. אָמַר לֵיהּ. וְהָא תַנִינָן. שְׁנַיִם שֶׁשִּׁילְּחוּ שְׁנֵי גִיטִּין שָׁוִין וְנִתְעָרְבוּ נוֹתֵן שְׁנֵיהֶן לְזוֹ וּשְׁנֵיהֶן לְזוֹ. תַּמָּן זֶה כְּרוּת לִשְׁמָהּ וְזֶה כְּרוּת לִשְׁמָהּ. תַּעֲרוֹבֶת הִיא שֶׁגָּרְמָה. בְּרַם הָכָא לֹא זֶה כְּרוּת לִשְׁמָהּ וְלֹא זֶה כְּרוּת לִשְׁמָהּ. מִכֵּיוָן שֶׁנְּתָנוֹ לָהּ יֵעָשֶׂה כְּמִי שֶׁכְּרוּת לִשְׁמָהּ מִשָּׁעָה רִאשׁוֹנָה. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** **HALAKHAH:** “If two men sent two identical bills of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose asked before Rebbi Yose: Just as you say that a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce is invalid in the case of two wives⁷⁹, similarly two bills of divorce should be invalid for two women. He answered, that is correct. He said to him, but did we not state: “If two men sent two identical bills of divorce and they became mixed up, one delivers both to both women”? There⁸⁰, each of the bills was written in the name of the respective wife; the mix-up caused the problem. But here⁸¹, neither one was written as divorce in her name; when it was delivered, could it be considered as divorce in her name from the start? footnotes: ⁷⁹ This refers to Halakhah 3:1, where a man has two wives with identical names. If he writes two bills of divorce without specifying to whom it applies, he can divorce neither of his wives, not even if he delivers both bills to both of them. ⁸⁰ “There” is here, in the case of Mishnah 9:6. ⁸¹ The question raised, which refers to Mishnah 3:1. ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:6:1 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:6:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:6:1) **משנה:** חֲמִשָּׁה שֶׁכָּתְבוּ כְּלָל בְּתוֹךְ הַגֵּט אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי מְגָרֵשׁ פְּלוֹנִית וּפְלוֹנִי לִפְלוֹנִית וְהָעֵדִים מִלְּמַטָּן כּוּלָּן כְּשֵׁירִין וְיִנָּתֵן לְכָל אַחַת וְאַחַת. הָיָה כוֹתֵב טוֹפֶס לְכָל אַחַת וְאַחַת וְהָעֵדִים מִלְּמַטָּן אֶת שֶׁהָעֵדִים נִיקְרִין עִמּוֹ כָּשֵׁר. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** **MISHNAH:** If five wrote collectively a bill of divorce⁸², the man A divorces B and C D⁸³ and the witnesses sign at the end, all are valid and [the bill] shall be delivered to each of them. If one wrote the text separately for each of them and the witnesses sign at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid⁸⁴. footnotes: ⁸² There is only one text; at the point where the names of the persons involed are to be declared, five different couples are mentioned. ⁸³ The Halakhah will point out that the verb “to divorce” is not repeated. ⁸⁴ Since the witnesses sign at the end of the last text, that text is certified. The other texts are not certified and, therefore, invalid. ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:6:2 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:6:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:6:2) **הלכה:** חֲמִשָּׁה שֶׁכָּתְבוּ כְּלָל בָּגֵּט כול׳. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן בְּשֵׁם רִבִּי יַנַּאי. וְשׁוֹאֵל אֲנִי בְשָׁלוֹם פְּלוֹנִי. חֲזָקָה עַל הַכֹּל חָתַם. שׁוֹאֵל אֲנִי בְשָָׁלוֹם פְּלוֹנִי. לֹא חָתַם אֶלָּא עַל שְׁאִילַת שָׁלוֹם בִּלְבַד. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר. אֲפִילוּ אָמַר. שׁוֹאֵל אֲנִי בְשָָׁלוֹם פְּלוֹנִי. חֲזָקָה עַל כֹּל חָתַם. אֵי זֶהוּ כְלָלוֹ שֶׁלְּרִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי מְגָרֵשׁ אֶת פְּלֹנִית וּפְלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי לִפְלֹנִית. אֵי זֶהוּ כְלָלוֹ שֶׁלְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ. אָנוּ פְלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי מְגָרְשִׁין אֶת נָשׁוֹתֵינוּ מִמָּקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי. אָמַר רִבִּי זְעִירָא. מוֹדֶה רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן שֶׁאִם הִזְכִּיר גֵּירוּשִׁין לְכָל אַחַת וְאַחַת שֶׁהוּא צָרִיךְ טוֹפֶס וְעֵדִים לְכָל אַחַת וְאַחַת. חֵיילֵיהּ דְּרִבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִן הָדָא. שֶׁאֵינִי נֶהֱנֶה לָזֶה וְלָזֶה קָרְבָּן. צְרִיכִין פֶּתַח לְכָל אַחַת וְאַחַת. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. מַתְנִיתָא מְסַיְיעָא לְרִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. הָיָה כוֹתֵב טוֹפֶס לְכָל אַחַת וְאַחַת וְהָעֵדִים מִלְּמַטָּן. אֶת שֶׁהָעֵדִים נִקְרִין עִמּוֹ כָּשֵׁר. שְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר. פְּרָטוֹ שֶׁלְּרִבִּי מֵאִיר כְּלָלוֹ שֶׁלְּרִבִּי יְהוּדָה וּפְרָטוֹ שֶׁלְּרִבִּי יְהוּדָה כְּלָלוֹ שֶׁלְּרִבִּי מֵאִיר. אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל בְשֵׁם רִבִּי זְעִירָא. מִילֵּיהוֹן דְּרַבָּנִין אָמְרִין שֶׁאֵין פְּרָטוֹ שֶׁלְּרִבִּי מֵאִיר כְּלָלוֹ שֶׁלְּרִבִּי יְהוּדָה וּפְרָטוֹ שֶׁלְּרִבִּי יְהוּדָה כְּלָלוֹ שֶׁלְּרִבִּי מֵאִיר. דָּמַר רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן בְּשֵׁם רִבִּי יַנַּאי. וְשׁוֹאֵל אֲנִי בְשָׁלוֹם פְּלוֹנִי. חֲזָקָה עַל הַכֹּל חָתַם. שׁוֹאֵל אֲנִי בְשָׁלוֹם פְּלוֹנִי. לֹא חָתַם אֶלָּא עַל שְׁאִילַת שָׁלוֹם בִּלְבַד. אִם אוֹמֵר אַתְּ. פְּרָטוֹ שֶׁלְּרִבִּי מֵאִיר כְּלָלוֹ שֶׁלְּרִבִּי יְהוּדָה. אֲפִילוּ אָמַר. וְשׁוֹאֵל אֲנִי בְשָׁלוֹם פְּלוֹנִי. חֲזָקָה עַל הַכֹּל חָתַם. מַאי כְדוֹן. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. מַתְנִיתָא אָמְרָה כֵן שֶׁאֵין פְּרָטוֹ שֶׁלְּרִבִּי יְהוּדָה כְּלָלוֹ שֶׁלְּרִבִּי מֵאִיר. דְּתַנִּינָן תַּמָּן. רִבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר. אֲפִילוּ אָמַר. חִיטָּה וּשְׂעוֹרָה וְכוּסֶמֶת. חַיָיב עַל כָּל אַחַת. וְלֵית בַּר נַשׁ אֲמַר אֲפִילוּ אֶלָּא דּוּ מוֹדֶה עַל קַדְמִיָיתָא. מַאי כְדוֹן. אָמַר רִבִּי חֲנִינָה. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר בֵּין שֶׁאָמַר. חִיטָּה וּשְׂעוֹרָה וְכוּסֶמֶת. כְּלָל וּפְרָט הוּא. אִם אָמַר. חִיטִּין שְׂעוֹרִין כּוּסְמִין. כְּלָל שֶׁאֵין בוֹ פְרָט. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** **HALAKHAH:** “Five who wrote collectively a bill of divorce,” etc. ⁸⁵ 5:5; the reading there are noted **ש**. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything⁸⁶ I am greeting”, he makes clear that his signature refers to the entire document. The same statement (R. Abbahu in the name of R. Joḥanan) is in the Babli, 87a.; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he said “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything⁸⁷. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Joḥanan⁸⁸? X divorces Y and Z U. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A⁸⁹. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately he needs a text and witnesses for each one separately⁹⁰. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit, a *qorbān* for this one or that one’; each single one needs a separate opening⁹¹ 9:7. The quote is incorrect. The Mishnah states that if each vow separately is declared as *qorban*, it will have to be annulled separately. One has to read: “a *qorbān* for this one, a *qorbān* for that one”. This Mishnah supports R. Ze‘ira’s interpretation of R. Joḥanan’s position..” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text⁹² for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.” Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr⁹³ 5:5 (36c 1. 4), Babli 38a. It refers to Mishnah *Šebuot* 5:5: “Give me my wheat, barley, and spelt, (expressed in the plural) which you are holding!” “An oath that I am holding nothing of yours”, he is guilty only once (if he swore falsely). “An oath that I am not holding any wheat, or barley, or spelt (expressed in the plural) of yours”, he is guilty for every statement. Rebbi Meїr says, even if he said “wheat, or barley, or spelt (expressed in the collective singular)”, he is guilty for every statement. In a *baraita* (Babli *Šebuot* 38a, *Qiddušin* 25a; quoted in Yerushalmi *Qiddušin* 2:1, 62b 1. 76) R. Meїr states that for a general statement in a false oath he is guilty only once, for a detailed statement he is guilty for every particular item. R. Jehudah notes that if a person is sued simultaneously by several people (Mishnah *Šebuot* 5:3) and he falsely swears that he owes “not to you, nor to you, nor to you”, he is guilty for every single statement. Samuel notes that what is a general statement for one may be a detailed statement for another.. [Rebbi]⁹⁴. The Giṭṭin text cannot be correct since the first generation Samuel cannot quote the fourth generation R. Ze‘ira. Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “and I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “and I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed regarding everything⁹⁵, R. Jehudah is mentioned as differing from R. Meїr, the question arises whether for R. Meїr there is a difference between a denial of a debt “to you, to you, to you” and “to you, and to you, and to you”. In the first case, there might be three denials, in the second case, there is only one. The implications for R. Jehudah would be the opposite.? How is this⁹⁶? Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated there⁹⁷ 5:5. The omission of תמן “there” in the parallel text is appropriate.: “Rebbi Meїr says, even ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt’ makes him guilty for each one separately”, but nobody says “even” unless he refers to an earlier statement⁹⁸. How is this⁹⁶? Rebbi Ḥanina said, in Rebbi Meїr’s opinion, [whether]⁹⁹. he said “wheat, and barley, and spelt”, [or “wheat, barley, spelt] is a general statement and particulars¹⁰⁰. [In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion,] if he said, “wheat grains, barley grains, and spelt grains”, it is a general statement without particulars¹⁰¹. footnotes: ⁸⁵ A parallel is in S̄ebuot ⁸⁶ If a witness to any contract, including a bill of divorce, signs and appends a greeting and formulates the greeting as a sentence standing alone, his signature cannot be counted as testimony. But if he writes: “and ⁸⁷ This opinion is not mentioned in the Babli. ⁸⁸ Referring to the Mishnah. How must a collective bill of divorce be formulated to be valid? ⁸⁹ This statement is ambiguous since no further details are given about R. Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion. It is obvious from Halakhah 3:1 that a text which mentions men and women separately, “we X and Z divorce our wives Y and U” is biblically invalid since (a) one cannot divorce two women with one statement and (b) it is not clear which woman was married to which man. One has to assume that the text was something like: “we X and Z divorce our wives, X Y and Z U,” with mention of place and date. ⁹⁰ If the language is “X divorces Y and Z divorces U”, there can be no collective bill of divorce. It still can be written on one sheet but it must spell out in full that X divorces Y and frees her to marry any man she choses, Z divorces U and frees her to marry any man she choses, and each statement has to be separately validated by two witnesses. ⁹¹ Mishnah Nedarim ⁹² And using a separate sentence containing the verb “to divorce” for each couple represents a separate text for each divorce. ⁹³ The same statement is in Šebuot ⁹⁴ From the text in Šebuot ⁹⁵ Since in the baraita ⁹⁶ As the parallel shows, this interjection should be deleted. ⁹⁷ Mishnah Šebuot ⁹⁸ Which must have been “wheat, barley, spelt” without connectives. ⁹⁶ As the parallel shows, this interjection should be deleted. ⁹⁹ The necessary inserted text is from Šebuot ¹⁰⁰ Since there are three particulars, he is obligated for three separate purificatioon offerings. ¹⁰¹ It is one connected statement which, if false, constitutes one sin. ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:7:1 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:7:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:7:1) **משנה:** שְׁנֵי גִיטִּין שֶׁכְּתָבָן זֶה בְצַד זֶה וּשְׁנֵי עֵדִים עִבְרִים בָּאִים מִתַּחַת זֶה לְתַחַת זֶה וּשְׁנַיִם עֵדִים יְוָונִים בָּאִים מִתַּחַת זֶה לְתַחַת זֶה. אֶת שֶׁהָעֵדִים הָרִאשׁוֹנִים נִקְרִין עִמּוֹ כָּשֵׁר. עֵד אֶחָד עִבְרִי וְעֵד אֶחָד יְוָונִי עֵד אֶחָד יְוָונִי וְעֵד אֶחָד עִבְרִי בָּאִין מִתַּחַת זֶה לְתַחַת זֶה שְׁנֵיהֶן פְּסוּלִין. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** **MISHNAH:** If he wrote two bills of divorce side by side and two Hebrew-writing witnesses signed from one column to the next, and two Greek-writing witnesses signed from one column to the next, the one whose witnesses are read with it is valid. If one Hebrew- and one Greek-writing witness are under each of them, reaching from one column to the other, all are invalid¹⁰². footnotes: ¹⁰² The scribe wrote two bills of divorce in two parallel columns. When the witnesses came to sign, they used the space under both columns. Then only the bill whose witnesses sign directly under it is valid since for the other bill the first witness is at least two lines too far away to be counted. The additional complication is that the Hebrew text starts at the right but the Greek text on the left. For example:               bill                                    bill                                                יצחק בן אברהם                                                משה בן עמרםΕνως υἱὸς ΣηθΣημ υἰὸς ΝωεIn this case, if the first two signatures apply to the bill on the right hand side, that bill is valid. If they applied to the bill at the left, both bills would be invalid since the bill is read from the left but the signatures from the right. If each bill carries two signatures, one to be read from the right, the other from the left:               bill                                    bill                                                יצחק בן אברהםΕνως υἱὸς Σηθ                                                משה בן עמרםΣημ υἰὸς Νωεno bill can be read with its signatures and both are invalid. If both Hebrew signatures belong to one bill and both Greek to the other, both bills are still invalid since the second signature is only on the fourth line. ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:7:2 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:7:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:7:2) **הלכה:** שְׁנֵי גִיטִּין שֶׁכְּתָבָן זֶה בְצַד זֶה כול׳. הִרְחִיק אֶת הָעֵדִים מִן הַכְּתָב. מְקוֹם שְׁנֵי שִׁיטִּין פָּסוּל. פָּחוֹת מִיכֵּן כָּשֵׁר. שִׁמְעוֹן בַּר בָּא בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. חָלָק מְקוֹם שְׁנֵי שִׁיטִּין לְעִנְיָין אֶחָד. אֲפִילוּ כָּל שֶׁהוּא פָּסוּל. אָמַר רִבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר רַב יִצְחָק. מַתְנִיתָא אָמְרָה כֵן. עֵד אֶחָד עִבְרִי וְעֵד אֶחָד יְוָונִי עֵד אֶחָד יְוָונִי וְעֵד אֶחָד עִבְרִי בָּאִין מִתַּחַת זֶה לְתַחַת זֶה שְׁנֵיהֶן פְּסוּלִין. וְעִבְרִי גַּבֵּי יְוָונִי לֹא כְעִנְיָין אֶחָד הוּא. אָמַר רִבִּי מָנָא. הִתְחִיל בְּסוֹף שְׁתַּיִם וְגָמַר בְּסוֹף אַרְבַּע כָּשֵׁר. כַּמָּה יְהוּ הָעֵדִים רְחוֹקִין מִן הַכְּתָב. כְּדֵי שֶׁיְּהוּ נִיקְרִין עִמּוֹ. דִּבְרֵי רִבִּי. רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר. מְלֹא שִׁיטָּה. רִבִּי דּוֹסִתַּי בֵּירִבִּי יַנַּאי אוֹמֵר. בלא חֲתִימַת יַד הָעֵדִים. בְּאֵי זֶה כְתָב מְשָׁעֲרִין. רִבִּי יָסָא בֵּירִבִּי שַׁבָּתַי. מְלֹא חֲתִימַת יְדֵי עֵדִים. רִבִּי אַבָּהוּ בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר חֲקוּלָא כְּדֵי לך ולך. רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה בָּעֵי קוֹמֵי רִבִּי זְעִירָא. חֲתִימַת יוֹסֵי בֶּן יַנַּאי כַּחֲתִימַת שָׁאוּל בֶּן בָּרוּךְ. אָמַר לֵיהּ. לָכֵן צְרִיכָה. חֲתִימַת יוֹסֵי בֶּן יַנַּאי כַּחֲתִימַת שָׁאוּל בֶּן בָּרוּךְ. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** **HALAKHAH:** “If he wrote two bills of divorce side by side,” etc. ¹⁰³ 10:1, noted **ב**. Even though this is evidently from a different edition, the text (except for the last two lines) is close enough to be considered identical. The text is Tosephta 7:11 (Babli *Baba batra* 162b).“It is invalid if the witnesses are separated from the text by the width of two lines; less than that it is valid”¹⁰⁴. ¹⁰⁵ Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An empty space of two lines in a text about one subject¹⁰⁶ reads: “Another subject”. The parallel in 3:2 shows that this is an editorial difference, not a scribal error. makes invalid in any case. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said: The Mishnah says so: “One Hebrew- and one Greek-writing witness are under each of them, reaching from one column to the other, are all invalid.” Is not Hebrew combined with Greek one item¹⁰⁷: “Is Hebrew relative to Greek not another subject?” The text here is preferable since for a single bill on a sheet of paper it is perfectly acceptable to have one witness sign in Hebrew and the other in Greek or Roman letters. The bills are invalid only because the signatures would be separated by more than one line, not because they are in different alphabets (cf. *Tosephta ki F shutah Giṭṭin* p. 910).? Rebbi Mana said, if he started at the end of the second line and ended at the fourth line, it is valid¹⁰⁸. ¹⁰⁹.“How far from the text should the witnesses sign? That they can be read with it, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, one full line. Rebbi Dositheos ben Yannai¹¹⁰ erroneously: Dositheos ben Jehudah. says, the width of the witnesses’ handwriting.” What kind of writing does one use to estimate? Rebbi Yasa ben Rebbi Sabbatai¹¹¹ correctly: R. Yasa *in the name* of R. Sabbatai. says, the width of the witnesses’ handwriting¹¹²: The largest of the writing of the scribe or one of the witnesses. This seems to be from the editors of *Neziqin;* the text here implies that the two lines are judged by the larger of the signatures. The Babli, *Baba batra* 163a, explicitly states that the handwriting of the scribe is irrelevant.. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Isaac ben Ḥaqula: Corresponding to לך ולך¹¹³ 163a.. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does the signature of Yose ben Yannai have equal weight with the signature of Shaul ben Barukh¹¹⁴? He said to him: For that it is needed, that the signature of Yose ben Yannai has equal weight with the signature of Shaul ben Barukh¹¹⁵. footnotes: ¹⁰³ There is a parallel in Baba batra ¹⁰⁴ The witnesses cannot sign directly after the text since then they would not appear as witnesses. In commercial contracts, the distance cannot be two full lines since then the holder of the document could insert a line of text at the end after the signing. Since a commercial contract is invalid if the witnesses are too far from the text, the same standard is applied for bills of divorce and manumission. ¹⁰⁵ A corresponding rule holds for lacunae in the text: Chapter 3:2, Notes 68, 69. ¹⁰⁶ The text in Baba batra ¹⁰⁷ In Baba batra ¹⁰⁸ If the first witness does not start to sign at the start of the second line but towards its end, extending his signature to the third line and forcing the second witness to write his patronymic on the fourth line, the document is valid since it cannot be adulterated. ¹⁰⁹ Tosephta 7:11–12; an extended version is quoted in Baba batra ¹¹⁰ In Baba batra ¹¹¹ In Baba batra ¹¹² In Baba batra ¹¹³ The empty line must be large enough as to accomodate separately the height of ל and the bottom of ך. The Babli agrees, Baba batra ¹¹⁴ It seems that it was acceptable if ~ב was written for “son of”. In that case, “Yose ben Yannai” had no lengths above and below the line, but “Shaul ben Barukh” had both. ¹¹⁵ In judging a document, the actual signatures count, not theoretical distances. It might be that “Yose ben Yannai” uses up more space than “Shaul ben Barukh”. ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:7:3 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:7:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:7:3) שְׁטָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ מַחַק אוֹ תְלוּת. מִגּוּפוֹ פָּסוּל. שֶׁלֹּא מִגּוּפוֹ כָּשֵׁר. וְאִם הֶחֱזִירוֹ מִלְּמַטָָּה אֲפִילוּ מִגּוּפוֹ כָּשֵׁר. רִבִּי יוֹנָה וְרִבִּי יוֹסֵי תְּרֵיהוֹן אָמְרִין. צָרִיךְ לְהַחֲזִיר שְׁתֵּי שִׁיטִּין מְקוֹם הַכְּתָב. רִבִּי זְעִירָא בְשֵׁם רַב. צָרִיךְ לְהַזְכִּיר עִנְיָינוֹ שֶׁלַּגֵּט עִמּוֹ. רִבִּי בָּא בְשֵׁם רַב. לֹא הִזְכִּיר עִנְיָינוֹ שֶׁלַּגֵּט עִמּוֹ. מִחְלְפָה שִׁיטָּתֵיהּ דְּרִבִּי בָּא. תַּמָּן אָמַר רִבִּי בָּא בְשֵׁם רַב יִרְמְיָה. עֵדִים פְּסוּלִין אֵינָן נַעֲשִׂין כְּהַרְחֵק עֵדוּת. שֶׁלֹּא בָאוּ אֶלָּא לְהֶכְשֵׁירוֹ שֶׁלַּגֵּט. וְהָכָא הוּא אָמַר הָכֵין. תַּמָּן בְּשֵׁם רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה. הָכָא בְשֵׁם רַב. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** A document which has an erasure or insertion in its main part¹¹⁶ is invalid; in the routine matter it is valid; but if it was mentioned later¹¹⁷ it is valid even in the main part. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, one has to mention it at least in the second line before the end of the text. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav: One has to mention the essence of the document with it¹¹⁸. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: If one did not mention the essence of the document with it¹¹⁹. The argument of Rebbi Abba seems inverted. There, Rebbi Ba said in the name of Rav Jeremiah: Disqualified witnesses do not constitute remote testimony since they came only to support the document’s validity¹²⁰. And here, he says so¹²¹? There, in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah, here in the name of Rav. footnotes: ¹¹⁶ Where the parties are identified and the sums of money specified. ¹¹⁷ Reference is made to the erasure or the addition before the last line of text. ¹¹⁸ In justifying erasure or addition, the purpose has to be stated. ¹¹⁹ This sentence is incomplete. The following discussion shows that one has to add: “it is invalid.” ¹²⁰ If the first lines after the contract text were filled with the signatures of people invited for reasons other than testimony and the real witnesses sign only later, one validates the document even though the real signatures start more than one line after the text. ¹²¹ If the essence of the document is not stated at the acknowledgment of a correction, the document is invalid. ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:7:4 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:7:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:7:4) קָרָא עִרְעֵר עַל חֲתִימַת יְדֵי עֵדִים. וְעַל חֲתִימַת יְדֵי הַדַּיָינִין. רִבִּי בָּא בְשֵׁם רַב יְהוּדָה. שֶׁכֵּן אִם רָצָה לְקַיְימוֹ בִּכְתַב יַד הָעֵדִים מְקוּיָים. בִּכְתַב יְדֵי הַדַּיָינִין מְקוּיָים. אֲנִי אוֹמֵר. אֲפִילוּ בְעֵד אֶחָד מִדַּיָין אֶחָד מְקוּיָים. יְהַב רְשׁוּ לַכְּתוֹבָא שֶׁיִּכְתּוֹב וְלַחַתִימַיָיא שֶׁיַּחְתִּימוֹן. רִבִּי בָּא בְשֵׁם רַב יִרְמְיָה. צְרִיכִין הָעֵדִים לִכְתּוֹב. הַמִּלְוָה הַזֹּאת מֵאֶחָד בְּנִיסָן הוּא וְאָנוּ אִיחַרְנוּ אֶת זְמַנּוֹ. רִבִּי זְעִירָא בְשֵׁם רַב הַמְנוּנָא. אַשְּׁרַת הַדַּיָינִין אֲפִילוּ רְחוֹקָה כַּמָּה כָּשֵׁר. אָמַר רִבִּי מָנָא. וְיֵאוּת. שֶׁכֵּן אִם רָצָה לְקַיְימוֹ אֲפִילוּ בִּכְתַב אֶחָד מְקַיֵים. רַב אָמַר. צְרִיכִין הַדַּיָינִין לִכְתּוֹב. אִישַּׁרְנוּהִי בְמַעֲמַד פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי. לָמָּה. כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יְהוּ מְצוּיִין לְהַזִּים. מֵעַתָּה אֲפִילוּ בְּאֵי זֶה יוֹם וּבְאֵי זֶה שָׁעָה וּבְאֵי זֶה מָקוֹם. גְּזַר דִין נְפַק מִקּוֹמֵי רַב וְלֹא הֲוָה כָתוּב כָּךְ. אָמַר רִבִּי חַגַּיי. צְרִיכִין הַדַּיָינִים מַכִּירִין אֶת הַנִּידּוֹנִין. מַעֲשֶׂה הָיָה וְזִיְיפוּ. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** If somebody contests the signature of the witnesses or the signature of the judges¹²². Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: If he wants to certify it from the handwriting of the witnesses it is certified, from the handwriting of the judges it is certified¹²³; I am saying¹²⁴ that even from one witness and one judge it is certified. If he gave permission to the scribe to write and to the witnesses to sign, Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jeremiah: The witnesses have to write: “This loan is from the first of Nisan but we wrote at a later date.”¹²⁵ 170b, confirms the statement but notes that it is not enforced. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: The confirmation of the judges is valid even if it is at some distance¹²⁶ 163b, forbids *any* space between signatures and confirmation, not even one line.. Rebbi Mana said, is that correct? Could he then not certify from one handwriting¹²⁷? Rav said: The judges have to write: We certified this in the presence of X and Y. Why? So they can be convicted of perjury¹²⁸. 19:16–21 to characterize the perjurer. In Talmudic theory, a wrong testimony is not usually perjured testimony; it is up to the court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Perjury is impossible testimony, i. e., the witnesses pretend to have seen things they could not have seen since they were not present at the place at the time indicated. This leads to the notion that the validity of a document could be tested only if the exact time and place of the signing were indicated in the document.. But then also on which date, at which time, at which place? A judgment was given before Rav and this was not written¹²⁹. Rebbi Ḥaggai said: The judges have to know the parties. It happened that they falsified¹³⁰. footnotes: ¹²² A debtor whose property is attached following a decree of a court in another jurisdiction claims that the document is counterfeit and the signatures of the witnesses and the judges are fake. ¹²³ The creditor can prove the document genuine either by proving the validity of the signatures of the witnesses or that of the judges. ¹²⁴ R. Abba adds that only two signatures have to be verified; they can also be those of one witness and one judge. ¹²⁵ The debtor told the scribe and witnesses to execute a document of indebtedness. If it was not written on the same day, the fact has to be noted on the document even though a postdated document is valid (only a predated one is invalid). The Babli, Baba batra ¹²⁶ Judicial confirmation of the genuineness of a document does not have to be written immediately below the signatures of the witnesses; it can be anywhere on the document. The Babli, Baba batra ¹²⁷ R. Mana’s argument is that of the Babli: If there is an empty space, the creditor could insert text in between and create a fake document with genuine signatures. ¹²⁸ The root זמם, used to describe perjury, really means “to devise (a plot)”. It is used in Deut ¹²⁹ It was executed by the signatures of the judges alone. ¹³⁰ A case of identity theft, where the signatures of the witnesses and the judges were all genuine but the presumed debtor gave a false identity, so that an innocent third party was hit with a decree of payment. ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:8:1 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:8:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:8:1) **משנה:** שִׁיֵיר מִקְצָת הַגֵּט וּכְתָבוֹ בַּדַּף הַשֵׁנִי וְהָעֵדִים מִלְּמַטָּן כָּשֵׁר. חָתְמוּ עֵדִים בְּרֹאשׁ הַדַּף מִן הַצַּד אוֹ מֵאֲחוֹרָיו בְּגֵט פָּשׁוּט פָּסוּל. הִקִּיף רֹאשׁוֹ שֶׁלָּזֶה בְּצַד רֹאשׁוֹ שֶׁלָּזֶה וְהָעֵדִים בָּאֶמְצַע שְׁנֵיהֶם פְּסוּלִין. רֹאשׁוֹ שֶׁלָּזֶה בְּצַד סוֹפוֹ שֶׁלָּזֶה וְהָעֵדִים מִלְּמַטָּן אֶת שֶׁהָעֵדִים נִקְרִין בְּסוֹפוֹ כָּשֵׁר. גֵּט שֶׁכְּתָבוֹ עִבְרִית וְעֵדָיו יְוָונִית יְוָונִית וְעֵדָיו עִבְרִית עֵד אֶחָד עִבְרִי וְעֵד אֶחָד יְוָונִי כָּתַב הַסּוֹפֵר וָעֵד כָּשֵׁר. אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי עֵד כָּשֵׁר. בֶּן אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי עֵד כָּשֵׁר. אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי בֶּן אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי וְלֹא כָתַב עֵד כָּשֵׁר. כָּתַב חְנִיכָתוֹ וַחֲנִיכָתָהּ כָּשֵׁר. כָּךְ הָיוּ נְקִיָּי הַדַּעַת בִּירוּשָׁלֵם כּוֹתְבִין. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** **MISHNAH:** It is valid if some of the text remained and was written in the second column¹³⁵, with the witnesses signing below. If the witnesses signed on top of the page, or at the sides¹³⁶, or on the other side for a simple document¹³⁷, it is invalid. If [two bills of divorce] start at the same place¹³⁸ and the witnesses are in the middle, both are invalid. If the start of one bill is next to the end of the other and the witnesses are at the end, the bill whose witnesses are read with the end is valid. A bill of divorce written in Hebrew with its witnesses signing in Greek, written in Greek with its witnesses signing in Hebrew, or one witness signing in Hebrew and one in Greek¹⁴¹, or the scribe wrote with one witness, is valid. “X, witness” is valid. “The son of Y, witness” is valid¹⁴². “X the son of Y”, but he did not write “witness”, is valid. If he wrote his or her surname¹⁴³, it is valid; that is how the punctilious in Jerusalem used to write. footnotes: ¹³⁵ The scribe folded the sheet so that it formed two columns. He then used both columns for the text. The witnesses then signed at the end. (The Babli, 88a, points out that this is valid only if the parchment or paper was folded, not if the two columns were glued together since they originally might have been parts of two different documents.) ¹³⁶ The signatures are disregarded unless they are affixed at the end of the document, exactly one line from the end of the text. ¹³⁷ In contrast to a sealed document. ¹³⁸ Two bills written on the same sheet, one from the middle to the bottom, the other from the middle to the top. The signatures do not belong to either text. ¹⁴¹ If there is only one document to be certified, it makes no difference if one signature is read from the right and the other from the left. ¹⁴² If the signature was recognizable as that of a certain person, the exact wording of the signature is irrelevant. ¹⁴³ The family name (in addition to the proper name but without the patronymic), in a society where family names were not common. ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:8:2 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:8:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:8:2) **הלכה:** שִׁיֵיר מִקְצָת הַגֵּט כול׳. מָהוּ שִׁיֵיר. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר בַּיבוֹן. כְּגוֹן קַיָים שָׁרִיר וּבָרוּר. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** **HALAKHAH:** “If some of the text remained,” etc. What does “remained” mean? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Baibon said, e. g., “true, valid, and clear¹³⁹ (Tel Aviv 1980) Vol. 1, p. 478, Note 112..” footnotes: ¹³⁹ The expression “remained” implies that most of the text was in the first column. It is now asserted that the document is valid even if only the last line is written in the second column, in which the husband asserts that the contents of the bill conform to his wishes. (The Babylonian formulary has only the words “valid and true”.) Cf. M.A. Friedman, Jewish Marriage in Palestine ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:8:3 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:8:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:8:3) וְגֵט פָּסוּל פָּשׁוּט בִּמְקוּשָּׁר כָּשֵׁר וּבִלְבַד מֵאַחֲרָיו. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** And what is invalid for a simple document is valid for a “knotted” one if it is on the back¹⁴⁰. footnotes: ¹⁴⁰ Cf. Chapter 8:12 for the rules of simple and sealed (knotted) documents. ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:8:4 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:8:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:8:4) רַב אָמַר. הַדַּיָינִין חוֹתְמִין אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינָן יוֹדְעִין לִקְרוֹת. אֲבָל אֵין הָעֵדִים חוֹתְמִין אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הָיוּ יוֹדְעִין לִקְרוֹת. אָמַר. יָבֹא עָלַי אִם עָשִׂיתִי מִיָּמַיי. אָמַר רִבִּי חַגַּיי קוֹמֵי רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. לֹא בָא קוֹמֵי רַב כְּתָב יְוָונִי מְיוּמוֹי וְקִיְימָהּ בְּחוֹתְמָיו. מַתְנִיתָא פְלִיגָא עַל רַב. גֵּט שֶׁכְּתָבוֹ עִבְרִית וְעֵדָיו יְוָונִית. יְוָונִית וְעֵדָיו עִבְרִית. עֵד אֶחָד עִבְרִי וְעֵד אֶחָד יְוָונִי. כָּשֵׁר. פָּתַר לָהּ כְּשֶׁהָיוּ יוֹדְעִין לִקְרוֹת וְלֹא הָיוּ יוֹדְעִין לַחֲתוֹם. וְאִם הָיוּ יוֹדְעִין אֶת שְׁנֵיהֶן יַחְתְּמוּ בְּאֵי זֶה מֵהֶן שֶׁיִּרְצוּ. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** ¹⁴⁷ Rav said: Judges may sign even if they cannot read, but no witnesses may sign unless they know how to read¹⁴⁸ 109a/b, the rule is attributed to R. Ḥiyya, Rav’s uncle.. He said, such should come over me¹⁴⁹ if I ever acted thus¹⁵⁰. Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Did no Greek document come before Rav that he could confirm it by its signatures¹⁵¹? The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “A bill of divorce written in Hebrew with its witnesses signing in Greek, written in Greek with its witnesses signing in Hebrew, or one witness signing in Hebrew and one in Greek, is valid¹⁵².” He explains that they knew how to read but not how to sign; or if they knew both [languages], they could sign in either one of their choice. footnotes: ¹⁴⁷ In the ms., Halakhah 10 starts only at 50d, line 12. ¹⁴⁸ If judges sign the document, they only certify that it was presented to them and they attest to the genuineness of the signatures. Therefore, judges who do not know Greek can certify Aramaic signatures on a Greek document. But the witnesses testify to the genuineness of the document and they may be called to testify about its meaning; they are prohibited from signing unless they can read and understand it. In the Babli, Ketubot ¹⁴⁹ An oath; the speaker invokes all kinds of bad things which should happen to him if he ever did what he denies doing. ¹⁵⁰ He never acted on what he permitted in theory. ¹⁵¹ Since Rav exercised jurisdiction only in Babylonia, it is quite possible than no Greek document ever came before him. ¹⁵² Does this not mean that the witness signing in Greek did not know Hebrew and vice-versa? ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:8:5 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:8:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:8:5) אָמַר רִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר. דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל הִיא. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. דְּרִבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. לֹא בְעִית מִדַּעְתּוֹ דְּרִבִּי יוֹחָנָן פְּלִיג. בְּשִׁיטָּתוֹ הֵשִׁיבֵהוּ. לְאוֹרְכּוֹ. דּוּ אָמַר בְּשֵׁם רִבִּי זְעִירָא. מִכֵּיוָן שֶׁאֵינוֹ מָצוּי לְזַוֵוג וְלֹא זִיוֵוג. כֵּינִי מַתְנִיתָא. כָּתַב סוֹפֵר וָעֵד כָּשֵׁר. אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי כָּשֵׁר. בֶּן אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי כָּשֵׁר. אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי בֶּן אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי וְלֹא כָתַב עֵד כָּשֵׁר. כָּתַב חְנִיכָתוֹ וַחֲנִיכָתָהּ פָּסוּל. רִבִּי אַבָּהוּ בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. אֲפִילוּ כָתַב אִינּוֹ. כָּשֵׁר. רִבִּי אַבָּהוּ כָתַב אל״ף. רַב חִסְדָּא כָתַב סמ״ך. שְׁמוּאֵל כָּתַב חָרוּתָא. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** Rebbi Eleazar said, it is everybody’s opinion¹⁵³. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is Rebbi Jehudah’s¹⁵⁴. Rebbi Yose said, you should not infer that the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan is that he differs, but he answered him following his argument. Lengthwise¹⁵⁵ reads instead of לאורכו two words לא רבו and takes it together with the next statement: לא רבו דו אמא: “Was it not his teacher who said”, viz., one supports R. Yose, who is quoted in Chapter 3, Note 66, that his teacher R. Jeremiah quoted his own teacher R. Ze‘ira to the effect that one does not have to worry that two men, both called X ben Y, divorce their wives, both called A bat B, at the same place on the same day. Therefore, one does not have to worry either that a person whose characteristic signature consists only of one word be taken for another person.. That is what he said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Since pairing is infrequent, there was no pairing. So is the Mishnah: “If the scribe wrote with one witness, is it valid¹⁵⁶ Vol. 1, p. 489.. “X” is valid. “The son of Y” is valid¹⁴². “X the son of Y” but he did not write “witness”, is valid¹⁵⁷. If he wrote his or her surname, it is invalid¹⁵⁸. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even if he wrote “he is it¹⁵⁹”, it is valid. Rebbi Abbahu wrote **א**. Rav Ḥisda wrote **ס**.¹⁶⁰ Samuel wrote a palm branch. footnotes: ¹⁵³ The Mishnah which lets the witnesses sign in any way they choose, if only their signatures are characteristic for them. ¹⁵⁴ Who in Mishnah 3 requires a lengthy text. ¹⁵⁵ Mishnah 9 speaks of the case that the sheet containing the bill was folded lengthwise, with the two columns then in parallel. This may be ascribed to R. Jehudah who in Mishnah 3 requires that the text be very specific in detailing the divorce.The editio princeps ¹⁵⁶ J. N. Epstein (2 מבוא לנוסח המשנה, p. 476–477) notes that in most documents from the Genizah, at the end the scribe appended his own name. The Mishnah admits this declaration as testimony to the genuineness of the document. This is rejected by the Babli, 88a, in the name of R. Jeremiah. Cf. M.A. Friedman, Jewish Marriage in Palestine ¹⁴² If the signature was recognizable as that of a certain person, the exact wording of the signature is irrelevant. ¹⁵⁷ In the revised version, no witness has to declare that he signs as a witness; his signature at the correct place automatically justifies it. ¹⁵⁸ Evrybody, including J. N. Epstein, considers this as a scribal error for “valid”. But it might mean that the family name alone, without a proper name, is invalid. ¹⁵⁹ Reading אִינּוֹ for הִנּוֹ. This is acceptable as a signature as long as it was written in a characteristic way that would be difficult to counterfeit, more or less in the tradition of Sephardic rabbinical signatures through the ages. ¹⁶⁰ Probably in a very convoluted manner. In the Babli, 87b, a number of rabbis are mentioned who wrote their names in the form of a picture: R. Ḥanina a palm branch, Rav a beehive, Rabba bar Rav Huna a sail (the latter was imitated in the 18th. Cent. by R. H. Y. D. Azulay.) ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:9:1 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:9:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:9:1) **משנה:** גֵּט מְעוּשֶּׂה בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל כָּשֵׁר וּבַגּוֹֹיִם פָּסוּל. וְהַגּוֹיִים חוֹבְטִין אוֹתוֹ וְאוֹמְרִים לוֹ עֲשֵׂה מַה שֶׁיִּשְׂרָאֵל אוֹמְרִים לָךְ. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** **MISHNAH:** A forced bill of divorce among Jews is valid¹⁴⁴, from Gentiles it is invalid¹⁴⁵; but the Gentiles may whip him and tell him, do what the Jews tell you¹⁴⁶. footnotes: ¹⁴⁴ In a case where the marriage is valid but sinful. ¹⁴⁵ If the wife’s family pays Gentiles to beat up the husband or the Gentile ruler to jail the husband until he agrees to a divorce (documented in many cases from Medieval Spain), the resulting divorce is invalid. ¹⁴⁶ If the rabbinic court asks the Gentile court to act on its behalf, the resulting divorce is valid. ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:9:2 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:9:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:9:2) **הלכה:** כָּךְ הָיוּ נְקִיָּי הַדַּעַת בִּירוּשָׁלֵם כּוֹתְבִין. גֵּט מְעוּשֶּׂה בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל כָּשֵׁר וּבַגּוֹיִם פָּסוּל כול׳. שְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר. פָּסוּל וּפוֹסֵל בִּכְהוּנָה. שְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר. אֵין מְעַשִּׂין אֶלָּא לִפְסוּלִין. שְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר. אֵין מְעַשִּׂין אֶלָּא אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל גְּרוּשָׁה וַחֲלוּצָה לְכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט. וְהָתַנִּינָן שְׁנִיּוֹת. לָא בְגִין אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל. וְהָתַנִּינָן. הַמַדִּיר אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ מִלֵּיהֲנוֹת לוֹ. עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם יַעֲמִיד פַּרְנָס. יוֹתֵר מִיכֵּן יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתוּבָּה. שָׁמַעְנוּ שֶׁהוּא מוֹצִיא. שָׁמַעְנוּ שֶׁכּוֹפִין. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** **HALAKHAH:** “That is how the punctilious in Jerusalem used to write. A forced bill of divorce among Jews is valid, from Gentiles it is invalid”. ¹⁶¹ Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies from the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by *ḥalȋṣah* in the case of a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him for up to 30 days shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay *ketubah*”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him? footnotes: ¹⁶¹ This paragraph is from Yebamot 9:5 (י) Notes 40–46. ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:9:3 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:9:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:9:3) רַב יִרְמְיָה בְשֵׁם רַב. יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁעִיסּוּ כְמַעֲשֶׂה גּוֹיִם פָּסוּל. וּבְאוֹמֵר. אֵינִי זָן וּמְפַרְנֵס. תַּנֵּי רִבִּי חִיָיה. וְגוֹיִם שֶׁעִיסּוּ כְמַעֲשֶׂה יִשְׂרָאֵל כָּשֵׁר. אֲפִילוּ אָמַר. אֵינִי זָן וּמְפַרְנֵס. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. מַתְנִיתָא אָמְרָה כֵן. וְהַגּוֹיִם אוֹמְרִים לוֹ וְחוֹבְטִין אוֹתוֹ וְאוֹמְרִים לוֹ. עֲשֵׂה מַה שֶׁיִּשְׂרָאֵל אוֹמְרִים לָךְ. רַב חִיָיה בַּר אַשִּׁי בְשֵׁם אִיסִּי. הָאוֹמֵר. אֵינִי זָן וּמְפַרְנֵס. כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ לְהוֹצִיא. רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה בָּעֵי קוֹמֵי רִבִּי אַבָּהוּ. וְכוֹפִין. אָמַר לֵיהּ. וְאַדַּיִין אַתְּ לָיֵי. אִם מִפְּנֵי רֵיחַ רַע כּוֹפִין לֹא כָּל שֶׁכֵּן מִפְּנֵי חַיֵּי נֶפֶשׁ. אָתָא רִבִּי חִזְקִיָּה רִבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אָחָא רִבִּי יָסָא בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. הָאוֹמֵר. אֵינִי זָן וְאֵינִי מְפַרְנֵס. אוֹמְרִים לוֹ. אוֹ זָן אוֹ פַרְנֵס אוֹ פְטוֹר. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Jews who forced in the manner of Gentiles make invalid¹⁶² ובגוים, *Baba batra* 48a *s.v.* גט) if the forcing was executed under the supervision of a Gentile court or a Gentile ruler., even if he says, I shall not feed nor provide. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Gentiles who forced in the manner of Jews are valid, even if he says, I shall not feed nor provide¹⁶³. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says this: “Gentiles may tell him¹⁶⁴, whip him, and tell him, do what the Jews tell you to do.” Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Issy¹⁶⁵ 77a). Samuel holds that the husband has to be forced to pay but Rav asserts that one cannot require the wife “to live in the same basket with a snake” and the court has to force a divorce.: If somebody says: “I shall not feed nor provide”, one forces him to divorce. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Abbahu: Does one force? He said to him, do you still have doubts? If one forces because of a foul smell¹⁶⁶ 7:10., so much more because of sustenance! Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Yasa came in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody says: “I shall not feed and I shall not provide”, one tells him: Either feed and provide, or divorce. footnotes: ¹⁶² In the interpretation of Tosaphot (88b s.v. ¹⁶³ If the forcing is under the supervision of a rabbinic court, the divorce is valid even if the marriage is completely legitimate because the husband has no right to mistreat his wife in any way. ¹⁶⁴ This addition probably is a scribal error. ¹⁶⁵ The Babli agrees in the name of Rav (Ketubot ¹⁶⁶ Mishnah Ketubot ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:10:1 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:10:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:10:1) **משנה:** יָצָא שְׁמָהּ בָּעִיר מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת הֲרֵי זוֹ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת. וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא שָׁם אֲמַתְלָא. וְאֵיזוֹ הִיא אֲמַתְלָא. גִּירֵשׁ אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ עַל תְּנַאי זָרַק לָהּ קִידּוּשִׁין סָפֵק קָרוֹב לָהּ סָפֵק קָרוֹב לוֹ זוֹ הִיא אֲמַתְלָא. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** **MISHNAH:** If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married¹⁶⁷; divorced, she is divorced¹⁶⁸, except if there was an excuse. What would be an excuse? Mr. X divorced his wife conditionally¹⁶⁹, or he threw valuables for preliminary marriage to her and it was doubtful whether it was closer to her than to him¹⁷⁰; that is an excuse. footnotes: ¹⁶⁷ If she had been unmarried, she cannot marry another man without receiving a divorce from the one to whom she is betrothed in the eyes of the public. ¹⁶⁸ And could not marry a Cohen even if previously unmarried. ¹⁶⁹ And the condition was not satisfied. ¹⁷⁰ A doubt whether a doubtful marriage was concluded has to be dismissed as irrelevant. ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:10:2 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:10:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:10:2) **הלכה:** יָצָא שְׁמָהּ בָּעִיר מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת כול'. רִבִּי יָסָא בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. נֵירוֹת דּוֹלְקִין וְשִׂיחוֹת בְּנֵי אָדָם מְשִׂיחִין. הָתִיב רִבִּי זְעִירָא קוֹמֵי רִבִּי יָסָא. וְהָא תַנִּינָן. יָצָא שְׁמָהּ בָּעִיר מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת הֲרֵי זוֹ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת. אִית לָן מֵימַר נֵירוֹת דּוֹלְקִין. לֹא סִיחֹת בְּנֵי אָדָם מְסִיחִין. וְהָכָא סִיחוֹת בְּנֵי אָדָם מְשִׂיחִין. רִבִּי יָסָא בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. נִבְדַּק הַשֵּׁם וְנִמְצָא מִפִּי נָשִׁים וּמִפִּי קְטַנִּים בָּטֵל הַשֵּׁם. רַב אָמַר. לֹא הִתִּירוּ בֶהּ אֶלָּא עֵד מִפִּי עֵד בִּלְבַד. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** **HALAKHAH:** “If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married”. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If lights are burning and people talk¹⁷⁵. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected before Rebbi Yasa: But did we not state: “If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married; divorced, she is divorced”? Can you say that lights are burning¹⁷⁶? No, people talk. So here also, people talk¹⁷⁷. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the title was checked and found to be from the mouth of women or minors, the title is abolished¹⁷⁸. Rav said, they permitted only in case of a hearsay witness¹⁷⁹. footnotes: ¹⁷⁵ A person can be held married only if there was a marriage celebration and people talk about it. The same opinion is attributed to R. Joḥanan in the Babli, 89a. ¹⁷⁶ Since the Mishnah treats divorce as parallel to marriage and usually people do not make divorce parties, no celebration can be required. ¹⁷⁷ Likewise for marriage, no testimony about festivities is required. ¹⁷⁸ The court cannot act (to require a divorce or to prohibit marriage to a Cohen) unless it is informed by people able to appear as formal witnesses in court. ¹⁷⁹ Rav disagrees with R. Joḥanan. If a formal proof were required, the Mishnah would be unnecessary. Therefore, only a determination of facts is needed, and women can be asked about facts. He agrees only that if the information was by hearsay and its source cannot be located, it has to be disregarded. In the Babli, 89a, Rav holds that if the source was located but cannot be asked because the informant left, one accepts the rumor as true. ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:11:1 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:11:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:11:1) **משנה:** בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים לֹא יְגָרֵשׁ אָדָם אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן מָצָא בָהּ עֶרְוָה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר כִּי מָצָא בָהּ עֶרְוַת דָּבָר. וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים אֲפִילוּ הִקְדִּיחָה תַבְשִׁילוֹ שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר כִּי מָצָא בָהּ עֶרְוַת דָּבָר. רִבִּי עֲקִיבָה אוֹמֵר אֲפִילוּ מָצָא אַחֶרֶת נָאָה מִמֶּנָּה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר וְהָיָה אִם לֹא תִמְצָא חֵן בְּעֵינָיו וגו׳. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** **MISHNAH:** The House of Shammai say, a person should not divorce his wife unless he found her immoral, as it was said¹⁷¹. 24:1.: “For he found with her a matter of nakedness¹⁷² 1:1, Notes 13,14). In the absence of proof, the House of Shammai counsel him to divorce her. This probably is also the interpretation to be given to *Matth*. 19:9 and is the basis of the disapproval of marrying a divorcee expressed in *Sifry Deut*. 270..” But the House of Hillel say, even if she spoiled his dish, as it was said: “For he found with her a bad thing¹⁷³.” Rebbi Aqiba said, even if he found another more beautiful than her, as it was said: “It will be if she does not appear pleasing in his eyes¹. 24:1.¹⁷⁴, he may divorce her. In his opinion (adopted in practice), a divorcee may be completely blameless., etc.” footnotes: ¹⁷¹ Deut ¹⁷² If the husband had proof of her infidelity, he would by law be obligated to divorce her (cf. Soṭah ¹⁷³ The Houses of Shammai and Hillel explain the same verse. The House of Shammai read עֶרְוַת דָּבָר as if it were (in rabbinic Hebrew) דְּבַר עֶרְוָה “a matter of nakedness (immorality)”. The House of Hillel read the construct state עֶרְוַת as a modifier of דָּבָר “thing”: an undesirable thing; e.g., being a bad cook. ¹ Deut ¹⁷⁴ Even if she is beautiful in an objective way, but not beautiful in his eyes ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:11:2 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:11:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:11:2) **הלכה:** וְהָא תַנֵּי. בֵּית שַׁמַּי אוֹמְרִים. אֵין לִי אֶלָּא הַיּוֹצֵא מִשּׁוּם עֶרְוָה בִּלְבַד. וּמִנַּיִין הַיּוֹצְאָה וְרֹאשָׁהּ פָּרוּעַ צְדָדֶיהָ פְרוּמִין וּזְרוֹעוֹתֶיהָ חֲלוּצוֹת. תַּלמוּד לוֹמַר כִּי מָצָא בָהּ עֶרְוַת דָּבָר. מַה מְקַיְימִין דְּבֵית שַׁמַּי. שֶׁלֹּא תֹאמַר. הַיּוֹצֵא מִשּׁוּם עֶרְוָה אָסוּר. מִשּׁוּם דָּבָר אַחֵר מוּתֶּרֶת. אָמַר רִבִּי שִׁילָא דִכְפַר תָּמַרְתָּא. קִרְיָיא מַקְשֵׁי עַל דְּבֵית שַׁמַּי. לֹא יוּכַל בַּעֲלָהּ הָרִאשׁוֹן אֲשֶׁר שִׁלְּחָהּ לְשׁוּב לְקַחְתָּהּ. מַה אֲנָן מְקַיְימִין. אִם לְאוֹסְרָהּ עָלָיו כְּבָר הִיא אֲסוּרָה לוֹ. אֶלָּא כֵּן אֲנָן קַיָימִין. לִיתֵּן עָלָיו בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** **HALAKHAH:** ¹⁸⁰ 1:1, Notes 13,14. Was it not stated in the name of the House of Shammai: Not only that the woman must leave because of incest; from where that she must leave if her head’s [hair] is loose, if the side seams of her dress are open, or her arms stripped bare? The verse says, “for he found in her a matter of nakedness.” How can the House of Shammai confirm this¹⁸¹, they admit all kinds of lewd behavior.? Lest you say that one divorced because of immorality is forbidden, for anothercause she would be permitted¹⁸². Rebbi Shila from Kefar-Tamarta said: The verse is difficult for the House of Shammai: “Her first husband, who had sent her away, cannot afterwards retake her.¹⁸³. 24:4.” Where do we hold? If to forbid her to him, is she not already forbidden to him¹⁸⁴? But we must hold, to burden him with a prohibition¹⁸⁵. מה).. footnotes: ¹⁸⁰ Soṭah ¹⁸¹ In the Mishnah, the House of Shammai admit only adultery as cause of divorce. In the baraita ¹⁸² Could be remarried by her first husband after having had a second husband. ¹⁸³ Deut ¹⁸⁴ If she committed adultery, she is automatically forbidden to her husband, even if she does not remarry. The prohibition to remarry the first husband after a remarriage seems to be unnecessary for the House of Shammai. ¹⁸⁵ In remarrying her, the first husband would commit two sins in one act (cf. Tosaphot 90a, s.v ###### Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:11:3 [Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:11:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Gittin/r/9:11:3) כְּתִיב וְהַדָּוָה בְּנִידָּתָהּ וְהַזָּב אֶת זוֹבוֹ. זְקֵינִים הָרִאשׁוֹנִים הָיוּ אוֹמְרִים. תְּהֵא בְנִידָּתָהּ. לֹא תִכְחוֹל וְלֹא תִפְקוֹס עַד שֶׁתָּבוֹא בַמַּיִם. אָמַר לָהֶן רִבִּי עֲקִיבָה. מִשָּׁם רְאַיָיה. אִם אַתְּ אוֹמֵר כֵּן אוֹף הִיא עַצְמָהּ מֵבִיאָה לִידֵי כְעִירוּת וְהוּא נוֹתֵן אֶת עֵינָיו בָּהּ לְגָרְשָׁהּ. וְאַתְיָיא דִּזְקֵנִים כְּבֵית שַׁמַּי וּדְרִבִּי עֲקִיבָה כְבֵית הִלֵּל. **The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:** It is written¹⁸⁶. 15:33. The same argument in the Babli, *Šabbat* 64b, *Sifra Meṣoraʻ Pereq* 9(12).: “And the unwell in her menstruation and the sufferer from gonorrhea in his flow.” The earlier Elders used to say, “she shall be in her menstruation¹⁸⁷. 15:19.”, she shall not use *kohl* nor any make-up until she comes into water. Rebbi Aqiba said to them: Is that a reason? If you say so, she makes herself ugly and he starts thinking to divorce her. It turns out that the Elders follow the House of Shammai¹⁸⁸ and Rebbi Aqiba the House of Hillel¹⁸⁹. footnotes: ¹⁸⁶ Lev ¹⁸⁷ Lev ¹⁸⁸ Since she cannot be divorced, it does not matter how she looks. ¹⁸⁹ In the Mishnah, R. Aqiba does not disagree with the House of Hillel; he simply takes their argument to its logical conclusion.