## Jerusalem Talmud Horayot Chapter 1

###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:1:1
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:1:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:1:1)

**משנה:** הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין לַעֲבוֹר עַל אַחַת מִכָּל מִצְוֹת הָאֲמוּרוֹת בַּתּוֹרָה וְהָלַךְ הַיָּחִיד וְעָשָׂה שׁוֹגֵג עַל פִּיהֶם בֵּין שֶׁעָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה עִמָּהֶן בֵּין שֶׁעָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה אַחֲרֵיהֶן בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא עָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה פָּטוּר מִפְּנֵי שֶׁתָּלָה בְבֵית דִּין. הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין וְיָדַע אֶחָד מֵהֶן שֶׁטָּעוּ אוֹ תַלְמִיד שֶׁהוּא רָאוּי לְהוֹרָיָיה וְהָלַךְ וְעָשָׂה עַל פִּיהֶם בֵּין שֶׁעָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה עִמָּהֶם בֵּין שֶׁעָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה אַחֲרֵיהֶם בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא עָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָיב מִפְּנֵי שֶׁלֹּא תָלָה בְבֵית דִּין. זֶה הַכְּלָל הַתּוֹלֶה בְעַצְמוֹ חַיָיב וְהַתּוֹלֶה בְבֵית דִּין פָּטוּר:

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**MISHNAH:** If the Court¹ ruled to violate one of the commandments spelled out in the Torah² and a single person went and acted inadvertently³ following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is not liable⁴ 4:27–35) or, in the absence of a Temple, repentance and an expiatory action. since he depended on the Court. If the Court ruled but one of them knew that they erred, or a student worthy of ordination⁵ went and acted following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is liable⁴ 4:27–35) or, in the absence of a Temple, repentance and an expiatory action. since he did not depend on the Court. This is the principle: The person depending on himself is liable⁶ Chapter 8) since by definition the rebellious Elder came to ask the High Court; in the matter he came to ask, his knowledge is not independent of the Court., but one depending on the Court is not liable.

footnotes:
¹ The High Court.
² A commandment clearly spelled out, like the prohibition of eating blood, where the biblical text does not imply an authorization of the rabbinical authorities to define the parameters of the obligation.
³ When the Court realized its error and changed its ruling, the person acting in good faith on their prior ruling is now faced with the fact that his act violated a biblical commandment, against his intention.
⁴ For a purification sacrifice (Lev.
⁵ He knows how to answer when asked any question of religious law.
⁴ For a purification sacrifice (Lev.
⁶ This rule, which declares that no instruction of the High Court supersedes one’s own certain knowledge, does not contradict the law of the rebellious Elder (Sanhedrin


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:1:2
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:1:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:1:2)

**הלכה:** הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין כול׳. נֶפֶשׁ כִּי תֶחֱטָא. אַחַת תֶּחֱטָא. בַּעֲשׂוֹתָהּ תֶּחֱטָא. הֲרֵי אֵילּוּ מִיעוּטִין. הַתּוֹלֶה בְעַצְמוֹ חַיָיב וְהַתּוֹלֶה בְבֵית דִּין פָּטוּר. בְּכָל אַתָר אַתָּ מַר. מִיעוּט אַחַר מִיעוּט לְרַבּוֹת. וָכָא אַתָּ מַר. מִיעוּט אַחַר מִיעוּט לְמָעֵט. אָמַר רִבִּי מַתַּנְיָה. שַׁנְיָיא הִיא. דִּכְתִיב מִיעוּט אַחַר מִיעוּט אַחַר מִיעוּט.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**HALAKHAH:** ⁷“If the Court ruled.” etc. *A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress;* these are restrictions⁸, but the first of the quotes in the Leiden ms. is a misquote, referring to *Lev.*4:2 instead of 4:27. The basic text is in *Sifra Wayyiqra Parašah* 7(1), referred to in Babli 2b, discussed in detail *Šabbat*93a.
Chapter 4 in *Lev.* treats the purification sacrifices for unintentional sin first by the High Priest (vv. 1–12), then the High Court (13–21), then a chief, identified in Mishnah 3:3 as a king (22–26), and finally by a commoner (27–35). V. 27 reads: *If one* *person of the populace transgresses inadvertently, by acting on one prohibitions of the Eternal, and feels guilt.* It is noted that the sentence seems to be unnecessarily wordy. Why does it not say simply, “if somebody inadvertently transgresses a prohibition of the Eternal”? The additional words must have a meaning; they describe restrictions. In Babli *Šabbat*93a one derives from the insistence that *one* person commit the sin that a violation of a commandment cannot be prosecuted if committed by two persons acting in common, so that no single person commits a punishable act but the combined result is a clear violation,. Such a violation cannot be atoned for by a purification sacrifice. It also is clear that only *acts* are punishable.
In the context here the additional terms are interpreted to mean that only a person acting on his own is required to offer a purification sacrifice; this excludes one who is told by a religious authority that his act is permitted.: the person depending on himself is liable, but one dependent on the Court is not liable. Everywhere it is said that a restriction after a restriction is an addition, but here it is said, a restriction after a restriction is to reduce? Rebbi Mattaniah said, it is different here since there is written a restriction after a restriction after a restriction⁹ 6:9 Note 154, *Yebamot* 12:1 Note 10, *Sotah*9:2 Note 63, *Roš Haššanah* 1:1 56a l.58, *Megillah* 4:4 75b l.14; Babli *Megillah*23b, *Yoma* 43a, *Bava qamma* 15b, *Bava batra* 15a, *Sanhedrin* 15a,44b,66a, *Makkot* 9b, *Ševuot* 7b, *Menahot* 9b,67a, *Hulin* 132a.) The principle is extended here to read that any even number of restrictions (additions) is an addition (restriction) while any odd number of restrictions (additions) is a restriction (addition); cf. Rashi in *Sanhedrin* 15a *s. v.* חמשה..

footnotes:
⁷ The text is that of the Leiden ms., the readings are those of the Yerushalmi text in the Bomberg Babli of 1520.
⁸ The quotes are correct in the Yerushalmi text of the Babli editio princeps
⁹ It is a generally recognized principle that a double restriction is an addition and a double addition a restriction (Peah


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:1:3
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:1:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:1:3)

רִבִּי חַגַּיי שָׁאַל לַחֲבֵרַיָיה. מְנַיִין לָאוֹכֵל בִּרְשׁוּת שֶׁהוּא פָטוּר. מַה בֵּין סָבוּר שֶׁהוּא חוּלִין וְנִמְצֵאת תְּרוּמָה שֶׁהוּא חַיָיב. מַה בֵּין הַמַּחֲזִיק בְּעַצְמוֹ שֶׁהוּא כֹהֵן וְנִמְצָא יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁהוּא פָטוּר. אָמְרִין לֵיהּ. מִן הוֹרָיוֹת בֵּית דִּין. אָמַר לוֹן. אוֹף אֲנָא צְרִיכָא לִי. מַה בֵּין סָבוּר שֶׁהוּא חוֹל וְנִמְצֵאת שַׁבָּת שֶׁהוּא חַיָיב. מַה בֵּין סָבוּר שֶׁהוּא פֶסַח וְנִמְצָא שְׁלָמִים שֶׁהוּא פָטוּר. אָמְרִין לֵיהּ. מִן הַשּׁוֹחֵט בִּרְשׁוּת. אָמַר לוֹן. אוֹף אֲנָא צְרִיכָה לִי. מַה בֵּין סָבוּר שֶׁהוּא מוּתָּר וְנִמְצָא אָסוּר שֶׁהוּא חַיָיב. מַה בֵּין סָבוּר שֶׁהוּא חֵלֶב וְנִמְצָא שׁוּמָּן שֶׁהוּא פָטוּר. לֹא אָמְרוּ לֵיהּ כְּלוּם. אָמַר לוֹן. נֵימָא לְכוֹן מִינָּן. אוֹ הוֹדַע אֵלָיו חַטָּאתוֹ וְהֵבִיא. עָאַל רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. אָמְרִין לֵיהּ. קַשִׁי לַן הָדָא מִילְּתָא. אָמַר לוֹן. וְלָמָּה לָא אַגִּיבְתּוֹנֵיהּ מִן הָדָא אוֹ הוֹדַע אֵלָיו חַטָּאתוֹ וְהֵבִיא. אָמְרִין לֵיהּ. חַגַּיי קְשִׁיתָהּ חַגַּיי קִיַימְתָּהּ.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
¹⁰ 8:1, Notes 14–22. As explained there, the background of the paragraph in *Terumot* is different from the one presumed here; therefore at a place where the readings there and here seem to be opposite to one another, both are correct in their settings. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked the colleagues: From where that he who eats with permission be not liable¹¹ 8:1; a childless woman of non-priestly birth, married to a Cohen, was eating heave in purity, as is her right and duty, when she was informed of her husband’s death. By this death she returns to her non-priestly status and heave is forbidden to her. Nevertheless, she is not liable for a reparation sacrifice nor to pay for the heave eaten in error. This is the topic of *Terumot* 8:1, it is not followed up here.? What is the difference between him¹² 6:1. who thought that it was profane but it turned out to be heave, who is liable, and him who thought that he was a Cohen but it turned out that he was an Israel, who is not liable¹³? They said to him, by the instruction of the court. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was weekday but it turned out that it was Sabbath¹⁴ 4:27., who is liable, and him who thought that it was a Passover sacrifice but it turned out to be a well-being offering, who is not liable¹⁵ 8:1, Note 18. The Passover sacrifice must be slaughtered in the afternoon of the 14 of Nisan, whether Sabbath or weekday. A festival wellbeing offering may not be slaughtered on the Sabbath. If the 14 was a Sabbath and somebody slaughtered a sheep in the Temple courtyard thinking that it was a designated Passover sacrifice when in fact it had been designated as a well-being offering, R. Joshua, an overriding authority, declares him not liable (Mishnah *Pesahim* 6:4).. They said to him, because he slaughtered with permission. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was permitted but it turned out to be forbidden¹⁵ 8:1, Note 18. The Passover sacrifice must be slaughtered in the afternoon of the 14 of Nisan, whether Sabbath or weekday. A festival wellbeing offering may not be slaughtered on the Sabbath. If the 14 was a Sabbath and somebody slaughtered a sheep in the Temple courtyard thinking that it was a designated Passover sacrifice when in fact it had been designated as a well-being offering, R. Joshua, an overriding authority, declares him not liable (Mishnah *Pesahim* 6:4)., who is liable, and him who thought that it was forbidden fat¹⁶ and it turned out to be permitted fat, who is not liable. They did not answer at all. He told them, let me tell you from myself¹⁷: *Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring*¹⁸ 4:28. Since he was informed that he failed to commit the sin, he cannot bring a purification sacrifice. His repentance for his sinful intent will be a private matter between him and God.. Rebbi Yossi came to visit them; they told him, that problem is hard for us. He asked them, why did you not answer him, *or his transgression in which he**sinned was made known to him; he has to bring*? They told him, Ḥaggai asked the question, Ḥaggai gave the answer.

footnotes:
¹⁰ This paragraph has a parallel in Terumot
¹¹ Referring to Mishnah Terumot
¹² An Israel to whom heave is forbidden, Mishnah Terumot
¹³ He had been told from childhood that he was a Cohen; he was stripped of his priesthood by a court on the testimony of two witnesses that one of his female ancestors had been forbidden to her Cohen husband. His case is not different from that of the woman in Note 12.
¹⁴ This is a paradigm of an inadvertent sin as mentioned in Lev.
¹⁵ Cf. Terumot
¹⁵ Cf. Terumot
¹⁶ Fat of animals which would be burned on the altar if these animals were sacrifices, and the fat into which ischiatic tendons are embedded, is forbidden for human consumption. All other fat is permitted. If a person intended to commit a sin but, unknown to him at the time, failed to commit the sin, he is not liable for a purification sacrifice.
¹⁷ Translated using the Bomberg Babli text.
¹⁸ Lev.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:1:4
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:1:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:1:4)

עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל דְּלָא מַפְנֶה אָהֵן קִרְיָיה בִּמְחוּיָיבֵי חַטָּאוֹת וַאֲשָׁמוֹת וַודָּאִין שֶׁעָבַר עֲלֵיהֶן יוֹם הַכִּיפּוּרִים נִיחָא. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי עֲקִיבָה דְּמַפְנֶה אָהֵן קִרְיָיה בִּמְחוּיָיבֵי חַטָּאוֹת וַאֲשָׁמוֹת וַודָּאִין שֶׁעָבַר עֲלֵיהֶן יוֹם הַכִּיפּוּרִים. דְּתַנֵּי. מְנַיִין לִמְחוּיָיבֵי חַטָּאוֹת וַאֲשָׁמוֹת וַודָּאִין שֶׁעָבַר עֲלֵיהֶן יוֹם הַכִּיפּוּרִים שֶׁהֵן חַיָיבִין לְהָבִיא לְאַחַר יוֹם הַכִּיפּוּרִים וְחַיְיבֵי אֲשָׁמוֹת תְּלוּיִין פְּטוּרִין. תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר אוֹ הוֹדַע אֵלָיו חַטָּאתוֹ וְהֵבִיא. אַף לְאַחַר יוֹם הַכִּיפּוּרִים. מִן הָדָא. נֶפֶשׁ כִּי תֶחֱטָא. אַחַת תֶּחֱטָא. בַּעֲשׂוֹתָהּ. הֲרֵי אֵילּוּ מִיעוּטִין. הַתּוֹלֶה בְעַצְמוֹ חַיָיב. הַתּוֹלֶה בְבֵית דִּין פָּטוּר.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael, who does not refer this verse to those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, it is understandable¹⁹ 4:27. Since our halakhic Midrashim are all from the school of R. Aqiba, we have to accept the occasional indications of the Yerushalmi on the interpretations of the school of R. Ismael. For him, the verses 4:27–28 detail the conditions on which a private person is permitted and obligated to bring a purification offering.. But what is the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba, who refers this verse to those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, as we have stated²⁰ 6:4; *Sifra Wayyiqra 2 Paršetah* 3(1), 6(1), *Ahare Mot Parašah*4(8).
Reparation sacrifices are required (1) for sins against a fellow man after restitution (*Lev.* 5:20–26; *Num.* 5:5–10), (2) misappropriation of *sancta*(*Lev.*5:14–16), (3) to regain sanctified status after skin disease (*Lev.* 14). A *suspended* reparation sacrifice is due if a person suspects that he may have committed an inadvertent sin, without having proof either way. Since the sin is forgiven on the Day of Atonement (with due repentance), such a sacrifice cannot be offered after that day since the scapegoat carries away *all* iniquities (*Lev.* 16:21).: From where that those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, are obligated to bring them after the Day of Atonement, but those obligated for suspended reparation offerings are no longer liable? The verse says¹⁸ 4:28. Since he was informed that he failed to commit the sin, he cannot bring a purification sacrifice. His repentance for his sinful intent will be a private matter between him and God., *or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring*, even after the Day of Atonement. ²¹ From the following: *A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress;* these are restrictions⁸, but the first of the quotes in the Leiden ms. is a misquote, referring to *Lev.*4:2 instead of 4:27. The basic text is in *Sifra Wayyiqra Parašah* 7(1), referred to in Babli 2b, discussed in detail *Šabbat*93a.
Chapter 4 in *Lev.* treats the purification sacrifices for unintentional sin first by the High Priest (vv. 1–12), then the High Court (13–21), then a chief, identified in Mishnah 3:3 as a king (22–26), and finally by a commoner (27–35). V. 27 reads: *If one* *person of the populace transgresses inadvertently, by acting on one prohibitions of the Eternal, and feels guilt.* It is noted that the sentence seems to be unnecessarily wordy. Why does it not say simply, “if somebody inadvertently transgresses a prohibition of the Eternal”? The additional words must have a meaning; they describe restrictions. In Babli *Šabbat*93a one derives from the insistence that *one* person commit the sin that a violation of a commandment cannot be prosecuted if committed by two persons acting in common, so that no single person commits a punishable act but the combined result is a clear violation,. Such a violation cannot be atoned for by a purification sacrifice. It also is clear that only *acts* are punishable.
In the context here the additional terms are interpreted to mean that only a person acting on his own is required to offer a purification sacrifice; this excludes one who is told by a religious authority that his act is permitted.: the person depending on himself is liable, {but one dependent}⁹ 6:9 Note 154, *Yebamot* 12:1 Note 10, *Sotah*9:2 Note 63, *Roš Haššanah* 1:1 56a l.58, *Megillah* 4:4 75b l.14; Babli *Megillah*23b, *Yoma* 43a, *Bava qamma* 15b, *Bava batra* 15a, *Sanhedrin* 15a,44b,66a, *Makkot* 9b, *Ševuot* 7b, *Menahot* 9b,67a, *Hulin* 132a.) The principle is extended here to read that any even number of restrictions (additions) is an addition (restriction) while any odd number of restrictions (additions) is a restriction (addition); cf. Rashi in *Sanhedrin* 15a *s. v.* חמשה. on the Court is not liable.

footnotes:
¹⁹ This paragraph has no direct connection with the theme of the Mishnah, but is added here to elucidate Lev.
²⁰ Mishnah Keritut
¹⁸ Lev.
²¹ This copy from the first paragraph has no discernible meaning here.
⁸ The quotes are correct in the Yerushalmi text of the Babli editio princeps
⁹ It is a generally recognized principle that a double restriction is an addition and a double addition a restriction (Peah


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:1:5
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:1:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:1:5)

אֵין חַיָיבִין אֶלָּא עַל דָּבָר שֶׁהָיָה גָלוּי לָהֶן וְנִכְסֶה מֵהֶן. וּמַה טַעַם. וְנֶעְלַם דָּבָר. דָּבָר שֶׁהָיָה גָלוּי לָהֶן וְנִכְסֶה מֵהֶן. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל דּוּ אָמַר. וְנֶעְלַם מִמֶּנּוּ. מִכְּלָל שֶׁהָיָה יוֹדֵעַ. וְהוּא יָדַע. הֲרֵי שְׁתֵּי יָדִיעוֹת. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי עֲקִיבָה דּוּ אָמַר. וְנֶעְלַם מִמֶּנּוּ וְנֶעְלַם מִמֶּנּוּ שְׁנֵי פְעָמִים. מִכְּלָל שֶׁבָּאת לוֹ יְדִיעָה בַּתְּחִילָּה וִידִיעָה בְסּוֹף וְהֶעֱלֵם בֵּינְתַיִים. תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר וְנֶעְלַם דָּבָר. דָּבָר שֶׁהָיָה גָלוּי לָהֶם וְנִכְסֶה מֵהֶן.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
²² the obligation of the High Court, as representatives of the people, to offer a purification sacrifice for a wrong ruling as described in *Lev.* 4:13–21.
It is sinful to bring an animal into the Temple precinct which is not dedicated as a sacrifice. For voluntary offerings this presents no problem; one simply has to dedicate them when bringing. But for obligatory offerings it implies that a sacrifice may be presented only if all conditions which make it obligatory are actually fulfilled. They only are liable²³ for something²⁴ that was clear to them and then covered from them²⁵. What is the reason? *something was hidden*²⁶ 4:13. An erring High Priest (*Lev.* 4:1–12) or ruler (22–26) have to offer a sacrifice if they err inadvertently; the condition that a ruling must have been forgotten is introduced only for the Court., something that was clear to them and then hidden from them. ²⁷ 5:1–13), where the same condition in mentioned in *Lev.* 5:2,3,4. R. Ismael and R. Aqiba differ in *Ševuot* 1:2 about the interpretation of the verses, but not about the actual rules. In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael who said, *it became hidden from him*, therefore he had known, *and he knew*²⁸ 5:4: …*an oath which a man would utter without thinking, it became hidden from him, and he knew and realized his guilt* …, these are two knowledges²⁹. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba who said, *it became hidden, it became hidden,* two times³⁰ 5:2–3) where in both verses oblivion is mentioned but not remembering. However, in Babylonian sources [*Ševuot* 14b, *Keritut* 19a, *Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Pereq* 12(7)], R. Ismael is reported to read one about oblivion the impurity and the second oblivion about being in the Temple., therefore he had knowledge at the beginning and knowledge at the end and oblivion in between, ³¹ something that was clear to them and then hidden from them.

footnotes:
²² Here one returns to a discussion of the theme of the Tractate, viz.,
²³ To bring the sacrifice.
²⁴ An official ruling by the Court.
²⁵ They forgot either a precedent or their own ruling.
²⁶ Lev.
²⁷ There is no problem with the explanation just given. One tries to connect the statement with a discussion about similar rules regarding sacrifices due for violations of either Temple purity or oaths (Lev.
²⁸ Lev.
²⁹ One when he uttered the oath and one when he remembered it, separated by a period of oblivion.
³⁰ R. Aqiba and R. Ismael actually are not differing in their interpretations; only R. Aqiba argues about violations of Temple purity (Lev.
³¹ Returning to our topic, Note 22.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:1:6
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:1:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:1:6)

אֵין חַיָיבִין עַד שֶׁיּוֹרוּ לְבַטֵּל מִקְצָת וּלְקַיֵים מִקְצָת. שְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר. וְהֵן שֶׁהוֹרוּ מוּתָּר. אֲבָל אִם הוֹרוּ פָטוּר לֹא בְדָא. אֵין חַיָיבִין עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא הוֹרָיָיה מִלִּישְׁכַּת הָגָּזִית. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. טַעֲמֵיהּ דְהַךְ תַנָּיָיא מִן הַמָּקוֹם הַהוּא אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יְי. אָמַר רִבִּי מָנָא בַּר תַּנְחוּם. נִכְנְסוּ מֵאָה. עַד שֶׁיּוֹרוּ כוּלָּן. תַּמָּן אָמַר רִבִּי זְעִירָא. וְהוּא שֶׁיְּהוּ כוּלָּן מוֹרִין מִצַּד אֶחָד. וָכָא מַה.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
They are not liable unless they void part and confirm part³² 4(7).. Samuel said, only if they ruled that it was permitted; but not if they ruled that it was not prosecutable³³. They are not liable unless instruction was given from the ashlar hall³⁴ Chapter 1, Note 345.. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the reason of this Tanna: *From that place which the Eternal will choose*³⁵ 17:10.*.* Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum said, if a hundred came together, only if they ruled unanimously³⁶ 4(4).]. There³⁷ 1:2, Note 166. He holds that a ruling of the High Court to intercalate a month based on the testimony of laymen is valid only if it not only is unanimous in fact but also in reason. Concurrent opinions, reaching the same conclusion for different reasons, invalidate the judgment. Why is this not mentioned here? The text confirms the reading of the ms. in *Roš Haššanah*(2:6 58b l.25) against the one in Sanhedrin., Rebbi Zeˋira said, only if they all rule for the same reason. And here, what³⁸?

footnotes:
³² If they declared a biblical prohibition as void, nobody would follow them since even schoolchildren would know that this is wrong. But if they were to abolish traditional restrictions, they would be followed. This is explicit in Mishnah 3; cf. Babli 4a, Tosephta 1:7, Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Parašah
³³ This is a commentary on the preceding sentence. Abolishing a biblical commandment entirely means declaring the prohibition as void; declaring it valid but unenforceable means partly confirming it.
³⁴ The seat of the High Court; Sanhedrin
³⁵ Deut.
³⁶ The ruling triggers the obligation of a purification sacrifice only if it was unanimous, including the opinions of the law students sitting before the 72 members of the Court. Mishnah 4 requires in addition that the president of the court be present and voting [Babli 4b, Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Parašah
³⁷ Sanhedrin
³⁸ B has the usual formula, “and here he says so?”


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:1:7
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:1:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:1:7)

הָלַךְ הַיָּחִיד וְעָשָׂה שׁוֹגֵג עַל פִּיהֶן. וְכִי יֵשׁ זְדוֹן שְׁגָגָה לְיָחִיד אֶצֶל הוֹרָיַית בֵּית דִּין. רִבִּי אִימִּי בְשֵׁם רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ. מַתְנִיתָא כְּגוֹן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי יוֹשֵׁב לִפְנֵיהֶן. מָה אֲנָן קַיָימִין. אִם בְּיוֹדֵעַ כָּל הַתּוֹרָה וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ אוֹתוֹ דָּבָר אֵין זֶה שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי. וְאִם בְּיוֹדֵעַ אוֹתוֹ הַדָּבָר וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ כָּל הַתּוֹרָה שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי הוּא אֶצֶל אוֹתוֹ הַדָּבָר. אֶלָּא כִּי נָן קַיָימִין בְּיוֹדֵעַ כָּל הַתּוֹרָה וּבְיוֹדֵעַ אוֹתוֹ הַדָּבָר. אֶלָּא שֶׁהוּא כְטוֹעֶה לוֹמַר. תּוֹרָה אָמְרָה אַחֲרֵיהֶם אַחֲרֵיהֶם. וְאִם בְּטוֹעֶה לוֹמַר הַתּוֹרָה אָמְרָה אַחֲרֵיהֶם אַחֲרֵיהֶם. אֵין זֶה שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי. כְּהָדָא דְתַנֵּי. יָכוֹל אִם יֹאמְרוּ לָךְ עַל יְמִין שֶׁהִיא שְׂמֹאל וְעַל שְׂמֹאל שֶׁהִיא יְמִין תִּשְׁמַע לָהֶם. תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר לָלֶכֶת יָמִין וּשְׂמֹאל. שֶׁיֹּאמְרוּ לָךְ עַל יָמִין שֶׁהוּא יָמִין וְעַל שְׂמֹאל שֶׁהִיא שְׂמֹאל. מַאי כְדוֹן. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בְשֵׁם רִבִּי הִילָא. לְפִי שֶׁבְּכָל מָקוֹם שׁוֹגֵג פָטוּר וּמֵזִיד חַיָיב. וָכָא אֲפִילוּ מֵזִיד פָּטוּר. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁתָּלָה בְּבֵית דִּין.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
“And a single person went and acted inadvertently³ following their pronouncement.” Is there an intentional inadvertent action concerning an instruction by the Court³⁹? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai⁴⁰ was sitting before them. Where do we hold? If he knows the entire Torah but does not know this detail, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. If he knows this particular subject but not the entire Torah, he is Simeon ben Azzai for this particular subject. But we must hold that he knows the entire Torah and knows the particular subject, but he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them⁴¹ 6:13, Note 128; *Sanhedrin* 1:2, p. 36).. If he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. As we have stated, I could think that if they tell you about right that it is left, and about left that it is right, you should listen to them? The verse says, “to go to the right or to the left;⁴² 17:11.” that they should tell you about the right that it is right, and about the left that it is left⁴³ 154, *Cant. rabba* 1(18), which require one to follow the instructions of the rabbis even if they tell him to believe that left is right. Sound methodology would require one to follow the Talmud in preference to Midrashim. The *Sifry* text seems to be formulated as a polemic against the Yerushalmi.. What about it⁴⁴? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Because everywhere for an inadvertent sin one is not liable but for an intentional one is liable, and here even intentionally he is not liable⁴⁵ action following the wrong teachings of the High Court has the status of unintended action even if it was intended. “Liable” and “not liable” here refer to criminal responsibility, not to obligations to offer sacrifices..

footnotes:
³ When the Court realized its error and changed its ruling, the person acting in good faith on their prior ruling is now faced with the fact that his act violated a biblical commandment, against his intention.
³⁹ The formulation of the Mishnah does not make any sense. The person who follows the instructions of the Court does this intentionally; how can he be inadvertent?
⁴⁰ The paradigm of the know-all; he was ready to answer any question about religious law on the spot. The Babli knows of a number of famous rabbis who tried to imitate him but quickly were confronted with a question they could not answer. He never was ordained; therefore he could not have been part of the Court, but as an outsider he could have pointed out the Court’s error.
⁴¹ This is the expression which R. Jehudah ben Bathyra used to convince Hanania ben Hanania, the foremost authority in Babylonia, to accept the overriding authority of the patriarch’s court in Palestine (Nazir
⁴² A misquote of Deut.
⁴³ This is the opposite of the teachings of Sifry Deut.
⁴⁴ Since the first explanation of the Mishnah was found to be untenable, what would be a reasonable explanation?
⁴⁵ Any


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:1:8
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:1:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:1:8)

חֲבֵרַיָיא בְשֵׁם שְׁמוּאֵל. יָחִיד מַשְׁלִים לְרוֹב הַצִּיבּוּר הִיא מַתְנִיתָא. אֲבָל כָּל יָחִיד וְיָחִיד שֶׁעָשָׂה בִפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ פָּטוּר. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן אֲפִילוּ כָּל יָחִיד וְיָחִיד שֶׁעָשָׂה בִפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ מֵבִיא כִשְׂבָּה וּשְׂעִירָה. וְקַשְׁיָא עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל לֹא נִמְצָא כָּל יָחִיד וְיָחִיד מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ בִשְׁנֵי חַטָּאוֹת. רִבִּי זְעִירָא בְשֵׁם שְׁמוּאֵל. הַיָּחִיד תָלוּי. אָכְלוּ רוֹב. בֵּית דִּין מְבִיאִין. אָכְלוּ מִיעוּט. הַיָּחִיד מֵבִיא. כָּל הַהוֹרָיָיה שֶׁבֵּית דִּין פָּר אֵין הַיָּחִיד מֵבִיא כִשְׂבָּה וּשְׂעִירָה.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
The colleagues in the name of Samuel. The Mishnah deals with an individual who complements the multitude⁴⁶. But any individual who acted on his own is not liable⁴⁷. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even any single individual who acted on his own brings a female sheep or goat⁴⁸. It is difficult. In Samuel’s opinion, would any single individual be atoned by two sacrifices⁴⁹? Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Samuel: The individual is suspended⁵⁰. If a majority ate, the court brings. If a minority ate, each individual brings. For any ruling for which the court [bring] a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep or goat⁵¹ 27:35.. ⁵² For any ruling for which the court bring a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep; for any ruling for which the court does not bring a bull, the individual brings a female sheep or goat. Samuel explains the Mishnah by majority and minority. If a majority ate⁵³, since the court does not bring a bull, an individual brings a female sheep or goat.

footnotes:
⁴⁶ As explained at the end of the paragraph (Babli 2b in the name of R. Jehudah). His problem with the prior explanation is that it does not fit the setting of the Mishnah. Since we are referring to sacrifices, the inadvertent sinner, while he is immune to prosecution, is obligated to bring a purification sacrifice; the intentional sinner, who can be punished, is barred from bringing a sacrifice. Therefore, if one compares the intentional to the unintentional sinner, the opposite of the argument of R. Hila should be formulated. (In contrast to the Babli, the Yerushalmi does not care for chronological consistency; Samuel of the first generation opposes R. Hila of the third.)
⁴⁷ Tosephta 1:2. If somebody acted in parallel with the ruling of the court but following his own interpretation of the biblical law, he is not liable for a purification sacrifice since in fact he is barred from offering one, and since he happened to act in parallel with the Court’s ruling neither is he prosecutable. Both interpretations of פטור are possible here. There is no reason to change the text which is confirmed by the two Yerushalmi texts and the Tosephta.
⁴⁸ Since acting on a faulty interpretation is qualified as acting in error, which for an individual requires the offering of a female sheep or goat (Note 51).
⁴⁹ Since, as is explained next, Samuel makes the Court’s offering dependent on whether a majority of the people acted on their instructions or not, it could be that after a number of individuals brought their own sacrifices it turns out that in the end a majority forces the Court to bring its own. But there cannot be more than one sacrifice for one infraction. Since the purification offering is eaten by the priests, it cannot be retroactively nullified.
⁵⁰ The problem raised in the previous Note cannot occur. The individuals are prevented from bringing their own sacrifices until the situation is cleared.
⁵¹ Lev.
⁵² Translation of the text of B, expanding the last sentence of the Leiden ms.
⁵³ Referring to the standard example, that the Court allowed some forbidden fat (Note 14) to be eaten.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:1:9
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:1:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:1:9)

רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן פָּתַר מַתְנִיתָא בְּהוֹרָיַית בֵּית דִּין. הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין לַעֲקוֹר אֶת כָּל הַגּוּף. הוֹאִיל וּבֵית דִּין מְבִיאִין פָּר אֵין הַיָּחִיד מֵבִיא כִשְׂבָּה וּשְׂעִירָה. הוֹרוּ לְבַטֵּל מִקְצָת וּלְקַיֵים מִקְצָת. הוֹאִיל וְאֵין בֵּית דִּין מְבִיאִין פָּר הַיָּחִיד מֵבִיא כִשְׂבָּה וּשְׂעִירָה.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
Rebbi Joḥanan explains the Mishnah by instruction from the Court. If the Court ruled to eliminate the entire body, since the Court has to bring a bull a private person does not have to bring a female sheep or goat. If they ruled to confirm part and to eliminate part, since the Court does not bring a bull a private person has to bring a female sheep or goat⁵⁴.

footnotes:
⁵⁴ Even though the text is confirmed by B, it cannot be accepted since Mishnah 3 explicitly states the opposite (Note 32), and R. Johanan does not disagree with an anonymous Mishnah. Therefore, one has to switch the place of the statements “bring” and “do not bring”. He disagrees with Samuel in that he does not require that a majority of the people act upon the instructions of the Court. If a single person consciously commits a sin by acting upon their instruction, the individual is barred from bringing a sheep and the Court is required to bring a bull.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:1:10
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:1:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:1:10)

שְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר מַתְנִיתָא. אַדַּיִין אֲנִי אוֹמֵר. מִיעוּט הַקָּהָל שֶׁעָשׂוּ חַיָיבִין שֶׂאֵין בֵּית דִּין מְבִיאִין עֲלֵיהֶן פָּר. תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר עַם הָאָרֶץ. אֲפִילוּ כוּלּוֹ. אֲפִילוּ רוּבּוֹ. רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן פָּתַר מַתְנִיתָא. אַדַּיִין אֲנִי אוֹמֵר. מִיעוּט הַקָּהָל שֶׁעָשׂוּ בְלֹא הוֹרָיָיה חַיָיבִין. שֶׁכֵּן בְּהוֹרָיָיה אֵין בֵּית דִּין מְבִיאִין פָּר. שְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר. אֲבָל הֵן מְבִיאִין כִּשְׂבָּה וּשְׂעִירָה. רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר. לֹא הֵן מְבִיאִין כִּשְׂבָּה וּשְׂעִירָה. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל דּוּ יְלִיף לָהּ חַיָיב מֵחַיָיב נִיחָא. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי יוֹחָנָן דּוּ יְלִיף לָהּ חִיּוּב מִפְּטוֹר. מַתְנִיתָא אָמְרָה פְלִיגָא עַל שְׁמוּאֵל. אוֹ הוֹדַע אֵלָיו חַטָּאתוֹ אֲשֶׁר חָטָא וְהֵבִיא. יָצָא הַמְשׁוּמָּר. מַתְנִיתָא פְלִיגָא עַל שְׁמוּאֵל. נֶפֶשׁ כִּי תֶחֱטָא. אַחַת תֶּחֱטָא. בַּעֲשׂוֹתָהּ. הֲרֵי אֵילּוּ מִיעוּטִין. הַתּוֹלֶה בְעַצְמוֹ חַיָיב. הַתּוֹלֶה בְבֵית דִּין פָּטוּר. הָדָא פְלִיגָא עַל שְׁמוּאֵל וְלֵית לָהּ קִיּוּם.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
Samuel spoke about the Mishnah: “I still am saying, if a minority acted they are liable because the Court will not bring a bull for them. The verse says⁵⁵. 4:27., *[from] the people of the Land.* Even [all of them] (part of them)⁵⁶ in *Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Parašah* 7(5), quoted in the Babli, 2b. Usually, a prefix מ “from” is interpreted to mean “not all”. This is behind the reading of B. The reading of the ms., in brackets, is that of *Sifra* and the Babli; it means that without instruction from the Court, any number of the people, maybe all except the members of the Court, may be required to bring private purification offerings simultaneously. This would not be a case that *all of the congregation of Israel err*(*Lev.* 4:13); this expression is reserved for pronouncements of the Court., even most of them.” Rebbi Joḥanan explains the Mishnah: I still am saying, if a minority acted without ruling they are liable because with instruction the Court will not bring a bull⁵⁷. Samuel said, but they bring a female sheep or goat. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they do not bring a female sheep or goat⁵⁸. According to Samuel, who infers liability from liability, it is understandable. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, who infers liability from exemption⁵⁹? The statement of a *baraita*⁶⁰7(7), quoted in the Babli, 2a. The apostate wants to forget; even if he really forgot it was desired by him; he never qualifies for a purification offering, even if his transgression happens to be in a situation for which the Court would have to bring an offering if its conditions were fulfilled. disagrees with Samuel. *Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him*¹⁸ 4:28. Since he was informed that he failed to commit the sin, he cannot bring a purification sacrifice. His repentance for his sinful intent will be a private matter between him and God.; this excludes the apostate. A *baraita* disagrees with Samuel, “*A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress*; these are restrictions⁸, but the first of the quotes in the Leiden ms. is a misquote, referring to *Lev.*4:2 instead of 4:27. The basic text is in *Sifra Wayyiqra Parašah* 7(1), referred to in Babli 2b, discussed in detail *Šabbat*93a.
Chapter 4 in *Lev.* treats the purification sacrifices for unintentional sin first by the High Priest (vv. 1–12), then the High Court (13–21), then a chief, identified in Mishnah 3:3 as a king (22–26), and finally by a commoner (27–35). V. 27 reads: *If one* *person of the populace transgresses inadvertently, by acting on one prohibitions of the Eternal, and feels guilt.* It is noted that the sentence seems to be unnecessarily wordy. Why does it not say simply, “if somebody inadvertently transgresses a prohibition of the Eternal”? The additional words must have a meaning; they describe restrictions. In Babli *Šabbat*93a one derives from the insistence that *one* person commit the sin that a violation of a commandment cannot be prosecuted if committed by two persons acting in common, so that no single person commits a punishable act but the combined result is a clear violation,. Such a violation cannot be atoned for by a purification sacrifice. It also is clear that only *acts* are punishable.
In the context here the additional terms are interpreted to mean that only a person acting on his own is required to offer a purification sacrifice; this excludes one who is told by a religious authority that his act is permitted.: the person depending on himself is liable, but one dependent on the Court is not liable.” This disagrees with Samuel and cannot be confirmed⁶¹.

footnotes:
⁵⁵ Lev
⁵⁶ The text is a baraita
⁵⁷ A person acting on the instructions of the Court can never bring a purification offering since his action is not inadvertent. If the conditions for such an offering by the Court are not satisfied, no sacrifice at all is due or possible for the action.
⁵⁸ This is a repetition of their prior positions. For Samuel, a private offering is due if and only if there is no Court offering. For R. Joḥanan, no offering is possible for action on the instruction of the Court, independent of what the Court has or does not have to do.
⁵⁹ Samuel is understandable; either the rules of the Court sacrifice or those of the private one do apply; never both together nor none of them. But might R. Johanan, who accepts a situation where both the individual and the Court are exempted from bringing an offering, have a situation where both apply simultaneously? The question is not answered.
⁶⁰ Sifra Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Parašah
¹⁸ Lev.
⁸ The quotes are correct in the Yerushalmi text of the Babli editio princeps
⁶¹ If the Court permitted certain intrinsically forbidden things and an individual acted on his own but did what they had allowed, then both the Court and the individual have to bring sacrifices for the same kind of action.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:2:1
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:2:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:2:1)

**משנה:** הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין וְיָדְעוּ שֶׁטָּעוּ וְחָזְרוּ בָהֶן בֵּין שֶׁהֵבִיאוּ כַפָּרָתָן וּבֵין שֶׁלֹּא הֵבִיאוּ כַפָּרָתָן וְהָלַךְ וְעָשָׂה עַל פִּיהֶן רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר וְרִבִּי לִעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר סָפֵק. אֵיזֶהוּ סָפֵק יָשַׁב לוֹ בְתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ חַיָיב. הָלַךְ לוֹ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם פָּטוּר. אָמַר רִבִּי עֲקִיבָה מוֹדֶה אֲנִי בָזֶה שֶׁהוּא קָרוֹב לִפְטוֹר מִן הַחוֹבָה. אָמַר לוֹ בֶן עַזַּאי מַה שָׁנָה זֶה מִן הַיּוֹשֵׁב בְּבֵיתוֹ שֶׁהַיּוֹשֵׁב בְּבֵיתוֹ אֶיפְשַׁר הָיָה לוֹ שֶׁיִּשְׁמַע וְזֶה לֹא הָיָה אֶיפְשַׁר לוֹ שֶׁיִּשְׁמַע:

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**MISHNAH:** If the Court gave an instruction; then they realized that they erred and reversed themselves⁶²; whether they brought their atonement or they did not bring their atonement⁶³4:13–21., another person went and acted on their instructions⁶⁴, Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable, but Rebbi Eliezer⁶⁵ says, it is in doubt. What is the doubt? If he remained at home, he is liable; if he went overseas he is not liable. Rebbi Aqiba said, I agree in this case that he is closer to not being liable than being liable. Ben Azzai asked him, what is the difference between him and the one staying at home? For one who stays at home might be informed⁶⁶ but the other one could not be informed.

footnotes:
⁶² Publicly.
⁶³ The sacrifice prescribed in Lev.
⁶⁴ He followed the original instructions after the Court had reversed itself. R. Simeon holds that the responsibility remains the Court’s as long as not all of Israel were duly informed of the new ruling.
⁶⁵ One should read with the Babli and many independent Mishnah mss. “R. Eleazar” (ben Shamuaˋ), since the third generation R. Simeon cannot be quoted preceding the first generation R. Eliezer.
⁶⁶ It would be his duty to stay informed. The one who is far away is still depending on the earlier ruling of the Court; he is not liable for a sacrifice according to everybody. The difference between R. Aqiba and ben Azzai is that the latter requires a sacrifice from anyone who could have known of the reversal whereas the former requires it only from one who should have known.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:2:2
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:2:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:2:2)

**הלכה:** הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין וְיָדְעוּ שֶׁטָּעוּ כול׳. רִבִּי אִימִּי בְשֵׁם רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ. מַתְנִיתָא כְּגוֹן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי יוֹשֵׁב לִפְנֵיהֶן. מָה נָן קַיָימִין. אִם בְּשֶׁסִּילְּקָן תְּבַטְּלוּ הוֹרָיָיתָן. אִם בְּשֶׁסִּילְּקוּ אוֹתוֹ תְּבַטֵּל הוֹרָיָיתוֹ. אֶלָּא כִי נָן קַיָימִין בְּשֶׁזֶּה עוֹמֵד בִּתְשׁוּבָתוֹ וָזֶה עוֹמֵד בִּתְשׁוּבָתוֹ. הוֹרָיָיתָן אֶצְלוֹ אֵינָהּ הוֹרָאָה. שֶׁלֹּא סִילְּקוּ אוֹתוֹ. אֶצֶל אֲחֵרִים הוֹרָיָיה. שֶׁלֹּא סִילְּקָן. לֵית הָדָא פְלִיגָא עַל רִבִּי מָנָא בַּר תַּנְחוּם. דְּרִבִּי מָנָא בַּר תַּנְחוּם אָמַר. נִכְנְסוּ מֵאָה. עַד שֶׁיּוֹרוּ כוּלָּן. פָּתַר לָהּ בְּשֶׁלֹּא נִכְנַס. אִם בְּשֶׁלֹּא נִכְנַס. מְעַכֵּב. פָּתַר לָהּ כְּרִבִּי. דְּרִבִּי אָמַר. אֵין לְךָ מְעַכֵּב אֶלָּא מוּפְלֶא שֶׁלְּבֵית דִּין (בלוד). וְהָא רִבִּי מָנָא בַּר תַּנְחוּם אָמַר. נִכְנְסוּ מֵאָה. עַד שֶׁיּוֹרוּ כוּלָּן. אַף בַּחֲזִירָה כֵן אוֹ רוֹב. כת פְּשִׁיטָא לָךְ רוֹב. מָה רוֹב. רוֹב הַהוֹרָיָיה רוֹב הַמִּשְׁתַּיֵיר. הֵיךְ עֲבִידָא. נִכְנְסוּ מֵאָה וּמֵתוּ מֵהֶן עֲשָׂרָה. אִין תֹּאמַר. רוֹב הַהוֹרָיָיה. חֲמִשִּׁים וְאֶחָד. וְאִין תֹּאמַר. רוֹב הַמִּשְׁתַּיֵיר. אַרְבָּעִים וְשִׁשָּׁה.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**HALAKHAH:** “If the Court gave an instruction; then they realized that they erred,” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai⁴⁰ was sitting before them. Where do we hold? If he removed⁶⁷ form סַלֵּק, from the root סלק “to raise, lift”, means “to remove (from office)”, comparable to German *entheben.* Here it must mean, “to silence the opposing party” either by a convincing argument of the single opponent, or by a formal judgment of the High Court. them, their instruction would be invalid. If they removed him, his instruction would be invalid. But we hold in the case that each side stands by its answer. For him, their instruction is no instruction, for they did not remove him⁶⁸. For others it is an instruction, for he did not remove them. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum, since Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum said, if a hundred came together, only if they instructed unanimously³⁶ 4(4).]? One explains it, that he was not present⁶⁹. Does this invalidate⁷⁰? He explains it following Rebbi, since Rebbi said, no one invalidates but the distinguished member of the Court (at Lydda) [only]⁷¹. Since Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum said, if a hundred came together, only if they instructed unanimously; is it the same in retraction or by majority? If it is obvious for you⁷² by majority, what kind of majority? The majority of those who instructed or the majority of those remaining? How is this? If there were a hundred but ten of them had died. If you say, a majority of those who instructed, 51. If you say, a majority of those remaining, 46.

footnotes:
⁴⁰ The paradigm of the know-all; he was ready to answer any question about religious law on the spot. The Babli knows of a number of famous rabbis who tried to imitate him but quickly were confronted with a question they could not answer. He never was ordained; therefore he could not have been part of the Court, but as an outsider he could have pointed out the Court’s error.
⁶⁷ In general, the Piel
⁶⁸ Since they could not convince him, he does not have to follow them against his better knowledge; cf. Note 43.
³⁶ The ruling triggers the obligation of a purification sacrifice only if it was unanimous, including the opinions of the law students sitting before the 72 members of the Court. Mishnah 4 requires in addition that the president of the court be present and voting [Babli 4b, Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Parašah
⁶⁹ At the vote.
⁷⁰ The text of B is more intelligible: If he was not present, does this invalidate the vote?
⁷¹ The ms. text, בלוד, “at Lydda” makes no sense since the High Court must sit in the ashlar hall on the Temple Mount. One has to read with B בלבד “only”. The president of the Court is the only one for whom no substitute can be found.
⁷² Read כַּד “if it is” for כַּת “group” in the text. The reading of B, צַייְתֵי “they obey” might be acceptable; since everywhere a majority opinion of religious authorities is to be followed, it is obvious that a retraction by a majority has to be followed. The original instruction also would have had to be followed if rendered by a majority of the Court; it is only the obligation of a sacrifice which is triggered by a unanimous vote.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:2:3
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:2:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:2:3)

הִפְרִישׁ חַטָּאתוֹ. נִתְחָרֵשׁ אוֹ נִשְׁטֶה אוֹ נִשְׁתַּמֵּד אוֹ שֶׁהוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל חֵלֶב. רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר. נִדְחֵית חַטָּאתוֹ. רִבִּי שְִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר. לֹא נִדְחֵית חַטָּאתוֹ. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בֵּירִבִּי בּוּן אָמַר. רִבִּי אָחָא מַחְלֵף שְׁמוּעָתָא דְלָא אֲתִי מִילְּתֵיהּ דְּרִבִּי יוֹחָנָן פְלִיגָא עַל מִילְּתֵיהּ. דָּמַר רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בַּר בָּא בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. כוס זוֹרְקִין עָלָיו מִדַּם חַטָּאתוֹ וּמִדַּם אֲשָׁמוֹ. רַבָּנִן דְּקַיְסָרִין אָמְרִין. רִבִּי חִיָיה אִמִּי מַחְלֵף. וחַד אָמַר כָּאֵן תַנָּיָיה.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
⁷³ 7:1, explained there in Notes 10–21. In the translation, the words in brackets follow the text of B. The ms. text here has quite a number of scribal errors. A parallel is in the Babli, *Zebahim* 12b. If somebody had selected his purification sacrifice when he became a deaf-mute, or insane, or an apostate, or the Court rules that fat may be eaten, Rebbi Joḥanan said, his sacrifice of purification is pushed aside⁷⁴, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, his sacrifice of purification is not pushed aside. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Aḥa switches traditions, to avoid that a word of Rebbi Joḥanan contradict his own word. For Rebbi Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One sprinkles the blood of a purification sacrifice or a reparation sacrifice for a person [terminally ill]⁷⁵. The Rebbi of Caesarea said, Rebbi Ḥiyya and [Rebbi] Immi, [one] switches and one says like [this] Tanna.

footnotes:
⁷³ This paragraph also is in Gittin
⁷⁴ This version is confirmed in the Babli, 11a.
⁷⁵ In the ms: “a cup”.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:2:4
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:2:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:2:4)

מָאן דְּמַחְלֵף לֵית לֵיהּ בְּאִילֵּין קִישׁוּאַיָיה. כְּמָאן דָּמַר. לֹא נִדְחֵית חַטָּאתוֹ. מִי מְקַבְּלָהּ הֵימֶינּוּ. יַמְתִּין עַד שֶׁיַּחְזְרוּ בָהֶן בֵּית דִּין. אֶלָּא כְשֶׁהָיָה כֹהֵן עָבַד וְהִקְרִיב וְכִיפֵּר. הָיָה שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי. מִי מְקַבְּלָהּ מִמֶּנּוּ. יַמְתִּין עַד שֶׁיַּחְזְרוּ בָהֶן בֵּית דִּין. כְּמָאן דָּמַר. לֹא נִדְחֵית חַטָּאתוֹ.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
He who switches has none of these difficulties⁷⁶. For him who says, his sacrifice of purification is not pushed aside⁷⁷, who would accept it from him? He has to wait until the Court retracts, or if he was a Cohen who served, sacrificed, and atoned⁷⁸. If he was Simeon ben Azzai⁷⁹, who would accept it from him? He has to wait until the Court retracts, for him who says, his sacrifice of purification is not pushed aside.

footnotes:
⁷⁶ The one difficulty pointed out in the previous paragraph that R. Johanan accepts the sacrifice on behalf of a dying person even though the sacrifice of a dead person is impossible. The second difficulty is that R. Johanan permits the writing and delivery of a divorce document to a wife whose husband became insane after he had ordered the document to be written.
⁷⁷ If the sacrifice becomes invalid, there is no problem. But since a purification sacrifice cannot be offered voluntarily, even according to him who said that the sacrifice remains valid, are the officiating priests not required to refuse the sacrifice after the Court ruled that the action for which it is offered was not forbidden?
⁷⁸ A layman can do nothing but wait whether the Court change its mind. But a Cohen can bring his own sacrifice and eat its meat for atonement if at the moment of the action it would have been sinful for anybody. Since he does not have to explain his reasons to a priest, he is not dependent on the Court.
⁷⁹ A layman who knows that the Court erred is not freed from an obligation to bring a sacrifice by the Court’s ruling; nevertheless he cannot find a priest who would accept it before the Court changes its mind.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:2:5
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:2:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:2:5)

תּוֹלְדוֹת הוֹרָיָיה כְהוֹרָיָיה. הוֹרָיָיה בְהוֹרָיָיה מָה הֵן שֶׁיִּצְטָרְפוּ. הֵיךְ עֲבִידָא. אָכְלוּ צִיבּוּר חֲלָבִים וְהִפְרִישׁוּ קָרְבְּנוֹתֵיהֶן. אִין תֵּימַר. תּוֹלְדוֹת הוֹרָיָיה כְהוֹרָיָיה. בֵּית דִּין חַיָיבִין. אִין תֵּימַר. אֵין תּוֹלְדוֹת הוֹרָיָיה כְהוֹרָיָיה. בֵּית דִּין פְּטוּרִין. כתי פְּשִׁיטָא לָךְ. תּוֹלְדוֹת הוֹרָיָיה כְהוֹרָיָיה. הוֹרָיָיה בְהוֹרָיָיה מַהוּ שֶׁיִּצְטָרְפוּ. הֵיךְ עֲבִידָא. הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין. חֵלֶב כּוּלְיָיא שֶׁלְּיָמִין מוּתָּר וְשֶׁלִּשְׂמֹאל ולו מִכְסֶה אָסוּר. חָזְרוּ וְהֶחֱלִיפוּ. אָכְלוּ רוֹב בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה וָרוֹב בַּשְּׁנִיָיה. אִין תֵּימַר. מִצְטָרְפִין. חַיָיבִין אַחַת. וְאִין תֵּימַר. אֵין מִצְטָרְפִין. חַיָיבִין שְׁתַיִם. שְׁתֵּי הוֹרָיוֹת בָּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת מָה הֵן שֶׁיִּצְטָרְפוּ. הֵיךְ עֲבִידָא. אָכְלוּ רוֹב וְשָׁחֲטוּ רוֹב. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי מֵאִיר חַיָיבִין אַחַת. וְעַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן חַיָיבִין שְׁתַּיִם. אָכְלוּ מִיעוּט בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה וּמִיעוּט בַּשְּׁנִיָיה. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי מֵאִיר חַיָיבִין. וְעַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פְּטוּרִין.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine⁸⁰? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable⁸¹. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling⁸². Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover⁸³ was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two⁸⁴. Do two instructions about one kind of work⁸⁵.” While the text as it stands is difficult, the text of B is impossible since, as explained in *Makkot* 3:11, while committing one sin one may commit any number of others at the same time.
The following example makes it clear that instead of “two instructions about one kind of work” one has to read “one instruction about two kinds of work.” combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered⁸⁶. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable⁸⁷. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable⁸⁸.

footnotes:
⁸⁰ The meaning of these expressions will be explained by examples in the text.
⁸¹ Most of the people ate forbidden fat (which makes the sinner subject to extirpation and therefore requires a sacrifice if inadvertent, Mishnah 3:7) without a ruling of the Court, and they already had dedicated their sacrifices when the Court ruled that eating fat is permitted. When it rescinded its ruling, it turned out that in the meantime nobody had acted on their instruction. According to the opinion that the ruling of the Court pushed aside the dedicated sacrifices, the Court certainly has to bring their own sacrifice since they invalidated the private sacrifices. But if one holds that the private sacrifices were re-installed upon recission, then if the rule is that consequences of instructions are like instructions, the Court still is liable for a sacrifice for preventing the purification offerings to be brought in the meantime, even though this was not included or intended in the original ruling. Otherwise, the private offerings will now be brought and the Court’s ruling is eliminated without further consequences.
⁸² This should not be so obvious since it implies that a purification sacrifice which for outside reasons could not be offered is reinstated when the outside reason disappears.
⁸³ The fat in lumps outside the kidney which is forbidden together with the fat embedded in the kidney lobes.
⁸⁴ If the Court followed one wrong decision with another wrong one on the same subject, it is an unresolved question whether they have to offer one or two sacrifices when they finally see their errors.
⁸⁵ In B: “Two instructions about one kind of sin
⁸⁶ It seems that one contemplates the case that the Court decided that one does not have to keep the Day of Atonement. This one instruction implicitly allows both work (slaughter) and eating on that day; both are sins punishable by extirpation.
⁸⁷ The difference between R. Meïr, the presumed author of the anonymous statement in Mishnah 3:3, and R. Simeon is that R. Meïr holds that the sin determines the sacrifice whereas R. Simeon holds that the status of the sinner at the moment he becomes aware of his sin is determining. Since the Court issued one statement, they have to bring one sacrifice. Since the people became aware of two kinds of sins, two sacrifices are due. This shows that R. Simeon does not hold that the consequences of an instruction have the status of the instruction.
⁸⁸ If the two majorities together form a majority, the conditions for the Court to be liable are satisfied; for R. Simeon the two minorities cannot be combined.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:2:6
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:2:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:2:6)

אָמַר רִבִּי זְעִירָא וְשָׁהוּת בֵּינֵיהוֹן. רִבִּי מֵאִיר אָמַר. נוֹתְנִין לוֹ שָׁהוּת עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁמַע. רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר. עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁפַּע. וְתַנֵּי כֵן. הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין בְּשׁוּק הָעֶלְיוֹן וְיָחִיד בְּשׁוּק הַתַּחְתּוֹן. בֵּית דִּין בַּבַּיִת וְיָחִיד בָּעֲלִיּיָה. פָּטוּר עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁמַע מַמָּשׁ.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
Rebbi Zeˋira said, the time span is between them⁸⁹7(3) that R. Simeon does not hold him liable (for a sacrifice) but R. Meïr does. It is explained that neither does R. Simeon free him forever nor R. Meïr hold him liable immediately, but R. Meïr holds him liable if he could have heard, and R. Simeon only if he had ample time to be informed. The reading of the ms., שֶׁיִּשְׁפַּע עַד, i. e., “until he had ample (time to be informed)” is preferable over that of B, “until he actually was informed.”. Rebbi Meïr said, one gives him time until he may hear. Rebbi Simeon said, until he must have heard, and we have stated so: If the Court instructed in the upper market and a single person was in the lower market, or the Court on the ground floor and a single person on the upper floor, he is not liable until he actually heard.

footnotes:
⁸⁹ This refers back to the Mishnah, about a person who acted on the Court’s instruction after the Court reversed itself. It is stated in Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Paršetah


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:2:7
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:2:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:2:7)

עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי עֲקִיבָה אַדַּיִין הוּא סָפֵק. אָמַר רִבִּי בּוּן בַּר חִיָיה. בָּעוֹמֵד בֵּין שְׁנֵי תְחוּמִין. בֵּין שְׁנֵי תְחוּמֵי אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל לִתְחוּמֵי אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
In Rebbi Aqiba’s opinion it remains a doubt⁹⁰. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, if he stands between two domains, between two domains of the Land of Israel and domains of the Land of Israel⁹¹.

footnotes:
⁹⁰ This refers to R. Aqiba’s statement in the Mishnah. Even though the position of one who could have known but did not inform himself looks as if he should not be liable, a doubt remains and in fact he has to bring a suspended reparation offering (cf. Note 19).
⁹¹ The reading in B is: Between domains of the Land of Israel and domains outside the Land. In this version, “overseas” mentioned in the Mishnah is interpreted to mean, “outside the Land.” The text of the ms. is to be read to mean that a person living outside of urban centers in the Land of Israel has the same status as a city dweller on an overseas trip, since he is far from sources of information.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:2:8
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:2:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:2:8)

רִבִּי אִמִּי בְשֵׁם רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ. לַהוֹרָיָיה הִילְּכוּ אַחַר יְשִׁיבַת אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל. לַטוּמְאָה הִילְּכוּ אַחַר רוֹב נִכְנָסִין לָעֲזָרָה. מַה. כָּל כַּת וָכַת מְשַׁעֲרִין אוֹ אֵין מְשַׁעֲרִין אֶלָּא כַּת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה בִלְבַד. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בֵּירִבִּי בּוּן. עַד שֶׁהֵן מִבַּחוּץ הֵן מְשַׁעֲרִין עַצְמָן. רִבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי. לִרְאִיָיה הִילְּכוּ מִלְּבוֹא חֲמַת עַד נַחַל מִצְרַיִם. רִבִּי תַנְחוּמָא בְשֵׁם רִבִּי הוּנָא. טַעֲמָא דְּרִבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי וַיַּעַשׂ שְׁלֹמֹה בָעֵת הַהִיא אֶת הֶחָג וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל עִמּוֹ וגו׳.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
⁹² 7:6 (34c line 66), following the wording of B. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. For instructions they considered the settlement of the Land of Israel⁹³ is not quoted here (in contrast to the Babli, 3a), the definition of the Land of Israel is that given in *Ševi*ˋ*it* 6:1, Notes 31–51.. For impurity they considered the majority of those coming to the Temple precinct⁹⁴ 94b. A private sacrifice may be presented in the Temple only by a person ritually pure. But the Passover lamb has the status of a public sacrifice; if most of the public are impure (of a kind which cannot be remedied by simple immersion in water), the sacrifice is slaughtered and eaten in impurity (cf. *Nazir* 9:2 Note 66.). How? Do they estimate every group or only the first group? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, when they are still outside they estimate themselves⁹⁵ finding that most of Israel were impure.. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: For appearance⁹⁶ 31:10–13) could proceed in impurity if most of Israel in the domain of Solomon’s empire were impure. they consider from Levo- Ḥamat to the brook of Egypt. Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: The reason of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi is, *at that time Solomon celebrated the holiday, and all of Israel*, ⁹⁷ 8:65 (misquoted in B.) etc.

footnotes:
⁹² This paragraph is also in Pesahim
⁹³ The definition of “majority” which would trigger the liability of the Court for a sacrifice for issuing false instruction counts only the Jewish population of the Land of Israel. Since the verse from 1Kings
⁹⁴ Babli Pesaḥim
⁹⁵ Since the Temple courtyard was rather small, the Passover lambs were slaughtered in three groups. Making the count depending on the composition of the groups would lead to the paradoxical situation that a first group might be permitted to slaughter and eat the lamb in impurity while from a second group only the pure members are admitted and have to follow the rules of purity. Also, it is impossible to make the decision depending on “those in the Temple court” since only pure persons could enter the Temple precinct in the absence of a prior
⁹⁶ The assembly of all of Israel in a Sabbatical year (Deut.
⁹⁷ 1K.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:3:1
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:3:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:3:1)

**משנה:** הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין לַעֲקוֹר אֶת כָּל הַגּוּף אָמְרוּ אֵין נִידָּה בַתּוֹרָה אֵין שַׁבָּת בַּתּוֹרָה. אֵין עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה בַתּוֹרָה הֲרֵי אֵילּוּ פְטוּרִין. הוֹרוּ לְבַטֵּל מִקְצָת וּלְקַיֵים מִקְצָת הֲרֵי אֶילּו חַיָיבִין. כֵּיצַד אָמְרוּ יֵשׁ נִידָּה בַתּוֹרָה אֲבָל הַבָּא עַל שׁוֹמֶרֶת יוֹם כְּנֶגֶד יוֹם פָּטוּר. יֵשׁ שַׁבָּת בַּתּוֹרָה אֲבָל הַמּוֹצִיא מֵרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים פָּטוּר. יֵשׁ עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה בַתּוֹרָה אֲבָל הַמִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה פָטוּר הֲרֵי אֵילּוּ חַיָיבִין שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר וְנֶעְלַם דָּבָר. דָּבָר וְלֹא כָל הַגּוּף:

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**MISHNAH:** If the Court ruled to uproot an entire subject; if they said, the menstruating woman is not mentioned in the Torah, Sabbath is not mentioned in the Torah, idolatry is not mentioned in the Torah, they are not liable⁹⁸. If they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part, they are liable. How is that? If they said, the menstruating woman is mentioned in the Torah but one who copulates with one who is watching a day to the next day is not liable⁹⁹(*Lev.*15:19) followed by another 11 days. If a woman has a discharge on one of these 11 days, she is not classified as *niddah* but as *zavah,* whose rules are spelled out in *Lev.*15:25–30. Since the verse speaks of a discharge of *many days,* it is concluded that the full rules of *zavah* only apply after 3 days. For the first and second discharges in that 11 day period, the woman is called “watching one day to the next day”. For a day she is under the rules of *niddah*(*Lev.* 15:25) and therefore forbidden to her husband. But since the verse uses the expression *all the days of the flow of her impurity shall be like the days of her menstruation,* one could think that she is impure only during the day and not during the following night, or that a discharge during the night does not make her impure. This is clearly a matter of rabbinic interpretation.; Sabbath is mentioned in the Torah but one who brings from a private domain to a public domain is not liable¹⁰⁰ 16:29, *nobody should go out from his place,* which is explained in *Jer.* 17:22 by *do not move a load from your houses.* Since as a matter of principle prophetic utterances should not be used as legal texts, the ruling of the Court could not be dismissed out of hand.; idolatry is mentioned in the Torah but one who prostrates himself is not liable¹⁰¹ 17:3 clearly defines prostrating oneself in idolatry as a capital crime. Therefore, one has to agree with Maimonides’s Commentary that the Court changed the definition of “prostration”, e. g., ruling that kneeling down, bowing the head to the ground, is not punishable as long as one does not lie on the ground with outstretched hands and feet.; these are liable for it is said¹⁰² 4:13. *Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Parašah*4(7–8). *something was hidden*, something but not an entire subject.

footnotes:
⁹⁸ Since anything written in the Torah is public knowledge and nobody would listen to them.
⁹⁹ In rabbinic medical theory, the minimum time which must elapse between one menstrual period and the next is the seven days of the niddah
¹⁰⁰ The pentateuchal root of the prohibition to carry from a private to the public domain is Ex.
¹⁰¹ This is more difficult to understand since Deut.
¹⁰² Lev.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:3:2
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:3:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:3:2)

**הלכה:** הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין לַעֲקוֹר אֶת כָּל הַגּוּף כול׳. רִבִּי חִזְקִיָּה אָמַר. מִדָּבָר. לֹא כָל דָּבָר. אָמַר רִבִּי הִילָא. מִמִּצְוֹת. לֹא כָל מִצְוֹת. וְכָתוּב כֵּן. כַּיי דָּמַר רִבִּי אִמִּי בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. גּוֹרְעִין לִדְרוֹשׁ מִתְּחִילַּת הַפָּרָשָׁה עַד סוֹפָהּ. רִבִּי חֲנַנְיָה בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה. וַאֲפִילוּ בְאֶמְצַע תֵּיבָה. וְיָצַקְתָּ עָלֶיהָ שָׁמֶן מִנְחָה הִיא. לְרַבּוֹת כָּל הַמְּנָחוֹת לִיצִיקָה.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**HALAKHAH:** “If the Court ruled to uproot an entire subject,” etc. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, “of a subject,” not the entire subject. Rebbi Hila said, “of the commandments”, not entire commandments¹⁰³ 4:13, R. Hizqiah reads דָּבָר וְנֶעֱלַם as וְנֶעֱלַם מִדָּבָר, presupposing a script which does not differentiate between regular and final *mem.* R. Hila’s comment is really unnecessary since מִכָּל־מִצְוֹת already means “of any commandments” but not entire commandments. In all situations, prefix *mem* is read as partitive, some but not all; cf. *Nazir* 5:4 Note 105.. ¹⁰⁴ 5:1, explained in Notes 8–10, *Nazir*5:1 Note 56. Is that written? As Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: For interpretation, one removes from the beginning of the paragraph to its end. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: Even a middle word. *You have to pour oil on it, it is a flour offering,* to include all flour offerings for pouring¹⁰⁵ 12 on *Lev.*2:6. The ms. text follows the argument of *Sifra* while B reproduces the text of *Sotah* and *Nazir.* The argument of *Sifra* has no connection with the theories of RR. Johanan and Jeremiah; it is a straightforward reading of the verse. Since it is stated that one has to pour oil on the bread crumbs *because it is a flour-offering,* it follows that a flour-offering requires pouring oil over it unless it be explicitly excluded as in the purification offering of v. 5:11..

footnotes:
¹⁰³ In Lev.
¹⁰⁴ The following text also is found in Sotah
¹⁰⁵ Sifra Wayyiqra 1 Pereq


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:3:3
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:3:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:3:3)

וְלֹא נִמְצֵאתָ עוֹקֵר כָּל שֵׁם שׁוֹמֶרֶת יוֹם כְּנֶגֶד יוֹם. בְּשֶׁאָמְרוּ. הַלַּיְלָה מוּתָּר וְהַיּוֹם אָסוּר. וְלֹא נִמְצֵאתָ עוֹקֵר כָּל שְׁחִיחָה. שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר. בְּשֶׁאָמְרוּ. אַמָּה מוּתֶּרֶת וּשְׁתֵּי אַמּוֹת אֲסוּרוֹת. וְלֹא נִמְצֵאתָ עוֹקֵר כָּל שֵׁם הִשְׁתַּחֲוָיָיה. בְּשֶׁאָמְרוּ. מוּתָּר לְהִשְׁתַּחֲוֹת וְאָסוּר לָשׁוּחַ. וְלֹא נִמְצֵאתָ עוֹקֵר כָּל שֵׁם הוֹצָאָה. אָמַר רִבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר רַב יִצְחָק. בְּשֶׁאָמְרוּ. גְּרוֹגֶרֶת מוּתֶּרֶת וּשְׁתֵּי גְרוֹגְרוֹת אֲסוּרוֹת. וְאַתְיָיא כְּמָאן דָּמַר. הַכְנָסָה וְהוֹצָאָה אַחַת הִיא. בְּרַם כְּמָאן דָּמַר. הַכְנָסָה וְהוֹצָאָה שְׁתַּיִם הֵן. וְלֹא נִמְצֵאתָ עוֹקֵר כָּל שֵׁם הַכְנָסָה. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. לֹא שֶׁהוֹרוּ מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל חֵלֶב. יוֹדְעִין הָיוּ שֶׁאָסוּר לוֹכַל חֵלֶב. וְהַתּוֹרָה נָתְנָה רְשׁוּת לְבֵית דְּין לְהוֹרוֹת. רִבִּי בּוּן בַּר חִיָיה בָּעֵי. כְּזַיִת הַיּוֹם וְכִשְׁנֵי זֵיתִים לְמָחָר. הֵיךְ עֲבִידָא נָביא וּמַדִּיחַ. יָכוֹל אִם יֹאמְרוּ לָךְ. אַל תִּתֵּן תְּפִילִּין הַיּוֹם תֵּן לְמָחָר. תִּשְׂמַע לָהֶם. תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר לָלֶכֶת בָּהֶם. בְּכוּלָּן לֹא בְמִקְצָתָן. הֲרֵי עָקַרְתָּ שֵׁם כָּל אוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם. וַתֵּ מַר אֵין כָּאן עֲקִירַת הַגּוּף. וְכָא אֵין כָּאן עֲקִירַת גּוּף. רִבִּי מָנָא שָׁמַע לָהּ מִן דְּבַתְרָה. שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר בָּא אָמַר. בְּשֶׁאָמְרוּ. אַמָּה מוּתֶּרֶת וּשְׁתֵּי אַמּוֹת אֲסוּרוֹת. הֲרֵי עָקַרְתָּ שֵׁם כָּל אוֹתָּה הָאַמָּה. וְתֵי מַר אֵין כָּאן עֲקִירַת גּוּף. וָכָא אֵין כָּאן עֲקִירַת גּוּף.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
But would you not have eliminated the entire notion of one who watches a day for the next day¹⁰⁶ But since the verse declares the one who watches a day for the next day as being under the rules of *niddah* for whom such relations are forbidden (*Lev.* 18:19), such a ruling would in effect eliminate all rules for the one who watches a day for the next day. Cf. Note 99. Babli 4a.? If they said, the night is permitted but the day is forbidden. Would you not have eliminated the entire notion of bending? Samuel bar Abba said, if they said, one cubit is permitted but two are forbidden¹⁰⁷שחיחה refers. Since in the Mishnah the Sabbath is mentioned in second place, a reasonable reference would be to Mishnah *Šabbat* 1:1 which describes forbidden transactions on the Sabbath as, e. g., a person standing behind a window handing a parcel to another who is standing outside. While the distance by which the parcel is moved is irrelevant in practice since only the fact counts that it is transported across the border line between public and private domains, a ruling that a minimum distance be required for the transfer to be a violation of Sabbath law is thinkable.. Would you not have eliminated the entire notion of prostrating? If they said, it is permitted to prostrate oneself but forbidden to sink down¹⁰⁸19:18 shows that going down on one’s knees is forbidden worship, it is possible to imagine a ruling that going down onone’s knees is prosecutable but other forms of prostration are not.. Would you not have eliminated the entire notion of taking out? Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, if they said, one dried fig is permitted but two dried figs are forbidden¹⁰⁹ and all of Tractate ˋ*Eruvin.* Moving minute quantities from domain to domain is not punishable. For example, transporting vegetable seeds in a volume less that of a dried fig is not punishable (Mishnah *Šabbat* 9:7). The long list of minimal quantities is traditional, not biblical. A wrong ruling in these matters does not abolish the principle that some minimal quantity is defined for everything.. This follows him who said that bringing in and taking out are the same¹¹⁰ (1:1, 2b l.11 ff.) whether the inclusion of putting down is scriptural or is a matter of indirect inference. If one accepts that “taking up” implies “putting down”, then the formulation of the Mishnah covers rulings both about taking up and putting down; but if the biblical status of “putting down” is different from “taking up”, the latter should have been mentioned. An answer is unnecessary since the consensus is that “taking up” implies “putting down”.. But for him who said that bringing in and taking out are two notions, would you not have eliminated the entire notion of bringing in? Rebbi Yose said, not that they said that it was permitted to eat fat; they knew that it is forbidden to eat fat, but the Torah gave permission to the Court to instruct¹¹¹. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked, the [amount of] an olive today and of two olives tomorrow¹¹² today, two tomorrow, etc., they might come to disestablish the entire commandment by a succession of steps, none of which can be classified as total negation of the commandment.? What about a prophet and seducer¹¹³11:8, Note 112 (Tosephta *Sanhedrin*14:13).? I could think that if they said to you, do not put on phylacteries today, put them on tomorrow¹¹⁴ 6:8,11:18), wearing them is a daily biblical commandment., that you should listen to them. The verse says¹¹⁵ 13:6 where the reading is בָּ֑הּ לָלֶ֣כֶת., *to walk in them,* in all of them, not only in part of them; you would have eliminated the notion of that entire day. You can say that this is not elimination of the entire subject. And here it is not elimination of the entire subject¹¹⁶. Rebbi Mana understood it from the following¹⁰⁷שחיחה refers. Since in the Mishnah the Sabbath is mentioned in second place, a reasonable reference would be to Mishnah *Šabbat* 1:1 which describes forbidden transactions on the Sabbath as, e. g., a person standing behind a window handing a parcel to another who is standing outside. While the distance by which the parcel is moved is irrelevant in practice since only the fact counts that it is transported across the border line between public and private domains, a ruling that a minimum distance be required for the transfer to be a violation of Sabbath law is thinkable.; Samuel bar Abba said, if they said, one cubit is permitted but two are forbidden. You can say that this is not elimination of the entire subject. And here it is not elimination of the entire subject.

footnotes:
¹⁰⁶ The literal text of the Mishnah could be read as a hypothetical ruling that there be no restriction on relations between a man and a temporary zavah.
¹⁰⁷ It is not at all clear to what the hapax
¹⁰⁸ While prostrating oneself before an idol is certainly subject to a biblical prohibition, there is no biblical definition of what constitutes prostrating. Since 1K.
¹⁰⁹ This refers to the prohibitions of the Sabbath. While the prohibition of moving things from one place to another is only one of the 49 categories of forbidden actions, its rules in effect cover half of Tractate Šabbat
¹¹⁰ Everybody agrees that “transporting” for the rules of the Sabbath comprises taking up, moving, and putting down. There is a discussion at the start of Tractate Šabbat
¹¹¹ While fat is not mentioned in the Mishnah, R. Yose explains how the Court might be liable for a false ruling concerning fat. The only fat (חֵלֶב) forbidden for consumption is (a) fat of domestic animals which for any sacrifice would be burned on the altar and (b) the fat in which the hip tendons are embedded. All other fat is permitted (שׁוּמָן). The exact definition of each category is a matter of rabbinic tradition and as such within the purview of the Court.
¹¹² He asks whether the entire discussion about abolishing an entire commandment or only a detail makes any sense. If they would permit eating one olive-sized piece of ḥēlev
¹¹³ To whom the distinction between abolishing a commandment and modifying it also applies, Babli 4b, Sanhedrin
¹¹⁴ This would be a situation in which the accredited prophet could eliminate a commandment in steps, similar to the Court ruling on fat. Since phylacteries are mentioned in connection with the study of Torah (Deut.
¹¹⁵ There is no such verse. The reference is to Deut.
¹¹⁶ Since R. Bun bar Hiyya’s question could have been asked about any example in the Mishnah, but the Mishnah makes a distinction between eliminating and modifying a commandment. It is true that a modification is only a modification even if its open-ended iteration could result in eliminating the commandment.
¹⁰⁷ It is not at all clear to what the hapax


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:4:1
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:4:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:4:1)

**משנה:** הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין וְיָדַע אֶחָד מֵהֶן שֶׁטָּעוּ וְאָמַר לָהֶן טוֹעִין אַתֶּם אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה מוּפְלָא שֶׁל בֵּית דִּין שָׁם אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה אֶחָד מֵהֶן גֵּר אוֹ מַמְזֵר אוֹ נָתִין אוֹ זָקֵן שֶׁלֹּא רָאָה לוֹ בָנִים הֲרֵי זוֹ פָטוּר שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר כָּאן עֵדָה וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן עֵדָה. מָה עֵדָה הָאֲמוּרָה לְהַלָן כּוּלָּן רְאוּיִין לְהוֹרָיָיה. אַף עֵדָה הָאֲמוּרָה כָאן כוּלָּן רְאוּיִין לְהוֹרָיָיה.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**MISHNAH:** If the Court ruled but one of them knew that it was in error and he told them, you are erring¹¹⁷, or that the distinguished member of the Court was not there¹¹⁸ Note 71., or that one of them was a proselyte, or a bastard, or a Gibeonite¹¹⁹, or a childless old man¹²⁰, it is not liable since it is said here “congregation” and it is said there “congregation”¹²¹ 4:13; “there” is *Num.*35:12,24,25 containing the rules of criminal courts.. Since in the congregation mentioned there, all of them were worthy of ordination, also the congregation here all have to be worthy of ordination.

footnotes:
¹¹⁷ Then the ruling of the Court is not unanimous; no sacrifice is due; Note 36.
¹¹⁸ The ruling is not ex cathedra,
¹¹⁹ While they can be civil judges, they are not eligible for the High Court as explained in the Halakhah.
¹²⁰ He should not be member of a criminal court since he never raised children and as a consequence never learned to have a positive attitude towards misbehaving people.
¹²¹ “Here” is Lev.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:4:2
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:4:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:4:2)

**הלכה:** הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין וְיָדַע אֶחָד מֵהֶן שֶׁטָּעוּ כול׳. מַתְנִיתָא דְרִבִּי. דְּרִבִּי אָמַר. אֵין לְךָ מְעַכֵּב אֶלָּא מוּפְלָא שֶׁלְּבֵית דִּין (בלוד). כְּתִיב וְהָיָה אִם מֵעֵינֵי הָעֵדָה. מִי שֶׁהוּא עָשׂוּי עֵינַיִם לָעֵדָה. כְּתִיב וְהִתְיַצְּבוּ שָׁם עִמָּךְ. מָה אַתְּ לא גֵר וְלֹא נָתִין וְלֹא מַמְזֵר. אַף הֵן לֹא גֵרִים וְלֹא נְתִינִים וְלֹא מַמְזֵרִים וְלֹא עֲבָדִים. נִיחָא גֵר. מַמְזֵר. בֵּית דִּין מְמַנִּין מַמְזֵירִין. רַב חוּנָא אָמַר. בְּשֶׁעָבְרוּ וּמִינוּ. רִבִּי חֲנַנְיָה רִבִּי מָנָא. חַד אָמַר. בְּתוֹךְ שִׁבְעִים. וָחָרָנָה אָמַר. חוּץ לְשִׁבְעִים. מָאן דָּמַר. חוּץ לְשִׁבְעִים. נִיחָא. וּמָאן דָּמַר. בְּתוֹךְ שִׁבְעִים. הָא חוּץ לְשִׁבְעִים לֹא. מִכֵּיוָן שֶׁאֵינוֹ רָאוּי לְהוֹרָיָיה נַעֲשֶׂה כָאֶבֶן.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**HALAKHAH:** “If the Court ruled but one of them knew that it was in error,” etc. The Mishnah is Rebbi’s, since Rebbi said, no one invalidates but the distinguished member of the Court (at Lydda) [only]⁷¹. It is written¹²² 15:24, detailing the rules governing the sacrifice of a goat if the Court unintentionally permitted idolatry. This is taken as biblical proof that the Court cannot rule in the absence of its president.: *If from the eyes of the congregation,* from him who is appointed as eyes of the congregation. It is written¹²³ 11:16, the appointment of the 70 Elders, the paradigm for the High Court. Babli 4b, *they shall stand there with you.* Just as you are neither proselyte, nor Gibeonite, nor a bastard¹²⁴. Proselytes are reasonable, but bastards? does the court appoints bastards? Rav Ḥuna said, when they breached the rules and appointed¹²⁵. Rebbi Ḥanania, Rebbi Mana. One said, as part of the Seventy; the other said, apart from the Seventy¹²⁶. He who said, apart from the Seventy, is understandable. But he who said, as part of the Seventy, therefore not apart from the Seventy? Since he is not suitable for ordination, he is considered like a stone¹²⁷.

footnotes:
⁷¹ The ms. text, בלוד, “at Lydda” makes no sense since the High Court must sit in the ashlar hall on the Temple Mount. One has to read with B בלבד “only”. The president of the Court is the only one for whom no substitute can be found.
¹²² Num.
¹²³ Num.
¹²⁴ As son of a man and his aunt, Moses would have been a bastard if his parents had married after the promulgation of Torah laws.
¹²⁵ The exclusion of proselytes, Gibeonites, and bastards is strongly recommended but a breach does not invalidate the appointment.
¹²⁶ He holds that the exclusion is prescriptive; an appointment would be invalid.
¹²⁷ If their vote cannot be counted, then automatically not all who are present are voting; therefore the false ruling will never trigger the obligation of a sacrifice.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:5:1
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:5:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:5:1)

**משנה:** הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין שׁוֹגְגִין וְעָשׂוּ כָל הַקָּהָל שׁוֹגְגִין מְבִיאִין פָּר. מְזִידִין וְעָשׂוּ שׁוֹגְגִין מְבִיאִין כִּשְׂבָּה אוֹ שְׂעִירָה. שׁוֹגְגִין וְעָשׂוּ מְזִידִין הֲרֵי אֵילּוּ פְטוּרִין:

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**MISHNAH:** If the Court ruled in error and the public acted in error, they have to bring a bull; intentionally but they acted in error, they bring a female sheep or goat; in error but they acted intentionally, they are not liable¹²⁸., that the sin to be expiated was committed unintentionally (*Lev.* 4:2,13,22,27). If both Court and public acted in error, the conditions for a sacrifice by the Court are satisfied. If the Court intentionally gave a false ruling, their sin cannot be atoned by a sacrifice; the public are forced to bring individual sacrifices. If the Court ruled in error but the public, although realizing the error, intentionally followed the false ruling, the Court cannot bring a sacrifice since the public did not follow their intent, and the public is barred from any sacrifice since they did not act in error..

footnotes:
¹²⁸ All purification sacrifices have a stated prerequisite, viz


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:5:2
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:5:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:5:2)

**הלכה:** הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין שׁוֹגְגִין כול׳. לֵית הָדָא פְלִיגָא עַל רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ. דָּמַר רִבִּי אִמִּי בְשֵׁם רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ. מַתְנִיתָא כְּגוֹן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי יוֹשֵׁב לִפְנֵיהֶן. וּמְזִידִין וְעָשׂוּ שׁוֹגְגִין. וְכִי יֵשׁ זָדוֹן לִשְׁגָגָה לְיָחִיד אֶצֶל הוֹרָיַית בֵּית דִּין. חֲבֵרַיָיא בְשֵׁם רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ. בְּשֶׁלֹּא קִיבְּלוּ רוֹב הַצִּיבּוּר עֲלֵיהֶן. רִבִּי זְעִירָא בְשֵׁם רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ. בְּשֶׁבָּעֲטוּ בְהוֹרָיָיתָן. מַה מַפְקָה מִבֵּינֵיהוֹן. קִיבְּלוּ עֲלֵיהֶן וְחָזְרוּ וּבָעֲטוּ. עַל דַּעְתּוֹן דַּחֲבֵרַיָיא כֵּיוָן שֶׁבָּעֲטוּ פְטוּרִין. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי זְעִירָא מִכֵּיוָן שֶׁקִּיבְּלוּ עֲלֵיהֶן מִשָּׁעָה רִאשׁוֹנָה הֲרֵי אֵילּוּ חַיָיבִין.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**HALAKHAH:** “If the Court ruled in error,” etc. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Since Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai⁴⁰ was sitting before them¹²⁹. “Intentionally but they acted in error.” Is there intentional misdeed or error with respect of an instruction by the Court¹³⁰? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If not most of the public accepted it¹³¹. Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, if they rebelled against their instruction¹³² 4:13.. What is the difference between them? If they first accepted and then rebelled. In the opinions of the colleagues, since they rebelled, they are not liable¹³³. In the opinion of Rebbi Zeˋira, since at the first moment they accepted it, those are liable¹³⁴.

footnotes:
⁴⁰ The paradigm of the know-all; he was ready to answer any question about religious law on the spot. The Babli knows of a number of famous rabbis who tried to imitate him but quickly were confronted with a question they could not answer. He never was ordained; therefore he could not have been part of the Court, but as an outsider he could have pointed out the Court’s error.
¹²⁹ He would immediately have pointed out the error; then one would be back at the situation of Mishnah 4; the case of Mishnah 5 never could arise.
¹³⁰ It already was stated in Mishnah 1 that a person acting upon the instructions of the Court is never liable for a purification offering, irrespective of the quality of the Court’s ruling. Why should the individual be held liable?
¹³¹ Then the main condition for a sacrifice of the Court is not fulfilled; automatically there is no valid ruling of the Court, only actions of individuals.
¹³² A High Court without authority is no High Court; it cannot claim to be the subject of Lev.
¹³³ Since at the moment a sacrifice would be due the conditions are not met, the Court is no longer liable.
¹³⁴ Since the authority of the Court is acknowledged, a later rejection does not change the fact of the Court’s false ruling, and the Court is liable.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:6:1
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:6:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:6:1)

**משנה:** הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין וְעָשׂוּ כָל הַקָּהָל אוֹ רוּבָּן עַל פִּיהֶן מְבִיאִין פָּר. וּבַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה מְבִיאִין פַּר וְשָׂעִיר דִּבְרֵי רִבִּי מֵאִיר. רִבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר שְׁבָטִים מְבִיאִין שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר פָּרִים וּבַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר שְׁבָטִים מְבִיאִין שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר פָּרִים וּשְׁנֵים עָשָׂר שְׂעִירִים. רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר שְׁלשָׁה עָשָׂר פָּרִים. וּבַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה שְׁלשָׁה עָשָׂר פָּרִים וּשְׁלשָׁה עָשָׂר שְׂעִירִים פַּר וְשָׂעִיר לְכָל שֵׁבֶט פַּר וְשָׂעִיר לְבֵית דִּין.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**MISHNAH:** If the Court ruled and all the public or a majority acted on their instruction, they bring a bull; or in a matter of idolatry a bull and a goat¹³⁵ 4:13–31 (a bull) and *Num.* 15:22–26 (a bull as elevation offering and a goat as purification offering). The verses in *Num.* are interpreted to refer to the sin of idolatry since that is the only sin by which in one action one violates *all* commandments (*Num.* 15:22). Since the sacrifice for violating all commandments cannot be less than that for violating one commandment, it is logical that the sacrifice for idolatry must be more than the regular sacrifice *Lev.*4:13–31. (*Sifry Num.* 111), the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, the Twelve Tribes bring twelve bulls and in a matter of idolatry the Twelve Tribes bring twelve bulls and twelve goats¹³⁶. Rebbi Simeon says, thirteen oxen, and in a matter of idolatry thirteen bulls and thirteen goats; a bull and a goat for each tribe; a bull and a goat for the Court.

footnotes:
¹³⁵ Sacrifices for unintended sins committed by the entire community are prescribed both in Lev.
¹³⁶ As discussed in the Halakhah, this is a problem of definition of עֵדָה and קָהָל.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:6:2
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:6:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:6:2)

**הלכה:** הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין וְעָשׂוּ כָל הַקָּהָל כול׳. מָאן תַּנָּא רוֹב. רִבִּי מֵאִיר. דְּתַנֵּי. הִיא מַחֲצִית כָּל הַשְּׁבָטִים הִיא מַחֲצִית כָּל שֵׁבֶט וָשֵׁבֶט וּבִלְבַד רוֹב. רִבִּי יוּדָה אוֹמֵר. חֲצִי כָּל שֵׁבֶט וָשֵׁבֶט וּבִלְבַד רוֹבֵי שְׁבָטִים שְׁלֵימִים. שֵׁבֶט אֶחָד גּוֹרֵר כָּל הַשְּׁבָטִים. רִבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר. כָּל הַשְּׁבָטִים קְרוּיִין קָהָל. רִבִּי יוּדָה אוֹמֵר. כָּל שֵׁבֶט וָשֵׁבֶט קָרוּי קָהָל. וְאַתְיָיא דְּרִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן כְּרִבִּי יוּדָה. כְּמַה דְּרִבִּי יוּדָה אָמַר. כָּל שֵׁבֶט וָשֵׁבֶט קָרוּי קָהָל. כֵּן רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר. כָּל שֵׁבֶט וָשֵׁבֶט קָרוּי קָהָל. מַה בֵּינֵיהוֹן. גְּרִירָה. רִבִּי יוּדָה אוֹמֵר. שֵׁבֶט אֶחָד גּוֹרֵר כָּל הַשְּׁבָטִים. רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר. אֵין שֵׁבֶט אֶחָד גּוֹרֵר אֶת כָּל הַשְּׁבָטִים. מוֹדֶה וְהוּא שֶׁתְּהֵא הוֹרָיָיה מִלִּשְׁכַּת הַגָּזִית. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. טַעֲמֵיהּ דָּהֵין תַּנַּיָיא מִן הַמָּקוֹם הַהוּא אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יי. רִבִּי אַבּוּן בְשֵׁם רִבִּי בִּנְיָמִן בַּר לֵוִי. קִרְיָיא מְסַיֵיעַ לְמָאן דָּמַר. כָּל שֵׁבֶט וָשֵׁבֶט קָרוּי קָהָל. דִּכְתִיב גּוֹי וּקְהַל גּוֹיִם יִהְיֶה מִמֶּךָּ. וְאַדַּיִין לֹא נוֹלַד בִּנְיָמִן. אָמַר רִבִּי חִיָיה בַּר בָּא. כְּשֵׁם שֶׁהֵן חַלּוּקִין כָּאן כָּךְ הֵן חַלּוּקִין בְּטוּמְאָה. דְּתַנֵּי. הָיָה צִיבּוּר חֶצְיָין טְהוֹרִין וְחֶצְיָין טְמֵאִין. הַטְּהוֹרִין עוֹשִׂין אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹן וְהַטְּמֵאִין עוֹשִׂין אֶת הַשֵּׁינִי. רִבִּי יוּדָה אוּמֵר. הַטְּהוֹרִין עוֹשִׂין לְעַצְמָן וְהַטְּמֵאִין עוֹשִׂין לְעַצְמָן. אָמְרוּ לוֹ. אֵין הַפֶּסַח לַחֲצָאִין אוֹ כוּלָּן יַעֲשׂוּ בְטוּמְאָה אוּ כוּלָּן יַעֲשׂוּ בְטַהֲרָה. מִינוּ אָמְרוּ לוֹ. כְּרִבִּי יוּדָה. דְּתַנֵּי. נִיטְמֵאת אַחַת מִן הַחַלּוֹת אוֹ אֶחָד מִן הַשְּׁיָירִים רִבִּי יוּדָה אוֹמֵר שְׁנֵיהֶן יֵצְאוּ לְבֵית הַשְּרֵיפָה. שֶׁאֵין קָרְבַּן צִיבּוּר חָלוּק. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים. הַטָּמֵא בְטוּמְאָתוֹ וְהַטָּהוֹר יֵאָכֵל. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בֵּרִבִּי בּוּן בְּשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר. מִינוּ אָמְרוּ לוֹ. חֲכָמִים שֶׁהֵן כְּשִׁיטַּת רִבִּי יְהוּדָה.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**HALAKHAH:** “If the Court ruled and all the public acted,” etc. ¹³⁷ 7:6. *Num.* 9:9–14 prescribes that individuals who were impure on Passover have to bring their Passover sacrifice a month later, on the Second Passover celebrated on the 14 of the Second Month. It is concluded that if the entire people are impure, the Second Passover is impossible and everybody celebrates the (First) Passover in impurity in the Temple. The problem then arises which percentage of the people have to be impure so that they represent the entire people; just as here the question is, how many people do have to follow the erroneous ruling of the Court so that “all of Israel were in error” (*Lev.* 4:13). Who stated “a majority”? Rebbi Meïr, as it was stated: Either half of the tribes or half of each tribe, if only it be a majority¹³⁸. Rebbi Jehudah says, half of each tribe, but only a majority of entire tribes¹³⁹. One tribe drags all tribes¹⁴⁰. Rebbi Meïr says, all tribes are called “the public”¹⁴¹ 4:14). The difference of opinions in the Mishnah is traced to different interpretations of this notion. R. Meïr holds that only the entire people of Israel qualify as “public”; RR. Jehudah and Simeon consider each tribe as a separate public. (Babli 5b, *Pesahim*80a, *Menahot* 15a).. Rebbi Jehudah says, each single tribe is called “public”. And Rebbi Simeon follows Rebbi Jehudah. Just as Rebbi Jehudah said, each single tribe is called “public”, so Rebbi Simeon says, each single tribe is called “public”. What is between them? Dragging. Rebbi Jehudah says, one tribe drags all tribes¹⁴⁰. Rebbi Simeon says, one tribe does not drag all tribes¹⁴². [Even though Rebbi Jehudah says, one tribe drags all tribes,]¹⁴³ text; required by the context. he agrees that only if the ruling came from the ashlar hall¹⁴⁴. Rebbi Yose said, the reason of that Tanna: *From this place which the Eternal will choose*¹⁴⁵ 17:10.*.* Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Bejamin ben Levi: The verse supports him who said that each tribe is called “public”, as it is written¹⁴⁶ 35:11, said to Jacob after the birth of 11 sons. Babli 5b.: *A people and a public of peoples will come from you,* and Benjamin was not yet born. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, just as they differ here, so they differ about impurity¹³⁷ 7:6. *Num.* 9:9–14 prescribes that individuals who were impure on Passover have to bring their Passover sacrifice a month later, on the Second Passover celebrated on the 14 of the Second Month. It is concluded that if the entire people are impure, the Second Passover is impossible and everybody celebrates the (First) Passover in impurity in the Temple. The problem then arises which percentage of the people have to be impure so that they represent the entire people; just as here the question is, how many people do have to follow the erroneous ruling of the Court so that “all of Israel were in error” (*Lev.* 4:13)., as we have stated: If the public was half pure and half impure; pure [people] celebrate the first [Passover] and impure the second. Rebbi Jehudah said, the pure ones celebrate for themselves, and the impure ones celebrate for themselves¹⁴⁷ equal to the number of impure ones.. They told him, there is no split Passover; either all celebrate in impurity or all celebrate in purity. Who is “they told him”? Following Rebbi Jehudah? As it was stated¹⁴⁸ 2:2.: “If one of the loaves or one of the (leftovers) [orders]¹⁴⁹ and all sources of the Mishnah; it is the only one which makes sense.
The Mishnah speaks of the two public cereal offerings which have to be baked, *viz.,* the weekly show-bread and the two leavened loaves presented at Pentecost. The 12 show-breads were presented in two rows, here called “orders” (*Lev.*24:6). became impure, Rebbi Jehudah said, both have to be brought to be burned¹⁵⁰ for a public offering cannot be split. But the Sages say, the impure in its impurity, and the pure shall be eaten.¹⁵¹” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, who is “they told him”? The Sages¹⁵² are the opinions of his opponents and R. Jehudah in *Menahot,* both seem to contradict themselves. One has to conclude that they agree in principle and they only differ about the practical applications of their theory. In this sense, B reads: The Sages *acting* in the sense of R. Jehudah. who argue like Rebbi Jehudah.

footnotes:
¹³⁷ The entire Halakhah is shortened from Pesaḥim
¹³⁸ He holds that everywhere 50%+1 represent “all”; Babli 5b.
¹³⁹ The language is somewhat self-contradictory. He also requires that a majority of Israel follow the erroneous ruling but in addition he demands that in a majority of tribes a majority follow the ruling. Babli 5b.
¹⁴⁰ If one tribe has more members than all the others together, the action of one tribe triggers the obligation of all of them. He does not hold that the law about erroneous rulings of the High Court became moot with the exile of the Ten Tribes. Even later, when the tribe of Jehudah represented the overwhelming majority of Israel, a majority of the people can be considered a majority of all twelve tribes and the majority of Judeans triggers the obligation for all tribes.
¹⁴¹ The purification sacrifice for an erroneous ruling by the Court has to be brought by “the public” (Lev.
¹⁴⁰ If one tribe has more members than all the others together, the action of one tribe triggers the obligation of all of them. He does not hold that the law about erroneous rulings of the High Court became moot with the exile of the Ten Tribes. Even later, when the tribe of Jehudah represented the overwhelming majority of Israel, a majority of the people can be considered a majority of all twelve tribes and the majority of Judeans triggers the obligation for all tribes.
¹⁴² Therefore he requires a separate sacrifice for the people of Israel in their entirety.
¹⁴³ Missing in the ms., from B and the Pesaḥim
¹⁴⁴ Even though each tribe has to bring its own sacrifice, the ruling of a tribal High Court cannot trigger an obligation of any other tribe; only the Court sitting at the central sanctuary has this power.
¹⁴⁵ Deut.
¹⁴⁶ Gen.
¹³⁷ The entire Halakhah is shortened from Pesaḥim
¹⁴⁷ Both offer their sacrifices in the Temple, in separate groups. For this to happen, the number of pure people in Jerusalem on the 14th of Nisan must be exactly
¹⁴⁸ Mishnah Menahot
¹⁴⁹ The text in parentheses is from the ms.; the text in brackets is from B, the text in Pesahim,
¹⁵⁰ Outside the Temple precinct.
¹⁵¹ By the officiating priests.
¹⁵² Since the opinions of R. Jehudah and his opponents in Pesaḥim


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:7:1
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:7:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:7:1)

**משנה:** הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין וְעָשׂוּ שִׁבְעָה שְׁבָטִים אוֹ רוּבָּן עַל פִּיהֶן מְבִיאִין פָּר וּבַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה מְבִיאִין פַּר וְשָׂעִיר דִּבְרֵי רִבִּי מֵאִיר. רִבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר שִׁבְעָה שְׁבָטִים שֶׁחָטְאוּ מְבִיאִין שִׁבְעָה פָרִים. וּשְׁאָר שְׁבָטִים שֶׁלֹּא חָטְאוּ מְבִיאִין עַל יְדֵיהֶן פַּר פַּר שֶׁאַף אֵילּוּ שֶׁלֹּא חָטְאוּ מְבִיאִין עַל יְדֵיהֶן פַּר פַּר עַל יְדֵי הַחוֹטְאִים. רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר שְׁמוֹנָה פָרִים. וּבַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה שְׁמוֹנָה פָרִים וּשְׁמוֹנָה שְׂעִירִים פַּר וְשָׂעִיר לְכָל שֵׁבֶט וּפַר וְשָׂעִיר לְבֵית דִּין.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**MISHNAH:** If the Court ruled and seven tribes or a majority¹⁵³ acted on their saying they bring a bull and for idolatry they bring a bull and a goat, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, the seven tribes who sinned bring seven bulls, and the remaining tribes who did not sin bring because of them a bull each, for also those who did not sin each bring a bull because of the sinners. Rebbi Simeon says eight bulls¹⁵⁴, and for idolatry eight oxen and eight goats, a bull and a goat for each tribe and a bull and a goat for the Court.

footnotes:
¹⁵³ Either seven tribes who form a majority of the tribes or a majority of the people of Israel irrespective of tribes.
¹⁵⁴ As stated in the preceding Halakhah, he disputes that innocent tribes should be dragged with the sinners into offering sacrifice.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:7:2
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:7:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:7:2)

**הלכה:** הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין וְעָשׂוּ שִׁבְעָה שְׁבָטִים כול׳. תַּנֵּי. רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר מִשְּׁמוֹ. חָטְאוּ שִׁשָּׁה וְהֵן רוּבּוֹ. הָא שִׁבְעָה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין רוּבּוֹ הֲרֵי אֵילּוּ חַיָיבִין. אָמַר רִבִּי לָעְזָר. לֹא מַר אֶלָּא שִׁשָּׁה וְהֵן רוּבּוֹ. הָא חֲמִשָּׁה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֵן רוּבּוֹ הֲרֵי אֵילּוּ פְטוּרִין. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בֵּירִבִּי בּוּן. מַתְנִיתָא אָמְרָה כֵן. מַחֲצִית שְׁבָטִים וּבִלְבַד רוֹב אוֹכָלוֹסִין. וְדִכְוָותָהּ. מַחֲצִית אוֹכָלוֹסִין וּבִלְבַד רוֹב הַשְּׁבָטִים. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בֵּירִבִּי בּוּן אָמַר. שְׁאִילְתָה דְכֹהֵן מָשִׁיחַ מִן. הָדָא הוֹרָיַית בֵּית דִּין גָּדוֹל הוֹרָיַית בֵּית דִּין קָטָן.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**HALAKHAH:** “If the Court ruled and seven tribes acted,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in his¹⁵⁵ 4(17); Babli 3a, 5b. name, if six sinned and they are a majority. Therefore seven even though they do not form a majority are liable¹⁵⁶ 45a, this is the conclusion of R. Johanan. Since in the next sentence R. Eleazar disagrees, one has to assume that the name originally was stated here also.. Rebbi Eleazar said, he only said “six and they are a majority”. Therefore for five, even though they are a majority, they are not liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, a *baraita* said so: Half of the tribes on condition that they be most of the population. And similarly, half of the population on condition that they be most of the tribes. ¹⁵⁷ Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the question of the Anointed Priest, is it as from the High Court or a lower court?

footnotes:
¹⁵⁵ In the name of R. Meïr, Tosephta 1:7; Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Parašah
¹⁵⁶ In the Babli, Menaḥot
¹⁵⁷ This does not belong here but at the end of Halakhah 2:1, speaking of rulings by the High Priest.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:8:1
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:8:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:8:1)

**משנה:** הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין שֶׁל אֶחָד מִן הַשְּׁבָטִים וְעָשָׂה אוֹתוֹ הַשֵּׁבֶט עַל פִּיהֶם אוֹתוֹ הַשֵּׁבֶט הוּא חַיָיב וּשְׁאָר כָּל הַשְּׁבָטִים פְּטוּרִין דִּבְרֵי רִבִּי יְהוּדָה. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִין אֵין חַיָיבִין אֶלָּא עַל הוֹרָיַת בֵּית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל בִּלְבָד שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר וְאִם כָּל עֲדַת יִשְׂרָאֵל יִשְׁגּוּ וְנֶעְלַם דָּבָר מֵעֵינֵי הָעֵדָה. וְלֹא עֲדַת אוֹתוֹ הַשֵּׁבֶט:

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**MISHNAH:** If the Court of one of the tribes¹⁵⁸ ruled and that tribe acted on their pronouncement, that tribe is liable but any other tribes are not liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah¹⁵⁹. But the Sages say, they are only liable for a ruling by the High Court, as it is said, *if the entire congregation of Israel be in error, and something was hidden from the eyes of the congregation*¹⁶⁰. 4:13. The verse is misquoted; the masoretic text reads הַקָּהָל “the public” instead of הָעֵדָה “the congregation”, supporting R. Jehudah. In most Mishnah sources, only the first clause of the verse is copied., not the congregation of that tribe.

footnotes:
¹⁵⁸ The tribal High Court.
¹⁵⁹ Since he holds that the expression קָהָל refers to each of the tribes.
¹⁶⁰ Lev


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:8:2
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:8:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:8:2)

**הלכה:** הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין שֶׁלְּאֶחָד מִן הַשְּׁבָטִים כול׳. רִבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר. חוֹבַת בֵּית דִּין הִיא. רִבִּי יוּדָה אוֹמֵר. חוֹבַת צִיבּוּרָא. אָמַר רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. חוֹבַת בֵּית דִּין וְחוֹבַת צִיבּוּרָא הִיא. מַה טַעֲמֵיהּ דְּרִבִּי מֵאִיר. נֶאֱמַר כָּאן מֵעֵינֵי וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן מֵעֵינֵי. מַה מֵעֵינֵי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר לְהַלָּן בֵּית דִּין אַף כָּאן בֵּית דִּין. מַה טַעֲם דְּרִבִּי יוּדָה. נֶאֱמַר כָּאן מֵעֵינֵי וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן מֵעֵינֵי. מַה מֵעֵינֵי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר לְהַלָּן צִיבּוּר אַף כָּאן צִיבּוּר. מַה טַעֲמָא דְּרִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. נֶאֱמַר כָּאן מֵעֵינֵי וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן מֵעֵינֵי. מַה מֵעֵינֵי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר לְהַלָּן בֵּית דִּין אַף מֵעֵינֵי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר כָּאן בֵּית דִּין. וּמַה מֵעֵינֵי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר לְהַלָּן צִיבּוּר אַף כָּאן צִיבּוּר. מָאן דָּמַר. חוֹבַת בֵּית דִּין הִיא. בֵּית דִּין מְבִיאִין. מָאן דְּאָמַר. חוֹבַת צִיבּוּר הִיא. מִי מֵבִיא. דְּתַנֵּי. מַטִּילִין הָיוּ עֲלֵיהֶן וּבָאִין. דִּבְרֵי רִבִּי מֵאִיר. רִבִּי יוּדָה אוֹמֵר. מִתְּרוּמַּת הַלִּשְׁכָּה הָיוּ בָאִין. מָאן דָּמַר. חוֹבַת בֵּית דִּין הִיא. בֵּית דִּין סוֹמְכִין. מָאן דָּמַר. חוֹבַת צִיבּוּר הִיא. מִי סוֹמֵךְ. דְּתַנֵּי. שְׁלֹשָׁה מִכָּל שֵׁבֶט וָשֵׁבֶט וְרֹאשׁ בֵּית דִּין עַל גַּבֵּיהֶן סוֹמְכִין יְדֵיהֶן עַל רֹאשׁ הַפָּר. יְדֵיהֶם. יְדֵי כָל יָחִיד וְיָחִיד. יְדֵיהֶם עַל רֹאשׁ הַפָּר. פַּר טָעוּן סְמִיכָה אֵין שְׂעִירֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה טְעוּנִין סְמִיכָה. דִּבְרֵי רִבִּי יוּדָה. רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר. פַּר טָעוּן סְמִיכָה בְזְקֵינִים אֵין שְׂעִירֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה טְעוּנִין סְמִיכָה בִזְקֵינִים. שֶׁרִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר. כָּל חַטַּאת צִיבּוּר שֶׁדָּמָהּ נִכְנַס לִפְנִים טְעוּנָה סְמִיכָה. מְתִיבִין לְרִבִּי יוּדָה. וְהָכְתִיב וַיַּגִּשׁוּ אֶת שְׂעִירֵי הַחַטָּאת. רִבִּי חִיָיה בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. הוֹרָאַת שָׁעָה הָיְתָה.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
**HALAKHAH:** "If the Court of one of the tribes ruled," etc. ¹⁶⁴Rebbi Meïr says, it is the Court's obligation. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the public's obligation. Rebbi Simeon said, it is an obligation of the Court and an obligation of the public. What is Rebbi Meïr's reason? It is said here *from the eyes*¹⁶⁵, and it is said there *from the eyes*¹⁶⁶. Since *from the eyes* said there refers to the Court, here it also refers to the Court¹⁶⁷. What is Rebbi Jehudah's reason? It is said here *from the eyes*, and it is said there *from the eyes*. Since *from the eyes* said there refers to the public, here it also refers to the public¹⁶⁸. What is Rebbi Simeon's reason? It is said here *from the eyes*, and it is said there *from the eyes*. Since *from the eyes* said there refers to the Court, also *from the eyes*here refers to the Court. Since *from the eyes* said there refers to the public, here it also refers to the public¹⁶⁹. For him who says, it is the Court's obligation, the Court has to bring¹⁷⁰. For him who says, it is the public's obligation, who brings¹⁷¹? As we have stated¹⁷², "one imposes and collects, the words of Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Jehudah says, they are brought from the Temple tax". For him who says, it is the Court's obligation, the Court has to lay their hands on. For him who says, it is the public's obligation, who lays their hands on¹⁷³? As we have stated, three from every tribe, ¹⁷⁴ led by the president of the Court, lay their hands on the head of the bull. "*Their hands*, the hands of each single one. *Their hands on the head of the bull*; the bull needs laying on of hands but the goats of idolatry do not need laying on of hands, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon said, the bull needs laying on of hands by the Elders but the goats of idolatry do not need laying on of hands by the Elders; for Rebbi Simeon says, every public purification offering whose blood is brought inside¹⁷⁵ needs laying on of hands. ¹⁷⁶" One objected to Rebbi Jehudah, is it not written, *they presented the goats of the purification offering*¹⁷⁷ The goats were offered by Josiah to atone for the idolatry of his father Ahas.? Rebbi Hiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, it was a temporary ruling¹⁷⁸.

footnotes:
¹⁶⁴ The Halakhah does not refer to Mishnah 8 but to Mishnaiot 6-7, to explain why R. Meïr requires only one bull, R. Jehudah 12, and R. Simeon 13.
¹⁶⁵ Lev. 4:13.
¹⁶⁶ Num. 15:24.
¹⁶⁷ This argument is difficult to explain. In Sifra Wayyiqra 2 Parasah 4(2), the expression עֲדַת יִשְׂרָאֵל used in Lev. 4:13 is explained as referring to the High Court, the selected group from Israel, based on v. 15 which makes it clear that the bull has to be presented by the Elders, the members of the High Court. Then R. Meïr's argument is to infer from Lev. 4:13 to Num. 15:24: Since the bull is the responsibility of the Court, the goat for idolatry also must be the responsibility of the Court.
¹⁶⁸ His argument is straightforward. Since the entire paragraph Num. 15:22-26 speaks only about עֵדָה, without any mention of the Elders, it is addressed to the public. Then the use of parallel terms is taken to transfer the setting to Lev. 4: 13.
¹⁶⁹ He accepts arguing both from Lev. 4: 13 to Num. 15:24 and vice versa.
¹⁷⁰ They have to pay for the bull from their own money and present it in the Temple.
¹⁷¹ Who has to pay and who has to officiate?
¹⁷² One imposes a tax and collects from everybody. In all other sources, Babli 3b, Menahot 52a; Tosephta Seqalim 2:6, the argument is between R. Jehudah and R. Simeon. This is the reasonable reading since for R. Meïr the Court pays from their own means.
¹⁷³ Since obviously not every single Israelite can be called to lay his hands on the bull.
¹⁷⁴ This follows R. Simeon in Sifra Wayyiqra 2 Pereq 6(2); R. Jehudah requires five.
¹⁷⁵ The only sacrifices whose blood is brought inside the sanctuary to be sprinkled on the incense altar are the purification offerings of the High Priest and the Community as well as the offerings of the Day of Atonement. The body of any such sacrifice must be burned outside the holy precinct (Lev. 6:23,16:27).
¹⁷⁶ Sifra Wayyiqra 2 Pereq 6(3); Tosephta Menahot 10:9; Babli Menahot 92a.
¹⁷⁷ 2Chr. 29:23. As usual, the argument is from the part of the verse which was not quoted: they presented the goats of the purification offering before the king and the public; they laid their hands on them.
¹⁷⁸ A temporary deviation from Torah norms acceptable by prophetic instruction as long as it does not violate prohibitions. The absence of a bull and the presence of multiple goats both deviate from Torah prescriptions.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:8:3
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:8:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:8:3)

רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן בָּעֵי. צִיבּוּר שֶׁמֵּת אֶחָד מָהוּ שֶׁיָּבִיא תַחְתָּיו. הָתִיבוֹן. וְהָכְתִיב הַבָּאִים מֵהַשְּׁבִי וגו׳. אֶיפְשַׁר חַטָּאת עוֹלָה. אֶלָּא מַה עוֹלָה לֹא נֶאֶכְלָה אַף חַטָּאת לֹא נֶאֶכְלָה. רִבִּי יוּדָה אוֹמֵר. עַל עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה הֵבִיאוּם. רִבִּי חִזְקִיָּה רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה רִבִּי חִיָיה בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. הוֹרָיַית שָׁעָה הָיְיתָה. רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה לָמַד כֵּן. אֶלָּא פַּר טָעוּן סְמִיכָה בְזְקֵנִים. אֵין שְׂעִירֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה טְעוּנִין סְמִיכָה בִזְקֵינִים. אֶלָּא בְמִי. רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה סָבַר מֵימַר. בְּאַהֲרֹן וּבָנָיו. אָמַר לֵיהּ רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. וְהָתַנֵּי רִבִּי חִיָיה. וְסָמַךְ וְסָמְכוּ. לְרַבּוֹת שְׂעִירֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה בִסְמִיכָה וְלֹא בִזְקֵנִים. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי לָמַד כֵּן. אֶלָּא חַי טָעוּן סְמִיכָה בְאַהֲרֹן אֵין שְׂעִירֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה טְעוּנִין סְמִיכָה בְאַהֲרֹן. וּכְתִיב כֵּן וְסָמַךְ אַהֲרֹן אֶת שְׁתֵּי יָדָיו עַל רֹאשׁ הַשָּׂעִיר הַחַי. חַי טָעוּן סְמִיכָה בְאַהֲרֹן. אֵין שְׂעִירֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה טְעוּנִין סְמִיכָה בְאַהֲרֹן. מַה עֲבַד לָהּ רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה. פָּתַר לָהּ בְּכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
Rebbi Joḥanan asked: If one of the public died, can it be brought in his stead¹⁷⁹? They answered, is it not written, *those who came from captivity*¹⁸⁰ 8:35: *Those who came from captivity, from the diaspora, sacrificed elevation offerings to the God of Israel, twelve bulls for all of Israel, 96 goats, 77 sheep, purification goats twelve, all of it an elevation offering for the Eternal.* An elevation offering is completely burned; the meat of a purification offering is eaten by the priests. To call a purification offering an elevation offering is a contradiction in terms.? Is a purification offering an elevation offering? But just as an elevation offering is not eaten, this purification offering was not eaten¹⁸¹ 15:24 by the Mishnah. That verse requires the congregation to bring *a bull as elevation offering and a goat as purification offering.* If a purification offering which may not be eaten can be called an elevation offering, it is possible to identify this bull with the one prescribed in *Lev.*4:13. V. 24 requires the congregation (i. e., its Elders) to proffer the sacrifices but v. 25 requires the Cohen to conduct the entire ceremony. Both the opinions that the Elders do the laying on of their hands as also that the Cohen has to do it have biblical support.. Rebbi Jehudah says, they brought it for idolatry; Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, it was a temporary ruling¹⁷⁸. Rebbi Jeremiah (learned) [did not say]¹⁶³ so but the bull needs laying on of hands by the Elders while the goats of idolatry do not need laying on of hands by the Elders. By whom? Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say, by Aaron and his sons. Rebbi Yose told him, Rebbi Ḥiyya also stated, *he shall put his hands on, they shall put their hands on*¹⁸² 16:21 prescribes that Aaron has to lay his hand on the live goat. Since the entire service of the Day of Atonement is by the unaided High Priest, the mention of the name seems to be superfluous; it could as well have said “he has to lay his hands on.” It is concluded (next Note) that this is the only case in which the High Priest is required to lay his hands on. In parallel, one may read *Lev.* 4:15 where the Elders of the congregation are required to lay their hands on the bull, that they are not required to lay their hands on the goat., to include the goats of idolatry for laying on hands but not by the Elders. Rebbi Yose (learned) [did not say]¹⁶³ so but the living [goat] needs laying on of hands by Aaron, but the goats of idolatry do not need laying on of hands by Aaron. It is written so, “*Aaron shall lean with both his hands on the living goat’s head;* the living [goat] needs laying on of hands by Aaron, but he goats of idolatry do not need laying on of hands by Aaron.¹⁸³ 4(4).” What does Rebbi Jeremiah do with this? He explains it, for a common priest¹⁸⁴ 15:25 requires the participation of a common priest, all biblical requirements are satisfied by having the common priest do the entire ceremony..

footnotes:
¹⁷⁹ This is a question for RR. Jehudah and Simeon. If a person dedicated an animal as a purification offering but died before it was sacrificed, the animal cannot be sacrificed without its owner nor can it be redeemed or used for any profane or holy purpose whatsoever. If the bull really is the obligation of the public and paid by the public’s money, it should become unusable if anybody who gave money for the sacrifice (Note 172) died before the ceremony was held. Practically, this would make the ceremony impossible.
¹⁸⁰ Ezra
¹⁸¹ Babli 6a. Since they brought 12 goats, R. Jehudah has Ezra’s authority for his position. This interpretation justifies the reading of Num.
¹⁷⁸ A temporary deviation from Torah norms acceptable by prophetic instruction as long as it does not violate prohibitions. The absence of a bull and the presence of multiple goats both deviate from Torah prescriptions.
¹⁶³ The text in the Babli shows that one has to read למר i. e. לֹא אָמַר.
¹⁸² Lev.
¹⁶³ The text in the Babli shows that one has to read למר i. e. לֹא אָמַר.
¹⁸³ Sifra Ahare Mot Parašah
¹⁸⁴ Since neither the High Priest nor the Elders are empowered but Num.


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:8:4
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:8:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:8:4)

רִבִּי זְעִירָא בְשֵׁם רַב הַמְנוּנָא כְרִבִּי מֵאִיר. תַּנֵּי תַמָּן. הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין וְעָשׂוּ קָהָל. מֵת אֶחָד מִבֵּית דִּין פְּטוּרִין. מֵת אֶחָד מִן הַצִּיבּוּר חַיָיבִין. אָמַר לָהֶן רִבִּי מֵאִיר. אִם לַאֲחֵרִים הוּא פוֹטֵר לֹא כָל שֶׁכֵּן עַל עַצְמוֹ. אָמְרוּ לוֹ. יִפְטוֹר לַאֲחֵרִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶן בַּמֶּה לִתְלוֹת וְאַל יִפְטוֹר לְעַצְמוֹ שֶׁאֵין לוֹ בַּמֶּה לִתְלוֹת.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: Following Rebbi Meïr¹⁸⁵ can be understood only following R. Meïr who declares the bull to be the exclusive responsibility of the Court.. There, it was stated: If the Court ruled and the public acted¹⁸⁶ 4(10). The Court is not liable as long as the public did not act on their instructions.. If a member of the Court died, they are not liable. If a member of the public died, they are liable¹⁸⁷. Rebbi Meïr told them, if he¹⁸⁸ relieves others of their liability, not so much more for himself? They told him, he can relieve others from their liability since they have where to hang on; he cannot relieve himself of liability since he has nothing to hang on.

footnotes:
¹⁸⁵ The following baraita
¹⁸⁶ Sifra Wayyiqra 2 Paršetah
¹⁸⁷ If a member of the Court died, the bull becomes a purification sacrifice whose part-owner had died; it cannot be brought nor sacrificed. While the sacrifice is brought for the benefit of the public, the public has no monetary interest in the bull following Rebbi Meïr. For him, all the public does is trigger the obligation.
¹⁸⁸ If a member of the Court acted on his own faulty ruling, the bull cannot relieve him of the obligation for a private purification sacrifice since the bull only is intended to shield those who acted on instructions of the Court. He himself does not depend on the Court and still is liable (Mishnah 1; Note 191).


###### Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:8:5
[Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:8:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Jerusalem%20Talmud%20Horayot/r/1:8:5)

רִבִּי זְעִירָא בְשֵׁם רַב חִסְדַּאי. תַּנֵּיי תַמָּן. הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין וְעָשׂוּ הֵן וְיָדְעוּ מָה הוֹרוּ. טָעוּ מָה הוֹרוּ שָׁגוּ מָה הוֹרוּ יָכוֹל יְהוּ חַיָיבִין. תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר וְנוֹדְעָה הַחַטָּאת לֹא שֶׁיִּוָודְעוּ הַחוֹטְאִין. מַה נַפְשָׁךְ. חֵלֶב כְּרִבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אַתְיָא הִיא בְּשֶׁהוֹרוּ וְלֹא יָדְעוּ מָה הוֹרוּ אִם עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה אִם שְׁאָר כָּל הַמִּצְוֹת. אִם עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה בְפָר אִם שְׁאָר כָּל הַמִּצְוֹת בְּשָׂעִיר. סָפֵק פַּר וְשָׂעִיר שִׁינּוּי קָרְבָּן הוּא וְהוּא פָטוֹר.

**The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015:**
Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisdai. There, it was stated¹⁸⁹4(12).: “If the Court ruled, and they themselves acted, and they realized what they ruled about. If they erred in what they ruled, would they be liable? The verse says, *if the sin became known*¹⁹⁰ 4:14. V. 13 makes it clear that the actions of the people trigger the obligation of the bull, not the actions of the court when it is not followed by the people.*,* not that the sinners became known.” Anyway you take it¹⁹¹18b, *Keritut* 19a, R. Eliezer is quoted to hold that if one is not sure of the exact category of the sin committed it does not matter as long as all of them require a sacrifice. R. Joshua holds that a purification sacrifice is possible only if the legal definition of the transgression is known, as in all cases the verse requires that the sin be known (*Lev.* 4:14 for the court, v. 23 for the prince, v. 28 for a private person; cf. Note 22.) From the text here it seems that the Yerushalmi tradition switches the names., if about fat [¹⁹² they ruled they are liable, if about Sabbath they ruled they are liable. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, this follows Rebbi Eliezer¹⁹³; it does not follow Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Yose said, but] it follows Rebbi Joshua if they ruled and they did not know whether about idolatry or about any other commandment¹⁹⁴. If about idolatry by a bull, if about any other commandment a goat¹⁹⁵. Since it is in doubt whether a bull or [a bull and¹⁹⁶] a goat, it is a difference in sacrifice and he¹⁹⁷ is not liable.

footnotes:
¹⁸⁹ Babli 5a, Sifra Wayyiqra 2 Paršetah
¹⁹⁰ Lev.
¹⁹¹ This refers to another situation which is described at the end. The court ruled, they were followed by the people, they realized their error but know they cannot decide which paragraph of the law they misinterpreted. In the Babli 5a, Ševuot
¹⁹² Text of B, missing in the ms. The text must be supposed also for the ms. since otherwise the reference to R. Joshua is unmotivated.
¹⁹³ Who in the Yerushalmi version prohibits the Court from offering the bull if they cannot define exactly which commandment had been breached.
¹⁹⁴ The argument in Note 191 is valid only if the different infractions all carry the same penalty. But if there is a question about which sacrifice to offer, no sacrifice is possible. Purification (and reparation) offerings cannot be brought as voluntary offerings since in contrast to these all voluntary offerings need gifts of flour and wine. Therefore one could not bring both kinds of sacrifice stipulating that the inappropriate one should be considered as voluntary.
¹⁹⁵ Clearly, one has to switch the positions of “bull” and “goat”.
¹⁹⁶ Text of B, more correct since the bull for unspecified sins is a purification offering and that for idolatry an elevation offering.
¹⁹⁷ The Court.