## Keritot Daf 14a

###### Keritot 14a:1
[Keritot 14a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/14a:1)

**גְּמָ׳** נֵימָא אִית לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר? נְהִי דְּאִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר לֵית לֵיהּ, אִיסּוּר כּוֹלֵל וְאִיסּוּר מוֹסִיף אִית לֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** The Gemara suggests: **Let us say** that it is evident from the mishna that **Rabbi Meir holds** that **a prohibition takes effect** where another **prohibition** already exists. The Gemara counters: **Although he does not** generally **hold** that **a prohibition takes effect** where another **prohibition** already exists, with regard to a more **inclusive prohibition and an expanded prohibition, he holds** that the second prohibition does take effect where a prohibition already exists. Under certain circumstances a second prohibition takes effect, and under other circumstances it does not. When the second prohibition is an expanded or inclusive prohibition, it takes effect.


###### Keritot 14a:2
[Keritot 14a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/14a:2)

טָהוֹר, מֵעִיקָּרָא לָא אֲסִיר אֶלָּא בְּחֵלֶב, הֲוָה לֵיהּ טָמֵא, מִיגּוֹ דַּאֲסִיר בַּחֲתִיכוֹת טְהוֹרוֹת – אִיתּוֹסַף בֵּיהּ נָמֵי אִיסּוּרָא עִילָּוֵי חֵלֶב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Therefore, in the case in the mishna of a ritually impure person who ate leftover forbidden fat from an offering, one who was **initially pure was prohibited** from eating the food **only** due to the prohibition **of** forbidden **fat.** Once the person **became impure, since he** became **prohibited from** eating even **pure pieces** of sacrificial meat, an additional **prohibition is also added** to the forbidden **fat.** The prohibition against an impure person eating sacrificial meat is considered an inclusive prohibition, and therefore it takes effect even though the prohibition against eating forbidden fat already applied.


###### Keritot 14a:3
[Keritot 14a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/14a:3)

וְחֵלֶב מֵעִיקָּרָא לָא אֲסִיר אֶלָּא בַּאֲכִילָה, אַקְדְּשֵׁיהּ, מִיגּוֹ דְּאִיתּוֹסַף בֵּיהּ אִיסּוּרָא דַּהֲנָאָה – אִיתּוֹסַף בֵּיהּ לְגַבֵּי חֵלֶב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** likewise, the forbidden **fat was initially forbidden only in consumption.** When he **consecrated** the animal, it became prohibited to derive benefit from it in any manner. Therefore, **since the prohibition** against **deriving** any form of **benefit was added to it, it was** also **added with regard to** eating the forbidden **fat.** Consequently, the prohibition against misusing consecrated property, which is an expanded prohibition, applies even to one who eats the forbidden fat.


###### Keritot 14a:4
[Keritot 14a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/14a:4)

וְאַכַּתִּי לְהֶדְיוֹט הוּא דַּאֲסִיר אֲבָל לְגָבוֹהַּ שְׁרֵי, הֲוָה לֵיהּ נוֹתָר, מִיגּוֹ דְּאִיתּוֹסַף אִיסּוּרָא לְגַבֵּי גָּבוֹהַּ – אִיתּוֹסַף בֵּיהּ לְגַבֵּי הֶדְיוֹט. חָל עֲלֵיהּ יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים, מִיגּוֹ דְּאִיתּוֹסַף בֵּיהּ אִיסּוּר לְגַבֵּי חוּלִּין – אִיתּוֹסַף בֵּיהּ לְגַבֵּי גָבוֹהַּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And still,** the consecrated forbidden fat is **prohibited** only **to an ordinary** person, **but it is permitted to the Most High,** i.e., the altar. When **it becomes leftover, since a prohibition was added with regard to the Most High,** as it is now prohibited to sacrifice it upon the altar, the expanded prohibition of leftover sacrificial meat is **added with regard to an ordinary** person as well. If **Yom Kippur,** during which the person is prohibited from eating anything, **takes effect with regard to it, since a prohibition was added with regard to** eating **non-sacred** food, a prohibition **is** also **added with regard to** food that had been consecrated **to the Most High.** The prohibition against eating on Yom Kippur is an inclusive prohibition, and therefore it takes effect even with regard to eating leftover sacrificial meat.


###### Keritot 14a:5
[Keritot 14a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/14a:5)

וְנִתְנֵי: חָמֵשׁ חַטָּאוֹת, וְנוֹקְמַהּ כְּגוֹן דַּאֲכַל כְּזַיִת פִּיגּוּל! בַּחֲדָא בְּהֵמָה קָמַיְירֵי, בִּשְׁתֵּי בְּהֵמוֹת לָא קָמַיְירֵי, וְנוֹתָר וּפִיגּוּל בַּחֲדָא בְּהֵמָה לָא מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara objects: **And let** the mishna **teach:** There is a case where one can perform a single act of eating an olive-bulk of food and be liable to bring **five sin offerings,** rather than four, **and interpret it** as a case **where he ate an olive-bulk** from **an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its appointed time [*piggul*].** The Gemara explains: The mishna is **referring** to a case **of one animal,** but is **not referring** to a case **of two animals, and you do not find** a case where the prohibitions of **leftover** sacrificial meat [*notar*] **and *piggul*** apply **to one animal.** From the moment an offering is rendered *piggul* it may not be sacrificed or eaten, and therefore it is not subject to the prohibition of *notar*.


###### Keritot 14a:6
[Keritot 14a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/14a:6)

אַלְּמָה לָא? מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ כְּגוֹן שֶׁהֶעֱלָה אֵבֶר פִּיגּוּל לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ, דְּפָקַע פִּיגּוּלֵיהּ מִינֵּיהּ וְהָוֵה לֵיהּ נוֹתָר,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Why** is it **not** possible for the prohibitions of *notar* and *piggul* to apply to the same animal? **You find it** in a case **where one brought upon the altar a limb** from an offering that was ***piggul*, as** from that time **its *piggul*** status has **been abrogated, and it becomes *notar*** once the time that it may be sacrificed has passed.


###### Keritot 14a:7
[Keritot 14a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/14a:7)

וְכִדְאָמַר עוּלָּא: קוֹמֶץ פִּיגּוּל שֶׁהֶעֱלָה לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ – פָּקַע פִּיגּוּלוֹ מִמֶּנּוּ וְהָוֵה לֵיהּ נוֹתָר. בְּאֵבֶר אֶחָד קָא מַיְירֵי, בִּשְׁנֵי אֵבָרִים לָא קָמַיְירֵי, וְנוֹתָר וּפִיגּוּל בְּחַד אֵבֶר לָא מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** this is **as Ulla says:** In the case of **a handful of** a meal offering that is ***piggul* that one brought upon the altar, its *piggul*** status has **been abrogated and it becomes leftover.** Consequently, he is liable with regard to the limb that was offered for violating the prohibition of *notar*, and is liable with regard to the rest of the animal for violating the prohibition of *piggul*. The Gemara answers: The mishna is **referring to one limb,** but it is **not referring to two limbs, and you do not find *notar* and *piggul* with regard to one limb.**


###### Keritot 14a:8
[Keritot 14a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/14a:8)

אַלְּמָה לָא? מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ כְּגוֹן שֶׁהֶעֱלָה אֵבֶר פִּיגּוּל לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ, דְּפַלְגֵיהּ אַנְּחֵיהּ עַל גַּבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ, וּפַלְגֵיהּ מֵאַבָּרַאי דְּמִזְבֵּחַ, דְּהָהוּא דְּמִזְבֵּחַ פָּקַע פִּיגּוּל וַהֲוָה לֵיהּ נוֹתָר, וְכִדְאָמַר עוּלָּא: קוֹמֶץ פִּיגּוּל שֶׁהֶעֱלָה עַל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ – פָּקַע פִּיגּוּלוֹ מִמֶּנּוּ וְהָוֵי לֵיהּ נוֹתָר!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Why** is there **no** such case? **You find it** in a situation **where one brought a limb** from **a *piggul*** offering **upon the altar,** and **he placed half of it upon the altar and half of it outside of the altar.** In such a case, with regard to **that** portion of the limb which he placed upon the **altar,** its ***piggul*** status has **been abrogated and it becomes *notar*. And** this is **as Ulla says:** In the case of **a handful of** a meal offering that is ***piggul* that one brought upon the altar, its *piggul*** status has **been abrogated and it becomes *notar*.** By contrast, the part of the limb that was not placed upon the altar retains its status as *piggul*.


###### Keritot 14a:9
[Keritot 14a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/14a:9)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא, אִי רוּבָּא דְּמִזְבֵּחַ – שִׁדְיֵיהּ לַמִּזְבֵּחַ, רוּבָּא דְּבָרַאי – שִׁדְיֵיהּ לְבָרַאי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Sage answering the question **said to** the questioner: **No,** the status of *piggul* cannot be abrogated from part of a limb. Rather, if **the majority** of the limb is **on the altar,** then **throw it on the altar,** i.e., the entire limb has the status of being on the altar. If **the majority** of the limb is **outside** the altar, **throw it outside,** i.e., it is considered as though the limb was not placed on the altar at all.


###### Keritot 14a:10
[Keritot 14a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/14a:10)

תִּפְשׁוֹט דְּבָעֵי רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: הָלְכוּ בְּאֵבָרִים אַחַר הָרוֹב אוֹ לֹא! אֶלָּא, בִּכְזַיִת אֶחָד קָמַיְירֵי, בִּשְׁנֵי זֵיתִים לָא קָא מַיְירֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara objects: If so, one can **resolve** the dilemma **that Rami bar Ḥama raised:** Does one **follow the majority with regard to limbs or not?** According to the previous interpretation of the mishna, one does follow the majority with regard to limbs. The Gemara explains: **Rather,** the reason that the mishna did not mention the prohibition of *piggul* is that it is **referring to** the consumption of **one olive-bulk** of forbidden fat, and is **not referring to two olive-bulks.** Even if parts of one limb can have the status of *piggul* and other parts can be leftover sacrificial meat, one single olive-bulk cannot have both statuses.


###### Keritot 14a:11
[Keritot 14a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/14a:11)

וְלָא? וְהָקָתָנֵי ״יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים״, וּבְיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים כּוֹתֶבֶת [הוּא] דְּמִחַיַּיב, וְכוֹתֶבֶת אִית בַּיהּ שְׁנֵי זֵיתִים!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** is the mishna **not** referring to a case of more than one olive-bulk? **But isn’t it taught** that one is liable to bring a sin offering for eating on **Yom Kippur, and on Yom Kippur** it is only eating the **volume of a large date that obligates** one to bring a sin offering, **and** the **volume of a large date contains** the volume of **two olives?**


###### Keritot 14a:12
[Keritot 14a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/14a:12)

אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: כְּגוֹן שֶׁאָכַל כּוּלְיָא בְּחֶלְבָּהּ. רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: כְּגוֹן דְּמַלְּיֵיהּ בְּתַמְרֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Zeira said:** It is referring to a case **where he eats a kidney with the fat** attached to **it.** He is liable to bring three of the sin offerings enumerated in the mishna for eating the olive-bulk of fat, and the additional amount of kidney he eats brings his total consumption to the volume of a large date, so that he is liable for eating on Yom Kippur. **Rav Pappa said:** It is referring to a case **where he** ate an olive-bulk of the fat and **completed** the volume of a large date **with dates.**


###### Keritot 14a:13
[Keritot 14a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/14a:13)

רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַחָא מַתְנֵי ״חָמֵשׁ חַטָּאוֹת״, וּמְתָרֵיץ לַהּ: כְּגוֹן דַּאֲכַל כְּזַיִת פִּיגּוּל, וְלָא מְשַׁנֵּי כְּהָנֵי שִׁינּוּיֵי דְּקָא מְשַׁנֵּינַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Adda bar Aḥa teaches** that the mishna is stating that one can be liable to bring **five sin offerings** for one act of eating, not just four, **and he interprets it** to be referring to a case **where one ate an olive-bulk of *piggul*** from another animal together with the olive-bulk of forbidden fat, **and he does not answer** in accordance **with these answers that we answered** in the name of Rav Pappa and Rabbi Zeira.


###### Keritot 14a:14
[Keritot 14a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/14a:14)

וְנִתְנֵי: ״שֵׁשׁ חַטָּאוֹת״, וְנוֹקְמַהּ כְּגוֹן דַּאֲכַל כְּזַיִת דָּם! בַּחֲדָא אֲכִילָה קָא מַיְירֵי, בִּשְׁתֵּי אֲכִילוֹת לֹא קָא מַיְירֵי, וְשִׁיעֲרוּ חֲכָמִים דְּאֵין בֵּית הַבְּלִיעָה מַחֲזִיק יוֹתֵר מִשְּׁנֵי זֵיתִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara objects: **And let** the mishna **teach** that one can be liable to bring **six sin offerings, and interpret it** as referring to a case **where he consumed an olive-bulk of blood** in addition to the other two olive-bulks. The Gemara explains: The mishna is **referring to one** act of **eating,** but is **not referring to two** acts of **eating, and the Sages calculated that** one’s **throat does not hold more than two olive-bulks** at once.


###### Keritot 14a:15
[Keritot 14a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/14a:15)

רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר וְכוּ׳. וְנִתְנֵי: ״אִם הוֹצִיאוֹ – חַיָּיב״, מַאי טַעְמָא קָתָנֵי ״אִם הָיְתָה שַׁבָּת״? אָמַר רַפְרָם: זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת: עֵירוּב וְהוֹצָאָה לְשַׁבָּת, וְאֵין עֵירוּב וְהוֹצָאָה לְיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches that **Rabbi Meir says:** If it was Shabbat and he carried it out from the private domain into the public domain while eating it, he would be liable to bring a sin offering for performing a prohibited labor on Shabbat. The Gemara objects: **And let** the mishna **teach: If he carried it out** he is **liable,** as the mishna is referring to one who ate on Yom Kippur, which is also a day when labor is prohibited. **What is the reason** that it **teaches: If it was Shabbat** and he carried it out he is liable? Why mention Shabbat at all? **Rafram said: That is to say** that the **joining** of courtyards in order to permit carrying, **and** the general prohibition against **carrying** from one domain to another, apply **with regard to Shabbat,** but the **joining** of courtyards **and** the prohibition against **carrying do not** apply **with regard to Yom Kippur.**


###### Keritot 14a:16
[Keritot 14a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/14a:16)

מִמַּאי? דִּלְמָא יֵשׁ עֵירוּב וְהוֹצָאָה לְיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים, וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: אִם הָיְתָה שַׁבָּת וְהוֹצִיאוֹ – חַיָּיב אַף מִשּׁוּם שַׁבָּת וְיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **From where** is this conclusion derived? **Perhaps** the **joining** of courtyards **and** the prohibition against **carrying do** apply **to Yom Kippur, and this** is what the mishna **is teaching: If it was Shabbat and he carried it out** from one domain to another he is **liable due to** the prohibition against carrying on **Shabbat and also** due to the prohibition against carrying on **Yom Kippur.**


###### Keritot 14a:17
[Keritot 14a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/14a:17)

אֶלָּא אִי אִיתְּמַר דְּרַפְרָם עַל הָדָא אִיתְּמַר, דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְשִׁלַּח בְּיַד אִישׁ עִתִּי״, ״אִישׁ״ – לְהַכְשִׁיר אֶת הַזָּר. ״עִתִּי״ – אֲפִילּוּ בְּטוּמְאָה וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּשַׁבָּת, ״עִתִּי״ – בִּמְזוּמָּן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, if** the statement **of Rafram was stated,** it **was stated with regard to this** case, **as it is taught** in a *baraita*: The verse states with regard to the scapegoat of Yom Kippur: **“And he shall send it away with an appointed man** into the wilderness” (Leviticus 16:21). The word **“man”** is mentioned in order **to render a non-priest fit** for this task. The term **“appointed”** indicates that the scapegoat is always sent away at the appropriate time, **even** when the appointed man is **in** a state of **ritual impurity, and even** when Yom Kippur occurs **on Shabbat.** In addition, the word **“appointed”** is referring **to** one who was **designated** for the task the day before.


###### Keritot 14a:18
[Keritot 14a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/14a:18)

קָתָנֵי: ״עִתִּי״ – אֲפִילּוּ בְּשַׁבָּת, אָמַר רַפְרָם: זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת עֵירוּב וְהוֹצָאָה לְשַׁבָּת, וְאֵין עֵירוּב וְהוֹצָאָה לְיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The *baraita* **taught** that the word **“appointed”** indicates that the scapegoat is sent away **even on Shabbat,** and in this context **Rafram says: That is to say** that the **joining** of courtyards **and** the prohibition against **carrying** apply **with regard to Shabbat,** but the **joining** of courtyards **and** the prohibition against **carrying do not** apply **with regard to Yom Kippur.**


###### Keritot 14a:19
[Keritot 14a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/14a:19)

מִמַּאי? שָׁאנֵי שָׂעִיר הַמִּשְׁתַּלֵּחַ, דְּהֶכְשֵׁירוֹ בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים בְּכָךְ! אֶלָּא דְּרַפְרָם בְּרוּתָא הִיא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara objects to Rafram’s inference: **From where** does he cite proof for this inference? The case of **the scapegoat is different, as its validity on Yom Kippur is in this** manner. Even if the prohibition against carrying does apply on Yom Kippur, the Torah explicitly commanded that the scapegoat be sent away on that day, and therefore it is permitted. **Rather,** the statement cited in the name **of Rafram is an error [*beruta*],** and it was not actually stated in the study hall.


###### Keritot 14a:20
[Keritot 14a:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/14a:20)

**מַתְנִי׳** יֵשׁ בָּא בִּיאָה אַחַת וְחַיָּיב עָלֶיהָ שֵׁשׁ חַטָּאוֹת, כֵּיצַד? הַבָּא עַל בִּתּוֹ חַיָּיב עָלֶיהָ מִשּׁוּם בִּתּוֹ, וַאֲחוֹתוֹ, אֵשֶׁת אָחִיו, וְאֵשֶׁת אֲחִי אָבִיו, וְאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ, וְנִדָּה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** **There is** a case where **one** can **engage in a single** act of **intercourse and** be **liable** to bring **six sin offerings for it. How so?** It is possible for **one who engages in intercourse with his daughter** to be **liable due to** having violated the prohibitions of engaging in intercourse with **his daughter, his sister, the wife of his brother, the wife of his father’s brother, a married woman, and a menstruating woman.**