## Keritot Daf 16a

###### Keritot 16a:1
[Keritot 16a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16a:1)

וְאִילּוּ עַל סְפֵיקוֹ, מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי לָא קָתָנֵי. מַנִּי הָא? אִילֵימָא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, לִיתְנֵי נָמֵי סֵיפָא: ״וְעַל סְפֵיקָן מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי״, דְּהָתְנַן: רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא מְחַיֵּיב עַל סְפֵק מְעִילָה אָשָׁם תָּלוּי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara notes: **And yet** in the final case in the *baraita*, it **does not teach** that **in** a situation where he is **uncertain** whether he ate from **it he brings a provisional guilt offering. Whose** opinion is **this? If we say** it is the opinion of **Rabbi Akiva, let him also teach** in **the last clause: For** a case where he is **uncertain** whether he ate from **them he brings a provisional guilt offering, as we learned** in the mishna (22b) that **Rabbi Akiva deems** one **liable** to bring **a provisional guilt offering for uncertainty** about **misuse** of consecrated property.


###### Keritot 16a:2
[Keritot 16a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16a:2)

אֶלָּא לָאו רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ הִיא, וְקָתָנֵי: ״בַּחֲמִשָּׁה הֶעְלֵמוֹת – מֵבִיא חָמֵשׁ חַטָּאוֹת״, וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: קַיבְּלַהּ מִינֵּיהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, isn’t** the *baraita* in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Yehoshua,** who disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva and holds that one is not liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for uncertainty about misuse of consecrated property? **And it teaches** that one who eats *notar* from one offering cooked in five pots **during five** separate **lapses of awareness brings five sin offerings,** which indicates that if he did so during a single lapse of awareness he would be liable to bring only one sin offering, in accordance with the opinion stated by Rabbi Akiva in the mishna. **And** one can **conclude from** here that Rabbi Yehoshua **accepted** the refutation **from** Rabbi Akiva.


###### Keritot 16a:3
[Keritot 16a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16a:3)

אֶלָּא אַדְּרַבָּה, מִסֵּיפָא, דְּקָתָנֵי: מֵחֲמִשָּׁה זְבָחִים אֲפִילּוּ בְּהֶעְלֵם (אַחַת) [אֶחָד] – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: לָא קַיבְּלַהּ מִינֵּיהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara responds: **But on the contrary,** one can infer otherwise **from the latter clause** of the *baraita*, **which teaches:** If he ate **from five** separate **offerings, even during one lapse of awareness,** he is **liable** to bring a separate sin offering **for each and every one.** One can **conclude from** this statement that Rabbi Yehoshua **did not accept** the refutation **from** Rabbi Akiva.


###### Keritot 16a:4
[Keritot 16a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16a:4)

וְאֶלָּא מַאי אִית [לָךְ] לְמֵימַר, תַּנָּאֵי הִיא, דְּאִיכָּא תַּנָּא דְּקַיבְּלַהּ וְאִיכָּא תַּנָּא דְּלָא קַיבְּלַהּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, what is there to say** about this *baraita*? It must be said that **it is** a dispute between ***tanna’im*, that there is a *tanna*** who maintains **that** Rabbi Yehoshua **accepted** Rabbi Akiva’s refutation, **and there is a *tanna*** who maintains **that** Rabbi Yehoshua **did not accept it.**


###### Keritot 16a:5
[Keritot 16a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16a:5)

אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא הִיא, וְהַאי תַּנָּא סָבַר לַהּ כְּוָתֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא וּפְלִיג עֲלֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא, סָבַר לַהּ כְּוָתֵיהּ בְּהַעֲלָמָה, וּפְלִיג עֲלֵיהּ בִּמְעִילוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
But once the *baraita* is interpreted in accordance with two different *tanna’im*, **you** may **even say** that the earlier clause of the *baraita* **is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Akiva** and not Rabbi Yehoshua. **And this *tanna*** of the *baraita* **holds in accordance with** the opinion of Rabbi Akiva **in one** matter **and disagrees with his** opinion **in one** matter: **He holds in accordance with** the opinion of Rabbi Akiva **with regard to a lapse of awareness,** that if one eats from five offerings during a single lapse of awareness he is liable to bring only one sin offering. **But he disagrees with his** opinion **with regard to misuse** of consecrated property, as he does not deem one liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for uncertainty about whether he misused consecrated property.


###### Keritot 16a:6
[Keritot 16a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16a:6)

הֵיכִי דָמֵי חָמֵשׁ מְעִילוֹת? אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: כְּאוֹתָהּ שֶׁשָּׁנִינוּ: חֲמִשָּׁה דְּבָרִים בָּעוֹלָה מִצְטָרְפִין: הַבָּשָׂר, וְהֶחָלָב, וְהַיַּיִן, וְהַסֹּלֶת, וְהַשֶּׁמֶן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches that if one eats five pieces from a single offering, each of which was cooked in a separate pot, he is liable to bring five guilt offerings for misuse of consecrated property. The Gemara asks: **What are the circumstances** which require **five** guilt offerings for **misuse** of consecrated property? **Shmuel says:** The five pieces must be from separate parts of the offering, **like that which we learned** in a mishna (*Me’ila* 15b) with regard to a different topic: **Five items from a burnt offering combine** to form an olive-bulk that renders one liable for sacrificing an offering outside the Temple: **The meat, and the** forbidden **fat, and the wine** from the libations of the burnt offering, **and the fine flour** from the meal offering brought with the libations, **and the oil** for mixing with the meal offering.


###### Keritot 16a:7
[Keritot 16a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16a:7)

חִזְקִיָּה אָמַר: כְּגוֹן שֶׁאָכַל מֵחֲמִשָּׁה אֵבָרִים. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא בְּאֵבֶר אֶחָד, מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ בְּכָתֵף. רַבִּי יִצְחָק נַפָּחָא אָמַר: כְּגוֹן שֶׁאָכַל בַּחֲמִשָּׁה מִינֵי קְדֵירָה. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: כְּגוֹן שֶׁאָכַל בַּחֲמִשָּׁה טְעָמִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Ḥizkiyya says:** The obligation to bring five guilt offerings applies in a case **where he ate from five** different **limbs** of one offering. **Reish Lakish says: You** may **even say** that he ate **from one limb,** and **you find** this **in** a case where he ate from **the shoulder** of an offering, which has several different sections. **Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa says:** It applies in a case **where he ate** pieces of meat prepared **as five** different **types of cooked dishes. Rabbi Yoḥanan says:** It applies in a case **where he ate** five pieces of meat that had **five** different **flavors,** as they were prepared with different types of seasonings.


###### Keritot 16a:8
[Keritot 16a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16a:8)

**מַתְנִי׳** אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: שָׁאַלְתִּי אֶת רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בְּעוֹשֶׂה מְלָאכוֹת הַרְבֵּה בְּשַׁבָּתוֹת הַרְבֵּה מֵעֵין מְלָאכָה אַחַת בְּהֶעְלֵם (אַחַת) [אֶחָד], מַהוּ? חַיָּיב אַחַת עַל כּוּלָּן, אוֹ חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** **Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer with regard to** one who **performs multiple** prohibited **labors on several *Shabbatot*,** and all those labors were **subsumed** as subcategories of **one** primary category of prohibited **labor,** and he performed them **during one lapse of awareness. What is** the *halakha*? Is he **liable** to bring **one** sin offering **for** unwitting performance of **all** these labors **or** is he **liable** to bring a sin offering **for** violation of **each and every one** of the labors?


###### Keritot 16a:9
[Keritot 16a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16a:9)

אָמַר לוֹ: חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת, מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר, וּמָה נִדָּה שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ תּוֹצָאוֹת הַרְבֵּה וְחַטָּאוֹת הַרְבֵּה – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת, שַׁבָּת שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ תּוֹצָאוֹת הַרְבֵּה וּמִיתוֹת הַרְבֵּה – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּהֵא חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabbi Eliezer **said to** Rabbi Akiva: He is **liable** to bring a sin offering **for** violation of **each and every one** of the labors, and this is derived **from an *a fortiori*** inference: **Just as** in the case of **a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are not multiple** actions that **result** in transgression **and** that result in **multiple sin offerings,** but rather only the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with her, and nevertheless **one** is **liable** to bring a separate sin offering **for each and every one** of his acts of unwitting intercourse; in the case of **Shabbat, with regard to which there are multiple** primary categories and subcategories of labor that **result** in transgression **and** that result in **multiple death** penalties or sin offerings, **is it not right that he will be liable** to bring a sin offering **for** performance of **each and every one** of the prohibited labors?


###### Keritot 16a:10
[Keritot 16a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16a:10)

אָמַרְתִּי לוֹ: אִם אָמַרְתָּ בַּנִּדָּה שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ שְׁתֵּי אַזְהָרוֹת, שֶׁהוּא מוּזְהָר עַל הַנִּדָּה וְהַנִּדָּה מוּזְהֶרֶת עָלָיו, תֹּאמַר בַּשַּׁבָּת, שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ אֶלָּא אַזְהָרָה אֶחָת!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabbi Akiva continues: **I said to** Rabbi Eliezer that the inference is not valid: **If you said** one is liable to bring multiple sin offerings **in the** case of **a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are two prohibitions, as** the man **is prohibited** from engaging in intercourse **with the menstruating woman and the menstruating woman is prohibited** from engaging in intercourse **with him, would you say** the same **in the** case of **Shabbat, with regard to which there is only one prohibition?**


###### Keritot 16a:11
[Keritot 16a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16a:11)

אָמַר לִי: הַבָּא עַל הַקְּטַנּוֹת יוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ אֶלָּא אַזְהָרָה אַחַת, וְחַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabbi Eliezer **said to me:** The *halakha* of **one who engages in intercourse with minor** menstruating **girls will prove** this refutation is not valid, **as in** that case **there is only one prohibition,** because the minor is exempt from the mitzvot, **and** nevertheless the man is **liable** to bring a separate sin offering **for** intercourse for **each and every one** of the acts of intercourse.


###### Keritot 16a:12
[Keritot 16a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16a:12)

אָמַרְתִּי לוֹ: אִם אָמַרְתָּ בַּקְּטַנּוֹת, שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶן עַכְשָׁיו – יֵשׁ בָּהֶן לְאַחַר זְמַן, תֹּאמַר בַּשַּׁבָּת, שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ עַכְשָׁיו וְלֹא לְאַחַר זְמַן?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabbi Akiva said: **I said to** Rabbi Eliezer that the cases of Shabbat and minor menstruating girls are not comparable. **If you said in the** case of **minor girls that although it is not** prohibited **for them at present it is** prohibited **for them after** the passage of **time,** when they reach majority, **would you say** the same **in the** case of **Shabbat, with regard to which there are neither** two prohibitions **at present, nor** will there be **after** the passage of **time?**


###### Keritot 16a:13
[Keritot 16a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16a:13)

אָמַר לִי: הַבָּא עַל הַבְּהֵמָה יוֹכִיחַ! אָמַרְתִּי לוֹ: הַבְּהֵמָה כַּשַּׁבָּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabbi Eliezer **said to me:** The *halakha* of **one who copulates with an animal will prove** this refutation is not valid, as there are never two prohibitions in that case, and nevertheless the person is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every act. Rabbi Akiva said: **I said to** Rabbi Eliezer that no proof can be cited from the case of an animal, as in my opinion the case of **the animal is like** that of **Shabbat;** there is uncertainty with regard to both cases.


###### Keritot 16a:14
[Keritot 16a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16a:14)

**גְּמָ׳** מַאי קָבָעֵי מִינֵּיהּ? אִי שַׁבָּתוֹת כְּגוּפִין דָּמְיָין וְאִי לָא בָּעֵי מִינֵּיהּ, נִיבְעֵי: הָעוֹשֶׂה מְלָאכָה אַחַת בְּשַׁבָּתוֹת הַרְבֵּה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** The Gemara asks: **What** precise **dilemma** did Rabbi Akiva **raise** before Rabbi Eliezer? **If he raised a dilemma** about **whether** different ***Shabbatot* are comparable to** separate **entities or not,** i.e., if performing one labor on several *Shabbatot* during one lapse of awareness is similar to engaging in intercourse with multiple menstruating women during one lapse of awareness, **let him raise** the **dilemma** as follows: If **one performs one** prohibited **labor on** each of **several *Shabbatot*** during a single lapse of awareness, what is the *halakha*?


###### Keritot 16a:15
[Keritot 16a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16a:15)

אֶלָּא: וַלְדֵי מְלָאכוֹת אִי כְּאָבוֹת דָּמְיָין וְאִי לָא בָּעֵי מִינֵּיהּ, נִיבְעֵי מִינֵּיהּ: הָעוֹשֶׂה מְלָאכוֹת הַרְבֵּה מֵעֵין מְלָאכָה אַחַת בַּשַּׁבָּת!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** perhaps **he raised a dilemma** about **whether** different **subcategories of** a single prohibited **labor are comparable** to different **primary categories,** which would mean one is liable separately for each, **or not.** But if so, **let him ask raise** the **dilemma** in the following manner: In the case of **one who performs multiple** prohibited **labors,** all **subsumed** as subcategories of **one** primary category of **labor, on** a single **Shabbat,** during a single lapse of awareness, what is the *halakha*? Why did Rabbi Akiva specify a case of one who performed multiple prohibited labors on multiple *Shabbatot*?


###### Keritot 16a:16
[Keritot 16a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16a:16)

אָמַר רָבָא: אָמְרִי בֵּי רַב, תַּרְתֵּי בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ: שַׁבָּתוֹת כְּגוּפִין דָּמְיָין וְאִי לָא בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ, וַלְדֵי מְלָאכוֹת כִּמְלָאכוֹת דָּמְיָין אִי לָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said: They say** in **the school of Rav [*bei Rav*]** that Rabbi Akiva **raised two dilemmas before him: He raised a dilemma** about **whether *Shabbatot* are comparable** to separate **entities or whether** they are **not** comparable to separate entities, and he also raised a dilemma about whether different **subcategories of** a single prohibited **labor are comparable** to different primary categories of **labor,** or **whether** they are **not.** Rabbi Eliezer answered that multiple *Shabbatot* are comparable to separate entities, and that one who performs different subcategories of a single category of prohibited labor is like one who performs multiple primary categories of labor.


###### Keritot 16a:17
[Keritot 16a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16a:17)

וְשַׁבָּתוֹת, הֵיכִי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ? שִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת – פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ דְּיָמִים שֶׁבֵּינְתַיִים הָוְיָין יְדִיעָה לְחַלֵּק,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises another question with regard to the mishna: **And** in connection to the performance of the same category of prohibited labor on each of several ***Shabbatot*** during a single lapse of awareness, **what** is the precise case about which Rabbi Akiva **raises** his **dilemma?** If the individual was **unwitting** in that he was unaware that it was **Shabbat but** acted **intentionally** with regard to the prohibited **labors,** i.e., he knew that these labors are prohibited on Shabbat, perhaps it is **obvious to** Rabbi Akiva **that** the **intervening days** constitute **an awareness** of his sin, which serves **to differentiate** between the *Shabbatot* and render the individual liable to bring separate sin offerings for each Shabbat.


###### Keritot 16a:18
[Keritot 16a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16a:18)

וּזְדוֹן שַׁבָּת וְשִׁגְגַת מְלָאכוֹת הוּא דְּבָעֵי מִינֵּיהּ, אִי כְּגוּפִין דָּמְיָין אִי לָא,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** if so, **it is** in reference to a case where the individual acts **intentionally** with regard to **Shabbat,** i.e., he knows that it is Shabbat, **but** he acts **unwittingly** in that he does not know that the prohibited **labors** he is performing are prohibited on Shabbat, **that** Rabbi Akiva **raises** his **dilemma.** His dilemma is **whether** the *Shabbatot* **are comparable** to separate **entities,** which would mean that he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each Shabbat, or **whether** they are **not** comparable to separate entities and therefore he is liable to bring only one sin offering.


###### Keritot 16a:19
[Keritot 16a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16a:19)

אוֹ דִלְמָא, זְדוֹן שַׁבָּת וְשִׁגְגַת מְלָאכוֹת – פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ דִּכְגוּפִין דָּמְיָין, וְשִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת הוּא דְּבָעֵי מִינֵּיהּ, דְּיָמִים שֶׁבֵּינָתַיִם אִי הָוְיָין יְדִיעָה לְחַלֵּק אִי לָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Or perhaps** in the case where he acts **intentionally** with regard to **Shabbat and unwittingly** with regard to prohibited **labors,** it is **obvious to** Rabbi Akiva **that** the *Shabbatot* **are comparable** to separate **entities** and he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each Shabbat. **And** it is in reference to a case where he acts **unwittingly** in that he does not know it is **Shabbat, but** he acts **intentionally** in that he knows that the **labors** he is performing are prohibited on Shabbat, **that** Rabbi Akiva **raises** his **dilemma.** His dilemma is whether the **intervening days** between the *Shabbatot* **are** considered **awareness** of his sin, which would serve **to differentiate** between one sin and the next, **or not.**


###### Keritot 16a:20
[Keritot 16a:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16a:20)

אָמַר רַבָּה:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabba said:**