## Keritot Daf 16b

###### Keritot 16b:1
[Keritot 16b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16b:1)

מִסְתַּבְּרָא שִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ דְּיָמִים שֶׁבֵּינְתַיִים הָוַיִין יְדִיעָה לְחַלֵּק, וּזְדוֹן שַׁבָּת וְשִׁגְגַת מְלָאכוֹת הוּא דְּבָעֵי מִינֵּיהּ – כְּגוּפִין דָּמְיָין, אוֹ לָאו.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**It stands to reason,** based on a proof from a mishna, to say that in a case where he acts **unwittingly** in that he does not know that it is **Shabbat, and intentionally** in that he knows that the **labors** he is performing are prohibited on Shabbat, it is **obvious to** Rabbi Akiva **that** the **intervening days** between the *Shabbatot* **are** considered **awareness** of his sin, which would serve **to differentiate** between one sin and the next. **And it is** in reference to a case where he acts **intentionally** with regard to **Shabbat and unwittingly** with regard to prohibited **labors that** Rabbi Akiva **raises his dilemma,** which is about whether the *Shabbatot* are **comparable** to separate **entities or not.**


###### Keritot 16b:2
[Keritot 16b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16b:2)

וּפְשַׁיט לֵיהּ דִּזְדוֹן שַׁבָּת וְשִׁגְגַת מְלָאכוֹת כְּגוּפִין דָּמְיָין, וְלָא קַבֵּיל מִינֵּיהּ. וּפְשַׁט לֵיהּ, דְּוַלְדֵי מְלָאכוֹת כִּמְלָאכוֹת דָּמְיָין, וְלָא קַבֵּיל מִינֵּיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** Rabbi Eliezer **resolved** his dilemma **for him** by stating **that** in a case where he acts **intentionally** with regard to **Shabbat and unwittingly** with regard to prohibited **labors,** the *Shabbatot* are **comparable** to separate **entities. But** Rabbi Akiva **did not accept** this resolution **from him. And** with regard to Rabbi Akiva’s other dilemma, Rabbi Eliezer **resolved** it **for him** by stating **that subcategories of labors** are **comparable** to primary categories of **labor,** and one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each act. **But** Rabbi Akiva **did not accept** this resolution **from him** either.


###### Keritot 16b:3
[Keritot 16b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16b:3)

אָמַר רַבָּה: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? דִּתְנַן, כְּלָל גָּדוֹל אָמְרוּ בַּשַּׁבָּת: כׇּל הַשּׁוֹכֵחַ עִיקַּר שַׁבָּת, וְעָשָׂה מְלָאכוֹת הַרְבֵּה בְּשַׁבָּתוֹת הַרְבֵּה – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabba said: From where do I say this? As we learned** in a mishna (*Shabbat* 67b): The Sages **stated a significant principle with regard to** the *halakhot* of **Shabbat:** With regard to **anyone who forgets the essence of Shabbat,** i.e., one who is entirely ignorant that labor is prohibited on Shabbat, **and** he **performed multiple** prohibited **labors on multiple *Shabbatot*, he is liable** to bring **only one** sin offering, as there is only a single, comprehensive lapse of awareness.


###### Keritot 16b:4
[Keritot 16b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16b:4)

הַיּוֹדֵעַ עִיקַּר שַׁבָּת, וְעָשָׂה מְלָאכוֹת הַרְבֵּה בְּשַׁבָּתוֹת הַרְבֵּה – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל שַׁבָּת וְשַׁבָּת. הַיּוֹדֵעַ שֶׁהוּא שַׁבָּת וְעָשָׂה מְלָאכוֹת הַרְבֵּה בְּשַׁבָּתוֹת הַרְבֵּה – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַב מְלָאכָה וּמְלָאכָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
With regard to **one who knows the essence of** the prohibition against labor on **Shabbat, and** he **performed multiple** prohibited **labors on multiple *Shabbatot*** because he was unaware that those days were Shabbat, he is **liable** to bring a sin offering **for each and every Shabbat,** as the intervening days are considered awareness which differentiates between the *Shabbatot*. **One who is aware that** the day **is Shabbat and performed multiple** prohibited **labors,** which he did not know were prohibited, **on multiple *Shabbatot*,** is **liable** to bring a sin offering **for each and every primary category of labor** that he performed.


###### Keritot 16b:5
[Keritot 16b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16b:5)

וְאִילּוּ ״חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַב מְלָאכָה שֶׁל כׇּל שַׁבָּת וְשַׁבָּת״ לָא קָתָנֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabba comments: **But** in the latter case, the mishna **does not teach** that he is **liable** to bring a sin offering **for each** act of **a primary category of labor** that he performed **on each and every Shabbat.** He is liable to bring one sin offering for each primary category of labor, despite the fact that he performed the act on multiple *Shabbatot*. This indicates that the different *Shabbatot* are not considered separate entities.


###### Keritot 16b:6
[Keritot 16b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16b:6)

מַנִּי הָא? אִילֵימָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: הָעוֹשֶׂה מְלָאכוֹת הַרְבֵּה מֵעֵין מְלָאכָה אַחַת – אֵין חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אֶחָת, וְאִי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל וַלְדֵי מְלָאכוֹת כִּמְלָאכוֹת!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Whose** opinion is **this? If we say** it is the opinion of **Rabbi Eliezer, say the last clause** of that mishna: **One who performs multiple** prohibited **labors subsumed,** as subcategories, under **one** primary category of prohibited **labor** is **liable** to bring **only one** sin offering. **And if** this were the opinion of **Rabbi Eliezer** it should state: He is **liable** to bring a separate sin offering **for each of** the different **subcategories of labors as** though they were separate primary categories of **labor.**


###### Keritot 16b:7
[Keritot 16b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16b:7)

אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא הִיא, וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ שִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ דְּיָמִים שֶׁבֵּינְתַיִים הָוַיִין יְדִיעָה לְחַלֵּק,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** it is **obvious** that this mishna **is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Akiva. And** you can **learn from** the mishna that when one acts **unwittingly** in that he did not know it was **Shabbat and** he acts **intentionally** in that he knows that these **labors** are prohibited on Shabbat, it is **obvious to** Rabbi Akiva **that** the **intervening days are** considered **awareness** of his sin, which serves **to differentiate** between the *Shabbatot* and render the individual liable to bring separate sin offerings for each Shabbat. It is for this reason that the mishna states that if one performs multiple labors on multiple *Shabbatot* because he was unaware that it was Shabbat, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each Shabbat.


###### Keritot 16b:8
[Keritot 16b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16b:8)

זְדוֹן שַׁבָּת וְשִׁגְגַת מְלָאכוֹת הוּא דְּבָעֵי אִי כְּגוּפִין דָּמְיָין, וּפְשַׁט לֵיהּ דִּכְגוּפִין דָּמְיָין, וַלְדֵי מְלָאכוֹת כִּמְלָאכוֹת דָּמְיָין, וְתַרְוַיְיהוּ לָא קַבֵּיל מִינֵּיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Consequently, it is clear that **it is** in a case where one acted **intentionally** in that he knew it was **Shabbat and unwittingly** in that he did not know that the acts he was performing were prohibited **labor, that** Rabbi Akiva **raises his dilemma,** as he is uncertain about **whether** the *Shabbatot* are **comparable** to separate **entities. And** Rabbi Eliezer **resolved** the dilemma **for him** by stating that the different *Shabbatot* are **comparable** to separate **entities,** and different **subcategories of labors are comparable** to primary categories of **labor,** and therefore one is liable for each act. **And** Rabbi Akiva **did not accept either of these** resolutions **from** Rabbi Eliezer.


###### Keritot 16b:9
[Keritot 16b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16b:9)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ זְדוֹן שַׁבָּת וְשִׁגְגַת מְלָאכוֹת פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא דְּשַׁבָּתוֹת לָאו כְּגוּפִין דָּמְיָין, וְשִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת הוּא דְּבָעֵי מִינֵּיהּ, דְּיָמִים שֶׁבֵּינְתַיִים מִי הָוַיִין יְדִיעָה לְחַלֵּק אוֹ לָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Abaye said to** Rabba: You cannot prove your claim from the mishna. **Actually, I** could **say to you** that in a case where one acts **intentionally** in that he knows it is **Shabbat and unwittingly** in that he does not know that his actions are prohibited **labors,** it is **obvious to Rabbi Akiva that *Shabbatot* are not comparable** to separate **entities,** as it can be inferred from the latter clause of this mishna that one is not liable to bring a separate sin offering for each primary category of labor performed on each individual Shabbat. **And it is** in reference to a case where one acted **unwittingly** in that he did not know it was **Shabbat and intentionally** in that he knew his actions are prohibited **labors, that** Rabbi Akiva **raises his dilemma to** Rabbi Eliezer. The dilemma is whether the **intervening days are** considered **awareness to differentiate** between the *Shabbatot* **or not.**


###### Keritot 16b:10
[Keritot 16b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16b:10)

וּפְשַׁיט לֵיהּ דְּיָמִים שֶׁבֵּינְתַיִים [הָוַיִין יְדִיעָה] לְחַלֵּק וְקַבֵּיל מִינֵּיהּ, וּפְשַׁט לֵיהּ וַלְדֵי מְלָאכוֹת כִּמְלָאכוֹת דָּמַיִין וְלָא קַבֵּיל מִינֵּיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** Rabbi Eliezer **resolved** the dilemma **for him** by stating **that** the **intervening days** are considered awareness **to differentiate** between the *Shabbatot*. **And** Rabbi Akiva **accepted** this resolution **from him,** due the ruling of the mishna that one who knows the essence of the prohibition against labor on Shabbat and performs multiple prohibited labors on multiple *Shabbatot* is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every Shabbat. **And** Rabbi Eliezer also **resolved** his other dilemma **for him** by stating that **subcategories of labors are comparable** to primary categories of **labor** and one is liable for each act, **but** Rabbi Akiva **did not accept** this resolution **from him.**


###### Keritot 16b:11
[Keritot 16b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16b:11)

רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר: זְדוֹן שַׁבָּת וְשִׁגְגַת מְלָאכוֹת – אֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סְבִירָא לֵיהּ דִּכְגוּפִין דָּמְיָין, וְכִי בָּעֵי מִינֵּיהּ, שִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת הוּא דְּבָעֵי מִינֵּיהּ, דְּיָמִים שֶׁבֵּינְתַיִים אִי הָוְיָין יְדִיעָה לְחַלֵּק.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ḥisda says:** In a case where one acts **intentionally** in that he knows it is **Shabbat and unwittingly** in that he does not know that his actions are prohibited **labors, even Rabbi Akiva holds that** the *Shabbatot* **are comparable** to separate **entities; and when he raises the dilemma** to Rabbi Eliezer, **it is** in reference to a case where one acted **unwittingly** with regard to **Shabbat and intentionally** with regard to prohibited **labor. And he raises the dilemma** in order to clarify whether or not the **intervening days are** considered **awareness to differentiate.**


###### Keritot 16b:12
[Keritot 16b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16b:12)

וּפְשַׁיט לֵיהּ יָמִים שֶׁבֵּינְתַיִים הָוַיִין יְדִיעָה לְחַלֵּק, וְקַבֵּיל מִינֵּיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** Rabbi Eliezer **resolved** the dilemma **for him** by stating that the **intervening days are** considered **awareness to differentiate** the transgressions, **and** Rabbi Akiva **accepted** this resolution **from him.** This is in accordance with the mishna in tractate *Shabbat* (67b) cited earlier, that one who knows the essence of the prohibition against labor on Shabbat and performed multiple prohibited labors on multiple *Shabbatot* is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every Shabbat.


###### Keritot 16b:13
[Keritot 16b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16b:13)

וּפְשַׁט לֵיהּ דְּוַלְדֵי מְלָאכוֹת כִּמְלָאכוֹת דָּמַיִין, וְלָא קַבֵּיל מִינֵּיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** Rabbi Eliezer also **resolved** Rabbi Akiva’s other dilemma **for him** by stating **that** different **subcategories of** prohibited **labors** are **comparable** to primary categories of **labor** and one is liable for each one separately. **But** Rabbi Akiva **did not accept** this resolution **from him,** due to the final clause of that mishna, which states that one who performs multiple prohibited labors that are subsumed as subcategories under one primary category of prohibited labor is liable to bring only one sin offering.


###### Keritot 16b:14
[Keritot 16b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16b:14)

אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? דְּתַנְיָא: הַכּוֹתֵב שְׁתֵּי אוֹתִיּוֹת בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד – חַיָּיב. בִּשְׁתֵּי הֶעְלֵמוֹת – רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל מְחַיֵּיב, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִין. וּמוֹדֶה רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, שֶׁאִם כָּתַב אוֹת אַחַת בְּשַׁבָּת זוֹ וְאוֹת אַחַת בְּשַׁבָּת אַחֶרֶת – פָּטוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ḥisda said: From where do I say** that according to Rabbi Akiva each Shabbat is considered a separate entity? This is **as it is taught** in a *baraita*: **One who writes two letters** on Shabbat **during one lapse of awareness** is **liable,** as writing two letters renders one liable for performing the prohibited labor of writing. If he does so **in two** separate **lapses of awareness,** e.g., he wrote one letter without realizing it was Shabbat, then became aware that it was Shabbat, and then again became unaware it was Shabbat and wrote a second letter, **Rabban Gamliel deems** him **liable** to bring a sin offering **and the Rabbis deem** him **exempt. And Rabban Gamliel concedes that if he wrote one letter on this Shabbat and one letter on another Shabbat** he is **exempt.**


###### Keritot 16b:15
[Keritot 16b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16b:15)

וְתַנְיָא אַחֲרִיתִי: הַכּוֹתֵב שְׁתֵּי אוֹתִיּוֹת בִּשְׁתֵּי שַׁבָּתוֹת, אֶחָד בְּשַׁבָּת זוֹ וְאֶחָד בְּשַׁבָּת זוֹ – רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל מְחַיֵּיב, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִין. קָא סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ, דְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סְבִירָא לֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And it is taught** in **a different** *baraita*: In the case of **one who writes two letters on two *Shabbatot*, one on this Shabbat and one on that Shabbat, Rabban Gamliel deems** him **liable and the Rabbis deem** him **exempt.** Rav Ḥisda explains: It **enters your mind that Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Akiva.**


###### Keritot 16b:16
[Keritot 16b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/16b:16)

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְדִידִי, דְּאָמֵינָא זְדוֹן שַׁבָּת וְשִׁגְגַת מְלָאכוֹת אֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר דְּשַׁבָּתוֹת כְּגוּפִין דָּמְיָין, הָא דְּתַנְיָא פָּטוּר – בִּזְדוֹן שַׁבָּת וְשִׁגְגַת מְלָאכוֹת, דְּשַׁבָּתוֹת כְּגוּפִין דָּמְיָין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Granted, according to my** opinion, **as I say** that in a case where one acts **intentionally** in that he knows it is **Shabbat and unwittingly** in that he does not know his actions constitute prohibited **labors, even Rabbi Akiva says that** the ***Shabbatot* are comparable** to separate **entities.** Consequently, **that which is taught** in the first *baraita*, that Rabban Gamliel concedes that if one wrote one letter on Shabbat and another letter the following Shabbat he is **exempt,** can be interpreted as referring **to** a case where one acts **intentionally** in that he knows it is **Shabbat but unwittingly** in that he does not know his actions constitute prohibited **labors. Since** separate ***Shabbatot* are comparable** to separate **entities,** the two acts do not combine to form the minimal act of writing that would render one liable to bring a sin offering.