## Keritot Daf 17a

###### Keritot 17a:1
[Keritot 17a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/17a:1)

וְהָא דְּתַנְיָא חַיָּיב – בְּשִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת (דְּשַׁבָּתוֹת כְּגוּפִין דָּמְיָין), דְּקָסָבַר: אֵין יְדִיעָה לַחֲצִי שִׁיעוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And that which is taught** in the second *baraita*, that Rabban Gamliel deems a person **liable** if he wrote two letters over two *Shabbatot*, can also be explained: It is referring to a case **where** he acts **unwittingly** in that he does not know it is **Shabbat, and intentionally** in that he knows his actions constitute prohibited **labors.** In such a situation he deems an individual liable despite the fact **that** different ***Shabbatot* are comparable** to separate **entities, as he holds** that although the intervening days are generally considered awareness of his transgression, **there is no awareness for a half-measure.** Since he performed only half the prohibited labor on the first Shabbat, he is not considered to have become aware of his transgression on the intervening days.


###### Keritot 17a:2
[Keritot 17a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/17a:2)

אֶלָּא לְרָבָא, דְּאָמַר: סְבִירָא לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא דְּשַׁבָּתוֹת כְּגוּף אֶחָד הֵן,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But according to Rava, who says** that **Rabbi Akiva,** and presumably also Rabban Gamliel, **holds that** separate ***Shabbatot* are** considered **as one** single **entity,** how can both *baraitot* be explained?


###### Keritot 17a:3
[Keritot 17a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/17a:3)

בִּשְׁלָמָא הָא דְּתַנְיָא חַיָּיב, מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ בֵּין בִּזְדוֹן שַׁבָּת וְשִׁגְגַת מְלָאכוֹת, דְּשַׁבָּתוֹת כְּגוּף אֶחָד הֵן, וּבֵין בְּשִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת, דְּקָסָבַר: אֵין יְדִיעָה לַחֲצִי שִׁיעוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara elaborates: **Granted, that which is taught** in the second *baraita*, that Rabban Gamliel deems one who writes a letter on each of two *Shabbatot* to be **liable,** is understandable. **You** can **find both** a case **where** one acted **intentionally** in that he knew it was **Shabbat and unwittingly** in that he did not know his actions constituted prohibited **labors, as** he holds that ***Shabbatot* are** considered **as one** single **entity, and** a case **where** he acted **unwittingly** in that he does not know it is **Shabbat and intentionally** in that he knows his actions constitute prohibited **labors.** The reason in the second case is **that he holds there is no awareness for a half-measure,** and therefore the actions on the two *Shabbatot* are considered to have taken place during one lapse of awareness.


###### Keritot 17a:4
[Keritot 17a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/17a:4)

וְאֶלָּא הָדְתַנְיָא פָּטוּר, בְּמַאי מוֹקְמַתְּ לַהּ? לָא בַּחֲדָא וְלָא בַּחֲדָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But** with regard to **that which is taught** in the first *baraita*, that one who writes a letter on each of two *Shabbatot* is **exempt, in what** case **can you interpret it,** i.e., in what circumstances would this ever apply? This ruling does **not** apply **in this** case, where he is aware that it is Shabbat but unaware that his action constitutes a prohibited labor, because Rabbi Akiva, and presumably Rabban Gamliel, maintains that each Shabbat is considered a single entity and therefore it is considered as though he wrote two letters on one Shabbat, and he is liable. **And** this ruling also does **not** apply **in that** case, where one is unaware that it is Shabbat and aware that his action constitutes a prohibited labor, because Rabban Gamliel maintains there is no awareness for a half-measure. Consequently, the two letters are considered to have been written in one lapse of awareness.


###### Keritot 17a:5
[Keritot 17a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/17a:5)

אָמַר לָךְ רָבָא: רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סְבִירָא לֵיהּ כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, דְּאָמַר: שַׁבָּתוֹת כְּגוּפִין דָּמְיָין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains that **Rava** could **say to you** that **Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Eliezer, who says: *Shabbatot* are comparable** to separate **entities,** and therefore an individual who wrote one letter on one Shabbat and another letter on a different Shabbat is exempt.


###### Keritot 17a:6
[Keritot 17a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/17a:6)

וְהָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי: וּמוֹדֶה רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, מִכְּלָל דִּפְלִיגִי אַאַחְרָנְיָיתָא. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סְבִירָא לֵיהּ – הַיְינוּ דִּפְלִיגִי בְּשִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת, דְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר: אֵין יְדִיעָה לַחֲצִי שִׁיעוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises an objection: **But from** the fact **that** the *baraita* **teaches: And Rabban Gamliel concedes** to the Rabbis that if he wrote one letter on one Shabbat and one more letter on a different Shabbat he is exempt, it can be derived **by inference that they disagree about another** *halakha*. **Granted, if you say** Rabban Gamliel **holds in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Akiva,** and the opinion of the Rabbis is that of Rabbi Akiva, **this is** referring to the fact **that they disagree** in the other *baraita* **with regard to** the case where one acts **unwittingly** in that he does not know it is **Shabbat and intentionally** in that he knows his actions constitute prohibited **labors, as Rabban Gamliel holds** that although the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the *Shabbatot*, **there is no awareness for a half-measure,** and therefore he is liable.


###### Keritot 17a:7
[Keritot 17a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/17a:7)

וּמוֹדֶה רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל בִּזְדוֹן שַׁבָּת וְשִׁגְגַת מְלָאכוֹת שֶׁהוּא פָּטוּר, אַלְמָא שַׁבָּתוֹת כְּגוּפִין דָּמְיָין. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סְבִירָא לֵיהּ, מִכְּלָל דִּפְלִיגִי. בְּמַאי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rabban Gamliel concedes** to Rabbi Akiva **in** a case where one acts **intentionally** in that he knows it is **Shabbat and unwittingly** in that he does not know his actions constitute prohibited **labors, that he is exempt. Evidently,** Rabbi Akiva holds that ***Shabbatot* are comparable** to separate **entities,** and therefore the letters written on different *Shabbatot* do not combine, which is why he is exempt. **But if you say Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Eliezer,** and from the fact that one *baraita* states that Rabban Gamliel concedes that he is exempt it can be derived **by inference that they disagree** about another similar *halakha*, this raises the question: **About what** case do they disagree?


###### Keritot 17a:8
[Keritot 17a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/17a:8)

אִי בְּשִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת – אֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר כְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סְבִירָא לֵיהּ דְּאֵין יְדִיעָה לַחֲצִי שִׁיעוּר, דְּתַנְיָא: הַכּוֹתֵב שְׁתֵּי אוֹתִיּוֹת בִּשְׁתֵּי שַׁבָּתוֹת, אוֹת אַחַת בְּשַׁבָּת זוֹ וְאוֹת אַחַת בְּשַׁבָּת זוֹ – רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מְחַיֵּיב!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**If** you suggest that they disagree **with regard to** a case where one acts **unwittingly** in that he does not know it is **Shabbat and intentionally** in that he knows his actions constitute prohibited **labors,** then that cannot be correct. After all, **even Rabbi Eliezer holds in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabban Gamliel that there is no awareness for a half-measure, as it is taught** in a *baraita*: With regard to **one who writes two letters on two** separate ***Shabbatot*, one letter on this Shabbat and one letter on that Shabbat, Rabbi Eliezer deems** him **liable.**


###### Keritot 17a:9
[Keritot 17a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/17a:9)

וְאֶלָּא, בְּאַחַת עַל הָאָרִיג – חַיּוֹבֵי מְחַיֵּיב, דִּתְנַן: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: הָאוֹרֵג שְׁלֹשָׁה חוּטִין בַּתְּחִלָּה, וְאֶחָד עַל הָאָרִיג – חַיָּיב!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But rather,** you might suggest that Rabban Gamliel’s concession that he is exempt is referring to a disagreement **with regard to** adding **one** thread **to** a preexisting **woven fabric.** If one weaves three threads together he has violated the prohibited labor of weaving on Shabbat. It might be suggested that if one adds a single thread to a preexisting woven fabric, Rabban Gamliel would deem him liable whereas Rabbi Eliezer would deem him exempt. And yet Rabban Gamliel concedes that if one writes one letter next to a letter written on the previous Shabbat he is exempt. This suggestion is also difficult, as Rabbi Eliezer **deems** one **liable** in the case of adding a single thread, **as we learned** in a mishna (*Shabbat* 105a) that **Rabbi Eliezer says: One who weaves three threads at the beginning** of a new fabric, **or** adds **one** thread **to** a preexisting **woven fabric,** is **liable.**


###### Keritot 17a:10
[Keritot 17a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/17a:10)

אָמַר רָבָא: מִכְּלָל דִּפְלִיג בַּחֲדָא, דְּתַנְיָא: הוֹצִיא חֲצִי גְרוֹגֶרֶת וְחָזַר וְהוֹצִיא חֲצִי גְרוֹגֶרֶת בְּהֶעְלֵם (אַחַת) [אֶחָד] – חַיָּיב. בִּשְׁתֵּי הֶעְלֵמוֹת – פָּטוּר. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד בִּרְשׁוּת (אֶחָד) [אַחַת] – חַיָּיב, בִּשְׁתֵּי רְשׁוּיוֹת – פָּטוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said:** When it was derived **by inference that** Rabban Gamliel **disagrees about one** other *halakha*, that disagreement is referring to the following case, **as it is taught** in a *baraita*: One who **carried out half of a dried fig** into the public domain on Shabbat **and then carried out** another **half of a dried fig, in one lapse of awareness,** is **liable;** if he carried them out **in two lapses of awareness** he is **exempt. Rabbi Yosei says:** Even in a case where this occurred **in one lapse of awareness,** if they were both carried **to one** public **domain** he is **liable;** but if they were carried **to two** public **domains** that are separated from each other he is **exempt.**


###### Keritot 17a:11
[Keritot 17a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/17a:11)

דְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל כְּתַנָּא קַמָּא, וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**As** in such a case, **Rabban Gamliel** holds **in accordance with** the opinion of **the first *tanna*,** who says that the separate domains do not cause the two acts to be considered separate; therefore, as he carried out a full dried fig, which is the minimum measure for the prohibited labor of carrying from one domain to another, he is liable. **And Rabbi Eliezer** holds **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei,** who says the separate domains cause the acts to be considered separate, and he is exempt. Another *baraita* then states that although Rabban Gamliel maintains that the separate domains do not cause the two acts to be considered separate, he concedes that individual *Shabbatot* are considered separate entities, and therefore writing two letters on two different *Shabbatot* is considered two separate acts and the individual is exempt.


###### Keritot 17a:12
[Keritot 17a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/17a:12)

תָּא שְׁמַע, אָמַר לוֹ: חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר, וּמָה נִדָּה שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ תּוֹצָאוֹת הַרְבֵּה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Come** and **hear** a proof for Rav Ḥisda’s opinion from the mishna: Rabbi Eliezer **said to** Rabbi Akiva: He is **liable** to bring a sin offering **for** violation of **each and every one** of the labors, and this is derived **from an *a fortiori*** inference. **Just as** in the case of **a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are not multiple** actions that **result** in multiple sin offerings, one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each act of unwitting intercourse; in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are multiple primary categories and subcategories of labor, is it not right that one will be liable to bring a sin offering for each prohibited labor?


###### Keritot 17a:13
[Keritot 17a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/17a:13)

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַב חִסְדָּא דְּאָמַר: שִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת בָּעֵי מִינֵּיהּ, דְּיָמִים שֶׁבֵּינְתַיִם מִי הָוְיָין יְדִיעָה לְחַלֵּק אוֹ לָא – הַיְינוּ דְּקָאָמַר לֵיהּ: ״וּמָה נִדָּה״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Granted, according to Rav Ḥisda, who says** that Rabbi Akiva **raises** his **dilemma** in reference to a case where one acted **unwittingly** in that he did not know it was **Shabbat and intentionally** in that he knew his actions constitute prohibited **labors,** and the basis of the dilemma was **whether** the **intervening days are** considered **awareness to differentiate** between the *Shabbatot* **or not, that is** the reason **that** Rabbi Eliezer **said to him: Just as** in the case of **a menstruating woman,** in the singular; in order to indicate that just as in the case of a menstruating woman one is liable for each act of intercourse due to the intervening days, so too with regard to Shabbat.


###### Keritot 17a:14
[Keritot 17a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/17a:14)

אֶלָּא לְרָבָא, דְּאָמַר: זְדוֹן שַׁבָּת וְשִׁגְגַת מְלָאכוֹת הוּא דְּבָעֵי מִינֵּיהּ, דְּשַׁבָּתוֹת אִי כְּגוּפִין דָּמְיָין וְאִי לָא – לִיתְנֵי ״נִדּוֹת״!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But according to Rava, who says it was** in reference to a case where one acted **intentionally** in that he knew it was **Shabbat and unwittingly** in that he did not know his actions constituted prohibited **labors that** Rabbi Akiva **raises** his **dilemma,** and the basis of the dilemma was **whether *Shabbatot*** are **comparable to** separate **entities or not, let** Rabbi Eliezer **teach** this *halakha* with the plural phrase: **Menstruating women.** This would indicate that just as a man who engages in intercourse with five different menstruating women is liable to bring a sin offering for his transgression with each woman, as they are separate entities, the same applies to *Shabbatot*, which are also separate entities.


###### Keritot 17a:15
[Keritot 17a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/17a:15)

אָמַר לָךְ רָבָא: תְּנִי ״נִדּוֹת״. שְׁמוּאֵל תָּנֵי ״נִדָּה״, רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה תָּנֵי ״נִדָּה״. רַב נָתָן בַּר אוֹשַׁעְיָא אָמַר: תָּנֵי ״נִדּוֹת״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara responds that **Rava** could **say to you:** Indeed, **teach** the mishna with the plural term **menstruating women.** The Gemara notes that **Shmuel teaches** the mishna with the singular term **menstruating woman,** and **Rav Adda bar Ahava teaches** the mishna with the term **menstruating woman;** but **Rav Natan bar Oshaya says: Teach** the mishna with the plural term **menstruating women.**


###### Keritot 17a:16
[Keritot 17a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/17a:16)

וּלְרַב חִסְדָּא דְּאָמַר: שִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת הוּא דְּבָעֵי מִינֵּיהּ, דְּיָמִים שֶׁבֵּינְתַיִם מִי הָוַיִין יְדִיעָה לְחַלֵּק וְאִי לָא, נִדָּה – מַאי יָמִים שֶׁבֵּינְתַיִם הָוַיִין יְדִיעָה לְחַלֵּק אִית בַּהּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And according to Rav Ḥisda, who says: It was** in reference to a case where he was **unwitting** with regard to **Shabbat and intentional** with regard to prohibited **labors that** Rabbi Akiva **raises** his **dilemma,** and the question was **whether** the **intervening days are** considered **awareness to differentiate** between the *Shabbatot* **or not,** how could Rabbi Eliezer attempt to resolve the dilemma by a comparison to a menstruating woman? In the case of **a menstruating woman, what intervening days apply to her** that can **be** considered **awareness** of his sin, which serves **to differentiate** the acts of intercourse into distinct transgressions?


###### Keritot 17a:17
[Keritot 17a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/17a:17)

אָמַר רָבָא: כְּגוֹן שֶׁבָּא עָלֶיהָ וְטָבְלָה, וְרָאֲתָה וְחָזַר וּבָא עָלֶיהָ, וְטָבְלָה, וְחָזַר וּבָא עָלֶיהָ, דִּטְבִילוֹת הָוְיָין כְּיָמִים שֶׁבֵּינְתַיִם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said:** This is possible in a case **where he** unwittingly **engaged in intercourse with her** while she was menstruating, **and** then **she immersed** in a ritual bath and became pure, **and** then **she saw** menstrual blood **and he engaged in intercourse with her again, and** then **she immersed** and then saw menstrual blood **and he engaged in intercourse with her again. As** here **the immersions** which purify her **are** considered **like intervening days.**


###### Keritot 17a:18
[Keritot 17a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/17a:18)

תָּא שְׁמַע: הַבָּא עַל הַקְּטַנּוֹת יוֹכִיחַ. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרָבָא, הַיְינוּ דְקָתָנֵי ״קְטַנּוֹת״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Come** and **hear** a proof for the opinion of Rava from the continuation of the mishna: Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Akiva: The case of **one who engages in intercourse with minor** menstruating **girls will prove** this refutation is not valid. **Granted, according to Rava,** who says that Rabbi Akiva’s dilemma was about whether *Shabbatot* are considered separate entities, **this** is the reason **that** Rabbi Eliezer **teaches** his resolution by using the plural term **minor girls,** to indicate that just as one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each girl, as she is a separate entity, the same applies to prohibited labor performed on different *Shabbatot*.


###### Keritot 17a:19
[Keritot 17a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/17a:19)

אֶלָּא לְרַב חִסְדָּא, מַאי ״קְטַנּוֹת״? קְטַנּוֹת דְּעָלְמָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But according to Rav Ḥisda,** who said Rabbi Akiva’s dilemma referred to whether the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the *Shabbatot*, **what** is the reason Rabbi Eliezer employed the plural term **minor girls?** The Gemara answers that the plural term is referring to **minor girls in general,** i.e., to men who engage in intercourse with minor girls, but it should not be taken to mean that one man engages in intercourse with multiple minor women.


###### Keritot 17a:20
[Keritot 17a:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/17a:20)

דְּלָא כְּהָדֵין תַּנָּא, דְּתַנְיָא: אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר לֹא כָּךְ שְׁאֵלוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, אֶלָּא כָּךְ שְׁאֵלוֹ: הַבָּא עַל אִשְׁתּוֹ נִדָּה וְחָזַר וּבָא עַל אִשְׁתּוֹ נִדָּה בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד, מַהוּ? חַיָּיב אַחַת עַל כּוּלָּן, אוֹ חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara notes that **the mishna,** which states that Rabbi Akiva raised a dilemma with regard to the *halakhot* of Shabbat and Rabbi Eliezer offered a resolution based on the *halakhot* of a menstruating woman, **is not in accordance with** the opinion of **this** following ***tanna*, as it is taught** in a *baraita* that **Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: That is not what Rabbi Akiva asked Rabbi Eliezer. Rather, this is what he asked him:** In the case of **one who** unwittingly **engaged in intercourse with his wife** while she was **menstruating, and then again engaged in intercourse with his wife** while she was **menstruating, during a single lapse of awareness, what is** the *halakha*? Is he **liable** to bring only **one** sin offering **for all of the** acts of intercourse, **or** is he **liable** to bring a separate sin offering **for each and every one?**


###### Keritot 17a:21
[Keritot 17a:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/17a:21)

אָמַר לֹיה: חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת, מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר, וּמָה שַׁבָּת שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ אֶלָּא אַזְהָרָה אַחַת, שֶׁהוּא מוּזְהָר עַל הַשַּׁבָּת וְהַשַּׁבָּת אֵינָהּ מוּזְהֶרֶת עָלָיו – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת, נִדָּה שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ שְׁתֵּי אַזְהָרוֹת, שֶׁהוּא מוּזְהָר עַל הַנִּדָּה וְנִדָּה מוּזְהֶרֶת עָלָיו – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabbi Eliezer **said to him:** He is **liable for each and every one,** and this is derived **from an *a fortiori*** inference: **And just as** in the case of **Shabbat, with regard to which there is only one prohibition because he is prohibited** to perform labor **on Shabbat but Shabbat is not prohibited with regard to him,** he is **liable** to bring a separate sin offering **for each and every** prohibited labor; in the case of **a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are two prohibitions, as** the man **is prohibited** to engage in intercourse **with the menstruating woman and the menstruating woman is prohibited** to engage in intercourse **with him, is it not right that he** should **be liable** to bring a separate sin offering **for each and every** act of intercourse?


###### Keritot 17a:22
[Keritot 17a:22](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/17a:22)

אָמְרוּ לוֹ: לֹא, אִם אָמַרְתָּ בַּשַּׁבָּת, שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ תּוֹצָאוֹת הַרְבֵּה לְחַטָּאוֹת הַרְבֵּה, תֹּאמַר בַּנִּדָּה, שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ תּוֹצָאוֹת הַרְבֵּה לְחַטָּאוֹת הַרְבֵּה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabbi Akiva **said to him: No, if you said** that one is liable to bring multiple sin offerings **in** the case of **Shabbat, with regard to which there are multiple** categories of labor that **result in** liability to bring **multiple sin offerings, shall you** also **say** the same **in** the case of **a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are not multiple** actions that **result** in **multiple** transgressions and **multiple sin offerings,** as there is only the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with her?


###### Keritot 17a:23
[Keritot 17a:23](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/17a:23)

אָמְרוּ לוֹ: הַבָּא עַל הַקְּטַנּוֹת יוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ תּוֹצָאוֹת הַרְבֵּה לְחַטָּאוֹת הַרְבֵּה, וְחַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabbi Eliezer **said to him:** The case of **one who engages in intercourse with** five **minor** menstruating **girls will prove** it, **as with regard to it there are not multiple** actions that **result in multiple sin offerings, and** yet one is **liable** to bring a separate sin offering **for** having engaged in intercourse with **each and every one** of the girls.


###### Keritot 17a:24
[Keritot 17a:24](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/17a:24)

אָמְרוּ לוֹ: לֹא, אִם אָמַרְתָּ בַּקְּטַנּוֹת שֶׁכֵּן גּוּפִין מוּחְלָקִין? אָמְרוּ לוֹ: הַבָּא עַל הַבְּהֵמָה יוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁאֵין גּוּפִין מוּחְלָקִין וְחַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת! אָמְרוּ לוֹ: הַבְּהֵמָה כַּנִּדָּה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabbi Akiva **said to him: No, if you said** that one is liable for each one **with regard to minors, who** are **separate entities,** shall you also say that he should be liable for each act with regard to one who engages in intercourse five times with his wife while she is menstruating? Rabbi Eliezer **said to him:** The case of **one who copulates with an animal** multiple times during a single lapse of awareness **will prove** that one should be held separately liable for each act, **as there are no separate entities, and** yet one is **liable for each and every** act. Rabbi Akiva **said to him:** The case of **the animal is like** the case of **the menstruating woman,** and one is liable to bring only one sin offering.


###### Keritot 17a:25
[Keritot 17a:25](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/17a:25)

**הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ אָמְרוּ לוֹ **


###### Keritot 17a:26
[Keritot 17a:26](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Keritot/r/17a:26)

מַתְנִי׳ **סָפֵק** אָכַל חֵלֶב, סָפֵק לֹא אָכַל, וַאֲפִילּוּ אָכַל, סָפֵק יֵשׁ בּוֹ כַּשִּׁיעוּר וְסָפֵק

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** If there is **uncertainty** whether **one ate** forbidden **fat** and **uncertainty** whether **one did not eat** forbidden **fat, or even** if **one ate** forbidden fat and there is **uncertainty** whether **there is the measure** that determines liability **in** the piece he ate **and uncertainty**