## Ketubot Daf 100a

###### Ketubot 100a:1
[Ketubot 100a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/100a:1)

רָבָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: שָׁלִיחַ כְּדַיָּינִין. רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר בִּיסְנָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: כְּאַלְמָנָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said** that **Rav Naḥman** said: The *halakha* with regard to the **agent** is **like** the *halakha* pertaining to the **judges. Rav Shmuel bar Bisna** said that **Rav Naḥman said:** The *halakha* with regard to the agent is **like** the *halakha* with regard to **a widow.**


###### Ketubot 100a:2
[Ketubot 100a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/100a:2)

רָבָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: שָׁלִיחַ כְּדַיָּינִין. מָה דַיָּינִין לָאו לְדִידְהוּ — אַף שָׁלִיחַ נָמֵי לָאו לְדִידֵיהּ, לְאַפּוֹקֵי אַלְמָנָה דִּלְדִידַהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said** that **Rav Naḥman** said: The *halakha* with regard to the **agent** is **like** the *halakha* with regard to the **judges. Just as the judges** have an advantage because they **do not** assess the value of property **for their** own benefit, **so too, the agent also does not** act **for his** own benefit; this is **to the exclusion of a widow** who sells **for her own** benefit.


###### Ketubot 100a:3
[Ketubot 100a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/100a:3)

רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר בִּיסְנָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: כְּאַלְמָנָה, מָה אַלְמָנָה יְחִידָה — אַף שָׁלִיחַ יָחִיד, לְאַפּוֹקֵי בֵּית דִּין — דְּרַבִּים נִינְהוּ. וְהִלְכְתָא, שָׁלִיחַ כְּאַלְמָנָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Shmuel, son of Bisna,** said that **Rav Naḥman said:** The *halakha* with regard to the agent is **like** the *halakha* with regard to **a widow. Just as a widow** is **an individual, so too the agent** is **an individual.** This is **to the exclusion of the court, which is** composed of **many** people. The Gemara concludes: **And the *halakha* is** that with regard to this matter, **an agent is like a widow.**


###### Ketubot 100a:4
[Ketubot 100a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/100a:4)

וּמַאי שְׁנָא מֵהָא דִּתְנַן: הָאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ ״צֵא וּתְרוֹם״ — תּוֹרֵם כְּדַעַת בַּעַל הַבַּיִת, וְאִם אֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ דַּעְתּוֹ שֶׁל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת — תּוֹרֵם בְּבֵינוֹנִית אֶחָד מֵחֲמִשִּׁים. פִּיחֵת עֲשָׂרָה אוֹ הוֹסִיף עֲשָׂרָה, תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** in **what** way **is** that case **different from this** case? **As we learned in a mishna** (*Terumot* 4:4): In the case of **one who says to his agent: Go out and separate** *teruma*, the agent **separates** *teruma* **in accordance with the mind-set of the homeowner. And if he does not know the mind-set of homeowner, he separates an intermediate** measure, i.e., **one-fiftieth** of the produce. If **he subtracted ten** from the denominator and separated one-fortieth **or added ten** to the denominator and separated one-sixtieth of the produce, **his *teruma*** is considered ***teruma*.** If the agent is comparable to a widow, then why isn’t the *halakha* that the *teruma* that he has separated is nullified, since he did not act in accordance with the wishes of the homeowner?


###### Ketubot 100a:5
[Ketubot 100a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/100a:5)

הָתָם כֵּיוָן דְּאִיכָּא דְּתוֹרֵם בְּעַיִן רָעָה וְאִיכָּא דְּתוֹרֵם בְּעַיִן יָפָה, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לְהָכִי אֲמַדְתָּיךְ. אֲבָל הָכָא טָעוּתָא הוּא, אָמַר לֵיהּ: לָא אִיבְּעִי לָךְ לְמִיטְעֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **There, since there are** those **who separate in a miserly fashion** one-sixtieth, **and there are** those **who separate generously** one-fortieth, the agent can **say to** his employer: **I estimated you** to be generous or miserly. **However, here** there is no logical reason for the mistake made by the agent. **It is** simply **an error** on the part of the agent, and so the owner can **say to him: You ought not to have erred.**


###### Ketubot 100a:6
[Ketubot 100a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/100a:6)

אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בַּר חֲנִינָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן, הֲלָכָה כְּדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים: וְלֵית לֵיהּ לְרַב נַחְמָן מָה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה? וְהָאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: יְתוֹמִים שֶׁבָּאוּ לַחְלוֹק בְּנִכְסֵי אֲבִיהֶן — בֵּית דִּין מַעֲמִידִין לָהֶן אַפּוֹטְרוֹפּוֹס, וּבוֹרְרִין לָהֶם חֵלֶק יָפֶה. הִגְדִּילוּ — יְכוֹלִין לְמַחוֹת. וְרַב נַחְמָן דִּידֵיהּ אָמַר: הִגְדִּילוּ — אֵין יְכוֹלִין לְמַחוֹת, אִם כֵּן מָה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rav Huna bar Ḥanina said** that **Rav Naḥman said:** The ***halakha* is in accordance with the statement of** the **Rabbis** in the mishna. The Gemara asks: **Does Rav Naḥman not** agree with the argument: **What** advantage is there to **the power of the court? Didn’t Rav Naḥman say** that **Shmuel said:** In a case of **orphans who came to divide their father’s property, the court appoints a steward [*apotropos*] for them and selects for** the orphans **appropriate portions** and divides the property accordingly. Afterward, once the orphans have **matured, they are able to protest** this division of the property. **And Rav Naḥman said his own** statement: Once the orphans have **matured, they are not able to protest, as if** they were able to do **so, what advantage** would there be to **the power of the court?** This proves that Rav Naḥman agrees with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.


###### Ketubot 100a:7
[Ketubot 100a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/100a:7)

לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא דִּטְעוֹ, הָא דְּלָא טְעוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: This is **not difficult.** The case of the mishna was one **where** the judges **erred** in their assessment, and therefore Rav Naḥman said that the sale is void in accordance with the Rabbis. However, the case of the division of property among the orphans is one **where they did not err,** and so he ruled in accordance with the principle of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that the court is given an advantage and the orphans are not able to protest the division.


###### Ketubot 100a:8
[Ketubot 100a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/100a:8)

אִי דְּלָא טְעוֹ, בְּמַאי יְכוֹלִין לְמַחוֹת? בְּרוּחוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **If** the case is one **where** the judges **did not err,** with regard **to what could** the orphans **protest?** After all, the judges acted correctly. The Gemara answers: They can protest **with regard to** the **locations;** one of the orphans can contend that he prefers property in a different location than he was given.


###### Ketubot 100a:9
[Ketubot 100a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/100a:9)

כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אָמַר: מַעֲשֶׂה וְעָשָׂה רַבִּי כְּדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים, אָמַר לְפָנָיו פַּרְטָא בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן פַּרְטָא בֶּן בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי פַּרְטָא הַגָּדוֹל: אִם כֵּן מָה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה, וְהֶחְזִיר רַבִּי אֶת הַמַּעֲשֶׂה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**When Rav Dimi came** from Eretz Yisrael, **he said:** A similar **incident** occurred **and Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi **acted in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis** of the mishna. **Perata, son of Rabbi Elazar ben Perata, grandson of Rabbi Perata the Great, said before him: If** that is the case, **what advantage** is there to **the power of the court** over an ordinary person? **And Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi **reversed** his ruling about **the incident.**


###### Ketubot 100a:10
[Ketubot 100a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/100a:10)

רַב דִּימִי מַתְנֵי הָכִי, רַב סָפְרָא מַתְנֵי הָכִי: מַעֲשֶׂה וּבִיקֵּשׁ רַבִּי לַעֲשׂוֹת כְּדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים, אָמַר לְפָנָיו פַּרְטָא בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן פַּרְטָא בֶּן בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי פַּרְטָא הַגָּדוֹל: אִם כֵּן מָה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה? לֹא עָשָׂה רַבִּי אֶת הַמַּעֲשֶׂה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Dimi** would **teach** the incident in **this** way, as described above. **Rav Safra** would **teach** it in **this** slightly altered way: There was **an incident, and Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi **wished to act in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis** of the mishna. **Perata, son of Rabbi Elazar ben Perata, grandson of Rabbi Perata the Great, said before him: If** that is the case, **what advantage** is there to the **power of the court** over an ordinary person? Consequently, **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi **did not take action** according to the statement of the Rabbis.


###### Ketubot 100a:11
[Ketubot 100a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/100a:11)

לֵימָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, מָר סָבַר: טָעָה בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה — חוֹזֵר, וּמָר סָבַר: אֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Let us say that they disagree about this:** One **Sage,** Rav Dimi, **holds** that if one **erred in a matter** that appears in the **Mishna,** the decision is **revoked. And** one **Sage,** Rav Safra, **holds** that if one erred in this manner the decision **is not revoked.** This is why, in Rav Safra’s version, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi changed his mind before issuing his ruling.


###### Ketubot 100a:12
[Ketubot 100a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/100a:12)

לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא טָעָה בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה חוֹזֵר, וּמָר סָבַר הָכִי הֲוָה מַעֲשֶׂה, וּמָר סָבַר הָכִי הֲוָה מַעֲשֶׂה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this: **No, everyone** agrees that if one **erred in a matter** that appears in the **Mishna,** the decision **is revoked.** There is no fundamental dispute between them, only a disagreement as to the details of the case. One **Sage holds** that the **incident** occurred **in this** way, **and** one **Sage holds** that the **incident** occurred **in this** way.


###### Ketubot 100a:13
[Ketubot 100a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/100a:13)

אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: אַרְמַלְתָּא דְּזַבִּינָה — אַחְרָיוּת אַיַּתְמֵי. וּבֵית דִּין דְּזַבֵּין — אַחְרָיוּת אַיַּתְמֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rav Yosef said:** In the case of **a widow who sold** property to support herself or as payment of her marriage contract, the property **guarantee** rests **upon the orphans.** Therefore, if she sold liened property that was then seized from the purchasers in payment of a previous debt, the buyers are entitled to be reimbursed from the property of the orphans. **And** so too, if the **court sold** property for the same purpose, the property **guarantee** rests **upon the orphans.**


###### Ketubot 100a:14
[Ketubot 100a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/100a:14)

פְּשִׁיטָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Isn’t** this **obvious?** The widow does not sell her own property, but rather she sells property from her husband’s estate to pay off his debts to her, and so clearly the guarantee rests on his properties that now belong to the orphans.


###### Ketubot 100a:15
[Ketubot 100a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/100a:15)

אַלְמָנָה לָא אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ. כִּי אִיצְטְרִיךְ לֵיהּ, בֵּי דִינָא — מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: In truth, **it was not necessary** for Rav Yosef to mention this with regard to the **widow,** as it is clear that the property guarantee rests upon the orphans. **Where** it **was necessary for** him to mention this *halakha* was with regard to the **court. Lest you say:**