## Ketubot Daf 101b

###### Ketubot 101b:1
[Ketubot 101b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/101b:1)

בְּלָאוֹתֶיהָ קַיָּימִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
her right to **her worn clothes** that are in **existence.** She retains possession of her clothes and all of the other items that she brought with her to the marriage that have not been worn out.


###### Ketubot 101b:2
[Ketubot 101b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/101b:2)

תָּנֵי תַּנָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן: זִינְּתָה — הִפְסִידָה בְּלָאוֹתֶיהָ קַיָּימִין. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִם הִיא זִינְּתָה, כֵּלֶיהָ מִי זַנַּאי? תָּנֵי: לֹא הִפְסִידָה בְּלָאוֹתֶיהָ קַיָּימִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**The *tanna* teaches** a *baraita* **before Rav Naḥman:** A woman who **was licentious lost** her right to **her extant, worn clothes,** i.e., when they divorce, she does not keep her clothing. **He said to him: If she** was unfaithful and **engaged in sexual intercourse** with another, **were her items** also **licentious?** Certainly she is not penalized by losing her right to her property, and therefore **teach** the opposite: A woman who was licentious **has not lost** her right to **her extant worn clothes.**


###### Ketubot 101b:3
[Ketubot 101b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/101b:3)

אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: זוֹ דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מְנַחֵם סְתִימְתָּאָה, אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: זִינְּתָה — לֹא הִפְסִידָה בְּלָאוֹתֶיהָ קַיָּימִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Similarly, **Rabba bar bar Ḥana said** that **Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This** *baraita* taught by the *tanna* **is the statement of Rabbi Menaḥem, the unattributed,** as his opinion is cited in several places as the unattributed mishna. **However, the Rabbis say** that if **she was licentious, she has not lost** her right to **her extant worn clothes.**


###### Ketubot 101b:4
[Ketubot 101b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/101b:4)

אִם מִתְּחִלָּה נָשְׂאָה כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: אַיְלוֹנִית — אִשָּׁה וְאֵינָהּ אִשָּׁה, אַלְמָנָה — אִשָּׁה גְּמוּרָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches that **if, from the start, he married** her with the understanding that she is an *ailonit*, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. **Rav Huna said: An *ailonit*** is **a wife and she is not a wife,** while **a widow** who is married to a High Priest is **entirely a wife.**


###### Ketubot 101b:5
[Ketubot 101b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/101b:5)

אַיְלוֹנִית אִשָּׁה וְאֵינָהּ אִשָּׁה: הִכִּיר בָּהּ — יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה, לֹא הִכִּיר בָּהּ — אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה. אַלְמָנָה אִשָּׁה גְּמוּרָה: בֵּין הִכִּיר בָּהּ, בֵּין לֹא הִכִּיר בָּהּ — יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: **An *ailonit*** is sometimes treated as **a wife and she** is sometimes **not** treated as **a wife.** How so? If **he knew about her** that she was an *ailonit* before marrying her, **she is entitled to** payment of her **marriage contract** like any other wife. But if **he did not know about her** that she was an *ailonit* before marrying her, **she is not entitled to** payment of her **marriage contract. A widow** is **entirely** considered **a wife. Whether he knew about her** that she was a widow before marrying her **whether he did not know** this **about her, she is entitled to** payment of her **marriage contract.**


###### Ketubot 101b:6
[Ketubot 101b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/101b:6)

וְרַב יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אַחַת זוֹ וְאַחַת זוֹ אִשָּׁה וְאֵינָהּ אִשָּׁה. הִכִּיר בָּהּ — יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה, לֹא הִכִּיר בָּהּ — אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rav Yehuda says: Both the** *ailonit* and **the** widow are sometimes treated as **a wife and** sometimes **not** treated as **a wife.** Even in the case of a widow who marries a High Priest, if **he knew about her** that she was a widow before marrying her, **she is entitled to** payment of her **marriage contract.** But if **he did not know about her** that she was a widow, **she is not entitled to** payment of her **marriage contract.**


###### Ketubot 101b:7
[Ketubot 101b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/101b:7)

מֵיתִיבִי: כְּנָסָהּ בְּחֶזְקַת שֶׁהִיא כֵּן, וְנִמְצֵאת שֶׁהִיא כֵּן — יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה. הָא סְתָמָא — אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**The Gemara raises an objection** to Rav Huna’s statement from a *baraita*: If **he married** the woman **with the presumption that she is so,** that she has some deficiency or that she is forbidden to him, **and it is found that she is so** as he thought from the start, then **she is entitled to** payment of her **marriage contract.** One can infer from here: If he married her **without specification,** and it turns out that she has a deficiency or that she is forbidden to him, **she is not entitled to** payment of her **marriage contract.**


###### Ketubot 101b:8
[Ketubot 101b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/101b:8)

לָא תֵּימָא: הָא סְתָמָא אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה, אֶלָּא אֵימָא: כְּנָסָהּ בְּחֶזְקַת שֶׁאֵינָהּ כֵּן, וְנִמְצֵאת שֶׁהִיא כֵּן — אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **Do not say** this implies **that** if he married her **without specification she is not entitled to** payment of her **marriage contract. Rather, say** the following inference: If **he married her with the presumption that she is not so and it is found that she is so, she is not entitled to** payment of her **marriage contract.**


###### Ketubot 101b:9
[Ketubot 101b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/101b:9)

אֲבָל סְתָמָא מַאי — אִית לַהּ, אַדְּתָנֵי בְּחֶזְקַת שֶׁהִיא כֵּן וְנִמְצֵאת שֶׁהִיא כֵּן יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה, לַשְׁמְעִינַן סְתָמָא, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן הָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But** if he married her **without specification, what** would the *halakha* be? The *halakha* would be that **she is entitled** to payment of her marriage contract. If that is the case, instead **of teaching** the case where he married her **with the presumption that she is so and she is found to be so** and **she is entitled to** payment of her **marriage contract, let him teach us** the case where he marries her **without specification.** If in a case where he marries her without specification she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract, then **all the more so** in **this** case, where he marries her knowingly, she must be entitled to it.


###### Ketubot 101b:10
[Ketubot 101b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/101b:10)

וְעוֹד, תָּנֵי: כְּנָסָהּ בְּיָדוּעַ וְנִמְצֵאת בְּיָדוּעַ — יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה, כְּנָסָהּ סְתָם — אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה. תְּיוּבְתָּא דְרַב הוּנָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And further,** it **is taught** explicitly in another *baraita*: If **he married her knowing** that she has a deficiency, **and it is found** that she does have the deficiency **as was known, she is entitled to** payment of her **marriage contract.** If he married her **without specification, she is not entitled to** payment of her **marriage contract.** This is **a conclusive refutation of** the opinion of **Rav Huna.**


###### Ketubot 101b:11
[Ketubot 101b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/101b:11)

רַב הוּנָא מַתְנִיתִין אַטְעִיתֵיהּ. הוּא סָבַר: מִדְּקָא מְפַלֵּיג בְּאַיְלוֹנִית וְלָא קָמְפַלֵּיג בְּאַלְמָנָה, מִכְּלָל דְּאַלְמָנָה אֲפִילּוּ בִּסְתָמָא נָמֵי אִית לַהּ, וְלָא הִיא: כִּי קָתָנֵי לַהּ לְאַלְמָנָה, אַפְּלוּגְתָּא דְּאַיְלוֹנִית קָאֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: **Rav Huna was misled by** the language of **the mishna** and made an inference that caused him to say something that is not in keeping with the *halakha*. **He thought that since** the mishna **differentiates** between a case where the husband was aware of her situation and a case where he was not aware **with** regard to **an *ailonit*, but** the mishna **does not differentiate with** regard to **a widow, by inference** one can say **that** with regard to **a widow, even where** one merely marries her without knowing that she is a widow, **she is entitled** to payment of her marriage contract. In truth, however, **that is not so. When** the mishna **teaches** the *halakha* **of the widow, it** is based **on the differentiation** stated **with** regard to **the *ailonit*.** The mishna intended for the distinction between whether the husband was aware of her situation before the marriage, which was stated in the case of an *ailonit*, to apply in the case of the widow as well.


###### Ketubot 101b:12
[Ketubot 101b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/101b:12)

**הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ אַלְמָנָה נִיזּוֹנֶת**


###### Ketubot 101b:13
[Ketubot 101b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/101b:13)

**הַנּוֹשֵׂא אֶת הָאִשָּׁה** וּפָסְקָה עִמּוֹ כְּדֵי שֶׁיָּזוּן אֶת בִּתָּהּ חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים — חַיָּיב לְזוּנָהּ חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** **One who marries a woman, and she stipulated with him that he would sustain her daughter** from another man for **five years, is obligated to sustain her** daughter for **five years.**


###### Ketubot 101b:14
[Ketubot 101b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/101b:14)

נִיסֵּת לְאַחֵר, וּפָסְקָה עִמּוֹ כְּדֵי שֶׁיָּזוּן אֶת בִּתָּהּ חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים חַיָּיב לְזוּנָהּ חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים. לֹא יֹאמַר הָרִאשׁוֹן: לִכְשֶׁתָּבֹא אֶצְלִי אֱזוּנָהּ, אֶלָּא מוֹלִיךְ לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹתֶיהָ לַמָּקוֹם שֶׁאִמָּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
If, in the course of those five years they were divorced and the woman **was married to another** man, **and she stipulated with him that he would sustain her daughter** for **five years, he** too **is obligated to sustain her** for **five years. The first** husband **may not say: When she comes to me, I will sustain her. Rather, he brings her sustenance to her, to the place where her mother** lives.


###### Ketubot 101b:15
[Ketubot 101b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/101b:15)

וְכֵן לֹא יֹאמְרוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם ״הֲרֵי אָנוּ זָנִין אוֹתָהּ כְּאֶחָד״, אֶלָּא אֶחָד זָנָה, וְאֶחָד נוֹתֵן לָהּ דְּמֵי מְזוֹנוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And likewise, both of them may not** jointly **say: We will sustain** the girl **as one** in a partnership. **Rather, one sustains her,** providing her with food, while **the other gives her the monetary** value **of the sustenance.**


###### Ketubot 101b:16
[Ketubot 101b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/101b:16)

נִיסֵּת — הַבַּעַל נוֹתֵן לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת, וְהֵן נוֹתְנִין לָהּ דְּמֵי מְזוֹנוֹת. מֵתוּ — בְּנוֹתֵיהֶן נִיזּוֹנוֹת מִנְּכָסִים בְּנֵי חוֹרִין, וְהִיא נִיזּוֹנֶת מִנְּכָסִים מְשׁוּעְבָּדִים, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא כְּבַעֲלַת חוֹב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
If the daughter **was married** during this period, her **husband provides her** with the **sustenance** customarily provided by a husband for his wife, **and** the two men obligated to sustain her due to agreements with her mother **provide her with the monetary value of the sustenance.** If the two husbands of the mother **died, their daughters are sustained from unsold property, and she,** their wife’s daughter, whom they agreed to sustain, **is sustained** even **from liened property** that was sold. This is **due to** the fact **that her** legal status is **like** that of **a creditor,** given that he is contractually obligated to support her.


###### Ketubot 101b:17
[Ketubot 101b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/101b:17)

הַפִּקְּחִים הָיוּ כּוֹתְבִים: עַל מְנָת שֶׁאָזוּן אֶת בִּתֵּךְ חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים כׇּל זְמַן שֶׁאַתְּ עִמִּי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**The perspicacious** ones **would write** an explicit stipulation into the agreement: I agree **on the condition that I will sustain your daughter for five years** only **as long as you are with me.** Then they would not be obligated to sustain a girl who is not their daughter when they are no longer married to the girl’s mother.


###### Ketubot 101b:18
[Ketubot 101b:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/101b:18)

**גְּמָ׳** אִתְּמַר: הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״חַיָּיב אֲנִי לְךָ מָנֶה״. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: חַיָּיב, וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: פָּטוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** **It was stated** with regard to **one who says to another: I am obligated to** pay **you one hundred dinars,** that **Rabbi Yoḥanan said:** He is **obligated** to pay, **and Reish Lakish said:** He is **exempt.**


###### Ketubot 101b:19
[Ketubot 101b:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/101b:19)

הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִי דְּאָמַר לְהוּ ״אַתֶּם עֵדַיי״, מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ דְּקָפָטַר! אִי דְּלָא אָמַר לְהוּ ״אַתֶּם עֵדַיי״, מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן דְּקָמְחַיֵּיב?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara seeks to clarify: **What are the circumstances** of this case? **If he said to** the people present: **You are my witnesses, what is the reasoning of Reish Lakish, who exempts** him from payment? He confessed before witnesses that he owes the money. **If he did not say to them: You are my witnesses, what is the reasoning of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who obligates** him to pay?


###### Ketubot 101b:20
[Ketubot 101b:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/101b:20)

לְעוֹלָם דְּלָא קָאָמַר לְהוּ ״אַתֶּם עֵדַיי״, וְהָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ ״חַיָּיב אֲנִי לְךָ מָנֶה בִּשְׁטָר״. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: חַיָּיב — אַלִּימָא מִילְּתָא דִשְׁטָרָא כְּמַאן דְּאָמַר לְהוּ ״אַתֶּם עֵדִים״ דָּמֵי. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: פָּטוּר, לָא אַלִּימָא מִילְּתָא דִשְׁטָרָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **Actually,** it is a case **where he did not say to** those present: **You are my witnesses.** However, **here we are dealing with** a case **where he said to** the other: **I am obligated to** give **you one hundred dinars,** and he did so **in a contract,** i.e., he gave him an unsigned contract in which he stated that he is obligated to give him one hundred dinars. **Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is obligated** to pay, since his **word** given through **a contract is** legally **as authoritative as one who said to** the bystanders: **You are my witnesses. Reish Lakish said: He is exempt** from payment, because his **word** given through **a contract is** legally **not** sufficiently **authoritative** to be considered a bona fide admission.


###### Ketubot 101b:21
[Ketubot 101b:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/101b:21)

תְּנַן: הַנּוֹשֵׂא אֶת הָאִשָּׁה וּפָסְקָה עִמּוֹ לָזוּן אֶת בִּתָּהּ חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים, חַיָּיב לְזוּנָהּ חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים. מַאי לָאו כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara presents a challenge to the opinion of Reish Lakish. **We learned** in the mishna: **One who marries a woman, and she stipulated with him** that he is obligated **to sustain her daughter** for **five years, is obligated to sustain her** for **five years. What, is it not** that the mishna is discussing **a case like this,** where he gave her a contract that lacks proper signatures and it is nevertheless legally binding, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan? If you say otherwise, where is the novelty in the teaching of the mishna?