## Ketubot Daf 102b

###### Ketubot 102b:1
[Ketubot 102b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/102b:1)

כִּי פְּלִיגִי אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן כְּרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ — עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל הָתָם אֶלָּא דְּשָׁיֵיךְ לֵיהּ לְשִׁיעְבּוּדָא דְאוֹרָיְיתָא, אֲבָל הָכָא לָא שָׁיֵיךְ שִׁיעְבּוּדָא דְאוֹרָיְיתָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**When they disagree, it is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Yoḥanan** stated his ruling **in accordance with** the simple interpretation of the opinion of **Rabbi Yishmael. And Reish Lakish** holds that **Rabbi Yishmael states** his opinion **only there,** in the case of the guarantor, **which relates to an obligation of Torah** law, since a guarantor is obligated by Torah law to pay. **But here,** where the case **does not relate** to **an obligation of Torah** law, as the man did not owe any money until he accepted this obligation upon himself, even Rabbi Yishmael would exempt him from paying.


###### Ketubot 102b:2
[Ketubot 102b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/102b:2)

גּוּפָא, אָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר רַב: ״כַּמָּה אַתָּה נוֹתֵן לְבִנְךָ?״, ״כָּךְ וְכָךְ״. ״וְכַמָּה אַתָּה נוֹתֵן לְבִתְּךָ?״, ״כָּךְ וְכָךְ״. עָמְדוּ וְקִידְּשׁוּ קָנוּ, הֵן הֵן הַדְּבָרִים הַנִּקְנִים בַּאֲמִירָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara continues to analyze **the** matter **itself** mentioned earlier: **Rav Giddel said** that **Rav said:** When two families negotiate the terms of marriage for their respective children and one side says to the other: **How much do you give your son?** And the second side answers: **Such and such** amount. **How much do you give your daughter?** And the first side responds: **Such and such** amount. Then, if the son and daughter **arose and performed the betrothal,** all of these obligations are **acquired** and therefore binding. **These are** among **the things that are acquired through words** alone, without the need for an additional act of acquisition. The mishna is referring to a document that records such an agreement.


###### Ketubot 102b:3
[Ketubot 102b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/102b:3)

אָמַר רָבָא: מִסְתַּבְּרָא מִילְּתָא דְּרַב בְּבִתּוֹ נַעֲרָה — דְּקָא מָטֵי הֲנָאָה לִידֵיהּ, אֲבָל בּוֹגֶרֶת דְּלָא מָטֵי הֲנָאָה לִידֵיהּ — לָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said: Rav’s statement is reasonable in** a case of a father **whose daughter** is **a young woman, since** the father **derives benefit** from this betrothal. The money given by the groom for the betrothal, as well as the rights to the bride’s marriage contract, belong to the father of the bride. Consequently, he accepts through verbal agreement alone the obligation to pay the money he specified. **However,** in the case of **a grown woman, where the** father **does not derive benefit** from the betrothal because the rights to the betrothal money and marriage contract belong to the woman herself, **no,** the father does not become obligated to pay the money he specified through verbal agreement alone.


###### Ketubot 102b:4
[Ketubot 102b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/102b:4)

וְהָאֱלֹהִים! אָמַר רַב: אֲפִילּוּ בּוֹגֶרֶת. דְּאִי לָא תֵּימָא הָכִי, אֲבִי הַבֵּן מַאי הֲנָאָה אֲתָא לִידֵיהּ? אֶלָּא בְּהַהִיא הֲנָאָה דְּקָמִיחַתְּנִי אַהֲדָדֵי גָּמְרִי וּמַקְנִי לַהֲדָדֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rava continues: **But by God! Rav said** his ruling **even** with regard to **a grown woman, as, if you do not say so,** in the case of **the father of the groom, what** monetary **benefit does he derive** from the betrothal? **Rather,** it must be explained that **in** exchange for **that benefit,** i.e., **that** the groom and bride **marry each other,** the fathers **fully transfer the rights** to the respective payments **to each other.**


###### Ketubot 102b:5
[Ketubot 102b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/102b:5)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: דְּבָרִים הַלָּלוּ נִיתְּנוּ לִיכָּתֵב, אוֹ לֹא נִיתְּנוּ לִיכָּתֵב? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לֹא נִיתְּנוּ לִיכָּתֵב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Are these matters,** i.e., verbal agreements concerning an upcoming marriage, **allowed to be written** down afterward in a proper contract, **or** are they **not allowed to be written** down afterward in a proper contract? Rav Ashi **said to him: They are not allowed to be written** down.


###### Ketubot 102b:6
[Ketubot 102b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/102b:6)

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: הַפִּקְחִין הָיוּ כּוֹתְבִין ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאָזוּן אֶת בִּתֵּךְ חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים כׇּל זְמַן שֶׁאַתְּ עִמִּי״! מַאי ״כּוֹתְבִין״ — אוֹמְרִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Ravina **raised an objection to** this from the mishna: **The perspicacious** ones **would write** an explicit stipulation into the agreement: I agree **on the condition that I will sustain your daughter for five years** only **as long as you are with me.** This indicates that one may document these verbal agreements. Rav Ashi responded: **What** is the meaning of the term **write** in this case? It means **say.**


###### Ketubot 102b:7
[Ketubot 102b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/102b:7)

וְקָרֵי לֵיהּ לַאֲמִירָה כְּתִיבָה? אִין, וְהָתְנַן: הַכּוֹתֵב לְאִשְׁתּוֹ ״דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִּנְכָסַיִיךְ״, וְתָנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשְׁתּוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Ravina continued to ask: **Does** the *tanna* **refer to saying** as **writing?** Rav Ashi replied: **Yes. And so we learned** in the mishna (83a): **One who writes to his wife: I have no legal** dealings **or involvement in your properties, and Rabbi Ḥiyya taught** in explanation, that it means: **One who says to his wife.** This proves that verbal agreements are sometimes referred to in the Mishna as writing.


###### Ketubot 102b:8
[Ketubot 102b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/102b:8)

תָּא שְׁמַע: אֵין כּוֹתְבִין שְׁטָרֵי אֵירוּסִין וְנִשּׂוּאִין אֶלָּא מִדַּעַת שְׁנֵיהֶם. הָא מִדַּעַת שְׁנֵיהֶם כּוֹתְבִין. מַאי לָאו שְׁטָרֵי פְסִיקָתָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Come** and **hear** a proof from the following mishna (*Bava Batra* 167b): **One writes documents of betrothal and marriage only with the consent of both of them.** It may be derived from here that **with the consent of both of them, one** may **write** the documents. **What, is it not** that this mishna is discussing **documents of stipulation** that specify the agreements accepted by each side before the marriage?


###### Ketubot 102b:9
[Ketubot 102b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/102b:9)

לָא, שְׁטָרֵי אֵירוּסִין מַמָּשׁ. כִּדְרַב פָּפָּא וְרַב שֵׁרֵבְיָא. דְּאִיתְּמַר: כְּתָבוֹ לִשְׁמָהּ, וְשֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעְתָּהּ — רַבָּה וְרָבִינָא אָמְרִי: מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, רַב פָּפָּא וְרַב שֵׁרֵבְיָא אָמְרִי: אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this: **No,** the discussion concerns **actual betrothal documents.** In other words, in a case where a man betroths a woman by giving her a document that states: You are hereby betrothed to me, the document must be written with the consent of both the man and the woman, **in accordance with** the opinions of **Rav Pappa and Rav Sherevya. As it was stated:** If the husband **wrote** a betrothal document **for the sake of** a specific woman and gave it to her, **but** he wrote it **without her consent, Rabba and Ravina say: She is betrothed** to this man. **Rav Pappa and Rav Sherevya say: She is not betrothed.**


###### Ketubot 102b:10
[Ketubot 102b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/102b:10)

תָּא שְׁמַע: מֵתוּ — בְּנוֹתֵיהֶן נִיזּוֹנוֹת מִנְּכָסִים בְּנֵי חוֹרִין, וְהִיא נִיזּוֹנֶת מִנְּכָסִים מְשׁוּעְבָּדִים, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא כְּבַעֲלַת חוֹב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests further: **Come** and **hear** another proof that verbal agreements may be written down, based upon the mishna: If the two husbands **died, their daughters are sustained from unsold property, and she,** their wife’s daughter, whom they agreed to sustain for five years, **is sustained** even **from liened property** that was sold. This is **due to** the fact **that her** legal status is **like** that of **a creditor,** given that they are contractually obligated to pay her. The fact that she is able to repossess liened property indicates that the agreement is recorded in a document.


###### Ketubot 102b:11
[Ketubot 102b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/102b:11)

הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — בְּשֶׁקָּנוּ מִיָּדוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this proof: **Here, we are dealing with** a case **where** the woman **acquired from** each husband the right to her daughter’s sustenance, i.e., they performed an act of acquisition and did not suffice with a mere verbal agreement. Consequently, the agreement may be recorded in a document.


###### Ketubot 102b:12
[Ketubot 102b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/102b:12)

אִי הָכִי, בָּנוֹת נָמֵי! בְּשֶׁקָּנוּ לָזוֹ וְלֹא קָנוּ לָזוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **If that is so,** that a proper mode of acquisition was employed, then let the husbands’ own **daughters also** repossess liened properties that were sold. The Gemara answers: The case is such **where they acquired** the right to receive sustenance **for this** daughter of the wife, **and they did not acquire** this right **for that** daughter, i.e., they did not perform an act of acquisition confirming their obligations to provide sustenance for their own daughters.


###### Ketubot 102b:13
[Ketubot 102b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/102b:13)

וּמַאי פַּסְקָא? אִיהִי דַּהֲוַאי בִּשְׁעַת קִנְיָן — מַהֲנֵי לַהּ קִנְיָן, בָּנוֹת דְּלָא הֲווֹ בִּשְׁעַת קִנְיָן — לָא מַהֲנֵי לְהוּ קִנְיָן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What** makes it **necessary** to say that the case is one in which an acquisition was made on behalf of the wife’s daughter and not on behalf of the husbands’ own daughters? The Gemara answers: **She,** the wife’s daughter from a previous marriage, **was present at the time of the transaction** when her mother was wed. Consequently, **for her the transaction is effective.** With regard to the **daughters** of the husbands, **who** were born after their parents’ marriage and **were not present at the time of the transaction, for them the transaction is not effective.**


###### Ketubot 102b:14
[Ketubot 102b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/102b:14)

מִי לָא עָסְקִינַן דַּהֲוַאי בִּשְׁעַת קִנְיָן, וְהֵיכִי דָּמֵי — כְּגוֹן דְּגָרְשַׁהּ וְאַהְדְּרַהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Are we not** also **dealing with** a situation where the husband’s daughters **were present at the time of the transaction? And what are the circumstances** that would allow for such a reality? This could occur in a situation **such as where** each one **divorced** his wife **and then took her back,** and they had a daughter from their first marriage.


###### Ketubot 102b:15
[Ketubot 102b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/102b:15)

אֶלָּא: אִיהִי דְּלֵיתַאּ בִּתְנַאי בֵּית דִּין — מַהֲנֵי לַהּ קִנְיָן, בָּנוֹת דְּאִיתַנְהוּ בִּתְנַאי בֵּית דִּין — לָא מַהֲנֵי לְהוּ קִנְיָן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** the distinction is as follows: **She,** the wife’s daughter, **is not included in the stipulation of the court** requiring a husband to support his daughters. Consequently, **for her the transaction is effective.** However, with regard to the husband’s own **daughters, who are included in the stipulation of the court, for them the transaction is not effective.**


###### Ketubot 102b:16
[Ketubot 102b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/102b:16)

מִגְרָע גָּרְעִי? אֶלָּא: בְּנוֹתָיו הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא — כֵּיוָן דְּאִיתַנְהוּ בִּתְנַאי בֵּית דִּין, אֵימַר צְרָרֵי אֶתְפְּסִינְהוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara wonders about this: Because they are included in the stipulation of the court **they are worse off?** On the contrary, since the stipulation of the court demands that they be supported, they should wield more power. **Rather, this is the reason** that **his** own **daughters** do not collect from liened property: **Since they are included in the stipulation of the court,** and it is therefore the norm for fathers to take care to provide their support, **say that** their father **gave them bundles of money** while he was still alive. Due to this concern, they cannot repossess liened property. However, in the case of the wife’s daughter, who is not included in the stipulation of the court, there is no concern that the husband gave her anything prior to his death.


###### Ketubot 102b:17
[Ketubot 102b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/102b:17)

לֹא יֹאמַר הָרִאשׁוֹן. אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת בַּת אֵצֶל אִמָּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ We learned in the mishna that **the first** husband **may not say** that he will provide his wife’s daughter with support only when she is with him. Rather, he must bring the sustenance to her in the place where her mother lives. **Rav Ḥisda said: That is to say** that in a case of divorce, a **daughter** lives **with her mother.**


###### Ketubot 102b:18
[Ketubot 102b:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/102b:18)

מִמַּאי דְּבִגְדוֹלָה עָסְקִינַן? דִּלְמָא בִּקְטַנָּה עָסְקִינַן, וּמִשּׁוּם מַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁהָיָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **From where** do we know that **we are dealing with** a case **of an adult woman** and there is a general guideline that in cases of divorce, a girl lives with her mother? **Perhaps we are dealing with** a case of **a minor girl, and** she lives with her mother because of concern for her safety, **due to an incident that occurred.**


###### Ketubot 102b:19
[Ketubot 102b:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/102b:19)

דְּתַנְיָא: מִי שֶׁמֵּת וְהִנִּיחַ בֵּן קָטָן לְאִמּוֹ, יוֹרְשֵׁי הָאָב אוֹמְרִים: יְהֵא גָּדֵל אֶצְלֵנוּ, וְאִמּוֹ אוֹמֶרֶת: יְהֵא בְּנִי גָּדֵל אֶצְלִי — מַנִּיחִין אוֹתוֹ אֵצֶל אִמּוֹ, וְאֵין מַנִּיחִין אוֹתוֹ אֵצֶל רָאוּי לְיוֹרְשׁוֹ. מַעֲשֶׂה הָיָה וּשְׁחָטוּהוּ עֶרֶב הַפֶּסַח!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**As it is taught** in a *baraita*: In the case of **one who died and left a minor son to** the care of **his mother,** and **the heirs of the father say:** The son **should grow up with us, and his mother says: My son should grow up with me,** the *halakha* is that **one leaves** the child **with his mother, and one does not leave** the child **with** one who is **fit to inherit** from **him,** i.e., the father’s heirs. **An incident occurred,** and the boy lived with his father’s heirs, **and they slaughtered him on the eve of Passover.** So too, a minor girl is not left in the care of those who are obligated to sustain her and who have a financial interest in her demise.


###### Ketubot 102b:20
[Ketubot 102b:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/102b:20)

אִם כֵּן לִיתְנֵי לְמָקוֹם שֶׁהִיא,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **If that is so, let** the mishna **teach** that the husband must bring the sustenance **to the place where she,** the daughter, is located.