## Ketubot Daf 15a

###### Ketubot 15a:1
[Ketubot 15a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/15a:1)

בִּקְרוֹנוֹת שֶׁל צִיפּוֹרִי הָיָה מַעֲשֶׂה, וְכִדְרַבִּי אַמֵּי. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי: וְהוּא שֶׁהָיְתָה סִיעָה שֶׁל בְּנֵי אָדָם כְּשֵׁרִין עוֹבֶרֶת לְשָׁם, וְכִדְרַבִּי יַנַּאי. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי: נִבְעֶלֶת בִּקְרוֹנוֹת כְּשֵׁרָה לַכְּהוּנָּה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The **incident** transpired **among the wagons [*keronot*]** in the marketplace **of Tzippori** on the market day, and this *halakha* is **in accordance with** the statement of **Rabbi Ami, as Rabbi Ami said: And this is** the ruling only in a case **where there was a contingent of men of unflawed lineage passing there.** Due to the fact that both the lineage of the majority of the people of the city where the girl was raped and the lineage of the majority of the passersby is unflawed, the rape is attributed to a man of unflawed lineage. **And** this ruling is **in accordance with** the statement of **Rabbi Yannai, as Rabbi Yannai said: If she engaged in intercourse in the wagons, she is fit to** marry a member of the **priesthood.**


###### Ketubot 15a:2
[Ketubot 15a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/15a:2)

בִּקְרוֹנוֹת סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ? אֶלָּא נִבְעֶלֶת בִּשְׁעַת קְרוֹנוֹת, כְּשֵׁרָה לַכְּהוּנָּה. אֲבָל פֵּירַשׁ אֶחָד מִצִּיפּוֹרִי וּבָעַל — הַוָּלָד שְׁתוּקִי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: Does it **enter your mind** to say that the woman was raped **in the wagons,** in the crowded area of the marketplace where business is conducted? **Rather,** Rabbi Yannai is saying that if **she** was forced to **engage in intercourse at the time of the wagons,** i.e., when the convoys pass, **she is fit to** marry a member of the **priesthood. However,** if **one** individual, whose lineage is unknown, **left Tzippori and engaged in intercourse** with a woman, **the child is a *shetuki*** and deemed unfit to marry into the priesthood even though the majority of the inhabitants of city are of unflawed lineage.


###### Ketubot 15a:3
[Ketubot 15a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/15a:3)

כִּי הָא דְּכִי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אָמַר זְעֵירִי, אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ, אָמַר זְעֵירִי אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: הוֹלְכִין אַחַר רוֹב הָעִיר, וְאֵין הוֹלְכִין אַחַר רוֹב סִיעָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara notes: That is **similar** to **this** statement **that when Rav Dimi came** from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, **Ze’eiri said** that **Rabbi Ḥanina said, and some say** directly that **Ze’eiri said** that **Rabbi Ḥanina said: One follows the** flawed lineage of the **majority of** the people in **the city and one does not follow** the unflawed lineage of **the majority of the** traveling **contingent,** and the woman who engaged in intercourse with a member of the itinerant contingent is deemed unfit to marry into the priesthood.


###### Ketubot 15a:4
[Ketubot 15a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/15a:4)

כְּלַפֵּי לְיָיא?! הָנֵי נָיְידִי, וְהָנֵי קְבִיעִי וְקָיְימִי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **On the contrary [*kelapei layya*],** the opposite is logical. **These** members of the contingent **are moving,** and in that case the principle is that one follows the majority. **And these** people of the city **are fixed and standing** in one place, and in that case the principle is that even if the lineage of the majority is unflawed, the uncertainty is treated as if it were equally balanced.


###### Ketubot 15a:5
[Ketubot 15a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/15a:5)

אֶלָּא: הוֹלְכִין אַחַר רוֹב הָעִיר, וְהוּא דְּאִיכָּא רוֹב סִיעָה בַּהֲדַהּ, וְאֵין הוֹלְכִין אַחַר רוֹב הָעִיר גְּרֵידְתָּא, וְלֹא אַחַר רוֹב סִיעָה גְּרֵידְתָּא. מַאי טַעְמָא? גְּזֵרָה רוֹב סִיעָה אַטּוּ רוֹב הָעִיר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** this is what Rabbi Yannai is saying: **One follows the** lineage of the **majority of the city, and that is** specifically in a case **where there is a majority** of men of unflawed lineage in the passing **contingent** together **with** the city’s unflawed majority. In that case, from both perspectives the intercourse can be attributed to a man of unflawed lineage. **However, neither does one follow the** unflawed lineage of the **majority of the city alone, nor** does he **follow the** unflawed lineage of the **majority of the contingent alone. What is the reason** that one does not follow the lineage of the majority of the moving contingent? It is because the Sages issued **a decree** not to follow **the majority of the contingent due to the majority of the city,** where one does not follow the majority.


###### Ketubot 15a:6
[Ketubot 15a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/15a:6)

וְרוֹב הָעִיר נָמֵי, אִי דְּקָא אָזְלִי אִינְהוּ לְגַבַּהּ: כֹּל דְּפָרֵישׁ — מֵרוּבָּא פָּרֵישׁ! לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּקָא אָזְלָא אִיהִי לְגַבַּיְיהוּ, דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ קָבוּעַ, וְאָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: כׇּל קָבוּעַ כְּמֶחֱצָה עַל מֶחֱצָה דָּמֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But** aren’t there cases where one follows **the majority of the city as well,** as, **if** one of the residents of the city **goes** out of the city **to her** and rapes her, the principle is: The legal status of **any** item **that is separated** from the group is that of one **separated from the majority?** Therefore, there is no reason to issue a decree. The Gemara answers: The decree is **necessary only** due to a case **where she went** into the city **to them,** in which case the rapist **is** an indistinguishable member of a **fixed** set, **and Rabbi Zeira said:** The legal status of uncertainty with regard to **any** item **fixed** in its place is that of an uncertainty that is **equally balanced,** and one does not follow the majority.


###### Ketubot 15a:7
[Ketubot 15a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/15a:7)

וּמִי בָּעֵינַן תְּרֵי רוּבֵּי? וְהָתַנְיָא: תֵּשַׁע חֲנוּיוֹת כּוּלָּן מוֹכְרוֹת בְּשַׂר שְׁחוּטָה, וְאַחַת מוֹכֶרֶת בְּשַׂר נְבֵלָה, וְלָקַח מֵאַחַת מֵהֶן וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ מֵאֵי זֶה מֵהֶן לָקַח — סְפֵיקוֹ אָסוּר. וּבַנִּמְצָא — הַלֵּךְ אַחַר הָרוֹב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara questions the statement of Rabbi Ami: **And do we require two majorities** to overcome the minority? **Isn’t it taught** in a *baraita*: With regard to **nine stores** in a city, **all of which sell** kosher **meat** from **a slaughtered** animal, **and one** other store that **sells meat** from unslaughtered **animal carcasses, and** a person **bought** meat **from one of** the stores **and he does not know from which** store **he bought** the meat, in this case of **uncertainty,** the meat **is prohibited.** The legal status of uncertainty with regard to any item fixed in its place is that of an uncertainty that is equally balanced, and one does not follow the majority. This *baraita* continues: **And in** the case of meat **found** in the street, outside the stores, **follow the majority** of stores that sell kosher meat. In other words, the meat is kosher.


###### Ketubot 15a:8
[Ketubot 15a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/15a:8)

וְכִי תֵּימָא בְּשֶׁאֵין דַּלְתוֹת מְדִינָה נְעוּלוֹת, דְּקָא אָתֵי לַהּ רוּבָּא מֵעָלְמָא — וְהָא אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁדַּלְתוֹת מְדִינָה נְעוּלוֹת! מַעֲלָה עָשׂוּ בְּיוּחֲסִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you would say** that one follows the majority only in a case **where the gates of the city are unlocked, where** the meat could have **come** to the city **from the majority** of kosher meat **outside** the city and only by combining that majority with the majority of kosher meat stores inside the city, creating two majorities, is the meat ruled kosher; **but didn’t Rabbi Zeira say: Even if the city gates are locked,** one follows the majority and the meat is kosher even without a double majority? The Gemara answers: The Sages require two majorities only in cases such as establishing the identity of the child’s father, because they **established a higher standard with regard to** matters of **lineage.** However, in other cases, e.g., concerning kosher meat, a single majority is sufficient.


###### Ketubot 15a:9
[Ketubot 15a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/15a:9)

גּוּפָא, אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: כׇּל קָבוּעַ — כְּמֶחֱצָה עַל מֶחֱצָה דָּמֵי, בֵּין לְקוּלָּא בֵּין לְחוּמְרָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ In terms of the matter **itself, Rabbi Zeira said:** The legal status of uncertainty with regard to **any** item **fixed** in its place is that of an uncertainty that is **equally balanced, both** when it leads to **leniency,** e.g., in a case where, were one to follow the majority, the ruling would be stringent, and when it leads to **stringency,** e.g., in a case where, were one to follow the majority, the ruling would be lenient.


###### Ketubot 15a:10
[Ketubot 15a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/15a:10)

מְנָא לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי זֵירָא הָא? אִילֵּימָא מִתֵּשַׁע חֲנוּיוֹת, כּוּלָּן מוֹכְרוֹת בְּשַׂר שְׁחוּטָה, וְאַחַת בְּשַׂר נְבֵלָה, וְלָקַח מֵאַחַת מֵהֶן וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ מֵאֵיזֶה מֵהֶן לָקַח — סְפֵיקוֹ אָסוּר, וּבַנִּמְצָא — הַלֵּךְ אַחַר הָרוֹב; הָתָם לְחוּמְרָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **From where does Rabbi Zeira** learn that the legal status of uncertainty with regard to any item fixed in its place is that of an uncertainty that is equally balanced, both when it leads to leniency and when it leads to stringency? **If we say** that it is derived **from** the case of **nine stores** in a city, **all of which sell** kosher **meat** from **a slaughtered** animal, **and one** other store that sells **meat** from unslaughtered **animal carcasses, and** a person **bought** meat **from one of** the stores **and he does not know from which** store **he bought** the meat, in this case of **uncertainty** the meat **is prohibited. And in the** case of meat **found** in the street, outside the stores, **follow the majority** of stores that sell kosher meat, and therefore the meat would be kosher. **There,** in the first case, ruling it an equally balanced uncertainty is **a stringency,** as there is a majority of kosher stores.


###### Ketubot 15a:11
[Ketubot 15a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/15a:11)

אֶלָּא מִתִּשְׁעָה צְפַרְדְּעִים וְשֶׁרֶץ אֶחָד בֵּינֵיהֶם, וְנָגַע בְּאֶחָד מֵהֶן, וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ בְּאֵיזֶה מֵהֶן נָגַע — סְפֵיקוֹ טָמֵא. הָתָם נָמֵי לְחוּמְרָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** Rabbi Zeira learns that *halakha* **from** a different *baraita*. If there were **nine frogs,** which is a creeping animal that does not impart ritual impurity while alive or when dead, **and one** ritually impure **creeping animal,** whose carcass imparts ritual impurity, **among them, and** a person **touched one of the** ten creatures, **and he does not know which of them he touched,** in this case of **uncertainty** the person is **ritually impure. There too,** ruling it an equally balanced uncertainty is **a stringency,** as the majority of the creeping animals do not impart impurity.


###### Ketubot 15a:12
[Ketubot 15a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/15a:12)

אֶלָּא מִתִּשְׁעָה שְׁרָצִים וּצְפַרְדֵּעַ אֶחָד בֵּינֵיהֶם, וְנָגַע בְּאֶחָד מֵהֶן, וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ בְּאֵיזֶה מֵהֶן נָגַע. בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד — סְפֵיקוֹ טָמֵא. בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים — סְפֵיקוֹ טָהוֹר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** Rabbi Zeira learns that *halakha* **from** the continuation of that *baraita*. If there are **nine creeping animals,** whose carcasses impart ritual impurity, **and one frog among them, and** a person **touched one of them, and he does not know which of them he touched,** if it was **in the private domain,** in this case of **uncertainty** the person is **ritually impure,** as all cases of uncertainty with regard to ritual impurity are ruled impure in the private domain. This is derived from the case of *sota*. However, **in the public domain,** in that case of **uncertainty** the person is **ritually pure.** Although contact with a creeping animal from the majority would render him ritually impure, since the uncertainty is with regard to a fixed group, its legal status is that of an equally balanced uncertainty, and in the public domain he is ritually pure. Rabbi Zeira learns that *halakha* from this case of leniency.


###### Ketubot 15a:13
[Ketubot 15a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/15a:13)

וּמִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא מְנָא לַן? אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְאָרַב לוֹ וְקָם עָלָיו״, עַד שֶׁיִּתְכַּוֵּין לוֹ. וְרַבָּנַן? אָמְרִי דְּבֵי רַבִּי יַנַּאי: פְּרָט לְזוֹרֵק אֶבֶן לְגָו.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
After citing a tannaitic source for Rabbi Zeira’s opinion, the Gemara asks: **And from where in the Torah do we** derive that the legal status of any item fixed in its place is like that of an uncertainty that is equally balanced, both when it leads to leniency and when it leads to stringency? It is derived from **the verse** that **states** with regard to a murderer: **“And lie in wait for him, and rise up against him”** (Deuteronomy 19:11), indicating that one is liable **only** in a case **where he intends to** kill **him.** One who intended to kill one person and inadvertently killed another is exempt from punishment. **And** how do **the Rabbis,** who hold that one is liable in that case, interpret that verse? The Sages **of the school of Rabbi Yannai say:** It **excludes** the case **of** one who **throws a stone into a crowd** and did not intend to kill a specific person.


###### Ketubot 15a:14
[Ketubot 15a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/15a:14)

הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דְּאִיכָּא תִּשְׁעָה גּוֹיִם וְאֶחָד יִשְׂרָאֵל בֵּינֵיהֶם — תִּיפּוֹק לִיה דְּרוּבָּא גּוֹיִם נִינְהוּ. אִי נָמֵי, פַּלְגָא וּפַלְגָא — סְפֵק נְפָשׁוֹת לְהָקֵל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What are the circumstances** of the case where he threw the stone and is exempt? **If we say that there are nine gentiles** in the crowd **and one Jew among them,** even without the verse, **let him derive** the exemption from the fact **that they are a majority of gentiles. Alternatively,** even if we say that **half** of the ten people are considered gentiles **and half** are considered Jews, let him derive the exemption from the principle: In a case of **uncertainty** concerning a **life-threatening** situation, the *halakha* **is lenient.**


###### Ketubot 15a:15
[Ketubot 15a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/15a:15)

לָא צְרִיכָא: דְּאִיכָּא תִּשְׁעָה יִשְׂרְאֵלִים וְגוֹי אֶחָד בֵּינֵיהֶם, דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ גּוֹי קָבוּעַ, וְכׇל קָבוּעַ — כְּמֶחֱצָה עַל מֶחֱצָה דָּמֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **No,** the verse is **necessary** only in a case where **there are nine Jews and one gentile among them.** Were the ruling to follow the majority the one who threw the stone would be liable. But in that case, **because the gentile is fixed** among them, **and** the legal status of **any** item **fixed** in its place is **like** that of an uncertainty that is **equally balanced,** he is exempt, based on the principle: In a case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation, the *halakha* is lenient. Apparently, even in cases of Torah law in which the result would be a leniency, i.e., exemption from the death penalty for murder, the legal status of any item fixed in its place is like that of an uncertainty that is equally balanced.


###### Ketubot 15a:16
[Ketubot 15a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/15a:16)

אִיתְּמַר, רַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָשֵׁי אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי. וְרַב חָנָן בַּר רָבָא אָמַר רַב: הוֹרָאַת שָׁעָה הָיְתָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ With regard to the matter of following the majority in cases of lineage, it **was stated** that there is an amoraic dispute: **Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi** said that **Rav said: The *halakha*** is **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei** in the mishna, and it is permitted for the young girl who was raped to marry a priest. **And Rav Ḥanan bar Rava** said that **Rav said:** That **was a provisional edict** issued in exigent circumstances. However, typically, with regard to matters of lineage two majorities are required.


###### Ketubot 15a:17
[Ketubot 15a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/15a:17)

מֵתִיב רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: וּלְיוּחֲסִין לָא בָּעֵינַן תְּרֵי רוּבֵּי? וְהָתְנַן:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Yirmeya raised an objection** to the ruling of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi, who apparently ruled that even in cases where there is one majority the *halakha* is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei: **And in matters of lineage, do we not require two majorities,** a majority of the city’s inhabitants and a majority of the passing contingent? **But didn’t we learn** in a mishna (*Makhshirin* 2:7):