## Ketubot Daf 27b

###### Ketubot 27b:1
[Ketubot 27b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/27b:1)

מָה לִי לְשַׁקֵּר. אוֹ דִלְמָא לָא אָמְרִינַן?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Why would I lie** in so ineffectual a manner, and deem her credible? Had she wanted to lie, she could have claimed that she hid, which is a more effective claim. **Or perhaps we do not say** that principle.


###### Ketubot 27b:2
[Ketubot 27b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/27b:2)

וּמַאי שְׁנָא מֵהָהוּא מַעֲשֶׂה, דְּהָהוּא גַּבְרָא דְּאֹגַר לֵיהּ חֲמָרָא לְחַבְרֵיהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא תֵּיזִיל בְּאוֹרְחָא דִּנְהַר פְּקוֹד דְּאִיכָּא מַיָּא, זִיל בְּאוֹרְחָא דְּנַרֶשׁ דְּלֵיכָּא מַיָּא, וַאֲזַל אִיהוּ בְּאוֹרְחָא דִּנְהַר פְּקוֹד וּמִית חֲמָרָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** in **what** way **is** this **different from that incident where a certain man who rented a donkey to his colleague said to** the renter: **Do not go on the path of the Pekod River, where there is water,** and the donkey is likely to drown. **Go on the path of Neresh, where there is no water. And he went on the path** along **the Pekod River and the donkey died.**


###### Ketubot 27b:3
[Ketubot 27b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/27b:3)

אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין, בְּאוֹרְחָא דִּנְהַר פְּקוֹד אֲזַלִי, מִיהוּ לָא הֲווֹ מַיָּא. אָמַר רַבָּא: ״מָה לִי לְשַׁקֵּר״. אִי בָּעֵי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בְּאוֹרְחָא דְנַרֶשׁ אֲזַלִי. וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: ״מָה לִי לְשַׁקֵּר״ בִּמְקוֹם עֵדִים לָא אָמְרִינַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The renter **came before Rava** and **said to him: Yes, I went on the path** along **the Pekod River; however, there was no water** there. The donkey’s death was caused by other factors. **Rava said:** His claim is accepted based on the principle: **Why would I lie. If he wanted** to lie, he could have **said to him, I went on the path of Neresh. And Abaye said to** Rava: **We do not say** the principle: **Why would I lie, in a situation** where there are **witnesses.** This principle, which is a form of *miggo*, is effective only when his claim does not contradict established facts. In this case, since it is known to all that there is water on the path along the Pekod River, his claim is not accepted. Similarly, as it is an established fact that the women taken captive were certainly raped, her claim is not accepted even though it is based on a *miggo*.


###### Ketubot 27b:4
[Ketubot 27b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/27b:4)

הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! הָתָם וַדַּאי אִיכָּא עֵדִים דְּאִיכָּא מַיָּא. הָכָא, וַדַּאי אִיטַּמַּי? חֲשָׁשָׁא הוּא, וּבִמְקוֹם חֲשָׁשָׁא — אָמְרִינַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **How can** these cases **be compared? There,** in the case of the donkey, **there are certainly witnesses** capable of confirming **that there is water** along that path. **Here,** in the case of the women, is it clearly established that she was **definitely defiled? It is** merely **a concern, and in a situation** where there is merely **a concern** and not an established fact **we say** the principle: Why would I lie, and her claim is accepted.


###### Ketubot 27b:5
[Ketubot 27b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/27b:5)

אִם יֵשׁ עֵדִים, אֲפִילּוּ עֶבֶד וַאֲפִילּוּ שִׁפְחָה נֶאֱמָנִין. וַאֲפִילּוּ שִׁפְחָה דִּידַהּ מְהֵימְנָא? וּרְמִינְהִי: לֹא תִּתְיַיחֵד עִמּוֹ אֶלָּא עַל פִּי עֵדִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ We learned in the mishna: **If** they **have witnesses, even** if the witness is **a slave and even** if the witness is **a maidservant, they are deemed credible.** The Gemara asks: **And** is **even her** personal **maidservant deemed credible?** The Gemara **raises a contradiction** from a mishna (*Gittin* 73a): With regard to one who divorced his wife conditionally, and the condition was not yet fulfilled, the woman **may enter into seclusion with him only on the basis of** the presence of **witnesses,** due to the concern that they will engage in intercourse. If between the drafting of a bill of divorce and its taking effect the husband and wife enter into seclusion together, the bill of divorce must be discarded and a new document drafted in its place.


###### Ketubot 27b:6
[Ketubot 27b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/27b:6)

וַאֲפִילּוּ עַל פִּי עֶבֶד וְעַל פִּי שִׁפְחָה. חוּץ מִשִּׁפְחָתָהּ, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁלִּבָּהּ גַּס בְּשִׁפְחָתָהּ! אָמַר רַב פַּפֵּי: בִּשְׁבוּיָה הֵקֵילּוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
And she may enter into seclusion **even on the basis of** the presence of **a slave and on the basis of** the presence of **a maidservant, except for her** personal **maidservant, due to** the fact **that she is accustomed to her maidservant,** and her presence will not serve as an impediment that would prevent her from engaging in intercourse. Therefore, with regard to the woman taken captive as well, the testimony of the maidservant is not accepted to establish that she was not defiled. **Rav Pappi** resolved the contradiction and **said: With regard to a captive woman,** the Sages **ruled leniently.** Because the prohibition against intercourse with a captive woman is based on the concern that she was violated, the Sages relied on the testimony of her personal maidservant.


###### Ketubot 27b:7
[Ketubot 27b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/27b:7)

רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: הָא בְּשִׁפְחָה דִּידַהּ, הָא בְּשִׁפְחָה דִּידֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Pappa** resolved the contradiction and **said: This** *halakha* in the case of conditional divorce **is** stated **with regard to her maidservant,** who is not deemed credible even in the case of a captive woman. **That** *halakha* in the case of the captive woman, where they said even the testimony of the maidservant is accepted, **is** stated **with regard to his maidservant** to whom the woman is not so accustomed, and therefore her presence serves as an impediment.


###### Ketubot 27b:8
[Ketubot 27b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/27b:8)

וְשִׁפְחָה דִּידַהּ לָא מְהֵימְנָא? הָא קָתָנֵי: אֵין אָדָם מֵעִיד עַל עַצְמוֹ, הָא שִׁפְחָה דִּידַהּ מְהֵימְנָא! שִׁפְחָתָהּ נָמֵי כְּעַצְמָהּ דָּמֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And is her maidservant not deemed credible? But isn’t it taught** in the mishna: **A person is not deemed credible** to establish his status **by his own testimony?** From that statement it may be inferred that the woman is not deemed credible to testify about herself, **but her maidservant is deemed credible.** The Gemara answers: The legal status of **her maidservant is like her own** status. Neither is deemed credible.


###### Ketubot 27b:9
[Ketubot 27b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/27b:9)

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: הָא וְהָא בְּשִׁפְחָה דִּידַהּ, וְשִׁפְחָה מִיחְזָא חָזְיָא וְשָׁתְקָה. הָתָם דִּשְׁתִיקָתָהּ מַתִּירָתָהּ — לָא מְהֵימְנָא. הָכָא דִּשְׁתִיקָתָהּ אוֹסַרְתָּהּ — מְהֵימְנָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ashi** resolved the contradiction and **said: Both** *halakhot* **are** stated **with regard to her maidservant,** but there is a distinction between the cases. **A maidservant sees** what transpires **and is silent,** but does not testify falsely. Therefore, **there,** in the case of conditional divorce, **where** the maidservant’s **silence** with regard to whether her mistress engaged in intercourse **renders** the woman **permitted,** as it is sufficient for the maidservant to say merely: I was there, **she is not deemed credible** due to the concern lest she witnessed them engaging in intercourse and remained silent. However, **here,** in the case of the captive woman, **where** the maidservant’s **silence would render** her mistress **forbidden,** as a captive woman is presumed to have been violated and the only way to render her permitted is by saying: She was not defiled, **she is deemed credible.**


###### Ketubot 27b:10
[Ketubot 27b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/27b:10)

הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי אָתְיָא וּמְשַׁקְּרָא! תַּרְתֵּי לָא עָבְדָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Here too** there should be concern that **she will come and lie** for the benefit of her mistress. The Gemara answers: She would **not perform two** acts of dishonesty. Although there is suspicion that she will refrain from telling the truth, there is no suspicion that she will lie as well. Therefore, if she relates that her mistress was not defiled, she is deemed credible.


###### Ketubot 27b:11
[Ketubot 27b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/27b:11)

כִּי הָא דְּמָרִי בַּר אִיסַק, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ חָנָא בַּר אִיסַק, אֲתָא לֵיהּ אַחָא מִבֵּי חוֹזָאָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: פְּלוֹג לִי בְּנִכְסֵי דְּאַבָּא! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא יָדַעְנָא לָךְ. אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב חִסְדָּא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שַׁפִּיר קָאָמַר לָךְ, דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיַּכֵּר יוֹסֵף אֶת אֶחָיו וְהֵם לֹא הִכִּירֻהוּ״, מְלַמֵּד שֶׁיָּצָא בְּלֹא חֲתִימַת זָקָן וּבָא בַּחֲתִימַת זָקָן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Proof that one is not suspected of both concealing the truth and lying is cited, **as** in **that** case **of Mari bar Isak, and some say** it was **Ḥana bar Isak,** where someone claiming to be his **brother came to him from Bei Ḥoza’a,** a district located far from the Jewish population centers in Babylonia. This brother **said to him: Apportion me** a share **in my father’s property.** Mari **said to him: I do not know you.** The brother **came before Rav Ḥisda** seeking a legal remedy. Rav Ḥisda **said to him:** Your brother **is speaking well** and his response is well founded, **as it is written: “And Joseph recognized his brothers but they recognized him not”** (Genesis 42:8). This **teaches that** Joseph **left** the land of Canaan **without the trace of a beard and came** to meet his brothers **with the trace of a beard.**


###### Ketubot 27b:12
[Ketubot 27b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/27b:12)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: זִיל אַיְיתִי סָהֲדֵי דַּאֲחוּהּ אַתְּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִית לִי סָהֲדֵי, וּמִסְתְּפוּ מִינֵּיהּ, דְּגַבְרָא אַלָּמָא הוּא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ לְדִידֵיהּ: זִיל אַיְיתִינְהוּ אַתְּ דְּלָאו אֲחוּךְ הוּא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: דִּינָא הָכִי? הַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָכִי דָּאֵינְנָא לָךְ וּלְכוּלְּהוּ אַלָּמֵי חַבְרָךְ. הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי אָתוּ וּמְשַׁקְּרִי! תַּרְתֵּי לָא עָבְדִי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Ḥisda **said to him: Go bring witnesses that you are his brother. He said to** Rav Ḥisda: **I have witnesses, but they are afraid of** Mari, **who is a violent man,** and will not testify. Rav Ḥisda **said to** Mari: **Go bring witnesses that he is not your brother.** Mari **said to him: Is that the *halakha*?** Isn’t the guiding principle in cases of this sort: **The burden of proof** rests **upon the claimant?** Let the man claiming part of my inheritance bring proof supporting his claim. Rav Ḥisda **said to him: This is how I render judgment for you and for all your fellow violent** men; I place the burden of proof upon them. The Gemara asks: **Now too,** witnesses **will come and lie** in fear of Mari, and what is accomplished by requiring Mari to bring the witnesses? Apparently, one is **not** suspected of **performing two** acts of dishonesty, to both conceal the truth and to lie.


###### Ketubot 27b:13
[Ketubot 27b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/27b:13)

לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי: זוֹ עֵדוּת — אִישׁ וְאִשָּׁה, תִּינוֹק וְתִינוֹקֶת, אָבִיהָ וְאִמָּהּ, וְאָחִיהָ וַאֲחוֹתָהּ. אֲבָל לֹא בְּנָהּ וּבִתָּהּ, לֹא עַבְדָּהּ וְשִׁפְחָתָהּ. וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ: הַכֹּל נֶאֱמָנִין לְהָעִיד, חוּץ מֵהֵימֶנָּה וּבַעְלָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Let us say** that the opinions of the *amora’im* with regard to the testimony of her maidservant are **subject to** this dispute between ***tanna’im*.** It is taught in one *baraita*: **This testimony** that a captive woman was not defiled with regard to which **a man and a woman, a male child or a female child,** the woman’s **father, and her mother, and her brother, and her sister** are deemed credible, **but not her son and her daughter,** and **not her slave or maidservant. And it is taught** in **another** *baraita*: **All are deemed credible to testify** with regard a captive woman, **except for her and her husband.**


###### Ketubot 27b:14
[Ketubot 27b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/27b:14)

דְּרַב פַּפֵּי וּדְרַב אָשֵׁי תַּנָּאֵי הִיא. דְּרַב פָּפָּא [מִי] לֵימָא תַּנָּאֵי הִיא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara notes: The opinion **of Rav Pappi and** the opinion **of Rav Ashi** are certainly **subject to** the dispute between ***tanna’im*,** as they hold that her maidservant is deemed credible contrary to the first *baraita* cited. However, with regard to the opinion **of Rav Pappa,** who distinguishes between her maidservant, who is not deemed credible, and his maidservant, who is, **do we say** that **it is** subject to the dispute between ***tanna’im*?** Perhaps the *tanna* in each *baraita* holds that her maidservant is not deemed credible, and the *baraita* that deems everyone credible except for the woman and her husband could be explained in another manner, e.g., the legal status of her maidservant is like her own status.


###### Ketubot 27b:15
[Ketubot 27b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/27b:15)

אָמַר לְךָ רַב פָּפָּא: כִּי תַּנְיָא הָהִיא, בִּמְסִיחָה לְפִי תּוּמָּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara says: There is no proof that Rav Pappa’s opinion is contingent upon the tannaitic dispute, as **Rav Pappa** could have **said to you: When that** *baraita* that deems everyone credible except for the woman and her husband **is taught,** it is taught **in** a case where **she is making an unconsidered, incidental remark** in the context of a conversation about an unrelated matter. However, direct testimony of her maidservant is not accepted.


###### Ketubot 27b:16
[Ketubot 27b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/27b:16)

כִּי הָא דְּכִי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אָמַר: רַב חָנָן קַרְטִיגְנָאָה מִשְׁתַּעֵי: מַעֲשֶׂה בָּא לִפְנֵי רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי מִישְׁתַּעֵי: מַעֲשֶׂה בָּא לִפְנֵי רַבִּי בְּאָדָם אֶחָד שֶׁהָיָה מֵסִיחַ לְפִי תּוּמּוֹ, וְאָמַר: אֲנִי וְאִמִּי נִשְׁבִּינוּ לְבֵין הַגּוֹיִם. יָצָאתִי לִשְׁאוֹב מַיִם — דַּעְתִּי עַל אִמִּי, לְלַקֵּט עֵצִים — דַּעְתִּי עַל אִמִּי. וְהִשִּׂיאָהּ רַבִּי לִכְהוּנָּה עַל פִּיו.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**As** in **that** case **when Rav Dimi came** from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia; **he said** that **Rav Ḥanan of Carthage relates: An incident came before Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi** for judgment; **and some say** that **Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi relates: An incident came before Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi, **with regard to a person who was making an unconsidered, incidental remark, and said: My mother and I were taken captive among the gentiles.** When **I went out to draw water, my thoughts were about my mother; to gather wood, my thoughts were about my mother.** We were never separated. **And Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi **deemed her** fit to **marry into the priesthood on the basis** of those remarks, even though with regard to testimony about his mother, a son is disqualified as a witness. The same is true of the woman’s maidservant.


###### Ketubot 27b:17
[Ketubot 27b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/27b:17)

**מַתְנִי׳** אָמַר רַבִּי זְכַרְיָה בֶּן הַקַּצָּב: הַמָּעוֹן הַזֶּה! לֹא זָזָה יָדָהּ מִתּוֹךְ יָדִי מִשָּׁעָה שֶׁנִּכְנְסוּ גּוֹיִם לִירוּשָׁלַיִם וְעַד שֶׁיָּצְאוּ. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אֵין אָדָם מֵעִיד עַל עַצְמוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** **Rabbi Zekharya ben HaKatzav said:** I swear by **this abode** of the Divine Presence that my wife’s **hand did not move from my hand from the time that the gentiles entered Jerusalem until they left,** and I know for a fact that she was not defiled. The Sages **said to him: A person cannot testify about himself.** The legal status of one’s wife is like his own status in this regard. Therefore, your testimony is not accepted, and your wife is forbidden to you.


###### Ketubot 27b:18
[Ketubot 27b:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/27b:18)

**גְּמָ׳** תָּנָא: וְאַף עַל פִּי כֵן, יִיחֵד לָהּ בַּיִת בַּחֲצֵרוֹ, וּכְשֶׁהִיא יוֹצְאָה — יוֹצְאָה בְּרֹאשׁ בָּנֶיהָ, וּכְשֶׁהִיא נִכְנֶסֶת — נִכְנֶסֶת בְּסוֹף בָּנֶיהָ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** The *tanna* **taught** in the *Tosefta*: **And even so,** despite the fact that the Sages ruled his wife forbidden to him because he was a priest, he did not divorce her. **He designated a house in his courtyard for her,** but did not enter into seclusion with her, **and when she** would **go out** of the courtyard **she** would **go out before her sons** so that she would not be alone in the courtyard with her husband, **and when she** would **enter** the house, **she** would **enter after her sons,** for the same reason.


###### Ketubot 27b:19
[Ketubot 27b:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/27b:19)

בָּעֵי אַבָּיֵי: מַהוּ לַעֲשׂוֹת בִּגְרוּשָׁה כֵּן? הָתָם הוּא, דְּבִשְׁבוּיָה הֵקֵילּוּ, אֲבָל הָכָא — לָא, אוֹ דִלְמָא לָא שְׁנָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Abaye raises a dilemma: What is** the *halakha* regarding whether we have **to do likewise with a divorcée?** Can a priest who divorces his wife designate a house for her in the courtyard and rely on the children to ensure that the couple will not enter into seclusion? **Is it** specifically **there,** in the case of Rabbi Zekharya ben HaKatzav **because with regard to a captive woman** the Sages **ruled leniently,** since the prohibition is based on suspicion and not certainty; **however here,** in the case of a divorcée, where there is a certain Torah prohibition, **no,** he may not designate a residence for her in the courtyard? **Or perhaps,** the case of a divorcée **is no different.**


###### Ketubot 27b:20
[Ketubot 27b:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/27b:20)

תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּתַנְיָא: הַמְגָרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ — לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא בִּשְׁכוּנָתוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara cites proof to resolve the dilemma: **Come** and **hear** proof **as it is taught** in a *baraita*: With regard to **one who divorces his wife, she may not marry** and live **in his** immediate **vicinity,** i.e., his courtyard, due to the concern that because of the intimacy they once shared, her living there will lead to transgression.