## Ketubot Daf 31a

###### Ketubot 31a:1
[Ketubot 31a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/31a:1)

וְקָרַע שִׁירָאִין שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**and** at the same time **he tore another’s silk [*shira’in*].** The question is whether the liability to receive the death penalty exempts him from the liability for payment incurred at precisely the same moment.


###### Ketubot 31a:2
[Ketubot 31a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/31a:2)

גּוּפָא, אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי נְחוּנְיָא בֶּן הַקָּנָה בְּגוֹנֵב חֶלְבּוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ וַאֲכָלוֹ שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב, שֶׁכְּבָר נִתְחַיֵּיב בִּגְנֵבָה קוֹדֶם שֶׁיָּבֹא לִידֵי אִיסּוּר חֵלֶב. לֵימָא פְּלִיגָא דְּרַבִּי אָבִין. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אָבִין: הַזּוֹרֵק חֵץ מִתְּחִילַּת אַרְבַּע לְסוֹף אַרְבַּע, וְקָרַע שִׁירָאִין בַּהֲלִיכָתוֹ — פָּטוּר. שֶׁעֲקִירָה צוֹרֶךְ הַנָּחָה הִיא. הָכָא נָמֵי: הַגְבָּהָה צוֹרֶךְ אֲכִילָה הִיא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara analyzes **the** matter **itself. Rav Ḥisda said: Rabbi Neḥunya ben HaKana concedes in** the case of one who **steals another’s** forbidden **fat and eats it that he is obligated** to pay for the fat, **as he is already liable for theft before he comes to** violate **the prohibition** against eating forbidden **fat.** The Gemara comments: **Let us say** that Rav Ḥisda **disagrees** with **Rabbi Avin, as Rabbi Avin said: One who shoots an arrow from the beginning of four** cubits **to the end of four** cubits in the public domain on Shabbat, thereby performing a prohibited labor for which he is liable to receive a court-imposed death penalty, **and** the arrow **ripped silk as it proceeds, is exempt** from the obligation to pay for the silk because he is liable for the more severe punishment for desecrating Shabbat. Although the silk was ripped prior to completion of the prohibited labor, as the arrow had not yet come to rest, he is nevertheless exempt, **as lifting is a prerequisite for placement.** The prohibited labor of carrying on Shabbat is comprised of lifting of the object and placement. Once he shot the arrow, its movement through the air is a continuation of his act of Shabbat desecration, for which he is liable to be executed. **Here, too,** say that **lifting** the fat **is a prerequisite for eating,** and therefore he should be exempt from payment.


###### Ketubot 31a:3
[Ketubot 31a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/31a:3)

הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! הָתָם, אִי אֶפְשָׁר לְהַנָּחָה בְּלֹא עֲקִירָה. הָכָא, אֶפְשָׁר לַאֲכִילָה בְּלֹא הַגְבָּהָה, דְּאִי בָּעֵי, גָּחֵין וְאָכֵיל. אִי נָמֵי: הָתָם אִי בָּעֵי לְאַהְדּוֹרַהּ — לָא מָצֵי מַהְדַּר לַהּ. הָכָא — מָצֵי מַהְדַּר לַהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara refutes this argument: **How can** these cases **be compared? There,** in the case of the arrow, **placement is impossible without lifting,** as placement without lifting is not a labor prohibited on Shabbat. Therefore, lifting and placement are a single unit. In contrast, **here, eating is possible without lifting as, if one wishes,** he could **bend down and eat** without lifting the food to his mouth. **Alternatively,** there is another difference between the cases: **There,** in the case of the arrow, even **if he seeks to take back** the arrow after shooting it, **he cannot take it back;** therefore, lifting and placement constitute one action. **Here, he could replace** the fat after lifting it.


###### Ketubot 31a:4
[Ketubot 31a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/31a:4)

מַאי אִיכָּא בֵּין הַאי לִישָּׁנָא לְהַאי לִישָּׁנָא? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ הַמַּעֲבִיר סַכִּין בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים וְקָרַע שִׁירָאִין בַּהֲלִיכָתוֹ. לְהָךְ לִישָּׁנָא דְּאָמְרַתְּ אִי אֶפְשָׁר לְהַנָּחָה בְּלֹא עֲקִירָה — הָכָא נָמֵי אִי אֶפְשָׁר לְהַנָּחָה בְּלֹא עֲקִירָה. לְהָךְ לִישָּׁנָא דְּאָמְרַתְּ לָא מָצֵי מַהְדַּר לַהּ — הָכָא מָצֵי מַהְדַּר לַהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What** practical difference **is there between this formulation,** where the criterion is whether the second stage could be performed independent of the first stage, **and that formulation,** where the criterion is whether the second stage is inevitable after performing the first stage? The Gemara responds: **There is** a practical difference **between them** with regard to **one who carries a knife in the public domain and tears silk as he proceeds. According to that formulation, where you said: Lifting is a prerequisite for placement, here too, lifting is a prerequisite for placement.** As these two stages are inexorably connected, they constitute one action, and the one carrying the knife is exempt from paying the damages. Conversely, **according to that formulation where you said: He cannot take back** the arrow and that is why they are considered one action, **here, he can take back** the knife; therefore, lifting and placement are separate actions and he is not exempt from punishment for the damages that he caused.


###### Ketubot 31a:5
[Ketubot 31a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/31a:5)

גּוּפָא, אָמַר רַבִּי אָבִין: הַזּוֹרֵק חֵץ מִתְּחִלַּת אַרְבַּע לְסוֹף אַרְבַּע וְקָרַע שִׁירָאִין בַּהֲלִיכָתוֹ — פָּטוּר, שֶׁעֲקִירָה צוֹרֶךְ הַנָּחָה הִיא. מֵתִיב רַב בִּיבִי בַּר אַבָּיֵי: הַגּוֹנֵב כִּיס בְּשַׁבָּת — חַיָּיב, שֶׁכְּבָר נִתְחַיֵּיב בִּגְנֵיבָה קוֹדֶם שֶׁיָּבֹא לִידֵי אִיסּוּר סְקִילָה. הָיָה מְגָרֵר וְיוֹצֵא, מְגָרֵר וְיוֹצֵא — פָּטוּר, שֶׁהֲרֵי אִיסּוּר שַׁבָּת וּגְנֵיבָה בָּאִין כְּאֶחָד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara analyzes **the** matter **itself. Rabbi Avin said:** With regard to **one who shoots an arrow from the beginning of four** cubits **to the end of four** cubits **and** the arrow **rips silk as it proceeds, he is exempt, as lifting is a prerequisite for placement. Rav Beivai bar Abaye raised an objection** from that which is taught in a *baraita*: **One who steals a purse on Shabbat is liable** for the theft **because he was already liable for theft** as soon as he lifted the purse. This took place **before he came to** violate **the prohibition** against performing prohibited labor on Shabbat by carrying it into the public domain, a violation punishable by **stoning.** However, if he did not lift the purse but **was dragging** it on the ground **and exiting** the private domain, **dragging and exiting, he is exempt, as the prohibition** against **theft and the prohibition of Shabbat** are violated **simultaneously** when he drags the purse out of the owner’s property and into the public domain.


###### Ketubot 31a:6
[Ketubot 31a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/31a:6)

וְאַמַּאי? הָכָא נָמֵי, לֵימָא: הַגְבָּהָה צוֹרֶךְ הוֹצָאָה הִיא! הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — כְּגוֹן שֶׁהִגְבִּיהוֹ עַל מְנָת לְהַצְנִיעוֹ, וְנִמְלַךְ עָלָיו וְהוֹצִיאוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Beivai concludes: **But why** is he liable if he carried the purse? **Here, too, let us say** that **lifting is a prerequisite for carrying out,** and therefore the theft was performed in the course of performance of the prohibited labor and he is exempt. The Gemara answers: **With what are we dealing here?** We are dealing with a case **where he lifted** the pouch **in order to conceal it** in the same domain, not to carry it out into the public domain, **and he reconsidered** his plan with regard to the purse **and carried it out.** In that case the act of lifting was not performed for the purpose of carrying out. Therefore, he is not exempt from the obligation to pay for the theft.


###### Ketubot 31a:7
[Ketubot 31a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/31a:7)

וְכִי הַאי גַּוְונָא מִי חַיָּיב? וְהָאָמַר רַב סִימוֹן אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַמְפַנֶּה חֲפָצִים מִזָּוִית לְזָוִית, וְנִמְלַךְ עֲלֵיהֶם וְהוֹצִיאָן — פָּטוּר, שֶׁלֹּא הָיְתָה עֲקִירָה מִשָּׁעָה רִאשׁוֹנָה לְכָךְ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And in a case like that,** where he reconsidered, **is** one **liable** for carrying out an object on Shabbat? **But didn’t Rav Simon say** that **Rabbi Ami said** that **Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who moves objects from** one **corner** of his house to another **corner** on Shabbat, **and he reconsidered** his plan in **their** regard after lifting them **and carried them out** into the public domain, he is **exempt, as the** act of **lifting was not initially** performed **for that** purpose of carrying from one domain to another. Here, too, since the thief did not lift the pouch with the intention of carrying it out, he is not liable to be stoned.


###### Ketubot 31a:8
[Ketubot 31a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/31a:8)

לָא תֵּימָא עַל מְנָת לְהַצְנִיעוֹ, אֶלָּא אֵימָא עַל מְנָת לְהוֹצִיאוֹ, הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — כְּשֶׁעָמַד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara emends the previous answer: **Do not say** that he lifted it **in order to conceal it; rather, say** that he lifted it **in order to carry it out.** Nevertheless, the case of shooting the arrow and the case of stealing the purse are different, as **with what** case **are we dealing here?** It is a case **where he stopped** in the courtyard before taking the pouch out to the public domain. Therefore, the initial lifting is exclusively theft and not the start of a prohibited labor, as by stopping, he separated the lifting from the carrying out.


###### Ketubot 31a:9
[Ketubot 31a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/31a:9)

עָמַד לְמַאי? אִי לְכַתֵּף — אוֹרְחֵיהּ הוּא! אֶלָּא בְּעוֹמֵד לָפוּשׁ. אֲבָל לְכַתֵּף מַאי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: This is a case where he **stopped. For what** purpose did he stop? **If** he stopped in order **to** adjust the burden on his **shoulder,** that **is** the typical **manner** of proceeding and would not be considered an interruption in the process of carrying out the object. **Rather,** it must be **in** a case of one who **stopped to rest,** and when he resumes moving he initiates a separate action. The Gemara infers: **But** if he stopped in order **to** adjust the burden on his **shoulder, what** is the *halakha*?