## Ketubot Daf 35a

###### Ketubot 35a:1
[Ketubot 35a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/35a:1)

מַאי לָאו, אָסוֹן מַמָּשׁ! לָא, דִּין אָסוֹן. אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: ״וְלֹא יִהְיֶה אָסוֹן עָנוֹשׁ יֵעָנֵשׁ״, מַאי לָאו, דִּין אָסוֹן? לֹא, אָסוֹן מַמָּשׁ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Is** this **not** referring to **actual harm,** i.e., the woman’s death? And the verse states that he pays only if she did not die, but if she died is he exempt, even if he was not forewarned? The Gemara answers: **No,** the verse can be explained to mean: If there is no **sentence of harm.** If the court does not actually sentence him to death, he pays the damages for the miscarried fetus. He is exempt from payment only if he is actually executed. **Some say** a different version of this exchange: **Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to** the opinion of **Reish Lakish: “And yet no harm follow, he shall be punished”** (Exodus 21:22); **is** this **not** referring to **a sentence of harm?** The Gemara answers: **No,** the verse can be explained to mean: If there is no **actual harm.**


###### Ketubot 35a:2
[Ketubot 35a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/35a:2)

אָמַר רָבָא: וּמִי אִיכָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר חַיָּיבֵי מִיתוֹת שׁוֹגְגִין חַיָּיבִים? וְהָא תָּנָא דְּבֵי חִזְקִיָּה: ״מַכֵּה אָדָם״ וּ״מַכֵּה בְהֵמָה״ —

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said: Is there anyone who said** that **those** who **unwittingly** performed a transgression for which one is **liable to** receive the **death** penalty **are obligated** to pay? **But didn’t** the Sage **of the school of Ḥizkiyya teach:** The verse speaks of **one who smites a person, and** the verse speaks of **one who smites an animal.** The two cases are juxtaposed in the verse “And one who smites an animal shall pay for it, and one who smites a person shall die” (Leviticus 24:21).


###### Ketubot 35a:3
[Ketubot 35a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/35a:3)

מָה מַכֵּה בְהֵמָה לֹא חִילַּקְתָּ בּוֹ בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג בֵּין בְּמֵזִיד, בֵּין מִתְכַּוֵּין לְשֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין, בֵּין דֶּרֶךְ יְרִידָה לְדֶרֶךְ עֲלִיָּיה לְפוֹטְרוֹ מָמוֹן, אֶלָּא לְחַיְּיבוֹ מָמוֹן — אַף מַכֵּה אָדָם לֹא תַּחְלוֹק בּוֹ בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג בֵּין בְּמֵזִיד, בֵּין מִתְכַּוֵּין לְשֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין, בֵּין דֶּרֶךְ יְרִידָה לְדֶרֶךְ עֲלִיָּיה — לְחַיְּיבוֹ מָמוֹן, אֶלָּא לְפוֹטְרוֹ מָמוֹן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Just as in** the case of one **who smites an animal, you did not distinguish between** one who did so **unwittingly and** one who did so **intentionally, between** one who acted **with intent and one who** acted **with no intent, between** one who smites **in** the course of **a downward motion and** one who smites **in** the course of **an upward motion,** and in all those cases it is not **to exempt** him from paying **money but rather to obligate him to** pay **money; so too, in** the case of one **who smites a person, do not distinguish between** one who did so **unwittingly and** one who did so **intentionally, between** one who acted **with intent and one who** acted **with no intent, between** one who smites **in** the course of **a downward motion and** one who smites **in** the course of **an upward motion.** In all those cases as well it is not **to obligate him** to pay **money but rather to exempt him** from paying **money.** The *halakha* in both cases is unconditional; when he smites an animal he is always liable to pay and when he smites a person he is always exempt from payment, regardless of whether or not he is actually executed.


###### Ketubot 35a:4
[Ketubot 35a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/35a:4)

אֶלָּא, כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין אָמַר: חַיָּיבֵי מִיתוֹת שׁוֹגְגִין — כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דִּפְטוּרִין. כִּי פְּלִיגִי, בְּחַיָּיבֵי מַלְקוֹת שׁוֹגְגִין וְדָבָר אַחֵר. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר חַיָּיב: חַיָּיבֵי מִיתוֹת אִיתַּקּוּשׁ, חַיָּיבֵי מַלְקִיּוֹת לָא אִיתַּקּוּשׁ. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר פָּטוּר: בְּפֵירוּשׁ רִיבְּתָה תּוֹרָה חַיָּיבֵי מַלְקִיּוֹת כְּחַיָּיבֵי מִיתוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, when Ravin came** from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, **he said:** With regard to **those** who **unwittingly** performed a transgression for which one is **liable to** receive the **death penalty, everyone agrees that** they **are exempt,** as per the derivation of the Sages of the school of Ḥizkiyya. **When they disagree** it is **with regard to those** who **unwittingly** performed a transgression for which one is **liable to** receive **lashes, and another matter,** for which he is liable to pay money. **Rabbi Yoḥanan said** that he is **obligated** to pay, as **those liable to** receive the **death penalty are juxtaposed** to cases of monetary payment and are unconditionally exempt from payment. However, **those liable** to receive **lashes are not juxtaposed.** Therefore, in the case of one who is liable to receive lashes, unless one is actually flogged, he is obligated to pay for the damage he inflicted. **Reish Lakish said:** He is **exempt, as the Torah explicitly included those liable to** receive **lashes, like those liable to** receive the **death** penalty, and unconditionally exempted them from payment.


###### Ketubot 35a:5
[Ketubot 35a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/35a:5)

הֵיכָן רִיבְּתָה תּוֹרָה? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אָתְיָא ״רָשָׁע״ ״רָשָׁע״. רָבָא אָמַר אָתְיָא ״מַכֵּה״ ״מַכֵּה״. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְרָבָא: הֵי ״מַכֵּה״? אִילֵימָא ״וּמַכֵּה בְהֵמָה יְשַׁלְּמֶנָּה וּמַכֵּה אָדָם יוּמָת״ — הַאי בִּקְטָלָא כְּתִיב! אֶלָּא הַאי ״מַכֵּה״: ״מַכֵּה נֶפֶשׁ בְּהֵמָה יְשַׁלְּמֶנָּה נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ״, וּסְמִיךְ לֵיהּ: ״וְאִישׁ כִּי יִתֵּן מוּם בַּעֲמִיתוֹ [כַּאֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה כֵּן יֵעָשֶׂה לּוֹ]״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Where did** the **Torah include** those liable to be flogged? **Abaye said:** It is **derived** by means of a verbal analogy between the term **wicked** in the verse “That he is wicked and liable to die” (Numbers 35:31), and the term **wicked** in the verse “That he is wicked and liable to be flogged” (Deuteronomy 25:2). **Rava said:** It is **derived** by means of a verbal analogy between the term **smites** in one verse and the term **smites** in another verse. **Rav Pappa said to Rava:** To **which** term **smites** are you referring? **If we say** that it is the verse **“And one who smites an animal shall pay for it, and one who smites a person shall die”** (Leviticus 24:21), clearly that is not so, as **that is written with regard to death.** Smiting a person in that verse is referring to murder. **Rather,** it is to **this** term **smites** that Rava is referring: **“And he who smites an animal shall pay for it, a life for a life”** (Leviticus 24:18), **and juxtaposed to it,** it is written: **“And a man who places a blemish upon his counterpart, as he has done so shall be done to him”** (Leviticus 24:19). The verses liken those liable to receive lashes to those obligated to pay money, from which it is derived that those liable to receive lashes are exempt from payment.


###### Ketubot 35a:6
[Ketubot 35a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/35a:6)

וְהַאי לָאו ״מַכֵּה״ הִיא! אֲנַן הַכָּאָה הַכָּאָה קָאָמְרִינַן. וְהָא כִּי כְּתִיב — בְּחוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵירוֹ הוּא דִּכְתִיב, וְחוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵירוֹ בַּר תַּשְׁלוּמִין הוּא! אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְהַכָּאָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה — תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְהַכָּאָה שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises a difficulty: **But this** term that appears in the latter verse **is** “places a blemish,” **not smites.** How, then, can one derive a verbal analogy? The Gemara answers: This is not a verbal analogy based on identical terms; rather, it is based on identical concepts. **We are saying** that it is a verbal analogy between **smiting** an animal in the first verse and **smiting** a person in the latter verse. The Gemara asks: **However, when** the second verse **is written, it is written with regard to one who injures another, and one who injures another is subject to payment** and not to lashes. This undermines the proof, as lashes are not mentioned in either verse. The Gemara answers: **If it is not a matter of smiting that** causes damage equivalent to the **value of a *peruta*,** in which case he would pay and would not be flogged, **apply it** to the **matter of smiting that** causes damage that is not equivalent to the **value of a *peruta*.** Since in that case there is no payment for the injury, one is flogged for striking that blow.