## Ketubot Daf 42b

###### Ketubot 42b:1
[Ketubot 42b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/42b:1)

מַאי לָאו בְּשֶׁעָמַד בַּדִּין! לָא, בְּשֶׁלֹּא עָמַד בַּדִּין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**What, is it not** referring to a case **where he has stood trial,** and yet Rabbi Shimon does not render him liable for the oath as the payment was originally a fine? Rabba refutes this argument: **No,** that *baraita* is referring to a situation **where he has not stood trial.**


###### Ketubot 42b:2
[Ketubot 42b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/42b:2)

וְהָא מִדְּרֵישָׁא בְּשֶׁעָמַד בַּדִּין, סֵיפָא נָמֵי בְּשֶׁעָמַד בַּדִּין. דְּקָתָנֵי רֵישָׁא: אֵין לִי אֶלָּא דְּבָרִים שֶׁמְּשַׁלְּמִין עֲלֵיהֶם אֶת הַקֶּרֶן. תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל, תַּשְׁלוּמֵי אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה, וְהָאוֹנֵס וְהַמְפַתֶּה וּמוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע, מִנַּיִן — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וּמָעֲלָה מַעַל״, רִיבָּה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Abaye persists: **But from** the fact **that** the **first clause** of the *baraita* deals **with** one **who has stood trial,** it follows that the **latter clause also** deals **with** one **who has stood trial. As** the *baraita* **teaches** in its **first clause: I have** derived the *halakha* **only** for **matters for which one pays the principal.** With regard to **the payments** that are **double** the principal, and **payments** that are **four and five** times the principal, and those of **the rapist, and the seducer, and the defamer, from where** is it derived that all these are included in the liability to bring an offering for falsely taking an oath on a deposit? **The verse states:** “If anyone sin **and commit a trespass [*ma’ala ma’al*]”** (Leviticus 5:21). The doubled usage of the word trespass serves to **amplify** and include any false oath taken in denial of monetary liability.


###### Ketubot 42b:3
[Ketubot 42b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/42b:3)

הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּלֹא עָמַד בַּדִּין, כְּפֵילָא מִי אִיכָּא? אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא בְּשֶׁעָמַד בַּדִּין. וּמִדְּרֵישָׁא בְּשֶׁעָמַד בַּדִּין, סֵיפָא נָמֵי בְּשֶׁעָמַד בַּדִּין!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Abaye analyzes this statement: **What are the circumstances? If** this is referring to a situation **when he has not stood trial, is there double** payment in that case? Everyone agrees that one who admits his guilt is exempt from the double payment, and yet this obligation is mentioned in the *baraita*. **Rather,** it **is obvious** that the *baraita* is referring to a case **where** it is claimed that he has already **stood trial** and was declared liable to pay the double payment, and the accused individual denies this claim. Abaye summarizes his question: **And from** the fact **that** the **first clause** of this *baraita* deals **with** one **who has stood trial,** the **latter clause also** deals **with** one **who has stood trial,** and even so Rabbi Shimon does not deem him liable to bring an offering for his oath.


###### Ketubot 42b:4
[Ketubot 42b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/42b:4)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ, יָכֵילְנָא לְשַׁנּוֹיֵי לָךְ: רֵישָׁא בְּשֶׁעָמַד בַּדִּין, וְסֵיפָא בְּשֶׁלֹּא עָמַד בַּדִּין, וְכוּלַּהּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא. וְשִׁינּוּיֵי דְּחִיקֵי לָא מְשַׁנֵּינַן לָךְ. דְּאִם כֵּן אָמְרַתְּ לִי: לִיתְנֵי רֵישָׁא ״רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר״, אוֹ לִיתְנֵי סֵיפָא ״דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabba **said to him: I could answer you** that the **first clause** deals **with** one **who** is accused of already having **stood trial** and been deemed liable, **and** the **latter clause** deals **with** one **who has not stood trial, and** this **entire** *baraita* **is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Shimon.** According to this answer, Rabbi Shimon concedes that after one has been deemed liable in court, the double payment attains the status of a regular monetary obligation rather than a fine, and therefore in the first case in the *baraita* he is liable to bring an offering and a payment for his admission. **But I will not answer you a far-fetched answer, for if** it is **so,** that the entire *baraita* represents the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, **you** could **say to me: Let** the *tanna* of the *baraita* either **teach** explicitly in the **first clause: Rabbi Shimon says, or let him teach** in the **latter clause:** This is **the statement of Rabbi Shimon.**


###### Ketubot 42b:5
[Ketubot 42b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/42b:5)

אֶלָּא: כּוּלַּהּ בְּשֶׁעָמַד בַּדִּין, וְרֵישָׁא רַבָּנַן וְסֵיפָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabba continued: **Rather,** I will say that the **entire** *baraita* is referring **to** one **who has stood trial, and** as for the difference in *halakha*, the **first clause** is in accordance with the opinion of **the Rabbis,** who deem one liable to bring the offering of an oath in a case where the plaintiff says that the defendant stood trial, was found liable, and swore falsely. **And** the **latter clause** represents the opinion of **Rabbi Shimon,** who exempts one who confesses from bringing the offering of an oath.


###### Ketubot 42b:6
[Ketubot 42b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/42b:6)

וּמוֹדֵינָא לָךְ לְעִנְיַן קׇרְבַּן שְׁבוּעָה דְּרַחֲמָנָא פַּטְרֵיהּ, מִ״וְּכִחֵשׁ״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And I concede to you,** Abaye, **with regard to** the liability to bring **an offering** for falsely taking **an oath** on a deposit, **that the Merciful One exempts him** from this offering here, **based upon** the verse **“And deal falsely** with his neighbor in a matter of a deposit,” (Leviticus 5:21), which indicates that one is liable to bring an offering only if he lied about a claim that was originally a monetary obligation.


###### Ketubot 42b:7
[Ketubot 42b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/42b:7)

וְכִי קָאָמֵינָא מָמוֹן הָוֵי — לְהוֹרִישׁוֹ לְבָנָיו.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And when I say** that Rabbi Shimon maintains that after one is declared liable in court his obligation to pay **is** considered a regular **monetary** payment rather than a fine, that is not to say that he is liable to bring an offering for falsely denying a monetary claim, but rather **to** say that the recipient of the payment **bequeaths it to his sons.** Unlike a fine, which does not pass by inheritance to one’s heirs, this is classified as a regular monetary payment. Consequently, if the perpetrator was deemed liable in court and ordered to pay the father of the girl he raped or seduced, and the father died before receiving payment, his sons inherit the right to that payment.


###### Ketubot 42b:8
[Ketubot 42b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/42b:8)

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אִם לֹא הִסְפִּיקָה לִגְבּוֹת עַד שֶׁמֵּת הָאָב — הֲרֵי הֵן שֶׁל עַצְמָהּ. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ מָמוֹן הָוֵי לְהוֹרִישׁוֹ לְבָנָיו, לְעַצְמָהּ אַמַּאי? דְּאַחִין בָּעֵי מִיהְוֵי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Abaye **raised an objection to** this last point from the mishna. **Rabbi Shimon says: If** the daughter **did not manage to collect** the payments **before the father died, they** belong **to her. And if you say** that this fine **is a monetary** payment **to** the extent that one can **bequeath it to his sons** after the trial, **why** does the money belong **to her?** Since the trial has taken place, it **should be** the property of **the brothers** by inheritance from their father, as it is already considered a regular monetary obligation that is owed to the father.


###### Ketubot 42b:9
[Ketubot 42b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/42b:9)

אָמַר רָבָא: הַאי מִילְּתָא קְשַׁאי בַּהּ רַבָּה וְרַב יוֹסֵף עֶשְׂרִין וְתַרְתֵּין שְׁנִין וְלָא אִיפְּרַק, עַד דִּיתֵיב רַב יוֹסֵף בְּרֵישָׁא וּפָירְקַהּ: שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וְנָתַן הָאִישׁ הַשּׁוֹכֵב עִמָּהּ לַאֲבִי הַנַּעֲרָה חֲמִשִּׁים כֶּסֶף״, לֹא זִיכְּתָה תּוֹרָה לָאָב אֶלָּא מִשְּׁעַת נְתִינָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said: This matter was difficult for Rabba and Rav Yosef** for **twenty-two years without resolution, until Rav Yosef sat at the head** of the academy **and resolved it** in the following manner: **There,** in the case of a rape, **it is different, as the verse states: “And the man who laid with her shall give the young woman’s father fifty shekels of silver”** (Deuteronomy 22:29), from which it is inferred: **The Torah entitled the father** to this money **only from the time of giving.** Consequently, if the father dies before receiving the money, he does not bequeath his right to the money to his sons. Instead, the daughter is considered to take her father’s place as the plaintiff, because she was the victim, and the money is paid to her.


###### Ketubot 42b:10
[Ketubot 42b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/42b:10)

וְכִי קָאָמַר רַבָּה מָמוֹנָא הָוֵי לְהוֹרִישׁוֹ לְבָנָיו — בִּשְׁאָר קְנָסוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And when Rabba said** that the fine imposed by a court **is** considered a regular **monetary obligation** with regard to one’s ability **to bequeath it to his sons,** he was not referring to this particular case of a rapist or seducer, but only **to other fines,** which do have the status of regular monetary obligations after the court delivers its verdict.


###### Ketubot 42b:11
[Ketubot 42b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/42b:11)

אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה גַּבֵּי עֶבֶד, דִּכְתִיב: ״כֶּסֶף שְׁלֹשִׁים שְׁקָלִים יִתֵּן לַאדוֹנָיו״, הָכִי נָמֵי לֹא זִיכְּתָה תּוֹרָה לָאָדוֹן אֶלָּא מִשְּׁעַת נְתִינָה?! ״יִתֵּן״ לְחוּד, ״וְנָתַן״ לְחוּד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **However, if** that is **so,** that the verb “give” is explained in this manner, **with regard to** an ox that killed **a slave, where it is written: “He shall give to their master thirty shekels of silver”** (Exodus 21:32), **so too** will you say that **the Torah entitled the master only from the time of giving?** The Gemara answers: **“Shall give [*yiten*],” is distinct,** and **“shall give [*venatan*],” is distinct.** The first expression, which is stated with regard to an ox that killed a slave, does not indicate that the recipient acquires the right to the money only from the moment it is given, whereas the formulation employed in the case of rape does indicate that this is the case.


###### Ketubot 42b:12
[Ketubot 42b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/42b:12)

אִי הָכִי, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְכִחֵשׁ״? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְנָתַן״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises a difficulty: **If so,** that the main source for this *halakha* is the phrase “shall give [*venatan*],” when it was taught in the *baraita* that a man who rapes or seduces a woman is not liable to bring the offering for a false oath in denial of a monetary claim, rather than saying that this is derived from the fact that **the verse states “and deal falsely,”** he **should have** said that it is derived from the fact that **the verse states “shall give,”** as this is the phrase that teaches that the payment is considered a fine even after he has stood trial.


###### Ketubot 42b:13
[Ketubot 42b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/42b:13)

אָמַר רָבָא: כִּי אִיצְטְרִיךְ ״וְכִחֵשׁ״ — כְּגוֹן שֶׁעָמְדָה בַּדִּין, וּבָגְרָה וּמֵתָה. דְּהָתָם, כִּי קָא יָרֵית אָבִיהָ — מִינַּהּ דִּידַהּ קָא יָרֵית.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
In answer to this question, **Rava said: When it was necessary** to cite a proof from **“and deal falsely,”** it was with regard to a situation **where** the young woman’s case was **brought to trial,** and the court ruled in her favor, **and she reached majority and** subsequently **died** before the money was paid. The reason that “and deal falsely” is necessary in that case is because **there, when the father inherits,** it is **from her** that **he inherits.**


###### Ketubot 42b:14
[Ketubot 42b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/42b:14)

אִי הָכִי, ״יָצְאוּ אֵלּוּ שֶׁהֵן קְנָס״, מָמוֹן הוּא! אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: יָצְאוּ אֵלּוּ שֶׁעִיקָּרָן קְנָס.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises another difficulty: **If so,** the language of the *baraita*: **Excluding these, as they are a fine,** is inaccurate, as **it is** a regular **monetary** payment, not a fine. In answer to this question, **Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said** that this phrase means: **Excluding these, as they are originally a fine,** and it is only once the court orders the man to pay that they are viewed as regular monetary payments.


###### Ketubot 42b:15
[Ketubot 42b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/42b:15)

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר, שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם קְנָס עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ. טַעְמָא דְּלֹא עָמַד בַּדִּין, הָא עָמַד בַּדִּין, דִּמְשַׁלֵּם עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ, קׇרְבַּן שְׁבוּעָה נָמֵי מִיחַיַּיב!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Abaye **raised an objection to** this explanation of the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, based upon the mishna in *Shevuot* cited above (42a), which states: **Rabbi Shimon exempts** him, **as he does not pay a fine on his own** admission. The Gemara infers: **The reason that** he is not liable to bring a guilt-offering is because **he has not stood trial.** However, if **he has stood trial** and been found guilty, **in which case he pays on his own** admission when he later admits that he was already convicted in court, **he should also be liable to** bring **an offering** if he denies that he was convicted in court and takes **an oath** to that effect. This contradicts the claim that, according to Rabbi Shimon, even after one is convicted in court, the payment is still considered a fine.


###### Ketubot 42b:16
[Ketubot 42b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/42b:16)

רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן לְדִבְרֵיהֶם דְּרַבָּנַן קָאָמַר לְהוּ: לְדִידִי, אַף עַל גַּב דְּעָמַד בַּדִּין — רַחֲמָנָא פַּטְרֵיהּ מִ״וְּכִחֵשׁ״. אֶלָּא לְדִידְכוּ, אוֹדוֹ לִי מִיהַת הֵיכָא דְּלֹא עָמַד בַּדִּין, דְּכִי קָא תָּבַע, קְנָסָא קָא תָּבַע,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **Rabbi Shimon stated** his opinion **to them in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis** themselves, as follows: **According to my** opinion, **although he has stood trial, the Merciful One exempts him** from the offering, as derived **from** the verse: **“And deal falsely** with his neighbor in a matter of a deposit” (Leviticus 5:21), which indicates that he is liable only for a claim that originally concerned a regular monetary payment. **However, according to your** opinion, you should **at least concede to me** in a case **where he has not stood trial, that when one claims** the money, he **claims a fine** and not a regular monetary payment.