## Ketubot Daf 44a

###### Ketubot 44a:1
[Ketubot 44a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/44a:1)

הָכָא נָמֵי הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּלָא גָּבְיָא, מִדְּלָא כְּתַב לַהּ ״אוֹסֵיפִית לִךְ מֵאָה אַמָּאתַיִם״, אַחוֹלֵי אַחֵילְתֵּיהּ לְשִׁעְבּוּדָא קַמָּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Here too, this is the reasoning** for the ruling **that she does not collect** the additional one hundred dinars from the second stipulated time, **as he did not write to her** in the second marriage contract: **I added one hundred** dinars **to your** original marriage contract **of two hundred** dinars. Evidently, he did not add to the existing marriage contract. Rather, **she forgave** her rights **to the first** marriage contract, including the **lien** on his property from the date it was written, in order to accept the second marriage document.


###### Ketubot 44a:2
[Ketubot 44a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/44a:2)

אָמַר מָר: אִי בָּעֲיָא — בְּהַאי גָּבְיָא, אִי בָּעֲיָא — בְּהַאי גָּבְיָא. לֵימָא פְּלִיגָא דְּרַב נַחְמָן? דְּאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: שְׁנֵי שְׁטָרוֹת הַיּוֹצְאִין בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה — בִּיטֵּל שֵׁנִי אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ After clarifying Rav Huna’s opinion, the Gemara turns its attention to a more general issue, connected to his last statement. **The Master,** i.e., Rav Huna, **said,** as indicated in the above discussion, that **if she wishes** she can **collect** the sum specified in **this** marriage contract, and **if she wishes** she can **collect** the sum specified in **that** marriage contract. The Gemara asks: **Shall we say** that this opinion **disagrees** with **that** of **Rav Naḥman? As Rav Naḥman said:** With regard to **two documents** that pertain to the same issue and **that are produced one after the other,** e.g., a pair of documents that ascribe the transfer of ownership over a particular field to different times, the **second,** later document **nullifies the first.** Here too, the second marriage contract should negate the first one entirely.


###### Ketubot 44a:3
[Ketubot 44a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/44a:3)

לָאו מִי אִיתְּמַר עֲלַהּ, אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: וּמוֹדֶה רַב נַחְמָן דְּאִי אוֹסֵיף בֵּיהּ דִּיקְלָא, לְתוֹסֶפֶת כַּתְבֵיהּ. הָכָא נָמֵי, הָא אוֹסֵיף לַהּ מִידֵּי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara refutes this suggestion: **Was it not stated with regard to** this *halakha* of Rav Naḥman that **Rav Pappa said: And Rav Naḥman concedes that if he added** so much as **a palm tree in** the second document, this shows that **he wrote it as an addition,** and therefore the second document does not cancel the first, but adds to its sum? **Here too, he added something for her,** as the sum of money specified in the second marriage contract is larger than that specified in the first.


###### Ketubot 44a:4
[Ketubot 44a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/44a:4)

גּוּפָא. אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: שְׁנֵי שְׁטָרוֹת הַיּוֹצְאִין בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה — בִּיטֵּל שֵׁנִי אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹן. אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: וּמוֹדֶה רַב נַחְמָן דְּאִי אוֹסֵיף בֵּיהּ דִּיקְלָא — לְתוֹסֶפֶת כַּתְבֵיהּ. פְּשִׁיטָא רִאשׁוֹן בְּמֶכֶר וְשֵׁנִי בְּמַתָּנָה, לְיַפּוֹת כֹּחוֹ הוּא דִּכְתַב לֵיהּ — מִשּׁוּם דִּינָא דְּבַר מִצְרָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ Since the Gemara has mentioned the statement of Rav Naḥman, it discusses this matter **itself: Rav Naḥman said:** With regard to **two documents that are produced one after the other,** the **second nullifies the first. Rav Pappa said: And Rav Naḥman concedes that if he added a palm tree to it, he wrote it as an addition.** The Gemara analyzes this *halakha* in detail. It **is obvious** that if the **first** document was a document **of a sale, and the second** stated that the same field was given **as a gift,** the second document does not negate the first, as **he wrote** the additional document of a gift **to improve the rights** of the recipient **due to the *halakha*** of **one** whose field **borders** the field of his neighbor.


###### Ketubot 44a:5
[Ketubot 44a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/44a:5)

וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן רִאשׁוֹן בְּמַתָּנָה וְשֵׁנִי בְּמֶכֶר, דְּאָמְרִינַן מִשּׁוּם דִּינָא דְּבַעַל חוֹב הוּא דִּכְתַב כֵּן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And all the more so,** this is the *halakha* if he wrote the **first** document **as a gift and the second** in the form **of a sale, as we say** it was **due to the *halakha*** of **a creditor that he wrote** it in **this way.** Out of concern that his creditor might come and snatch the field from the recipient and leave him without redress, he writes a document of sale for the recipient, so that he can return and collect this sum from him.


###### Ketubot 44a:6
[Ketubot 44a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/44a:6)

אֶלָּא אִי שְׁנֵיהֶם בְּמֶכֶר שְׁנֵיהֶם בְּמַתָּנָה בִּיטֵּל שֵׁנִי אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹן. מַאי טַעְמָא? רַפְרָם אָמַר: אֵימַר אוֹדוֹיֵי אוֹדִי לֵיהּ. רַב אַחָא אָמַר: אֵימַר אַחוֹלֵי אַחְלֵיהּ לְשִׁיעְבּוּדֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** Rav Naḥman meant that **if both of them** were documents **of sale** or **both of them** were documents **of gifts,** the **second nullifies the first.** The Gemara asks: **What is the reason** for this *halakha*? *Amora’im* argued over this matter. **Rafram said: Say** that the recipient of the field **admitted to him** that the first document was invalid, e.g., it was forged, and he therefore wrote a second, valid document. **Rav Aḥa said: Say** that the recipient **forgave him his lien** from the date of the first document. Consequently, if the seller’s creditors collect this field as payment for the debt owed to them, which necessitates the seller reimbursing the buyer for the purchase price of the field, the buyer has a lien only on property owned by the seller from the time of the second document.


###### Ketubot 44a:7
[Ketubot 44a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/44a:7)

מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ: אוֹרוֹעֵי סָהֲדֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What is** the practical difference **between** these two explanations? The Gemara explains: **The** practical difference **between them** involves several cases. First, there is the issue of whether this serves to **impair** the reliability of the **witnesses:** According to Rafram, who assumes that the first document was of questionable validity, the witnesses who signed on that document are likewise under suspicion, and therefore their testimony and signature in other cases are of questionable value.


###### Ketubot 44a:8
[Ketubot 44a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/44a:8)

וּלְשַׁלּוֹמֵי פֵּירֵי וּלְטַסְקָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** there is also a difference with regard **to paying** for the **produce** of the property between the dates specified in the two documents. According to Rafram, the transfer of ownership did not take place at the date specified in the first document. Consequently, the recipient of the field must compensate the original owner for the field’s produce that he consumed between the two dates. According to Rav Aḥa, the transfer of ownership took place at the time specified in the first document. **And** finally, there is a difference **with regard to** the payment of **the land tax [*taska*].** If the first document was invalid, the previous owner must pay all taxes due during the period between the two documents.


###### Ketubot 44a:9
[Ketubot 44a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/44a:9)

מַאי הָוֵי עֲלַהּ דִּכְתוּבָּה? תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: מָנֶה מָאתַיִם מִן הָאֵירוּסִין, וְתוֹסֶפֶת מִן הַנִּישּׂוּאִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The above discussion came in the wake of the dispute between Rav Huna and Rav Asi with regard to whether the lien on a husband’s property to ensure payment of his wife’s marriage contract applies from the time of betrothal or the time of marriage. The Gemara returns to that issue. **What** halakhic conclusion **was** reached **about** this matter of **a marriage contract?** The Gemara responds: **Come** and **hear** the following ruling, **as Rav Yehuda said** that **Shmuel said in the name of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon:** The lien on his property with regard to the **one hundred dinars** or **two hundred** dinars that comprise the basic sum of a marriage contract applies **from** the time of **the betrothal, and the** lien with regard to the **additional** sum applies **from** the time of **the marriage.**


###### Ketubot 44a:10
[Ketubot 44a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/44a:10)

וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֶחָד זֶה וְאֶחָד זֶה מִן הַנִּישּׂוּאִין. וְהִלְכְתָא: אֶחָד זֶה וְאֶחָד זֶה מִן הַנִּישּׂוּאִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And the Rabbis say:** The lien with regard to **both this and that** takes effect only **from** the time of **the marriage.** The Gemara concludes: **And the *halakha*** is that with regard to **both this and that,** the lien takes effect **from** the time of **the marriage,** in accordance with the majority opinion of the Rabbis.


###### Ketubot 44a:11
[Ketubot 44a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/44a:11)

**מַתְנִי׳** הַגִּיּוֹרֶת שֶׁנִּתְגַּיְּירָה בִּתָּהּ עִמָּהּ וְזִינְּתָה — הֲרֵי זוֹ בְּחֶנֶק, אֵין לָהּ לֹא פֶּתַח בֵּית הָאָב, וְלֹא מֵאָה סֶלַע.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** In the case of a female **convert whose daughter converted with her and** later, as a young woman, the daughter **engaged in licentious sexual relations** when she was betrothed, **she is** executed **by strangulation,** not stoning, the method of execution that would be employed had she been born Jewish. **She has neither** the *halakha* of being executed at the **entrance to** her **father’s house,** as in the case of a woman who was born Jewish who committed this crime, **nor** does she receive **one hundred *sela*** if her husband defamed her by falsely claiming that she had committed adultery. The reason is that the verses state “Israel” (Deuteronomy 22:19, 21) with regard to these *halakhot*, indicating that these *halakhot* apply only to those born as Jews.


###### Ketubot 44a:12
[Ketubot 44a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/44a:12)

הָיְתָה הוֹרָתָהּ שֶׁלֹּא בִּקְדוּשָּׁה וְלֵידָתָהּ בִּקְדוּשָּׁה — הֲרֵי זוֹ בִּסְקִילָה, וְאֵין לָהּ לֹא פֶּתַח בֵּית הָאָב, וְלֹא מֵאָה סֶלַע. הָיְתָה הוֹרָתָהּ וְלֵידָתָהּ בִּקְדוּשָּׁה, הֲרֵי הִיא כְּבַת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְכׇל דְּבָרֶיהָ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
However, if the daughter’s **conception occurred** when her mother **was not** yet **in** a state of **sanctity,** i.e., when she was still a gentile, **but her birth** took place when her mother was **in** a state of **sanctity,** as her mother converted during her pregnancy, **this** daughter is punishable **by stoning** if she committed adultery as a betrothed young woman. However, **she has neither** the *halakha* of being executed at the **entrance to** her **father’s house, nor** the right to **one hundred *sela*** if it turns out that her husband defamed her. If **her conception and birth occurred** when her mother **was in** a state of **sanctity,** i.e., after she converted, **she is like a** regular **Jewish woman in all matters.**


###### Ketubot 44a:13
[Ketubot 44a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/44a:13)

יֵשׁ לָהּ אָב וְאֵין לָהּ פֶּתַח בֵּית הָאָב, יֵשׁ לָהּ פֶּתַח בֵּית הָאָב וְאֵין לָהּ אָב — הֲרֵי זוֹ בִּסְקִילָה. לֹא נֶאֱמַר פֶּתַח בֵּית אָב אֶלָּא לְמִצְוָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
If a young woman who is betrothed commits adultery and **she has a father but does not have an entrance to** her **father’s house,** i.e., if her father does not possess a house of his own, or if **she has an entrance to** her **father’s house but does not have a father,** as he has passed away, **she is** nevertheless executed **via stoning, as** the requirement that she is to be executed at the **entrance to her father’s house is stated only for a mitzva** but it is not an indispensable requirement.