## Ketubot Daf 56a

###### Ketubot 56a:1
[Ketubot 56a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/56a:1)

אֶלָּא: תַּרְוַיְיהוּ אָזְלִי בָּתַר אוּמְדָּנָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
In any case, it has been established that Rav also follows the principle of assessing one’s intention, which calls into question the conclusion that Rabbi Natan is the one who said that the *halakha* is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. **Rather,** the Gemara concludes: **Both** Rav and Rabbi Natan **follow** the principle of **assessing** intention, and the debate can be explained in a different way.


###### Ketubot 56a:2
[Ketubot 56a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/56a:2)

מַאן דְּאָמַר הֲלָכָה — שַׁפִּיר, מַאן דְּאָמַר אֵין הֲלָכָה — הָכָא נָמֵי אוּמְדַּן דַּעְתָּא הוּא. מִשּׁוּם אִיקָּרוֹבֵי דַּעְתָּא הוּא, וְהָא אִיקָּרַבָא לֵיהּ דַּעְתָּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
According to **the one who says** the ***halakha*** is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, this works out **well.** According to **the one who says** the ***halakha* is not** in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, **here too, this is an assessment** of his **intention.** Why did he give her the additional sum of the marriage contract? **It was due to a sense of intimacy** between them, as they were betrothed and were planning to get married. Since **he did** demonstrate **a sense of intimacy** with her, the assessment is that he intended to give her the additional sum.


###### Ketubot 56a:3
[Ketubot 56a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/56a:3)

יָתֵיב רַב חֲנִינָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יַנַּאי וְקָאָמַר: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: פּוֹק, קְרִי קְרָאָךְ לְבָרָא! אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ḥanina,** who was known for teaching biblical verses, **sat before Rabbi Yannai and said:** The ***halakha* is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.** Rabbi Yannai **said to him: Go out** and **read your verses outside.** Your area of expertise is biblical verses, not *halakha*. What you said is incorrect and should not be said in the study hall, as the ***halakha* is** actually **not in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.**


###### Ketubot 56a:4
[Ketubot 56a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/56a:4)

אָמַר רַב יִצְחָק בַּר אַבְדִּימִי מִשּׁוּם רַבֵּינוּ: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה. אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said in the name of our teacher,** Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: The ***halakha* is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Rav Naḥman said** that **Shmuel said:** The ***halakha* is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.**


###### Ketubot 56a:5
[Ketubot 56a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/56a:5)

וְרַב נַחְמָן דִּידֵיהּ אָמַר: אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה. וּנְהַרְדָּעֵי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן אָמְרִי: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה. וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּלָט רַב נַחְמָן וְאָמַר: כֹּל דַּיָּינָא דְּדָאֵין כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה הָכִי וְהָכִי תֶּיהְוֵי, אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי — הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה. וַהֲלָכָה לְמַעֲשֶׂה כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rav Naḥman** also **said his** own statement: The ***halakha* is not in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. And** the Sages **of Neharde’a say in the name of Rav Naḥman:** The ***halakha* is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.** The Gemara comments: **And although Rav Naḥman cursed** them **and said: Any judge who rules in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, such and such** unspecified misfortune **will happen to him, even so** the ***halakha* is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.** Since the Gemara presented a number of different opinions, it concludes: **And the practical *halakha* is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.**


###### Ketubot 56a:6
[Ketubot 56a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/56a:6)

בָּעֵי רָבִין: נִכְנְסָה לְחוּפָּה וְלֹא נִבְעֲלָה, מַהוּ? חִיבַּת חוּפָּה קוֹנָה, אוֹ חִיבַּת בִּיאָה קוֹנָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ Since the practical *halakha* is that a woman who was divorced or widowed after betrothal receives the main sum of her marriage contract but not the additional sum, **Ravin asks: What is** the *halakha* with regard to a woman who **entered the wedding canopy and** is then widowed or divorced **without having had sexual intercourse?** Does the **affection** manifest in the **wedding effect** the marriage, and therefore she receives the additional sum as a married woman? **Or,** is it the **affection** manifest in the **intercourse** that **effects** the marriage, and consequently this woman is no different than a betrothed woman for the purpose of this *halakha*?


###### Ketubot 56a:7
[Ketubot 56a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/56a:7)

תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּתָנֵי רַב יוֹסֵף: שֶׁלֹּא כָּתַב לָהּ אֶלָּא עַל חִיבַּת לַיְלָה הָרִאשׁוֹן. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא חִיבַּת חוּפָּה קוֹנָה — הַיְינוּ דְּאָמַר לַיְלָה הָרִאשׁוֹן, אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ חִיבַּת בִּיאָה קוֹנָה, בִּיאָה — בְּלַיְלָה הָרִאשׁוֹן אִיתַהּ, מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ לֵיתַהּ?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Come** and **hear that Rav Yosef taught** the following *baraita*: **He wrote** the additional sum in the marriage contract **for her only on account of the affection** characteristic **of the first night** of the marriage. The Gemara asks: **Granted, if you say** that the **affection** manifest in the **wedding effects** the marriage, **this is** why **it says the** affection characteristic of **the first night,** as the wedding ceremony is performed on the first night only. **But if you say** that the **affection** manifest in the **intercourse effects** the marriage, **is there intercourse** only **on the first night** and then **from this** point **forward there is none?** Consequently, the *baraita* implies that the affection manifest in the wedding effects the marriage, and from that point on she is entitled to the additional sum of the marriage contract.


###### Ketubot 56a:8
[Ketubot 56a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/56a:8)

וְאֶלָּא מַאי, חוּפָּה? חוּפָּה בְּלֵילְיָא אִיתַהּ, בִּימָמָא לֵיתַהּ? וּלְטַעְמָיךְ — בִּיאָה בְּלֵילְיָא אִיתַהּ, בִּימָמָא לֵיתַהּ? הָא אָמַר רָבָא, אִם הָיָה בְּבַיִת אָפֵל מוּתָּר! הָא לָא קַשְׁיָא: אוֹרַח אַרְעָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, דְּבִיאָה בַּלַּיְלָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this proof: **But rather, what** is the advantage of interpreting the expression: Affection characteristic of the first night, as a reference to the **wedding? Is there a wedding** only **at night** and **not during the day?** The Gemara responds: **And according to your reasoning, is there intercourse** only **at night** and **not during the day?** Didn’t **Rava say** that although the Sages generally prohibited engaging in intercourse during the day, **if it was in a dark house** it is **permitted?** The Gemara rejects this question: **This** is **not difficult.** By employing this phrase, **it teaches us the ordinary mode of behavior,** i.e., **that intercourse** generally takes place **at night.**


###### Ketubot 56a:9
[Ketubot 56a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/56a:9)

אֶלָּא חוּפָּה קַשְׁיָא? חוּפָּה נָמֵי לָא קַשְׁיָא: כֵּיוָן דִּסְתַם חוּפָּה לְבִיאָה קָיְימָא, אוֹרַח אַרְעָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּבַלַּיְלָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** the opinion that the expression is a reference to the **wedding is difficult,** as a wedding does not have to take place at night. The Gemara responds: **The wedding** reference is **also not difficult, since** a reference to **a wedding without specification** means a wedding that **takes place** in order to lead directly **to intercourse.** By using this phrase, **it** similarly **teaches us the ordinary mode of behavior,** i.e., that intercourse generally takes place **at night.** Consequently, this *baraita* cannot be used as a proof for either possibility.


###### Ketubot 56a:10
[Ketubot 56a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/56a:10)

בָּעֵי רַב אָשֵׁי: נִכְנְסָה לְחוּפָּה וּפֵירְסָה נִידָּה, מַהוּ? אִם תִּימְצֵי לוֹמַר חִיבַּת חוּפָּה קוֹנָה, חוּפָּה דְּחַזְיָא לְבִיאָה, אֲבָל חוּפָּה דְּלָא חַזְיָא לְבִיאָה — לָא, אוֹ דִלְמָא לָא שְׁנָא? תֵּיקוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ashi asks** a question similar to Ravin’s: If the bride **entered the wedding canopy and began menstruating,** and the husband then died without ever engaging in intercourse with his wife, **what is** the *halakha* with regard to the additional sum of the marriage contract? **If you say** that the **affection** manifest in the **wedding effects** the marriage, does this refer specifically to **a wedding** in which the couple is **fit to** engage in **intercourse,** which involves greater affection, **and a wedding** in which the couple **is not fit to** engage in **intercourse** does **not** effect the marriage? **Or, perhaps it is not different.** The Sages could not answer this, so the question **shall stand** unresolved.


###### Ketubot 56a:11
[Ketubot 56a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/56a:11)

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: רָצָה, כּוֹתֵב לִבְתוּלָה וְכוּ׳. וְסָבַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה דְּכוֹתְבִין שׁוֹבָר? וְהָתְנַן: מִי שֶׁפָּרַע מִקְצָת חוֹבוֹ — רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: יַחְלִיף. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: יִכְתּוֹב לוֹ שׁוֹבָר!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna states: **Rabbi Yehuda says:** If **he wishes, he may write** a marriage contract **for a virgin** for two hundred dinars, and she may then write a receipt as if he had paid part of that sum. They ask: **And** did **Rabbi Yehuda hold** that one **writes a receipt** for partial payment of a debt? **But didn’t we learn** in a mishna (*Bava Batra* 170b): In the case of **one who repaid part of his debt, Rabbi Yehuda says: He should exchange** the original promissory note for a new one that states the amount still owed, and **Rabbi Yosei says:** The lender **should write him a receipt** for the money he received? According to Rabbi Yehuda, a new note is preferable to a receipt because if the borrower loses the receipt, the lender is still in possession of a promissory note for the full amount and can collect a second time.


###### Ketubot 56a:12
[Ketubot 56a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/56a:12)

אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: כְּשֶׁשּׁוֹבַרְתָּהּ מִתּוֹכָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yirmeya said:** In the mishna, Rabbi Yehuda is referring to a case **where the receipt is** written **within** the marriage contract itself and not as a separate document. The husband is therefore not required to hold on to a receipt, and consequently Rabbi Yehuda’s restriction against writing a receipt is not necessary.


###### Ketubot 56a:13
[Ketubot 56a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/56a:13)

אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא בְּשֶׁאֵין שׁוֹבַרְתָּהּ מִתּוֹכָהּ, בִּשְׁלָמָא הָתָם, וַדַּאי פַּרְעֵיהּ — דִּלְמָא מִירְכַס תָּבַרְתָּא, וּמַפֵּיק לֵיהּ לִשְׁטָרָא, וַהֲדַר גָּבֵי זִימְנָא אַחֲרִינָא. הָכָא, וַדַּאי יְהַב לַהּ? מִילְּתָא בְּעָלְמָא הִיא דַּאֲמַרָה לֵיהּ, אִי נַטְרֵיהּ — נַטְרֵיהּ, אִי לָא נַטְרֵיהּ — אִיהוּ הוּא דְּאַפְסֵיד אַנַּפְשֵׁיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Abaye said: Even** if **you say** that the mishna is referring to a case **where the receipt is not** written **within it,** it is logical that Rabbi Yehuda would make an exception in this case. **Granted, there,** in an ordinary case of a receipt, **it is certain** that the borrower **repaid** part of the loan, and consequently there is concern that **perhaps** he **will lose the receipt** and the lender will **take out the** promissory **note and return and collect** the entire payment **again.** But **here,** in the mishna, did the husband **definitely give** the wife part of the payment for the marriage contract? The receipt **merely** amounts to **something she said to him** in order to waive part of the payment, although she did not actually receive it. **If he saved** the receipt, **he saved it; if he did not save it, it is he himself who will lose.** Therefore, in this case, Rabbi Yehuda agrees that one writes a receipt.


###### Ketubot 56a:14
[Ketubot 56a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/56a:14)

בִּשְׁלָמָא אַבָּיֵי לָא אָמַר כְּרַבִּי יִרְמְיָה, לָא קָתָנֵי שׁוֹבַרְתָּהּ מִתּוֹכָהּ. אֶלָּא רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמַר כְּאַבַּיֵּי? גְּזֵירָה שׁוֹבָר דְּהָכָא אַטּוּ שׁוֹבָר דְּעָלְמָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
They ask: **Granted,** it is understandable why **Abaye did not say** his explanation **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yirmeya,** as the mishna **does not teach** explicitly that the **receipt is** written **within** the marriage contract. **However, what is the reason** that **Rabbi Yirmeya did not say** an explanation **in accordance with** the opinion of **Abaye?** Why does Rabbi Yirmeya limit the mishna to a case where the receipt was written within the marriage contract? The Gemara responds: Although this is an unusual case, as there is no concern that the receipt may be lost, there is nevertheless a rabbinic **decree** with regard to **this receipt due to the typical** case of **receipts.** Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda would not allow a receipt unless it was written into the marriage contract itself.


###### Ketubot 56a:15
[Ketubot 56a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/56a:15)

טַעְמָא — דְּכָתְבָה לֵיהּ, אֲבָל עַל פֶּה — לָא. אַמַּאי? דָּבָר שֶׁבְּמָמוֹן הוּא, וְשָׁמְעִינַן לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה דְּאָמַר: דָּבָר שֶׁבְּמָמוֹן — תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
With regard to the crux of the issue, the Gemara notes: **The reason** that Rabbi Yehuda holds that the wife can waive part of the main sum of her marriage contract **is** specifically because **she wrote him** a receipt. **However,** if she said it **verbally, no,** it is not effective, even according to Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara asks: **Why** not? **This is a monetary matter, and we** have **heard that Rabbi Yehuda said:** With regard to **monetary matters** in which someone makes a verbal stipulation, **his stipulation stands.**


###### Ketubot 56a:16
[Ketubot 56a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/56a:16)

דְּתַנְיָא: הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין לִיךְ עָלַי שְׁאֵר כְּסוּת וְעוֹנָה״ הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וּתְנָאוֹ בָּטֵל, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּדָבָר שֶׁבְּמָמוֹן — תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
This is **as it is taught** in the *Tosefta* (*Kiddushin* 3:7): In the case of **one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that you have no** ability to claim **from me food, clothing, or conjugal rights, she is betrothed and his stipulation is void;** this is **the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says:** With regard to **monetary matters,** such as food and clothing, **his stipulation stands;** therefore, if she verbally waives part of the marriage contract, and thereby makes a stipulation about a monetary matter, it should be effective.


###### Ketubot 56a:17
[Ketubot 56a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/56a:17)

קָסָבַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: כְּתוּבָּה דְּרַבָּנַן, וַחֲכָמִים עָשׂוּ חִיזּוּק לְדִבְרֵיהֶם יוֹתֵר מִשֶּׁל תּוֹרָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **Rabbi Yehuda holds:** The **marriage contract is a rabbinic** law, **and the Sages reinforced their pronouncements with greater** force **than Torah law.** Therefore, if the wife waives part of the main sum of the marriage contract, Rabbi Yehuda holds that her declaration has no force unless it is written down. However, a Torah obligation, such as food and clothing, does not require this reinforcement, and consequently the wife may waive it with a verbal stipulation.


###### Ketubot 56a:18
[Ketubot 56a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/56a:18)

הֲרֵי פֵּירוֹת דְּרַבָּנַן, וְלָא עֲבַדוּ לְהוּ רַבָּנַן חִיזּוּק! דִּתְנַן, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: לְעוֹלָם הוּא אוֹכֵל פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת — עַד שֶׁיִּכְתּוֹב לָהּ: ״דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִּנְכָסַיִךְ, וּבְפֵירוֹתֵיהֶן, וּבְפֵירוֹת פֵּירוֹתֵיהֶן עַד עוֹלָם״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges this answer: The husband’s entitlement to the **produce** of his wife’s property **is a rabbinic** decree, **and** nevertheless **the Sages did not reinforce** his rights to **them, as we learned** in a mishna (83a): **Rabbi Yehuda says:** Even if the husband wrote that he waived his rights to the produce of his wife’s property, **he may actually consume the produce of the produce** of her property, meaning that he could invest the produce in additional property, which would also belong to his wife, but he would consume its produce. This applies **unless he** explicitly **writes** to **her: I do not have any claim to your property, its produce, or the produce of its produce, forever.**