## Ketubot Daf 70b

###### Ketubot 70b:1
[Ketubot 70b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/70b:1)

נַעֲשָׂה כְּאוֹמֵר לָהּ ״צְאִי מַעֲשֵׂה יָדַיִךְ בִּמְזוֹנוֹתַיִךְ״. וְאִם אִיתַהּ לְהָא דְּרַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב, דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: יְכוֹלָה אִשָּׁה שֶׁתֹּאמַר לְבַעְלָהּ ״אֵינִי נִיזּוֹנֶת וְאֵינִי עוֹשָׂה״, ״קוּנָּם שֶׁאֲנִי עוֹשָׂה לְפִיךָ״, אַמַּאי אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְהָפֵר? לֵימָא: מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁיְּכוֹלָה לוֹמַר ״אֵינִי נִיזּוֹנֶת וְאֵינִי עוֹשָׂה״, נַעֲשֶׂה כְּמִי שֶׁאוֹמֶרֶת לוֹ: ״אֵינִי נִיזּוֹנֶת וְאֵינִי עוֹשָׂה״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**it is considered as** though **he** were in fact **saying to her: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself.** The Gemara raises a difficulty: **And if it is so,** i.e., **that** the *halakha* is in accordance with **that** statement **that Rav Huna said** that **Rav said, as Rav Huna said** that **Rav said: A wife may say to her husband: I will not be sustained** by you **and,** in turn, **I will not work,** i.e., you will not keep my earnings, then when she says: That **which I perform for** the benefit of **your mouth** will be **forbidden like an offering [*konam*], why does he not need to nullify** the vow? Here too, **let** us **say: Since she is able to say: I will not be sustained** by you **and I will not work, it is considered as** though **she** were in fact **saying to him** by her vow: **I will not be sustained** by you **and I will not work,** and he should therefore have to nullify the vow.


###### Ketubot 70b:2
[Ketubot 70b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/70b:2)

אֶלָּא, לָא תֵּימָא ״נַעֲשֶׂה״, אֶלָּא בְּאוֹמֵר לָהּ: ״צְאִי מַעֲשֵׂה יָדַיִךְ בִּמְזוֹנוֹתַיִךְ״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** the Gemara retracts its previous interpretation in favor of the following: **Do not say it is considered as** though he said to her: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself. **Rather,** the mishna is referring to a case **where he** explicitly **says to her: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself.**


###### Ketubot 70b:3
[Ketubot 70b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/70b:3)

אִי הָכִי פַּרְנָס לְמָה לַהּ? בִּדְלָא סָפְקָה: אִי בִּדְלָא סָפְקָה — הֲדַר קוּשְׁיַין לְדוּכְתֵּיהּ? אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: בְּמַסְפֶּקֶת לִדְבָרִים גְּדוֹלִים, וְאֵינָהּ מַסְפֶּקֶת לִדְבָרִים קְטַנִּים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises a difficulty: **If so,** if he provided for her sustenance by instructing her to spend her own earnings, **why** does **she** require **a trustee?** The Gemara answers: This is referring to a situation **where** the amount she earns **is not enough** for her needs. Therefore, the husband must appoint a trustee to provide the balance. The Gemara asks: **If** it is a case **where** the amount she earns **is not enough** for her needs, **our difficulty is restored to its place:** How can he prohibit her from benefiting from him if he is under a prior obligation to provide for her? **Rav Ashi said:** The mishna is referring to a case **where** her earnings are **enough for large things,** i.e., her basic requirements, **but not enough for small things.**


###### Ketubot 70b:4
[Ketubot 70b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/70b:4)

הָנֵי דְּבָרִים קְטַנִּים, הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דִּרְגִילָה בְּהוּ — הָא רְגִילָה בְּהוּ! וְאִי לָא רְגִילָה בְּהוּ — פַּרְנָס לְמָה לַהּ? לָא צְרִיכָא: דִּרְגִילָה בְּבֵית נָשָׁא, וְקָא מְגַלְגְּלָא בַּהֲדֵיהּ, דְּאָמְרָה לֵיהּ: עַד הָאִידָּנָא דְּלָא אַדַּרְתַּן — גַּלְגֵּילְנָא בַּהֲדָךְ, הַשְׁתָּא דְּאַדַּרְתַּן — לָא מָצֵינָא דֶּאֱיגַלְגֵּל בַּהֲדָךְ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: With regard to **these small things** for which her earnings are not enough, **what are the circumstances? If** the discussion involves a case where **she is accustomed to them,** then **she is accustomed to them** and they are equivalent to all other necessities, which he must provide. **And if she is not accustomed to them, why** does **she** require **a trustee?** The Gemara answers: **No,** it is **necessary** in a case **where** she was **accustomed** to such small provisions **in her father’s house, but she** agreed to marry him and lower her lifestyle, and she had, until now, **abided** the lesser lifestyle and remained **with him. For she says to him: Until now, when you did not vow** to render it prohibited for me to benefit from you, **I abided** the lesser lifestyle and remained **with you.** However, **now that you have vowed, I can no** longer **abide** the lesser lifestyle and remain **with you,** and therefore I wish to revert to the conditions of my father’s house.


###### Ketubot 70b:5
[Ketubot 70b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/70b:5)

וּמַאי שְׁנָא עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם? עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם לֹא שָׁמְעִי בַּהּ אִינָשֵׁי וְלָא זִילָא בַּהּ מִילְּתָא, טְפֵי — שָׁמְעִי בַּהּ אִינָשֵׁי וְזִילָא בַּהּ מִילְּתָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara poses a question: **And what is different** about the time period mentioned in the mishna: **Up to thirty days?** The Gemara answers: If **up to thirty days** have passed, this is a short enough amount of time that **people do not hear about her, and the matter** of her receiving her sustenance through an intermediary **is** therefore **not demeaning for her.** However, if the vow lasts **longer** than this, **people** do **hear about her, and the matter is demeaning for her.** The husband must therefore decide if he wants to divorce her or sustain her in the appropriate fashion.


###### Ketubot 70b:6
[Ketubot 70b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/70b:6)

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא שֶׁהִדִּירָהּ כְּשֶׁהִיא אֲרוּסָה, אֲרוּסָה מִי אִית לַהּ מְזוֹנֵי? שֶׁהִגִּיעַ זְמַן וְלֹא נִשְּׂאוּ. דִּתְנַן: הִגִּיעַ זְמַן וְלֹא נִשְּׂאוּ — אוֹכְלוֹת מִשֶּׁלּוֹ וְאוֹכְלוֹת בִּתְרוּמָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests an alternative answer: **If you wish, say** that the husband is under no obligation to sustain her because the case discussed in the mishna was **where he vowed** and obligated **her when she** was still **a betrothed woman,** and therefore he was not yet duty-bound to provide her with sustenance. The Gemara is puzzled by this explanation: **Does a betrothed woman have** any right to **sustenance** from her husband at all? The Gemara answers: The circumstance referred to is **when the** arranged **time** for the marriage **had arrived and they had not** yet gotten **married. As we learned** in a mishna (57a): If **the time arrived** and **they had not** yet gotten **married,** such women **may eat** food **from his** property, **and** if their husbands were priests **they may partake of *teruma*.**


###### Ketubot 70b:7
[Ketubot 70b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/70b:7)

וּמַאי שְׁנָא עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם? עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם עָבֵיד שָׁלִיחַ שְׁלִיחוּתֵיהּ, טְפֵי — לָא עָבֵיד שָׁלִיחַ שְׁלִיחוּתֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But** if so, **what is different** if the vow will remain in effect for **up to thirty days** or longer? The Gemara answers: For **up to thirty days,** the **agent will carry out his agency** effectively and take proper care of her needs. If the vow lasts **longer,** the **agent will not** fully **carry out his agency** but will begin to neglect her, until she cannot bear the situation any longer.


###### Ketubot 70b:8
[Ketubot 70b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/70b:8)

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא שֶׁהִדִּירָהּ כְּשֶׁהִיא אֲרוּסָה וְנִישֵּׂאת, נִישֵּׂאת — הָא סְבַרָה וְקַבִּילָה! דְּאָמְרָה: כִּסְבוּרָה אֲנִי שֶׁאֲנִי יְכוֹלָה לְקַבֵּל, עַכְשָׁיו אֵין אֲנִי יְכוֹלָה לְקַבֵּל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you wish, say** that **he vowed** and obligated **her when she was** still **a betrothed woman and she** subsequently **married** him, and therefore he is obligated to provide her sustenance. The Gemara is puzzled: If **she married** him after his vow, **she considered** the matter **and accepted** it upon herself. Why then is he forced to divorce her? The Gemara answers: The case is **when** she **says: I thought that I could accept** this manner of living, but **now** I see that **I cannot accept** it.


###### Ketubot 70b:9
[Ketubot 70b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/70b:9)

אֵימַר דְּאָמְרִינַן הָכִי גַּבֵּי מוּמִין, לְעִנְיַן מְזוֹנֵי מִי אָמְרִינַן הָכִי? אֶלָּא מְחַוַּורְתָּא כִּדְשַׁנִּינַן מֵעִיקָּרָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises a difficulty: You can **say that we say so,** that if either the husband or the wife suffers from a physical blemish, the other can demand a divorce even after agreeing to the marriage under these conditions. This is **with regard to blemishes,** but **with regard to sustenance can we say so? Rather, it is clear as we initially answered:** The mishna discusses either a case where he told her to support herself from her own earnings and she had accepted a lower standard of living while she was with him, or a case where he took the vow when she was betrothed, and now the appointed time for the marriage has arrived and they have not yet gotten married.


###### Ketubot 70b:10
[Ketubot 70b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/70b:10)

עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם יַעֲמִיד פַּרְנָס. וּפַרְנָס לָאו שְׁלִיחוּתֵיהּ קָא עָבֵיד? אָמַר רַב הוּנָא, בְּאוֹמֵר: ״כׇּל הַזָּן אֵינוֹ מַפְסִיד״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna states that if his vow will remain in effect for **up to thirty days he must appoint a trustee** to provide sustenance to his wife. The Gemara is puzzled by this ruling: **And does a trustee not perform** the husband’s **agency?** If through his vow he has rendered it prohibited for her to derive benefit from him, how can he provide for her through the trustee? An action performed by an agent is considered to have been performed by the principal. **Rav Huna said:** The trustee discussed in the mishna was not actually appointed as an agent. Rather, the mishna is referring **to one who says** in general terms: **Whoever sustains** my wife **will not lose out.** Thus, anyone who complies does so of his own choice, although the husband will later compensate him. Therefore, the wife is not benefiting directly from the husband.


###### Ketubot 70b:11
[Ketubot 70b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/70b:11)

וְכִי אָמַר הָכִי לָאו שְׁלִיחוּתֵיהּ קָעָבֵיד? וְהָתְנַן: מִי שֶׁהָיָה מוּשְׁלָךְ בְּבוֹר, וְאָמַר: ״כׇּל הַשּׁוֹמֵעַ קוֹלוֹ יִכְתּוֹב גֵּט לְאִשְׁתּוֹ״ — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ יִכְתְּבוּ וְיִתְּנוּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara poses a question: **And when** a husband **says this,** is the one who responds **not performing** the husband’s **agency? But didn’t we learn** in a mishna (*Gittin* 66a): With regard to **one who was cast into a pit and said** that **whoever hears his voice should write a bill of divorce for his wife,** saying this out of concern that he might not be rescued and that she would not be able to remarry or would be required to enter into levirate marriage, **those** who heard him **should write and give** her a bill of divorce? This ruling indicates that they are considered his agents based on his instructions, as otherwise they would not be able to write a bill of divorce on his behalf. The similarly formulated statement here should therefore also endow the trustee with the status of an agent.


###### Ketubot 70b:12
[Ketubot 70b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/70b:12)

הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! הָתָם קָאָמַר ״יִכְתּוֹב״, הָכָא מִי קָאָמַר ״יָזוּן״? ״כׇּל הַזָּן״ קָאָמַר!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara refutes this claim: **How can** these cases **be compared? There,** in the case of a bill of divorce, he **says** that whoever hears his voice **should write** a bill of divorce, which is a command, and therefore those who hear him are considered his agents. **Here,** however, **does** he **say** that anyone **should sustain** his wife? **He** merely **says: Whoever sustains** her will not lose out, which is a general statement.


###### Ketubot 70b:13
[Ketubot 70b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/70b:13)

וְהָא אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי: בִּדְלֵיקָה הִתִּירוּ לוֹמַר: ״כׇּל הַמְכַבֶּה אֵינוֹ מַפְסִיד״. בִּדְלֵיקָה לְמַעוֹטֵי מַאי? לָאו לְמַעוֹטֵי כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא?! לָא, לְמַעוֹטֵי שְׁאָר אִיסּוּרִים דְּשַׁבָּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises a difficulty: **But Rabbi Ami said:** In the case **of a fire** that broke out on Shabbat, the Sages **permitted** him **to say** in the presence of gentiles: **Whoever extinguishes** this fire **will not lose out.** From this it can be inferred that the phrase: In the case **of a fire,** comes **to exclude what?** Does it **not exclude a case like this?** It would seem that it was only in the case of a fire, when there are several extenuating factors, that the Sages permitted the use of such an expression without treating it as the appointment of an agent. The Gemara refutes this: **No,** this ruling serves **to exclude other prohibitions of Shabbat.**


###### Ketubot 70b:14
[Ketubot 70b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/70b:14)

מֵתִיב רַבָּה: הַמּוּדָּר הֲנָאָה מֵחֲבֵירוֹ, וְאֵין לוֹ מַה יֹּאכַל — יֵלֵךְ אֵצֶל חֶנְוָנִי הָרָגִיל אֶצְלוֹ, וְיֹאמַר לוֹ: ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי מוּדָּר הֲנָאָה מִמֶּנִּי, וְאֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ מָה אֶעֱשֶׂה לוֹ״. הוּא נוֹתֵן לוֹ, וּבָא וְנוֹטֵל מִזֶּה. הָכִי הוּא דִּשְׁרֵי, אֲבָל ״כׇּל הַזָּן אֵינוֹ מַפְסִיד״ — לָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabba raised an objection** from a mishna (*Nedarim* 43a): In the case of **one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another** because of a vow the other took, **and he does not have** anything **to eat,** if the one who made the vow wants to help him but is unable to do so due to the vow, **he may go to a storekeeper with whom he is familiar and say to him: So-and-so is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from me, and I do not know what I can do for him.** The storekeeper subsequently **gives** food **to him, and** later **comes and takes** payment **from this** person who approached him. Rabba infers: **This** method of indirectly hinting **is what is permitted, but** he may **not** say: **Whoever sustains** the man **will not lose out,** as a declaration of that kind would make the storekeeper his agent.


###### Ketubot 70b:15
[Ketubot 70b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/70b:15)

לָא מִיבַּעְיָא קָאָמַר: לָא מִיבַּעְיָא ״כׇּל הַזָּן אֵינוֹ מַפְסִיד״ — דִּלְעָלְמָא קָאָמַר, אֲבָל הַאי, כֵּיוָן דְּרָגִיל אֶצְלוֹ וְקָאָזֵיל קָאָמַר לֵיהּ, כְּמַאן דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ זִיל, ״הַב לֵיהּ אַתְּ״ דָּמֵי — קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara refutes this claim: The *tanna* **is speaking** utilizing the style of: **It is not necessary,** and he means the following: **It is not necessary** to say that he is permitted to say in general terms: **Whoever sustains** so-and-so **will not lose out, as** by doing so **he is speaking to everyone** and therefore does not appoint a specific agent. **But this** storekeeper, **since** the one who took the oath **is familiar with him and he goes** and **says** this **to him,** might be considered **like the one who said to him: Go, give him yourself.** The mishna therefore **teaches us** that since the one who made the vow did not issue an explicit command, the storekeeper is not considered his agent.


###### Ketubot 70b:16
[Ketubot 70b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/70b:16)

גּוּפָא: הַמּוּדָּר הֲנָאָה מֵחֲבֵירוֹ וְאֵין לוֹ מַה יֹּאכַל, הוֹלֵךְ אֵצֶל חֶנְוָנִי הָרָגִיל אֶצְלוֹ, וְאוֹמֵר לוֹ: ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי מוּדָּר הֲנָאָה מִמֶּנִּי, וְאֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ מָה אֶעֱשֶׂה לוֹ״. הוּא נוֹתֵן לוֹ, וּבָא וְנוֹטֵל מִזֶּה. בֵּיתוֹ לִבְנוֹת, וּגְדֵירוֹ לִגְדּוֹר, וְשָׂדֵהוּ לִקְצוֹר — הוֹלֵךְ אֵצֶל פּוֹעֲלִין הָרְגִילִין אֶצְלוֹ, וְאוֹמֵר לָהֶן: ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי מוּדָּר הֲנָאָה מִמֶּנִּי וְאֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ מָה אֶעֱשֶׂה לוֹ״. הֵן עוֹשִׂין עִמּוֹ, וּבָאִין וְנוֹטְלִים שְׂכָרָן מִזֶּה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ Since it mentioned the above case, the Gemara returns to discuss **the** matter **itself:** In the case of **one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another** because of a vow the other took, **and he does not have** anything **to eat,** the one who took the vow **may go to a storekeeper with whom he is familiar and say to him: So-and-so is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from me, and I do not know what I can do for him.** The storekeeper **gives** food **to him, and** later **comes and takes** payment **from this** one who approached him. Similarly, if the subject of the vow needed someone **to build his house, or to erect his fence, or to reap his field,** and the one who took the vow wants to help him, he should **go to workers with whom he is familiar and say to them: So-and-so is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from me, and I do not know what I can do for him. They** subsequently **perform** work **for** the subject of the vow, **and they come and take their wages from this** person who spoke to them.


###### Ketubot 70b:17
[Ketubot 70b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Ketubot/r/70b:17)

הָיוּ מְהַלְּכִין בַּדֶּרֶךְ, וְאֵין עִמּוֹ מַה יֹּאכַל — נוֹתֵן לְאַחֵר לְשׁוּם מַתָּנָה, וְהַלָּה נוֹטֵל וְאוֹכֵל, וּמוּתָּר. וְאִם אֵין שָׁם אַחֵר — מַנִּיחַ עַל גַּבֵּי הַסֶּלַע אוֹ עַל גַּבֵּי הַגָּדֵר, וְאוֹמֵר: ״הֲרֵי הֵן מוּפְקָרִין לְכׇל מִי שֶׁיַּחְפּוֹץ״, וְהַלָּה נוֹטֵל וְאוֹכֵל, וּמוּתָּר. וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹסֵר. אָמַר רָבָא: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי — גְּזֵירָה מִשּׁוּם

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
If the two **were walking along the way, and** the one prohibited from benefiting from the other **does not have** anything **with him to eat,** the one who took the vow may **give** food **to a different** person **as a gift, and this** one **takes** it **and eats, and** this arrangement is **permitted,** as he did not give the food directly to him. **And if there is no other** person **there** apart from the two of them, he should **place** the items **on a rock or on a fence and say: They are** hereby declared **ownerless for anyone who wants** them, **and this** one **takes** the food items **and eats** them, **and** this too is **permitted. But Rabbi Yosei prohibits** this practice. **Rava said: What is the reason** for this ruling **of Rabbi Yosei?** It is a rabbinic **decree due to**