## Kiddushin Daf 14a

###### Kiddushin 14a:1
[Kiddushin 14a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/14a:1)

״יְבָמָהּ יָבֹא עָלֶיהָ וּלְקָחָהּ לוֹ לְאִשָּׁה״. וְאֵימָא, לְכוּלַּהּ מִילְּתָא כְּאִשָּׁה! לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דְּתַנְיָא: יָכוֹל יְהוּ כֶּסֶף וּשְׁטָר גּוֹמְרִים בָּהּ, כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁהַבִּיאָה גּוֹמֶרֶת בָּהּ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְיִבְּמָהּ״ – בִּיאָה גּוֹמֶרֶת בָּהּ וְאֵין כֶּסֶף וּשְׁטָר גּוֹמְרִים בָּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**“Her brother-in-law will engage in sexual intercourse with her and take her to him as a wife,** and perform levirate marriage with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5), which indicates that intercourse renders her his wife. The Gemara asks: **But** one can **say** that **with regard to all matters** she is **like a wife,** and therefore she can also be acquired with money or a document like any other woman. The Gemara answers: It could **not enter your mind** to say this, **as it is taught** in a *baraita*: One **might** have thought that **money and a document can complete** the acquisition of a *yevama* and cause her to be married, **in the manner that intercourse completes** her acquisition. Therefore, **the verse states: “And perform levirate marriage with her”** (Deuteronomy 25:5), which indicates that only **intercourse completes her** acquisition, **but money or a document do not complete her** acquisition.


###### Kiddushin 14a:2
[Kiddushin 14a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/14a:2)

וְאֵימָא: מַאי ״וְיִבְּמָהּ״? דִּבְעַל כֻּרְחַהּ מְיַבֵּם. אִם כֵּן, לֵימָא קְרָא: ״וְיִבֵּם״, מַאי ״וְיִבְּמָהּ״? שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ תַּרְתֵּי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But** one can **say: What** is the meaning of: **“And perform levirate marriage with her”?** It teaches **that he can perform levirate marriage without her consent,** as unlike an ordinary marriage, a levirate marriage does not require the woman’s agreement. The Gemara answers: **If so, let the verse say: And perform levirate marriage,** and one would understand that the matter depends entirely on him. **What is** the meaning of: **“And perform levirate marriage with her”? Learn two** conclusions **from this:** First, that a levirate marriage can be performed against her will, and second, that the only way to acquire a *yevama* is through sexual intercourse.


###### Kiddushin 14a:3
[Kiddushin 14a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/14a:3)

בַּחֲלִיצָה. מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״וְנִקְרָא שְׁמוֹ בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל בֵּית חֲלוּץ הַנָּעַל״ – כֵּיוָן שֶׁחָלַץ בָּהּ נַעַל, הוּתְּרָה לְכׇל יִשְׂרָאֵל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches that the *yevama* acquires herself **through *ḥalitza*.** The Gemara asks: **From where do we** derive this *halakha*? The Gemara answers: **As it is written** with regard to levirate marriage, after the *yavam* has performed *ḥalitza*: **“And his name shall be called in Israel: The house of him who had his shoe removed”** (Deuteronomy 25:10). This indicates: **Once** his **shoe is removed by her, she is permitted to all of Israel.**


###### Kiddushin 14a:4
[Kiddushin 14a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/14a:4)

הַאי ״יִשְׂרָאֵל״ לְהָכִי הוּא דַּאֲתָא? הַאי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתָנֵי רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר יְהוּדָה: ״בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל״ – בְּבֵית דִּין שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל, וְלֹא בְּבֵית דִּין שֶׁל נׇכְרִים! תְּרֵי ״בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל״ כְּתִיבִי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **This** term **“Israel,” does it come** to teach **this** *halakha*? **It is required for that which is taught** by **Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda:** The verse says **“in Israel”** to teach that *ḥalitza* may be performed only **in a Jewish court, but not in a gentile court.** The Gemara answers that the phrase **“in Israel” is written twice** in that chapter: “And his name shall be called in Israel” (Deuteronomy 25:10), and: “To establish a name for his brother in Israel” (Deuteronomy 25:7). A different *halakha* is derived from each of these instances.


###### Kiddushin 14a:5
[Kiddushin 14a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/14a:5)

וְאַכַּתִּי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: פַּעַם אַחַת הָיִינוּ יוֹשְׁבִים לִפְנֵי רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן, וּבָאתָה יְבָמָה לַחְלוֹץ, וְאָמַר לָנוּ: עֲנוּ כּוּלְּכֶם וְאִמְרוּ: ״חֲלוּץ הַנַּעַל, חֲלוּץ הַנַּעַל״. הָהוּא, מִ״וְּנִקְרָא שְׁמוֹ״ נָפְקָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But still, we** also **require** the additional term “in Israel” **for that which is taught** in a *baraita*, that **Rabbi Yehuda said: Once we were sitting before Rabbi Tarfon and a *yevama* came to perform *ḥalitza*. And** Rabbi Tarfon **said to us** after the *ḥalitza*: **All of you** should **answer and say: The one whose shoe was removed, the one whose shoe was removed.** This indicates that the phrase: “And his name shall be called in Israel” (Deuteronomy 25:10), teaches that the matter must be announced and publicized throughout the nation. The Gemara answers: **That** *halakha* is not derived from the phrase “in Israel.” Rather, **it is derived from: “And his name shall be called,”** which indicates that it must be announced that this is his name.


###### Kiddushin 14a:6
[Kiddushin 14a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/14a:6)

וּבְמִיתַת הַיָּבָם. מְנָלַן? קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ שֶׁהִיא בְּחֶנֶק – מִיתַת הַבַּעַל מַתִּירָתָהּ, יְבָמָהּ שֶׁהִיא בְּלָאו – לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna further teaches that a *yevama* is released from levirate marriage and may remarry **through the death of the *yavam*.** The Gemara asks: **From where do we** derive this *halakha*? The Gemara answers that it is **an *a fortiori*** inference: **If,** with regard to **a married woman, who is** forbidden to other men by a prohibition punished **with strangulation,** and yet **the death of her husband renders her permitted,** is **it not all the more so** that with regard to **a *yevama*, who is** forbidden to other men while the *yavam* is alive **by** only a mere **prohibition,** that the death of the *yavam* should render her permitted?


###### Kiddushin 14a:7
[Kiddushin 14a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/14a:7)

מָה לְאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ, שֶׁכֵּן יוֹצְאָה בְּגֵט, תֹּאמַר בְּזוֹ שֶׁאֵינָהּ יוֹצְאָה בְּגֵט! הָא נָמֵי יוֹצְאָה בַּחֲלִיצָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises a difficulty against this *a fortiori* inference: **What** is unique **about a married woman** is **that she can leave through a bill of divorce** as well. Will **you say** the same **with regard to this** *yevama*, **who does not leave through a bill of divorce?** The Gemara answers: This is an insufficient refutation of the *a fortiori* inference, as **this** *yevama* **also leaves through *ḥalitza*,** which serves the same function as a bill of divorce.


###### Kiddushin 14a:8
[Kiddushin 14a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/14a:8)

אֶלָּא: מָה לְאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ שֶׁכֵּן אוֹסְרָהּ מַתִּירָהּ! אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: הָא נָמֵי אוֹסְרָהּ מַתִּירָהּ – יָבָם אוֹסְרָהּ, יָבָם שָׁרֵי לַהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** one can challenge this *a fortiori* inference in the following manner. **What** is unique **about a married woman** is **that** the one who **renders her forbidden** to everyone else, i.e., her husband, also **renders her permitted** when he dies. This is not so with regard to a *yevama*, as she is rendered forbidden upon the death of her husband. **Rav Ashi said:** With regard to **this** *yevama* **as well,** he who **renders her forbidden** is also the one who **renders her permitted:** The ***yavam* renders her forbidden,** because if he was not alive she would automatically be permitted to other men. Likewise, the ***yavam* renders her permitted** through *ḥalitza*.


###### Kiddushin 14a:9
[Kiddushin 14a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/14a:9)

וּתְהֵא אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ יוֹצְאָה בַּחֲלִיצָה מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה יְבָמָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ יוֹצְאָה בְּגֵט – יוֹצְאָה בַּחֲלִיצָה, זוֹ, שֶׁיּוֹצְאָה בְּגֵט – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיּוֹצְאָה בַּחֲלִיצָה? אָמַר קְרָא: ״סֵפֶר כְּרִיתֻת״ – סֵפֶר כּוֹרְתָהּ, וְאֵין דָּבָר אַחֵר כּוֹרְתָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And let a married woman leave** a marriage **through *ḥalitza*,** as derived **by an *a fortiori*** inference: **If a *yevama*, who cannot leave through a bill of divorce, can leave through *ḥalitza*, is it not logical** that **this** married woman, **who can leave through a bill of divorce, can** likewise **leave through *ḥalitza*?** The Gemara answers: **The verse states** with regard to a married woman: **“A scroll of severance”** (Deuteronomy 24:3), which indicates that **a scroll,** i.e., a written document, **severs her** from her husband **and nothing else severs her** from him. While the husband is alive only a bill of divorce can dissolve a marriage.


###### Kiddushin 14a:10
[Kiddushin 14a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/14a:10)

וּתְהֵא יְבָמָה יוֹצֵאת בְּגֵט מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ שֶׁאֵין יוֹצְאָה בַּחֲלִיצָה – יוֹצְאָה בְּגֵט, זוֹ שֶׁיּוֹצְאָה בַּחֲלִיצָה – אֵין דִּין שֶׁיּוֹצְאָה בְּגֵט? אָמַר קְרָא: ״כָּכָה״, וְ״כָכָה״ עִיכּוּבָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara further asks: **And let a *yevama* leave through a bill of divorce,** as derived **by an *a fortiori*** inference: **If a married woman, who cannot leave through *ḥalitza*, can leave through a bill of divorce, is it not logical** that **this** *yevama*, **who can leave through *ḥalitza*, can** also **leave through a bill of divorce?** The Gemara answers: **The verse states: “So** shall it be done to the man” (Deuteronomy 25:9), with regard to the *ḥalitza* of a *yevama*, **and “so” precludes** another option.


###### Kiddushin 14a:11
[Kiddushin 14a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/14a:11)

וְכֹל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא עִיכּוּבָא לָא דָּרְשִׁי קַל וָחוֹמֶר? וְהָא יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים דִּכְתִיב: ״גּוֹרָל״, וְ״חוּקָּה״,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** is it true that **anywhere that there is** a term that **precludes** another option **one cannot learn an *a fortiori*** inference? **But there is** the case of the designation of the goats on **Yom Kippur, as it is written:** “The goat upon which the **lot** came up for the Lord” (Leviticus 16:9), **and:** “This shall be an everlasting **statute** to you” (Leviticus 16:34), which indicates that everything stated with regard to the mitzvot of Yom Kippur is critical to the performance of the service of the day.


###### Kiddushin 14a:12
[Kiddushin 14a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/14a:12)

וְתַנְיָא: ״וְעָשָׂהוּ חַטָּאת״ – הַגּוֹרָל עוֹשֶׂה חַטָּאת, וְאֵין הַשֵּׁם עוֹשֶׂה חַטָּאת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And it is taught** in a *baraita* that the verse states: “Aaron shall bring forward the goat upon which the lot came up for the Lord, **and he shall offer it for a sin-offering”** (Leviticus 16:9). The verse indicates that **the lottery renders** it **a sin-offering,** but **a verbal designation** of the goat with the status of a sin-offering **does not render** it **a sin-offering.**


###### Kiddushin 14a:13
[Kiddushin 14a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/14a:13)

שֶׁיָּכוֹל, וַהֲלֹא דִּין הוּא: וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁלֹּא קִידֵּשׁ הַגּוֹרָל – קִידֵּשׁ הַשֵּׁם, מְקוֹם שֶׁקִּידֵּשׁ הַגּוֹרָל – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּקַדֵּשׁ הַשֵּׁם?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The *baraita* continues: A verse is necessary to teach this *halakha*, **as** one **might** have thought that the opposite conclusion is correct: Could this **not** be derived through an *a fortiori* **inference,** as follows: **Just as in a case in which** the use of **a lottery does not effect the consecration** of the animals with a specific designation, e.g., with regard to a woman who has given birth and must bring two birds, one as a sin-offering and one as a burnt-offering, and nevertheless **a verbal designation** of the animals with the required status **does effect the consecration** of them, so too, in **a case in which** the use of **a lottery does effect the consecration** of the animals, **is it not** logically **right that a verbal designation** of the animals with the required status **should effect the consecration** of them?


###### Kiddushin 14a:14
[Kiddushin 14a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/14a:14)

תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְעָשָׂהוּ חַטָּאת״ – הַגּוֹרָל עוֹשֶׂה חַטָּאת וְאֵין הַשֵּׁם עוֹשֶׂה חַטָּאת. וְטַעְמָא דְּמַעֲטֵיהּ קְרָא, הָא לָאו הָכִי דָּרְשִׁינַן קַל וָחוֹמֶר, אַף עַל גַּב דִּכְתִיב בֵּיהּ ״חוּקָּה״!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
To counter this reasoning, **the verse states** with regard to the goat: **“He shall offer it for a sin-offering”** (Leviticus 16:9), to indicate that **the lottery renders** it **a sin-offering, but a verbal designation** of the goat with the status of a sin-offering **does not render** it **a sin-offering. And the reason** that a verbal designation is ineffective **is that the verse excluded** this possibility, from which it may be inferred **that if it were not so, one would learn an *a fortiori*** inference, **even though it is written with regard to it “statute.”** The same logic should apply in the case of *ḥalitza*, i.e., the term “so” should not prevent one from learning an *a fortiori* inference, and therefore it might be argued that a *yevama* can be released through a bill of divorce.


###### Kiddushin 14a:15
[Kiddushin 14a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/14a:15)

אָמַר קְרָא: ״לָהּ״, ״לָהּ״ – וְלֹא לִיבָמָהּ. וְאֵימָא ״לָהּ״ לִשְׁמָהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rather, the Gemara explains that here too, there is a limitation derived from a verse. **The verse states** with regard to a bill of divorce: “And write **for her** a scroll of severance” (Deuteronomy 24:3). **“For her”** is a limitation, which teaches: A bill of divorce is effective for a regular woman **but not for a *yevama*.** The Gemara asks: **But** one can **say** that the phrase **“for her”** indicates that the bill of divorce must be written **for her sake.**


###### Kiddushin 14a:16
[Kiddushin 14a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/14a:16)

תְּרֵי ״לָהּ״ כְּתִיבִי. וְאַכַּתִּי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ חַד ״לָהּ״ לִשְׁמָהּ, וְאִידָּךְ ״לָהּ״ – וְלֹא לָהּ וְלַחֲבֶירְתָּהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **“For her” is written twice** (Deuteronomy 24:1, 3), and therefore both *halakhot* can be derived. The Gemara asks: **And still, one** instance of: **“For her” is required** to teach that the bill of divorce must be written **for her sake, and the other “for her”** is needed to teach: For her **and not** both **for her and for another,** i.e., her rival wife. One bill of divorce cannot be used for two women.


###### Kiddushin 14a:17
[Kiddushin 14a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/14a:17)

אֶלָּא, אָמַר קְרָא: ״נָעַל״ – נַעַל אִין, מִידֵּי אַחֲרִינָא – לָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** the Gemara suggests a different explanation as to why a bill of divorce is ineffective for a *yevama*. With regard to a *yevama* **the verse states:** “The house of him who had his **shoe** removed” (Deuteronomy 25:10), which teaches: If she is released by the *ḥalitza* of the **shoe, yes,** she is released from the *yavam*, but if she was released by means of **something else, no,** she is not released.


###### Kiddushin 14a:18
[Kiddushin 14a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/14a:18)

וְהַאי ״נָעַל״ לְהָכִי הוּא דַּאֲתָא? הַאי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״נַעֲלוֹ״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא נַעֲלוֹ, נַעַל שֶׁל כׇּל אָדָם מְנָא לֵיהּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But this** term **“shoe,” does it come** to teach **this? It is necessary for that which is taught** in a *baraita*: The verse said: “And remove **his shoe”** (Deuteronomy 25:9). **I have** derived **only** that **his shoe** may be used. **From where** do I derive that the **shoe of any person** may also be used for *ḥalitza*?


###### Kiddushin 14a:19
[Kiddushin 14a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/14a:19)

תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״נַעַל״ ״נַעַל״ – רִיבָּה. אִם כֵּן מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״נַעֲלוֹ״? – נַעֲלוֹ הָרָאוּי לוֹ, פְּרָט לְגָדוֹל שֶׁאֵין יָכוֹל לְהַלֵּךְ בּוֹ, פְּרָט לְקָטָן שֶׁאֵין חוֹפֶה אֶת רוֹב רַגְלוֹ, פְּרָט

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**The verse states “shoe,”** and states again in the next verse **“shoe,”** which **includes** any other shoe. **If so, what** is the meaning when **the verse states “his shoe,”** which is apparently referring to the shoe of that particular man? This teaches that it must be **his shoe that is fit for him, excluding** a shoe so **large that he cannot walk in it,** and **excluding** a shoe so **small that it does not cover most of his foot,** and **excluding**