## Kiddushin Daf 18b

###### Kiddushin 18b:1
[Kiddushin 18b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/18b:1)

כֵּיוָן שֶׁפֵּירַשׂ טַלִּיתוֹ עָלֶיהָ, שׁוּב אֵין רַשַּׁאי לְמוֹכְרָהּ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: ״בְּבִגְדוֹ בָּהּ״ – כֵּיוָן שֶׁבָּגַד בָּהּ, שׁוּב אֵין רַשַּׁאי לְמוֹכְרָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
This verse indicates that **once** the master **has spread his garment over her,** thereby designating her as his wife, her father **may no longer sell her.** This is **the statement of Rabbi Akiva,** who interprets *bevigdo* as related to *beged*, meaning garment. **Rabbi Eliezer says: “*Bevigdo vah*”** means that **since** the father **dealt deceitfully [*bagad*] with her** and sold her once, **he cannot sell her again.**


###### Kiddushin 18b:2
[Kiddushin 18b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/18b:2)

בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר: יֵשׁ אֵם לַמָּסוֹרֶת, וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר: יֵשׁ אֵם לַמִּקְרָא, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סָבַר: יֵשׁ אֵם לַמִּקְרָא וְלַמָּסוֹרֶת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **With regard to what** principle **do** they **disagree? Rabbi Eliezer maintains** that **the tradition** of the manner in which the verses in the Torah are written is **authoritative,** and one derives *halakhot* based on the spelling of the words. One relies on the way a word is written, without the traditional vocalization, and therefore it is read as though it were vocalized as *bevagdo*, which refers to betrayal, not a garment. **And Rabbi Akiva maintains** that the **vocalization** of the Torah **is authoritative,** meaning that one derives *halakhot* based on the pronunciation of the words, although it diverges from the spelling, and since one pronounces the term as *bevigdo*, it is related to the word *beged*, meaning garment. **And Rabbi Shimon maintains** that both the **vocalization** of the Torah **and the tradition** of the manner in which the verses in the Torah are written are **authoritative.** Consequently, she cannot be sold as a slave after she has been taken as a wife, nor can she be sold again after she has already been sold once.


###### Kiddushin 18b:3
[Kiddushin 18b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/18b:3)

בָּעֵי רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: יִעוּד נִישּׂוּאִין עוֹשֶׂה, אוֹ אֵירוּסִין עוֹשֶׂה? נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ לְיוֹרְשָׁהּ, וְלִיטַמֵּא לָהּ, וּלְהָפֵר נְדָרֶיהָ. מַאי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabba bar Avuh raises a dilemma:** Does **designation** of a Hebrew maidservant for betrothal by her master **effect marriage or** does it **effect** only **betrothal?** The **practical difference** of the outcome of this dilemma is **whether he inherits her** property, i.e., does her husband inherit her property if she dies as he would if she were married to him; **and** whether he is obligated to **become impure to** bury **her** when she dies, if he is a priest; **and** whether he can **nullify her vows** on his own without her father, as is the case with a married woman. **What** is the *halakha*?


###### Kiddushin 18b:4
[Kiddushin 18b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/18b:4)

תָּא שְׁמַע: ״בְּבִגְדוֹ בָּהּ״ – כֵּיוָן שֶׁפֵּירַשׂ טַלִּיתוֹ עָלֶיהָ שׁוּב אֵינוֹ רַשַּׁאי לְמוֹכְרָהּ. זַבּוֹנֵי הוּא דְּלָא מְזַבֵּין לַהּ, הָא יַעוֹדֵי מְיַיעֵד לַהּ, וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ נִישּׂוּאִין עוֹשֶׂה, כֵּיוָן דְּנִישֵּׂאת שׁוּב אֵין לְאָבִיהָ רְשׁוּת בָּהּ! אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ אֵירוּסִין עוֹשֶׂה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Come** and **hear** a solution to this dilemma. **“*Bevigdo vah*”** means: **Once** her master **has spread his garment over her,** the father **may no longer sell her.** The Gemara analyzes this statement: This indicates that her father **cannot sell her** afterward, but he **can designate her** for another man if the master dies or divorces her. **And if you say** that designation **effects marriage, once she is married her father no longer has authority over her. Rather,** is it **not** correct to **learn from this** that designation **effects** only **betrothal?**


###### Kiddushin 18b:5
[Kiddushin 18b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/18b:5)

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: הָכָא בְּקִידּוּשִׁין דְּעָלְמָא קָאֵי. וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: כֵּיוָן שֶׁמְּסָרָהּ אָבִיהָ לְמִי שֶׁנִּתְחַיֵּיב בִּשְׁאֵרָהּ כְּסוּתָהּ וְעוֹנָתָהּ – שׁוּב אֵין יָכוֹל לְמוֹכְרָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said** that this argument can be refuted. **Here,** the *baraita* is **dealing with** the **ordinary betrothal** of one’s daughter, not to one who sells his daughter as a maidservant. **And this is what** the *baraita* **is saying: Since her father gave her,** i.e., betrothed her, **to one who is obligated to** provide **her food, her clothing, and** fulfill **her conjugal rights, he can no longer sell her.** Therefore, this *baraita* proves nothing with regard to the issue of whether or not designation effects marriage.


###### Kiddushin 18b:6
[Kiddushin 18b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/18b:6)

תָּא שְׁמַע: אֵין מוֹכְרָהּ לִקְרוֹבִים. מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אָמְרוּ: מוֹכְרָהּ לִקְרוֹבִים. וְשָׁוִין שֶׁמּוֹכְרָהּ אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל, גְּרוּשָׁה וַחֲלוּצָה לְכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara cites another relevant source. **Come** and **hear:** A father **cannot sell** his daughter as a maidservant **to relatives** with whom she is prohibited from engaging in sexual intercourse, as they cannot fulfill the mitzva of designation. **They said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: He can sell her to relatives,** because designation is merely an option and its inapplicability does not negate the possibility of a sale. **And they agree that he can sell her to a High Priest** if she is **a widow,** or **to a common priest** if she is **a divorcée or a *yevama* who performed *ḥalitza* [*ḥalutza*].** Although it is prohibited for her to marry these men, their betrothal is effective, and therefore designation is not entirely impossible in these cases.


###### Kiddushin 18b:7
[Kiddushin 18b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/18b:7)

הַאי אַלְמָנָה הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דְּקַדִּישׁ נַפְשַׁהּ, אַלְמָנָה קָרֵי לַהּ? וְאֶלָּא דְּקַדְּשַׁהּ אָבִיהָ. מִי מָצֵי מְזַבֵּין לַהּ? וְהָא אֵין אָדָם מוֹכֵר אֶת בִּתּוֹ לְשִׁפְחוּת אַחַר אִישׁוּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara clarifies: **What are the circumstances of this widow? If we say that** she **betrothed herself** when she was a minor and her husband died, is **she called a widow?** Since the initial betrothal was entirely ineffective, as a minor cannot accept betrothal independently, she would not be considered his wife. **Rather,** one must say **that her father betrothed her** and she was subsequently widowed. But if that is the case, **can he sell her? But** it was taught that **a person cannot sell his daughter into slavery after marriage.**


###### Kiddushin 18b:8
[Kiddushin 18b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/18b:8)

וְאָמַר רַב עַמְרָם אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: הָכָא בְּקִדּוּשֵׁי יִעוּד, וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה דְּאָמַר: מָעוֹת הָרִאשׁוֹנוֹת לָאו לְקִידּוּשִׁין נִיתְּנוּ. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ נִישּׂוּאִין עוֹשֶׂה, כֵּיוָן שֶׁנִּישֵּׂאת שׁוּב אֵין לְאָבִיהָ רְשׁוּת בָּהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rav Amram says** that **Rabbi Yitzḥak says: Here,** it is referring **to** a woman widowed from **betrothal of designation, and** this is **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: The original money** of the sale of the maidservant **was not given for** the purpose of **betrothal** but as payment for her work, and if the master wishes to designate her he must give her additional money for that purpose. The relevance of this assertion will be clarified below. The Gemara explains the proof from this *baraita*: **And if you say** that designation **effects marriage, once she is married her father no longer has authority over her.** How can he sell her a second time after the death of her first husband?


###### Kiddushin 18b:9
[Kiddushin 18b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/18b:9)

וְאֶלָּא מַאי, אֵירוּסִין עוֹשֶׂה? – וְשָׁוִין שֶׁמּוֹכְרָהּ?! הָא אֵין אָדָם מוֹכֵר אֶת בִּתּוֹ לְשִׁפְחוּת אַחַר אִישׁוּת! אֶלָּא מַאי אִית לָךְ לְמֵימַר: שָׁאנֵי אֵירוּסִין דִּידַהּ מֵאֵירוּסִין דְּאָבִיהָ? – אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא נִישּׂוּאִין עוֹשֶׂה, שָׁאנֵי נִישּׂוּאִין דִּידַהּ מִנִּישּׂוּאִין דְּאָבִיהָ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks from the other perspective: **Rather, what** will you say, that designation **effects** only **betrothal?** If so, why does the *baraita* state: **And they agree that he can sell her?** After all, **a person cannot sell his daughter into slavery after matrimony.** This *baraita* also refers to a case where a woman was betrothed but the marriage was not consummated. **Rather, what have you to say? Betrothal** effected **by her is different from betrothal** effected **by her father.** Since the marriage was not performed through her father but by the master giving her additional money, as held by Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, the principle that one cannot sell his daughter into slavery after betrothal does not apply. But by the same reasoning, **even** if **you say** that designation **effects marriage,** you can argue that **marriage** effected **by her is different from marriage** effected **by her father.**


###### Kiddushin 18b:10
[Kiddushin 18b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/18b:10)

הַאי מַאי? בִּשְׁלָמָא אֵירוּסִין מֵאֵירוּסִין שָׁאנֵי, אֶלָּא נִישּׂוּאִין מִנִּישּׂוּאִין,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
This challenge is rejected: **What** is **this** comparison? **Granted,** one form of **betrothal is different from** the other **betrothal,** i.e., there is a difference between standard betrothal with the father’s consent and betrothal through designation, which is performed upon the master’s initiative. After that type of betrothal the father can, in fact, sell her a second time. **But** with regard to one mode of effecting **marriage** in relation **to** another mode of effecting **marriage,**