## Kiddushin Daf 24b

###### Kiddushin 24b:1
[Kiddushin 24b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/24b:1)

שֵׁן דְּחָלָב, כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״עַיִן״. וְאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״עַיִן״ הֲוָה אָמֵינָא מָה עַיִן שֶׁנִּבְרָא עִמּוֹ – אַף כֹּל שֶׁנִּבְרָא עִמּוֹ, אֲבָל שֵׁן – לָא, צְרִיכָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**a milk tooth,** a child’s tooth that will eventually fall out to be replaced by another, is included in this *halakha*. Therefore **the Merciful One writes “eye,”** to teach that this *halakha* applies only to a body part that does not regenerate, like an eye. **And if the Merciful One had written** only **“eye,” I would say** that **just as an eye was created with him** in the womb, **so too,** this *halakha* applies to **anything that was created with him** in the womb. **But** with regard to **a tooth,** which grows later, perhaps he would **not** be emancipated if his master knocked it out. Therefore, **it is necessary** to mention both cases.


###### Kiddushin 24b:2
[Kiddushin 24b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/24b:2)

וְאֵימָא: ״כִּי יַכֶּה״ – כָּלַל, ״שֵׁן וָעַיִן״ – פָּרַט. כְּלָל וּפְרָט, אֵין בַּכְּלָל אֶלָּא מַה שֶּׁבַּפְּרָט. שֵׁן וָעַיִן – אִין, מִידֵּי אַחֲרִינָא – לָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But** one can **say** the following argument: **“If** a man **smites”** (Exodus 21:26), is **a generalization; “a tooth” and “an eye”** are each **a detail.** If so, this should be read as **a generalization and a detail,** and the hermeneutical principle in a case of this kind is that **the generalization includes only what is** mentioned explicitly **in the detail.** Consequently, **a tooth and an eye are** included, but **not other matters.**


###### Kiddushin 24b:3
[Kiddushin 24b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/24b:3)

״לַחׇפְשִׁי יְשַׁלְּחֶנּוּ״ – חָזַר וְכָלַל. כְּלָל וּפְרָט וּכְלָל, אִי אַתָּה דָן אֶלָּא כְּעֵין הַפְּרָט, מָה הַפְּרָט מְפוֹרָשׁ מוּם שֶׁבַּגָּלוּי וְאֵינָן חוֹזְרִים – אַף כֹּל מוּמִין שֶׁבַּגָּלוּי וְאֵינָן חוֹזְרִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers that when each verse states: **“To freedom shall he send him”** (Exodus 21:26, 27), **it then generalized** again. Consequently, this should be read as **a generalization and a detail and a generalization.** In this case, the hermeneutical principle is that **you may deduce** that the verse is referring **only** to items **similar to the detail: Just as the explicit detail** is **an exposed blemish** that **does not regenerate** itself, **so too, any** body parts that are **exposed blemishes and that do not regenerate** themselves are included in this *halakha*.


###### Kiddushin 24b:4
[Kiddushin 24b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/24b:4)

אִי מָה הַפְּרָט מְפוֹרָשׁ – מוּמִין שֶׁבַּגָּלוּי וּבָטֵל מִמְּלַאכְתּוֹ וְאֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר – אַף כֹּל מוּמִין שֶׁבַּגָּלוּי וְאֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר וּבָטֵל מִמְּלַאכְתּוֹ. אַלְּמָה תַּנְיָא: תָּלַשׁ בִּזְקָנוֹ וְדִילְדֵּל בּוֹ עֶצֶם – עֶבֶד יוֹצֵא בָּהֶם לְחֵירוּת! ״לַחׇפְשִׁי יְשַׁלְּחֶנּוּ״ – רִיבּוּיָא הוּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **If** so, one can limit this category even further: **Just as with the explicit details,** they are referring to **exposed blemishes and** the body part **is prevented from** performing **its** regular **function and does not regenerate, so too,** a slave should be emancipated as a result of an injury to **all exposed blemishes that do not regenerate and** where the body part **is prevented from** performing **its** regular **function. Why,** then, **is it taught** in a *baraita*: If the master **pulled out his beard and dislocated a bone in** the slave’s jaw, **the slave is emancipated by means of** this injury. In this case there is no loss of function. The Gemara answers: **“To freedom shall he send him”** (Exodus 21:26–27), **is an amplification,** which includes an injury that is not exactly the same as the detail.


###### Kiddushin 24b:5
[Kiddushin 24b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/24b:5)

וְאִי רִיבּוּיָא הוּא, אֲפִילּוּ הִכָּהוּ עַל יָדוֹ וְצָמְתָה וְסוֹפָהּ לַחְזוֹר נָמֵי, אַלְּמָה תַּנְיָא: הִכָּהוּ עַל יָדוֹ וְצָמְתָה וְסוֹפָהּ לַחְזוֹר – אֵין עֶבֶד יוֹצֵא בָּהּ לְחֵירוּת? אִם כֵּן, שֵׁן וָעַיִן מַאי אַהֲנִי לֵיהּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But if it is an amplification,** which includes additional injuries, the slave should **also** be emancipated **even if he struck him on his hand and it withered,** i.e., became temporarily paralyzed, **but would eventually** be expected to **regenerate. Why,** then, **is it taught** in a *baraita*: If **he struck him on his hand and** the hand **withered but** it **will eventually regenerate, the slave is not emancipated by means of** this injury? The Gemara answers: **If so,** that even limbs that will eventually regain their function are included in this *halakha*, **what** purpose do the examples of **tooth and eye serve?** These two items that are explicitly stated in the verse would not exclude anything. Rather, only injuries similar to the details of an tooth and an eye are included, but not temporary injuries.


###### Kiddushin 24b:6
[Kiddushin 24b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/24b:6)

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: בְּכוּלָּם, עֶבֶד יוֹצֵא בָּהֶם לְחֵירוּת, וְצָרִיךְ גֵּט שִׁחְרוּר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: צָרִיךְ. רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: צָרִיךְ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**The Sages taught: With regard to any of** the twenty-four extremities, if a master strikes his slave and injures him there, **the slave is emancipated by means of** these injuries, **and** he **requires a bill of manumission** from his master. This is **the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Meir says: He does not require** a bill of manumission. **Rabbi Eliezer says: He requires** one. **Rabbi Tarfon says: He does not require** one. **Rabbi Akiva says: He requires** one.


###### Kiddushin 24b:7
[Kiddushin 24b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/24b:7)

הַמַּכְרִיעִים לִפְנֵי חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: נִרְאִין דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן בְּשֵׁן וָעַיִן, שֶׁהַתּוֹרָה זִכְּתָה לוֹ, וְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא בִּשְׁאָר אֵבָרִים, הוֹאִיל וּקְנַס חֲכָמִים הוּא. קְנָס הוּא?! קְרָאֵי קָא דָרְשִׁינַן! אֶלָּא: הוֹאִיל וּמִדְרַשׁ חֲכָמִים הוּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Those who** discuss matters and **decide before the Sages say** the following compromise: **Rabbi Tarfon’s statement appears** correct **with regard to a tooth and an eye, since** in these cases **the Torah** explicitly **benefitted him.** Because his right to emancipation is stated explicitly in the verse, the slave does not require a bill of manumission. **And Rabbi Akiva’s statement** is reasonable **with regard to other limbs, since it is a rabbinic penalty.** The Gemara is puzzled by this claim: **Is it** a rabbinic **penalty? We interpret** the **verses,** and therefore this *halakha* applies to the other limbs by Torah law. **Rather,** these Sages meant that is necessary to give a bill of manumission **since it is a rabbinic interpretation** and is not written explicitly in the Torah.


###### Kiddushin 24b:8
[Kiddushin 24b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/24b:8)

מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? יָלֵיף ״שִׁילּוּחַ״ ״שִׁילּוּחַ״ מֵאִשָּׁה. מָה אִשָּׁה בִּשְׁטָר – אַף עֶבֶד נָמֵי בִּשְׁטָר. וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר: אִי כְּתַב ״חׇפְשִׁי״ לְבַסּוֹף – כִּדְקָאָמְרַתְּ. הַשְׁתָּא דִּכְתַב ״לַחׇפְשִׁי יְשַׁלְּחֶנּוּ״ – הֲוָה לֵיהּ חׇפְשִׁי מֵעִיקָּרָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon? He derives** a verbal analogy between: **Sending away,** “to freedom shall he send him” (Exodus 21:26, 27), and: **Sending away,** “and sends her out of his house” (Deuteronomy 24:1), **from** the case of **a woman. Just as a woman** can be released from her husband only **by** means of **a document, so too, a slave** can **also** be released from his master only **by** means of **a document. And Rabbi Meir** would say that **if** the term **“freedom” was written at the end** of the phrase, i.e., if the verse had stated: He shall send him away to freedom, it would be **as you said,** that he must be given a bill of manumission before he can be emancipated. **Now that it is written “to freedom shall he send him,”** this indicates that **he is free from the beginning,** i.e., no additional act of emancipation is required.


###### Kiddushin 24b:9
[Kiddushin 24b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/24b:9)

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הִכָּהוּ עַל עֵינוֹ וְסִמְּאָהּ, עַל אׇזְנוֹ וְחֵרְשָׁהּ – עֶבֶד יוֹצֵא בָּהֶן לְחֵירוּת. נֶגֶד עֵינוֹ וְאֵינוֹ רוֹאֶה, כְּנֶגֶד אׇזְנוֹ וְאֵינוֹ שׁוֹמֵעַ – אֵין עֶבֶד יוֹצֵא בָּהֶן לְחֵירוּת. אָמַר רַב שֶׁמֶן לְרַב אָשֵׁי: לְמֵימְרָא דְּקָלָא לָאו כְּלוּם הוּא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**The Sages taught** in a *baraita* (*Tosefta*, *Bava Kamma* 9:26): If a slave owner **struck** his slave **on his eye and blinded him,** or **on his ear and deafened him, the slave is emancipated by means of these** injuries. If he struck **near his eye and** as a result **he does not see,** or **near his ear and he does not hear, the slave is not emancipated by means of these** injuries. **Rav Shemen said to Rav Ashi: Is this to say that a sound** that causes damage **is nothing?**


###### Kiddushin 24b:10
[Kiddushin 24b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/24b:10)

וְהָתָנֵי רָמֵי בַּר יְחֶזְקֵאל: תַּרְנְגוֹל שֶׁהוֹשִׁיט רֹאשׁוֹ לַאֲוִיר כְּלִי זְכוּכִית, וְתָקַע בּוֹ וּשְׁבָרוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם. וְאָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף, אָמְרִי בֵּי רַב: סוּס שֶׁצָּנַף וַחֲמוֹר שֶׁנָּעַר, וְשָׁבְרוּ כֵּלִים בְּתוֹךְ הַבַּיִת – מְשַׁלְּמִים חֲצִי נֶזֶק.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But didn’t Rami bar Yeḥezkel teach** a *baraita*: With regard to **a rooster that stuck its head into the airspace of a glass vessel and crowed into it and** the noise **broke it,** its owner **pays the full** cost of the **damage** like a regular case of damage. **And Rav Yosef said** that the Sages of **Rav’s study hall say:** With regard to **a horse that neighed or a donkey that brayed and they** thereby **broke vessels in the house,** their owners must **pay** for **half** of **the damage.** Although these two examples are different, as one results in full payment and the other in half payment, it is clear that sound can be a source of liability for damages.


###### Kiddushin 24b:11
[Kiddushin 24b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/24b:11)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שָׁאנֵי אָדָם, דְּכֵיוָן דְּבַר דַּעַת הוּא – אִיהוּ מְיבַעֵית נַפְשֵׁיהּ. כִּדְתַנְיָא: הַמַּבְעִית אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ – פָּטוּר מִדִּינֵי אָדָם וְחַיָּיב בְּדִינֵי שָׁמַיִם. כֵּיצַד? תָּקַע בְּאׇזְנוֹ וְחֵרְשׁוֹ – פָּטוּר, אֲחָזָהוּ וְתָקַע בְּאׇזְנוֹ וְחֵרְשׁוֹ – חַיָּיב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Ashi **said to him: A person is different, as, since he is** mentally **competent it is he who frightened himself.** It was not the physical sound that caused the damage but the slave’s subjective fear, which is not a direct result of the action. **As it is taught** in a *baraita* (*Tosefta*, *Bava Kamma* 6:16) that injury can result from being frightened: **One who frightens another** and causes him injury is **exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. How so?** If **one shouted into** another’s **ear and deafened him,** he is **exempt.** But if **he held him and shouted into his ear and deafened him,** he is **liable** according to human laws as well, as he took physical hold of him. Once he physically took hold of him, he is liable for all the resultant damage.


###### Kiddushin 24b:12
[Kiddushin 24b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/24b:12)

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הִכָּהוּ עַל עֵינוֹ וְכָהֲתָה, עַל שִׁינּוֹ וְנָדְדָה, אִם יָכוֹל לְהִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בָּהֶן עַכְשָׁיו – אֵין עֶבֶד יוֹצֵא בָּהֶן לְחֵירוּת, וְאִם לָאו – עֶבֶד יוֹצֵא בָּהֶן לְחֵירוּת. תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ: הֲרֵי שֶׁהָיְתָה עֵינוֹ כְּהוּיָה וְסִמְּאָהּ, שִׁינּוֹ נְדוּדָה וְהִפִּילָהּ, אִם יָכוֹל לְהִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בָּהֶן כְּבָר – עֶבֶד יוֹצֵא בָּהֶן לְחֵירוּת, וְאִם לָאו – אֵין עֶבֶד יוֹצֵא בָּהֶן לְחֵירוּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**The Sages taught** in a *baraita* (*Tosefta*, *Bava Kamma* 9:9): In a case where the master **struck him on his eye and weakened** his vision without blinding him, or he struck him **on his tooth and loosened it, if he can use** the eye or the tooth **now,** the **slave is not emancipated by means of them. And if** he can **no** longer use them at all, then the **slave is emancipated by means of them. It is taught** in **another** clause in that *baraita*: In a case **where** the slave’s **eye was weak** prior to this incident, **and** the master **blinded it** entirely, or if the slave’s **tooth was loose and** his master **knocked it out, if he** was **able to use them before** the master struck him, the **slave is emancipated by means of them, and if not,** then the **slave is not emancipated by means of them.**


###### Kiddushin 24b:13
[Kiddushin 24b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/24b:13)

וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן הָךְ קַמַּיְיתָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּמֵעִיקָּרָא נְהוֹרָא בְּרִיָּא וְהַשְׁתָּא נְהוֹרָא כְּחִישָׁא. אֲבָל הָכָא, דְּמֵעִיקָּרָא נָמֵי נְהוֹרָא כְּחִישָׁא – אֵימָא לָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara comments: **And** it is **necessary** to state both *halakhot*, despite the fact that they apparently teach the same *halakha* that a weakened eye is not considered a significant injury, **as, if** the *tanna* had **taught us** only **this first** *halakha*, I would say that he is emancipated, **because at the outset** his **vision was strong and now** his **vision is weak. But here,** in the second *baraita*, **where his vision was also weak at the outset,** I would **say** he is **not** emancipated if the master blinded him entirely, as his eye did not function properly even beforehand.


###### Kiddushin 24b:14
[Kiddushin 24b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/24b:14)

וְאִי אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן הָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּסַמְּיַהּ לִגְמָרֵי, אֲבָל הָתָם, דְּלָא סַמְּיַהּ לִגְמָרֵי אֵימָא לָא, צְרִיכָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** conversely, **if** the *tanna* had **taught us** only **this** second *halakha*, I would say that he is emancipated **because he blinded** him **entirely. But there,** where **he did not blind** him **entirely** I would **say no,** he is not emancipated, despite the fact that he weakened his vision. Therefore, it is **necessary** to state both *halakhot*.


###### Kiddushin 24b:15
[Kiddushin 24b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/24b:15)

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הֲרֵי שֶׁהָיָה רַבּוֹ רוֹפֵא, וְאָמַר לוֹ לִכְחוֹל לוֹ עֵינוֹ וְסִמְּאָהּ, לַחְתּוֹר לוֹ שִׁינּוֹ וְהִפִּילָהּ – שִׂיחֵק בָּאָדוֹן, וְיָצָא לְחֵירוּת. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: ״וְשִׁחֲתָהּ״ – עַד שֶׁיִּתְכַּוֵּין לְשַׁחֲתָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**The Sages taught** in a *baraita* (*Tosefta*, *Bava Kamma* 9:9): In a case **where his master was a doctor and** the slave **said to him to paint his eye** with a medicament, **and** the master **blinded it** in the process, or he asked him **to drill his** aching **tooth, and** the master **knocked it out,** the slave **laughs at the master and is emancipated. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says** that the verse: “And if a man smites the eye of his slave, or the eye of his maidservant, **and destroys it,** to freedom shall he send him for his eye’s sake” (Exodus 21:26), means that the slave is not emancipated **unless** the master **intends to destroy it.** If he intended to heal him, the slave is not freed, even if the master did, in fact, injure him.


###### Kiddushin 24b:16
[Kiddushin 24b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/24b:16)

וְרַבָּנַן, הַאי ״וְשִׁחֲתָהּ״, מַאי עָבְדִי לֵיהּ? מִיבְּעֵי לְהוּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: הֲרֵי שֶׁהוֹשִׁיט יָדוֹ לִמְעֵי שִׁפְחָתוֹ וְסִימֵּא עוּבָּר שֶׁבְּמֵעֶיהָ – פָּטוּר. מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וְשִׁחֲתָהּ״ – עַד שֶׁיְּכַוֵּין לְשַׁחֲתָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And the Rabbis, what do they do with this** verse **“and destroys it”?** What do they derive from this phrase? The Gemara answers: **They require** it **for that which is taught** in a *baraita*: **Rabbi Elazar says** that in a case **where** the master **stuck his hand into the womb of his maidservant** to assist her in giving birth **and he blinded the fetus in her womb, he is exempt** and the fetus is not emancipated when born. **What is the reason** for this? **As the verse states “and destroys it,”** meaning **unless he intends to destroy** it, and in this case he did not mean to touch the fetus’s eye.


###### Kiddushin 24b:17
[Kiddushin 24b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/24b:17)

וְאִידָּךְ? מִ״וְשִׁחֵת״ ״שִׁחֲתָהּ״ נָפְקָא. וְאִידַּךְ? ״שִׁחֵת״ ״שִׁחֲתָהּ״ לָא דָּרֵישׁ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And the other** Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, would say that that *halakha* is **derived from** the fact that the verse could have said: **And destroys,** and instead said **“destroys it.” And the other** Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, how do they respond to this argument? **They do not expound** the difference between **“destroys”** and **“destroys it,”** i.e., they maintain that this is not a significant deviation from which one can derive a *halakha*.


###### Kiddushin 24b:18
[Kiddushin 24b:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/24b:18)

אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: הֲרֵי שֶׁהָיְתָה עֵינוֹ סְמוּיָה, וַחֲטָטָהּ – עֶבֶד יוֹצֵא בָּהֶן לְחֵירוּת. מַאי טַעְמָא? מְחוּסָּר אֵבֶר הוּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Sheshet says:** In a case **where** the slave’s **eye was blind and** the master **removed it** entirely, the **slave is emancipated by means of** this injury. **What is the reason** for this? **He is** now **lacking a limb,** which is worse than a mere blemish.


###### Kiddushin 24b:19
[Kiddushin 24b:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/24b:19)

וְתַנָּא תּוּנָא: תַּמּוּת וְזַכְרוּת בִּבְהֵמָה, וְאֵין תַּמּוּת וְזַכְרוּת בְּעוֹפוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And the *tanna*** of a *baraita* also **taught:** The *halakha* of **unblemished status,** i.e., that an offering must not contain a blemish, **and** the *halakha* of **male status** apply **to animal** offerings, **but** the *halakha* of **unblemished status and** the *halakha* of **male status** do **not** apply **to bird** offerings.


###### Kiddushin 24b:20
[Kiddushin 24b:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/24b:20)

יָכוֹל יָבְשָׁה גַּפָּהּ, נִקְטְעָה רַגְלָהּ, נֶחְטְטָה עֵינָהּ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִן הָעוֹף״ – וְלֹא כׇּל הָעוֹף.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara comments: One **might** have thought that if one brings a bird **whose wing is dried,** or whose **leg is severed,** or whose **eye was removed,** that it too is acceptable as an offering. Therefore, **the verse states:** “And if his offering to the Lord is a burnt-offering **from birds”** (Leviticus 1:14). This phrase indicates that only some birds can be sacrificed as offerings, **but not all birds.** This teaches that a bird can be disqualified due to a blemish. For example, if a significant part of the bird is missing, e.g., a limb, the bird is not acceptable as an offering. This indicates that the actual loss of an eye is considered a greater blemish than blindness. Consequently, if his master takes out the slave’s blind eye, he is emancipated.


###### Kiddushin 24b:21
[Kiddushin 24b:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/24b:21)

אָמַר רַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָשֵׁי אָמַר רַב: הָיְתָה לוֹ

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi says** that **Rav says:** If the slave **had**