## Kiddushin Daf 28a

###### Kiddushin 28a:1
[Kiddushin 28a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/28a:1)

שֶׁלֹּא נִיתְּנָה לְהִתָּבַע בְּעֵד אֶחָד – מְגַלְגְּלִין, מָמוֹן, שֶׁנִּיתָּן לְהִתָּבַע בְּעֵד אֶחָד – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁמְגַלְגְּלִין?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**where** an oath **cannot be imposed by one witness,** as two witnesses must testify that the wife secluded herself with the man concerning whom she was warned in order for her to be obligated to take the oath of a *sota*, and yet **one can extend** her oath, **is it not logical** that with regard to a claim involving **money, where** an oath **can be imposed by** the testimony of **one witness,** that **one can extend** the oath?


###### Kiddushin 28a:2
[Kiddushin 28a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/28a:2)

אַשְׁכְּחַן בְּוַדַּאי, סָפֵק מְנָלַן?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **We found** a source for the extension of an oath **in** the case of **a definite** claim, i.e., when the plaintiff is certain of his claim. **From where do we** derive that this *halakha* of the extension of an oath applies also to **uncertain** claims, when the plaintiff is not sure the defendant owes him money but merely suspects this to be the case?


###### Kiddushin 28a:3
[Kiddushin 28a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/28a:3)

תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹחַאי אוֹמֵר: נֶאֶמְרָה שְׁבוּעָה בַּחוּץ, וְנֶאֶמְרָה שְׁבוּעָה בִּפְנִים. מָה שְׁבוּעָה הָאֲמוּרָה בִּפְנִים – עָשָׂה בָּהּ סָפֵק כְּוַדַּאי, אַף שְׁבוּעָה הָאֲמוּרָה בַּחוּץ – עָשָׂה בָּהּ סָפֵק כְּוַדַּאי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **It is taught** in a *baraita* that **Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: The Torah states an external oath,** i.e., an oath administered outside of the Temple, **and it states an internal oath,** an oath administered inside the Temple courtyard, i.e., the oath of a *sota*. **Just as with regard to an oath stated** in the Torah that is taken **inside** the Temple, the Torah **rendered uncertainty like certainty,** as in the case of a *sota* the husband’s claim is based on suspicion and yet he can extend that oath; **so too, with regard to an oath stated** in the Torah that is taken **outside** the Temple, the Torah **rendered uncertainty** to be **like certainty,** i.e., all oaths can be extended to include even uncertain claims.


###### Kiddushin 28a:4
[Kiddushin 28a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/28a:4)

עַד הֵיכָן גִּלְגּוּל שְׁבוּעָה? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: ״הִישָּׁבַע לִי שֶׁאֵין עַבְדִּי אַתָּה״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara asks: **Until where** does the **extension of an oath** reach? It has been established that a plaintiff can attach other claims to the oath that the defendant is required to take, even if they do not relate to the current claim submitted in court. To what extent can the plaintiff impose additional oaths? **Rav Yehuda said** that **Rav said:** The *halakha* is **that** a plaintiff **can** even **say to** a defendant: **Take an oath to me that you are not my** Canaanite **slave.** If the defendant is required to take an oath, e.g., concerning denial of a debt, he can be forced to take an oath about this matter as well.


###### Kiddushin 28a:5
[Kiddushin 28a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/28a:5)

הָהוּא שַׁמּוֹתֵי מְשַׁמְּתִינַן לֵיהּ! דְּתַנְיָא: הַקּוֹרֵא לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״עֶבֶד״ – יְהֵא בְּנִידּוּי. ״מַמְזֵר״ – סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים. ״רָשָׁע״ – יוֹרֵד עִמּוֹ לְחַיָּיו!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: But the court **ostracizes one** who says this to another, **as it is taught** in a *baraita*: **One who calls another a slave shall be ostracized.** One who calls another **a *mamzer* incurs the** punishment of **forty** lashes. If one calls another **a wicked person** then the insulted person may **harass him** in all aspects of **his life.** In light of this *halakha*, it is clear that the court will not force the accused to respond to this insult by taking an oath.


###### Kiddushin 28a:6
[Kiddushin 28a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/28a:6)

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: הִישָּׁבַע לִי שֶׁלֹּא נִמְכַּרְתָּ לִי בְּעֶבֶד עִבְרִי. הַאי טַעַנְתָּא מְעַלַּיְיתָא הִיא, מָמוֹנָא אִית לֵיהּ גַּבֵּיהּ! רָבָא לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: עֶבֶד עִבְרִי גּוּפוֹ קָנוּי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, Rava said** that the plaintiff can extend an oath by stating: **Take an oath to me that you were not sold to me as a Hebrew slave.** In this case the plaintiff is not questioning the man’s lineage, as he is simply claiming that he was sold to him as a slave and must work for him. The Gemara asks: But there is nothing novel about this *halakha*, as this **is a proper claim** that **there is money** owed **to him** by the accused. The sale and service of a Hebrew slave can be assessed in monetary terms, and is analogous to all claims of debt, which can be imposed by extension of an oath. The Gemara answers: **Rava** conforms **to his** line of **reasoning, as Rava says: The Hebrew slave himself is acquired** by his master. Consequently, this claim involves not just money but ownership over his person as well.


###### Kiddushin 28a:7
[Kiddushin 28a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/28a:7)

אִי הָכִי, הַיְינוּ קַרְקַע! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: קַרְקַע הוּא דְּעָבְדִי אִינָשֵׁי דִּמְזַבְּנִי בְּצִינְעָא, אִם אִיתָא דְּזַבֵּין – לֵית לֵיהּ קָלָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **If so, this is** similar to a claim concerning ownership of **land,** and the mishna already taught that an oath can be extended to include a claim concerning land. The Gemara answers: This ruling is necessary **lest you say: It is land that people are likely to sell privately,** and **if it is so that** the plaintiff had **sold** it to him, the sale would **not** have generated **publicity,** and the public would not know about it. Therefore, the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant sold land to him is reasonable.


###### Kiddushin 28a:8
[Kiddushin 28a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/28a:8)

הַאי, אִם אִיתָא דְּזַבֵּין – קָלָא אִית לֵיהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
By contrast, in **this** case, where the plaintiff claims that he purchased the defendant as a Hebrew slave, **if it is so that he purchased** him as a slave, the sale would have generated **publicity.** Since this supposed sale is not common knowledge, one might have thought that the defendant cannot be forced to take an oath to deny this claim. Therefore, Rava **teaches us** that despite the absence of public knowledge, one can extend an oath to this claim as well.


###### Kiddushin 28a:9
[Kiddushin 28a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/28a:9)

**מַתְנִי׳** כׇּל הַנַּעֲשֶׂה דָּמִים בְּאַחֵר, כֵּיוָן שֶׁזָּכָה זֶה – נִתְחַיֵּיב זֶה בַּחֲלִיפָיו. כֵּיצַד? הֶחְלִיף שׁוֹר בְּפָרָה אוֹ חֲמוֹר בְּשׁוֹר, כֵּיוָן שֶׁזָּכָה זֶה – נִתְחַיֵּיב זֶה בַּחֲלִיפָיו.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** The mishna discusses a transaction involving the barter of two items. With regard to **all** items **used as monetary** value **for another** item, i.e., instead of a buyer paying money to the seller, they exchange items of value with each other, **once one** party in the transaction **acquires** the item he is receiving, **this** party **is obligated** with regard to the item being **exchanged for it.** Therefore, if it is destroyed or lost, he incurs the loss. **How so?** If **one exchanges an ox for a cow, or a donkey for an ox, once this** party **acquires** the animal that he is receiving, this party **is obligated** with regard to the item being **exchanged for it.**


###### Kiddushin 28a:10
[Kiddushin 28a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/28a:10)

**גְּמָ׳** חֲלִיפִין מַאי נִיהוּ? – מַטְבֵּעַ, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: מַטְבֵּעַ נַעֲשֶׂה חֲלִיפִין? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: הָכִי קָאָמַר: כׇּל הַנִּישּׁוֹם דָּמִים בְּאַחֵר,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** The Gemara asks: **What is** the item given in **exchange** mentioned in the mishna? If it is referring to **a coin,** for which property is usually exchanged, can one **learn from** the mishna that **a coin can effect exchange,** i.e., it is possible to perform the act of acquisition of exchange, either a standard exchange or a symbolic exchange, using coins? This is problematic, as the *halakha* is that coins cannot be used for this act of acquisition. **Rav Yehuda said:** The phrase: All items used as monetary value for another item, is not referring to a coin. Rather, **this is what** the mishna **is saying:** With regard to **all** items **that** can be **appraised** when used **as monetary** value **for another** item, i.e., that their value can be appraised relative to the value of another item, excluding a coin, whose value is apparent,