## Kiddushin Daf 29a

###### Kiddushin 29a:1
[Kiddushin 29a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/29a:1)

עַד שֶׁיִּמְשׁוֹךְ וְיַחְזִיק. מְשָׁכוֹ בְּמָנֶה וְלֹא הִסְפִּיק לִפְדּוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁעָמַד בְּמָאתַיִם – נוֹתֵן מָאתַיִם. מַאי טַעְמָא – ״וְנָתַן הַכֶּסֶף וְקָם לוֹ״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**until he pulls or takes possession** of it. Additionally, the Temple treasury has the following advantage: If a commoner **pulled** a consecrated item for the purpose of acquiring it **with one hundred dinars, and he did not manage to redeem it** by paying the one hundred dinars to the Temple treasurer **before** the item’s price **stood at two hundred** dinars, he **gives two hundred** dinars. **What is the reason** for this? It states: **He will give the money and it will be assured to him** (see Leviticus 27:19). This indicates that one can acquire an item from the Temple treasury only by the actual transfer of money.


###### Kiddushin 29a:2
[Kiddushin 29a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/29a:2)

מְשָׁכוֹ בְּמָאתַיִם, וְלֹא הִסְפִּיק לִפְדּוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁעָמַד בְּמָנֶה – נוֹתֵן מָאתַיִם. מַאי טַעְמָא – לֹא יְהֵא כֹּחַ הֶדְיוֹט חָמוּר מֵהֶקְדֵּשׁ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
By contrast, in the reverse case, when the commoner **pulled** an item when it was worth **two hundred** dinars, **and he did not manage to redeem it before** the value of the item **stood at one hundred dinars,** he **gives two hundred** dinars. **What is the reason** for this? **The power of a commoner should not be greater than** that of the Temple treasury of **consecrated** property. Since a commoner completes his acquisition by pulling, the item is acquired by him at that price, and the Temple treasury should not suffer a loss in a case where the commoner could not have reneged on his commitment had he been dealing with another commoner.


###### Kiddushin 29a:3
[Kiddushin 29a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/29a:3)

פְּדָאוֹ בְּמָאתַיִם, וְלֹא הִסְפִּיק לְמוֹשְׁכוֹ עַד שֶׁעָמַד בְּמָנֶה – נוֹתֵן מָאתַיִם, מַאי טַעְמָא – ״וְנָתַן הַכֶּסֶף וְקָם לוֹ״. פְּדָאוֹ בְּמָנֶה וְלֹא הִסְפִּיק לְמוֹשְׁכוֹ עַד שֶׁעָמַד בְּמָאתַיִם – מַה שֶּׁפָּדָה פָּדוּי, וְאֵין נוֹתֵן אֶלָּא מָנֶה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Similarly, if the commoner **redeemed it** at **two hundred** dinars, **but he did not manage to pull it before** its value **stood at one hundred dinars, he gives two hundred** dinars. **What is the reason?** It states: **He will give the money and it will be assured to him,** which indicates that the redemption of consecrated property is effected with money. By contrast, if **he redeemed it at one hundred dinars and did not manage to pull it before it stood at two hundred** dinars, **what he redeemed is redeemed, and he gives only one hundred dinars.**


###### Kiddushin 29a:4
[Kiddushin 29a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/29a:4)

אַמַּאי? הָכִי נָמֵי נֵימָא: לֹא יְהֵא כֹּחַ הֶדְיוֹט חָמוּר מֵהֶקְדֵּשׁ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Why** is this the *halakha*? **So too, let us say: The power of a commoner should not be greater than** that of the Temple treasury of **consecrated** property, and if this occurred in a case where he was dealing with another commoner he would need to pay the full two hundred dinars, which was the value of the item when he pulled it. Shouldn’t the Temple treasury have as much power as a common person?


###### Kiddushin 29a:5
[Kiddushin 29a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/29a:5)

אַטּוּ הֶדְיוֹט לָאו בְּמִי שֶׁפָּרַע קָאֵי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: There is an additional impediment to reneging on an agreement with another commoner. **Is that to say** that **a commoner** who gave a seller money and changed his mind before acquiring the item is **not** forced to accept upon himself the curse **of: He Who exacted payment** from the generation of the flood (see Genesis, chapter 7) and the generation of the dispersion (see Genesis, chapter 11) will punish one who does not keep his word? Although a commoner can legally renege on his agreement at this stage, the Sages disapproved of such dishonest conduct, and one who did so would be cursed in this manner. Consequently, the power of a commoner is not greater than that of the Temple treasury, as it is not a simple matter to renege on an agreement with another commoner.


###### Kiddushin 29a:6
[Kiddushin 29a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/29a:6)

**מַתְנִי׳** כׇּל מִצְוֹת הַבֵּן עַל הָאָב אֲנָשִׁים חַיָּיבִין וְנָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת. וְכׇל מִצְוֹת הָאָב עַל הַבֵּן – אֶחָד אֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד נָשִׁים חַיָּיבִין. וְכׇל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁהַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ – אֲנָשִׁים חַיָּיבִין וְנָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת. וְכׇל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁלֹּא הַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ – אֶחָד הָאֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד הַנָּשִׁים חַיָּיבִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** With regard to **all mitzvot of a son with regard to** his **father, men are obligated** to perform them **and women are exempt. And** with regard to **all mitzvot of a father with regard to his son, both men and women are obligated** to perform them. The mishna notes an additional difference between the obligations of men and women in the performance of mitzvot: With regard to **all positive, time-bound mitzvot,** i.e., those which must be performed at specific times, **men are obligated** to perform them **and women are exempt. And** with regard to **all positive mitzvot that are not time bound, both men and women are obligated** to perform them.


###### Kiddushin 29a:7
[Kiddushin 29a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/29a:7)

וְכׇל מִצְוֹת לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה, בֵּין שֶׁהַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא הַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ – אֶחָד הָאֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד הַנָּשִׁים חַיָּיבִין, חוּץ מִ״בַּל תַּקִּיף״ וּ״בַל תַּשְׁחִית״, וּ״בַל תִּטַּמֵּא לְמֵתִים״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** with regard to **all prohibitions, whether** they are **time-bound** or **whether** they are **not time-bound, both men and women are obligated** to observe them, **except for** the prohibitions of: **Do not round** the corners of your head, **and: Do not destroy** the corners of your beard, which are derived from the verse: “You shall not round the corners of your head and you shall not destroy the corners of your beard” (Leviticus 19:27), **and** a prohibition that concerns only priests: **Do not contract ritual impurity from a corpse** (see Leviticus 21:1). These mitzvot apply only to men, not women, despite the fact that they are prohibitions.


###### Kiddushin 29a:8
[Kiddushin 29a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/29a:8)

**גְּמָ׳** מַאי ״כׇּל מִצְוֹת הַבֵּן עַל הָאָב״? אִילֵּימָא כׇּל מִצְוֹת דְּמִיחַיַּיב בְּרָא לְמִיעְבַּד לְאַבָּא, נָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת? וְהָתַנְיָא: ״אִישׁ״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא אִישׁ, אִשָּׁה מִנַּיִן? כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״אִישׁ אִמּוֹ וְאָבִיו תִּירָאוּ״, הֲרֵי כָּאן שְׁנַיִם!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** The Gemara asks: **What** is the meaning of the phrase: **All mitzvot of a son with regard to** his **father? If we say** that it is referring to **all mitzvot that the son is obligated to perform with regard to** his **father,** are **women exempt** from obligations of this kind? **But isn’t it taught** in a *baraita* concerning a verse that deals with the mitzva of honoring one’s father and mother: **“A man** shall fear [*tira’u*] his mother and his father” (Leviticus 19:3)? **I have** derived **only** that **a man** is obligated in this mitzva. **From where** do I derive that **a woman** is also obligated? **When it says** in the same verse: **“A man shall fear [*tira’u*] his mother and his father”** (Leviticus 19:3), employing the plural form of the verb, this indicates that **there are two** that are obligated **here,** both a man and a woman.


###### Kiddushin 29a:9
[Kiddushin 29a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/29a:9)

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: הָכִי קָאָמַר: כׇּל מִצְוֹת הַבֵּן הַמּוּטָּלוֹת עַל הָאָב לַעֲשׂוֹת לִבְנוֹ – אֲנָשִׁים חַיָּיבִין וְנָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Yehuda said** that **this is what** the mishna **is saying:** With regard to **all mitzvot of a son that are incumbent upon** his **father to perform for his son, men are obligated** in them **and women are exempt.**


###### Kiddushin 29a:10
[Kiddushin 29a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/29a:10)

תְּנֵינָא לְהָא דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: הָאָב חַיָּיב בִּבְנוֹ לְמוּלוֹ, וְלִפְדוֹתוֹ, וּלְלַמְּדוֹ תּוֹרָה, וּלְהַשִּׂיאוֹ אִשָּׁה, וּלְלַמְּדוֹ אוּמָּנוּת. וְיֵשׁ אוֹמְרִים: אַף לַהֲשִׁיטוֹ בַּמַּיִם. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: כֹּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְלַמֵּד אֶת בְּנוֹ אוּמָּנוּת – מְלַמְּדוֹ לִיסְטוּת. לִיסְטוּת סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ? אֶלָּא: כְּאִילּוּ מְלַמְּדוֹ לִיסְטוּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara comments: According to this interpretation, **we learn** in this mishna **that which the Sages taught** in a *baraita*: **A father is obligated with regard to his son to circumcise him, and to redeem him** if he is a firstborn son who must be redeemed by payment to a priest, **and to teach him Torah, and to marry him to a woman, and to teach him a trade. And some say:** A father is **also** obligated **to teach** his son **to swim. Rabbi Yehuda says: Any** father **who does not teach his son a trade teaches him banditry [*listut*].** The Gemara expresses surprise at this statement: Can it **enter your mind** that he actually teaches him **banditry? Rather,** the *baraita* means that it is **as though he teaches him banditry.** Since the son has no profession with which to support himself, he is likely to turn to theft for a livelihood. This *baraita* accords with Rav Yehuda’s interpretation of the mishna.


###### Kiddushin 29a:11
[Kiddushin 29a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/29a:11)

״לְמוּלוֹ״ מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיָּמׇל אַבְרָהָם אֶת יִצְחָק בְּנוֹ״. וְהֵיכָא דְּלָא מַהְלֵיהּ אֲבוּהּ מִיחַיְּיבִי בֵּי דִינָא לְמִימְהֲלֵיהּ, דִּכְתִיב: ״הִמּוֹל לָכֶם כׇּל זָכָר״. וְהֵיכָא דְּלָא מַהְלוּהּ בֵּי דִינָא מִיחַיַּיב אִיהוּ לְמִימְהַל נַפְשֵׁיהּ, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְעָרֵל זָכָר אֲשֶׁר לֹא יִמּוֹל אֶת בְּשַׂר עׇרְלָתוֹ וְנִכְרְתָה״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The *baraita* teaches that a father is obligated **to circumcise** his son. The Gemara asks: **From where do we** derive this? The Gemara answers that this is **as it is written: “And Abraham circumcised his son Isaac”** (Genesis 21:4). The Gemara comments: **And** in a case **where one’s father did not circumcise him the court is obligated to circumcise him,** i.e., if this obligation is not fulfilled by the father it applies to the community as a whole, **as it is written: “Every male among you shall be circumcised”** (Genesis 17:10), in the form of a general mitzva that does not apply only to the father. **And** in a case **where the court did not circumcise him** the son **is obligated to circumcise himself** when he reaches adulthood, **as it is written: “And the uncircumcised male, who is not circumcised in the flesh of his foreskin,** that soul **shall be cut off** from his people” (Genesis 17:14).


###### Kiddushin 29a:12
[Kiddushin 29a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/29a:12)

אִיהִי מְנָלַן דְּלָא מִיחַיְּיבָא? דִּכְתִיב: ״כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה אֹתוֹ אֱלֹהִים״ – אוֹתוֹ וְלֹא אוֹתָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**From where do we** derive **that** his mother **is not obligated** to circumcise her son? **As it is written:** “And Abraham circumcised his son Isaac when he was eight days old, **as God commanded him”** (Genesis 21:4). The verse emphasizes that God commanded **him, and not her.**


###### Kiddushin 29a:13
[Kiddushin 29a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/29a:13)

אַשְׁכְּחַן מִיָּד, לְדוֹרוֹת מְנָלַן? תָּנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: כָּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״צַו״ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא זֵירוּז, מִיָּד וּלְדוֹרוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**We found** a source for this mitzva **immediately,** i.e., when it was given to Abraham; **from where do we** derive that this is the *halakha* **for** the men of all **generations? The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught** that **any place where it is stated: “Command,” it is nothing other** than an expression of **galvanization** both **immediately and for generations.** The mitzva of circumcision is presented by means of this term.


###### Kiddushin 29a:14
[Kiddushin 29a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/29a:14)

זֵירוּז, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְצַו אֶת יְהוֹשֻׁעַ וְחַזְּקֵהוּ וְאַמְּצֵהוּ״. מִיָּד וּלְדוֹרוֹת, דִּכְתִיב: ״מִן הַיּוֹם אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה׳ וָהָלְאָה לְדֹרֹתֵיכֶם״

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara elaborates: From where is it derived that the term “command” indicates **a galvanization? As it is written: “And command Joshua, and encourage him and strengthen him”** (Deuteronomy 3:28). In this context, the term “command” is not referring to a specific command but is a general expression of galvanization. From where is it derived that this applies **immediately and for generations? As it is written: “From the day that the Lord commanded and onward throughout your generations”** (Numbers 15:23). This shows that whenever the word “command” is used it is referring to that day onward for all generations.


###### Kiddushin 29a:15
[Kiddushin 29a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/29a:15)

לִפְדּוֹתוֹ. מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״כׇּל בְּכוֹר בָּנֶיךָ תִּפְדֶּה״. וְהֵיכָא דְּלָא פַּרְקֵיהּ אֲבוּהּ מִיחַיַּיב אִיהוּ לְמִפְרְקֵיהּ דִּכְתִיב: (פָּדֹה) ״תִּפָּדֶה״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The *baraita* teaches that a father is obligated **to redeem** his son. The Gemara asks: **From where do we** derive this? The Gemara answers that this is **as it is written: “All the firstborn of your sons you shall redeem”** (Exodus 34:20). **And** in a case **where** one’s **father does not redeem him he is obligated to redeem** himself, **as it is written: “You shall redeem [*pado tifde*]”** (Numbers 18:15). The repetition of the verb indicates that a firstborn is required to be redeemed in any case, even if his father neglects to do so.


###### Kiddushin 29a:16
[Kiddushin 29a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/29a:16)

וְאִיהִי מְנָלַן דְּלָא מִיפַּקְדָה? דִּכְתִיב: ״תִּיפָּדֶה״ – ״תִּפְדֶּה״, כֹּל שֶׁמְּצֻוֶּוה לִפְדּוֹת אֶת עַצְמוֹ – מְצֻוֶּוה לִפְדּוֹת אֶת אֲחֵרִים, וְכֹל שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְצֻוֶּוה לִפְדּוֹת אֶת עַצְמוֹ – אֵינוֹ מְצֻוֶּוה לִפְדּוֹת אֲחֵרִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And from where do we** derive **that** a mother **is not commanded** to redeem her son? **As it is written: “You shall redeem [*tifde*]”** which can be read as: **You shall be redeemed [*tippadeh*].** This indicates that **whoever is commanded to redeem himself is commanded to redeem others, and whoever is not commanded to redeem himself is not commanded to redeem others.** Since a woman is not commanded to redeem herself, she is not commanded to redeem her son either.


###### Kiddushin 29a:17
[Kiddushin 29a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/29a:17)

וְאִיהִי מְנָלַן דְּלָא מִיחַיְּיבָא לְמִיפְרַק נַפְשַׁהּ? דִּכְתִיב: ״תִּפְדֶּה״ – ״תִּיפָּדֶה״, כֹּל שֶׁאֲחֵרִים מְצֻוִּוים לִפְדּוֹתוֹ – מְצֻוֶּוה לִפְדּוֹת אֶת עַצְמוֹ, וְכֹל שֶׁאֵין אֲחֵרִים מְצֻוִּוים לִפְדּוֹתוֹ – אֵין מְצֻוֶּוה לִפְדּוֹת אֶת עַצְמוֹ. וּמִנַּיִן שֶׁאֵין אֲחֵרִים מְצֻוִּוין לִפְדּוֹתָהּ? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״כׇּל בְּכוֹר בָּנֶיךָ תִּפְדֶּה״ – בָּנֶיךָ וְלֹא בְּנוֹתֶיךָ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And from where do we** derive **that she is not obligated to redeem herself?** The Gemara answers that this is **as it is written: “You shall redeem [*tifde*],”** which can be read as: **You shall be redeemed [*tippadeh*].** This indicates that **any** person **whom others are commanded to redeem is commanded to redeem himself, and any** person **whom others are not commanded to redeem is not commanded to redeem himself.** Since there is no mitzva for a parent to redeem his daughter, there is similarly no mitzva for a daughter to redeem herself. **And from where** is it derived **that others are not commanded to redeem** a daughter? **As the verse states: “All the firstborn of your sons you shall redeem”** (Exodus 34:20), i.e., **your sons and not your daughters.**


###### Kiddushin 29a:18
[Kiddushin 29a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/29a:18)

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הוּא לִפְדּוֹת וּבְנוֹ לִפְדּוֹת – הוּא קוֹדֵם לִבְנוֹ. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּנוֹ קוֹדְמוֹ. שֶׁזֶּה מִצְוָתוֹ עַל אָבִיו, וְזֶה מִצְוַת בְּנוֹ עָלָיו.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**The Sages taught:** If a firstborn has not yet been redeemed and he himself has a firstborn son, he is obligated **to redeem himself and** he is also obligated **to redeem his** firstborn **son,** and **he takes precedence over his son.** If he does not have enough money to redeem both of them, he redeems himself. **Rabbi Yehuda says: His son takes precedence over him.** Rabbi Yehuda’s reasoning is **that** with regard to **this** one, the father, the **mitzva** of **his** redemption was **upon his father,** and only when his father did not observe the mitzva did it apply to the adult son. **And that mitzva of** the redemption of **his** firstborn **son applies to him** directly. Consequently, he should first fulfill the mitzva that applies to him by redeeming his son.


###### Kiddushin 29a:19
[Kiddushin 29a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/29a:19)

אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: הַכֹּל מוֹדִין

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yirmeya says: Everyone agrees**