## Kiddushin Daf 41b

###### Kiddushin 41b:1
[Kiddushin 41b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/41b:1)

פִּיחֵת עֲשָׂרָה אוֹ הוֹסִיף עֲשָׂרָה – תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה. מְנָלַן? וְכִי תֵּימָא דְּיָלֵיף מִגֵּירוּשִׁין – מָה לְגֵירוּשִׁין, שֶׁכֵּן יֶשְׁנָן חוֹל! אָמַר קְרָא: ״אַתֶּם״, ״גַּם אַתֶּם״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַשָּׁלִיחַ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**If** the agent **subtracted ten** from the denominator and separated one-fortieth **or added ten** to the denominator and separated one-sixtieth, thereby giving more or less than the owner intended, **his *teruma* is *teruma*. From where do we** derive that one can appoint an agent to separate *teruma*? **And if you would say that** it **is derived from divorce,** one could argue: **What** is an aspect unique **to divorce is that it is** considered **a non-sacred** matter in relation to *teruma* and will have different *halakhot*, so one cannot learn from divorce that one can appoint an agent to separate *teruma*. The Gemara answers: The verse states with regard to *teruma*: “So you also shall set apart a gift unto the Lord of all your tithes” (Numbers 18:28). Once the **verse states “you,”** the addition of the word “also” in the term **“you also”** serves **to include an agent.**


###### Kiddushin 41b:2
[Kiddushin 41b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/41b:2)

וְנִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בִּתְרוּמָה, וְנֵיתוֹ הָנָךְ וְנִגְמְרוּ מִינֵּיהּ! מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמִפְרַךְ: שֶׁכֵּן יֶשְׁנָהּ בְּמַחְשָׁבָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And let the Merciful One write in** the passage concerning ***teruma*** that one can appoint an agent, **and** the *halakha* that one can appoint an agent to act on his behalf in **these** other matters, i.e., divorce and betrothal, **can come and be derived from it.** The Gemara answers: Agency in these matters cannot be derived in this manner **because** the derivation **can be refuted:** Separating *teruma* is different, in **that it is** able to be separated **by** mere **thought.** It is enough for one to decide that a certain portion of his produce shall be *teruma* to have that status take effect. Just as there is this leniency unique to separating *teruma*, perhaps the leniency that enables one to appoint an agent is also unique to separating *teruma*.


###### Kiddushin 41b:3
[Kiddushin 41b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/41b:3)

וְהָא דִּתְנַן: חֲבוּרָה שֶׁאָבַד פִּסְחָהּ, וְאָמְרוּ לְאֶחָד: ״צֵא וּבַקֵּשׁ וּשְׁחוֹט עָלֵינוּ״, וְהָלַךְ וּמָצָא וְשָׁחַט, וְהֵן לָקְחוּ וְשָׁחֲטוּ, אִם שֶׁלּוֹ נִשְׁחַט רִאשׁוֹן – הוּא אוֹכֵל מִשֶּׁלּוֹ, וְהֵם אוֹכְלִים וְשׁוֹתִים עִמּוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara further clarifies the source for agency: Generally, the Paschal offering was brought by a group of people together. **But** there is **that which we learned** in a mishna (*Pesaḥim* 98b): In the case of **a group whose Paschal offering was lost** before it was sacrificed, **and they said to one** member of the group: **Go and search** for our Paschal offering, **and** when you find it, **slaughter** it **on our** behalf; **and** this person **went and found** the lost animal **and slaughtered** it on behalf of the entire group, **but** meanwhile, despairing of his return, **they took** a different animal **and slaughtered** it as a Paschal offering, the *halakha* is as follows: **If his** Paschal offering **was slaughtered first, he eats from his** offering, **and they eat and drink with him.** This demonstrates that one can act as an agent to slaughter the Paschal offering.


###### Kiddushin 41b:4
[Kiddushin 41b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/41b:4)

מְנָלַן? וְכִי תֵּימָא דְּיָלֵיף מֵהָנָךְ – מָה לְהָנָךְ, שֶׁכֵּן יֶשְׁנָן חוֹל אֵצֶל קָדָשִׁים!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**From where do we** derive this *halakha*, that one can appoint an agent to slaughter an offering? **And if you would say that** it **is derived from these** other instances of agency, i.e., divorce and *teruma*, one could refute this derivation by saying: **What** is unique **about these is that they are** considered **non-sacred** matters **relative to offerings,** and perhaps offerings have their own set of *halakhot*.


###### Kiddushin 41b:5
[Kiddushin 41b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/41b:5)

נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִדְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה: מִנַּיִן שֶׁשְּׁלוּחוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם כְּמוֹתוֹ? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְשָׁחֲטוּ אֹתוֹ כֹּל קְהַל עֲדַת יִשְׂרָאֵל בֵּין הָעַרְבָּיִם״, וְכִי כָּל הַקָּהָל כּוּלָּן שׁוֹחֲטִין? וַהֲלֹא אֵינוֹ שׁוֹחֵט אֶלָּא אֶחָד! אֶלָּא מִכָּאן שֶׁשְּׁלוּחוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם כְּמוֹתוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **He derives it from** that **which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa** says, **as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: From where** is it derived **that** the legal status of **a person’s agent is like** that of **himself? As it is stated** with regard to the Paschal offering: **“And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the afternoon”** (Exodus 12:6). **Is it so** that **the whole assembly slaughters** the offering? **But only one** person from each group **slaughters** it. **Rather,** it can be derived **from here that** the legal status of **a person’s agent is like** that of **himself.**


###### Kiddushin 41b:6
[Kiddushin 41b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/41b:6)

נִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בְּקָדָשִׁים, וְנֵיתֵי הָנָךְ וְנִיגְמְרוּ מִינֵּיהּ! מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמִפְרַךְ: מָה לְקָדָשִׁים, שֶׁכֵּן רוֹב מַעֲשֵׂיהֶן עַל יְדֵי שָׁלִיחַ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
In light of that exposition, the Gemara asks: **Let the Merciful One write** in the Torah the *halakha* of an agent **with regard to offerings, and these,** i.e., agency in the cases of betrothal, divorce, and *teruma*, **can come and be derived from it.** The Gemara answers: Agency in these matters cannot be derived in this manner **because** the derivation **can be refuted: What** is unique **about offerings** is that the **majority of their actions** are performed **by** means of **an agent.** Since most of the sacrificial service is performed by priests, who serve as the agents of those bringing the offerings, the general *halakha* of agency cannot be derived from there.


###### Kiddushin 41b:7
[Kiddushin 41b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/41b:7)

חֲדָא מֵחֲדָא לָא אָתְיָא, תֵּיתֵי חֲדָא מִתַּרְתֵּי? – הֵי תֵּיתֵי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara continues to ask: For the reasons stated, the *halakha* of agency **cannot be derived** for any **one** of these **from** any other **one** of them. Still, **derive one** of these **from** the other **two.** The Gemara clarifies: **Which** of them will be **derived** from the others?


###### Kiddushin 41b:8
[Kiddushin 41b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/41b:8)

לָא נִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בְּקָדָשִׁים וְתֵיתֵי מֵהָנָךְ – מָה לְהָנָךְ, שֶׁכֵּן יֶשְׁנָן חוֹל אֵצֶל קֳדָשִׁים. לָא נִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בְּגֵירוּשִׁין וְתֵיתֵי מֵהָנָךְ – מָה לְהָנָךְ, שֶׁכֵּן יֶשְׁנָן בְּמַחְשָׁבָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
If you say: **Let the Merciful One not write** the *halakha* of agency **with regard to offerings and derive** agency with regard to offerings **from these,** i.e., divorce and *teruma*, that derivation can be refuted: **What** is unique **about these is that they are** considered **non-sacred** matters **relative to offerings,** as even *teruma* is not sacred compared to offerings, and sacred procedures such as offerings may have their own *halakhot*. If you say: **Let the Merciful One not write** the *halakha* of agency **with regard to divorce, and derive** agency with regard to divorce **from these,** i.e., *teruma* and offerings, this too can be refuted: **What** is unique **about these is they can be** designated **by means of thought,** and therefore may be easier to effect than divorce.


###### Kiddushin 41b:9
[Kiddushin 41b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/41b:9)

אֶלָּא: לָא לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בִּתְרוּמָה, וְתֵיתֵי מֵהָנָךְ! הָכִי נָמֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** it is the third derivation that is possible: **Let the Merciful One not write** the *halakha* of agency **with regard to *teruma*, and derive** agency **from these,** i.e., offerings and divorce. Although *teruma* is sacred, offerings are more sacred, and yet the *halakha* of agency applies to them. Although the separating of *teruma* can be accomplished by means of thought, as opposed to divorce, offerings can also be designated by means of thought. The Gemara answers: It is **indeed** so; this is the derivation for the applicability of agency to *teruma*.


###### Kiddushin 41b:10
[Kiddushin 41b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/41b:10)

וְאֶלָּא ״אַתֶּם״ ״גַּם אַתֶּם״ לְמָה לִי? מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְרַבִּי יַנַּאי. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי ״גַּם אַתֶּם״ – מָה אַתֶּם בְּנֵי בְּרִית, אַף שְׁלוּחֲכֶם בְּנֵי בְּרִית.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But** then **why do I** need the derivation that once the verse states **“you,”** the addition of the word “also” in the term **“you also”** serves to include an agent? The Gemara answers: It **is necessary to** function as the source of **the** statement **of Rabbi Yannai, as Rabbi Yannai says** that from the term **“you also,”** the following is derived: **Just as you,** those who appoint agents, **are members of the covenant,** i.e., Jews, **so too, your agents** must be **members of the covenant.** A gentile cannot separate *teruma* even if appointed as an agent by a Jew.


###### Kiddushin 41b:11
[Kiddushin 41b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/41b:11)

הָא לְמָה לִי קְרָא? מִדְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן נָפְקָא! דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֵין הָעֶבֶד נַעֲשֶׂה שָׁלִיחַ לְקַבֵּל גֵּט מִיַּד בַּעְלָהּ שֶׁל אִשָּׁה, לְפִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּתוֹרַת גִּיטִּין וְקִידּוּשִׁין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Why do I** need **a verse** to teach **this** *halakha*? **It** is **derived from that** which **Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba** says that **Rabbi Yoḥanan says, as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says** that **Rabbi Yoḥanan says: A slave cannot become an agent to receive a bill of divorce from the hand of a woman’s husband** on her behalf **because he is not** included **in the laws of bills of divorce and betrothal.** This indicates that there is a principle that if certain matters do not apply to a person, he cannot act as an agent with regard to those matters. Therefore, since gentiles are not commanded to separate *teruma*, they cannot be agents for its separation.


###### Kiddushin 41b:12
[Kiddushin 41b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/41b:12)

אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: עֶבֶד, דְּלָאו בַּר הֶיתֵּירָא הוּא כְּלָל. אֲבָל נׇכְרִי, הוֹאִיל וְאִיתֵיהּ בִּתְרוּמָה דְּנַפְשֵׁיהּ, דִּתְנַן: הַנׇּכְרִי וְהַכּוּתִי שֶׁתָּרְמוּ – תְּרוּמָתָן תְּרוּמָה, אֵימָא שָׁלִיחַ נָמֵי עָבֵיד, קָמַשְׁמַע לַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: It **was** nevertheless **necessary** to derive this *halakha* for the case of *teruma*, because it cannot be derived from the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan. This is as it might **enter your mind to say:** It is **a slave** who cannot serve as an agent to receive a bill of divorce, **since he cannot release** a woman by divorce **at all; but a gentile, since he is included in his own *teruma*, as we learned** in a mishna (*Terumot* 3:9): **A gentile or a Samaritan who separated *teruma*** from their own produce, **their *teruma* is considered *teruma*,** despite the fact that they are not obligated to do so, **I will say** that he can **also be** appointed as an **agent.** To counter this argument, the term “you also” **teaches us** that only members of the covenant can act as agents for separating *teruma*; gentiles cannot.


###### Kiddushin 41b:13
[Kiddushin 41b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/41b:13)

וּלְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דְּפָטַר, דִּתְנַן: תְּרוּמַת נׇכְרִי מְדַמַּעַת וְחַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ חוֹמֶשׁ וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר, ״אַתֶּם״ ״גַּם אַתֶּם״ לְמָה לִי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But according to Rabbi Shimon, who exempts** one from paying an additional penalty for the *teruma* of a gentile, this explanation cannot be stated. **As we learned** in a mishna (*Terumot* 3:9): If **the *teruma* of a gentile** gets mixed with regular produce, it is considered to be **a mixture of** *teruma* **and non-sacred** produce, **and** if a non-priest eats this mixture unwittingly **he is liable** to pay **for it** an additional **one-fifth** beyond its value, just as is the *halakha* with regard to one who unwittingly eats *teruma*. **But Rabbi Shimon exempts** him from paying the additional one-fifth, as he holds that the *teruma* of a gentile possesses no sanctity and is considered a mere gift to a priest. If so, if there is no need to learn the additional *halakha* that a gentile cannot act as an agent with regard to the separating of *teruma*, **why do I** need the derivation from **“you”** and **“you also”?**


###### Kiddushin 41b:14
[Kiddushin 41b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/41b:14)

אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וְאָמַר מָר: ״אַתֶּם״ – וְלֹא אֲרִיסִין, ״אַתֶּם״ – וְלֹא שׁוּתָּפִין, ״אַתֶּם״ – וְלֹא אַפּוֹטְרוֹפּוֹס, ״אַתֶּם״ – וְלֹא הַתּוֹרֵם אֶת שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ, אֵימָא: ״אַתֶּם״ – וְלֹא שְׁלוּחֲכֶם נָמֵי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: It **was necessary** to state this additional term, as it might **enter your mind to say: Since the Master says** that the word “you” is interpreted as a limitation, it means that **“you,” but not sharecroppers,** can separate *teruma*, as a sharecropper cannot separate *teruma* from the produce of the owner of the field; **“you”** can separate *teruma* **but not partners** from shared property without the consent of the other; **“you”** can separate *teruma* **but not a steward [*apotropos*]** from the estate that he is administering; and **“you”** can separate *teruma* **but not one who separates** *teruma* **from** produce **that is not his,** you might **also say: “You”** can separate *teruma* **and not your agents.** The verse therefore **teaches us** that “you also” indicates that one can appoint an agent to separate *teruma*.


###### Kiddushin 41b:15
[Kiddushin 41b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/41b:15)

הָנִיחָא לְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה. אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹנָתָן, דְּמַפֵּיק לֵיהּ לְהַאי קְרָא לִדְרָשָׁא אַחֲרִינָא, מְנָא לַן? דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִן שֶׁכׇּל יִשְׂרָאֵל כּוּלָּן יוֹצְאִים

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara poses a question with regard to the basic derivation of the *halakha* of agency: **This works out well** according **to** the opinion of **Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa,** who explains that the verse: “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the afternoon” (Exodus 12:6), teaches the *halakha* of agency with regard to offerings. **But** according **to** the opinion of **Rabbi Yonatan, who derives a different exposition from this verse, from where do we** derive the *halakha* of agency with regard to offerings? **As it is taught** in a *baraita* that **Rabbi Yonatan says: From where do we** derive that **all of the Jews can fulfill** their obligations