## Kiddushin Daf 42a

###### Kiddushin 42a:1
[Kiddushin 42a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/42a:1)

בְּפֶסַח אֶחָד? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְשָׁחֲטוּ אֹתוֹ כֹּל קְהַל עֲדַת יִשְׂרָאֵל בֵּין הָעַרְבָּיִם״, וְכִי כׇּל הַקָּהָל כּוּלָּם שׁוֹחֲטִים? וַהֲלֹא אֵינוֹ שׁוֹחֵט אֶלָּא אֶחָד! אֶלָּא מִכָּאן שֶׁכׇּל יִשְׂרָאֵל יוֹצְאִים בְּפֶסַח אֶחָד – שָׁלִיחַ בְּקָדָשִׁים מְנָא לֵיהּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**with one Paschal offering?** Although it is impossible for all of the Jewish people to each eat an olive-bulk from one offering, they nevertheless fulfill their obligation to sacrifice the Paschal offering by sacrificing one animal, **as it is stated** with regard to the Paschal offering: **“And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the afternoon”** (Exodus 12:6). **Is it so that the whole assembly slaughters** it? **But only one** person from each group **slaughters. Rather,** it can be derived **from here that all of the Jews can fulfill** their obligations **with one Paschal** offering, despite the fact that not everyone will be able to eat from it. Since Rabbi Yonatan derives from this verse that one offering suffices, **from where does he** derive the *halakha* of **agency with regard to offerings?**


###### Kiddushin 42a:2
[Kiddushin 42a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/42a:2)

– מִינֵּיהּ. וְדִילְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאִית לֵיהּ שׁוּתָּפוּת בְּגַוַּיְיהוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: He derives it **from that** very same verse, as it can be seen that one person slaughters the animal on behalf of the rest of the assembly. The Gemara rejects this: **But perhaps it is different there, since** the one slaughtering the animal **has partnership with them** in the offering. This does not prove that there is agency when the agent has no share in the offering.


###### Kiddushin 42a:3
[Kiddushin 42a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/42a:3)

אֶלָּא מֵהָכָא: ״וְיִקְחוּ לָהֶם אִישׁ שֶׂה לְבֵית אָבֹת שֶׂה לַבָּיִת״. וְדִילְמָא הָתָם נָמֵי, דְּאִית לֵיהּ שׁוּתָּפוּת בְּגַוַּיְיהוּ? אִם כֵּן תְּרֵי קְרָאֵי לְמָה לִי? אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְהֵיכָא דְּשָׁיֵיךְ תְּנֵיהוּ עִנְיָן לְהֵיכָא דְּלָא שָׁיֵיךְ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** he derives agency with regard to offerings **from here: “And they shall take to them every man a lamb, according to their fathers’ houses, a lamb for a household”** (Exodus 12:3). This demonstrates that one person takes a lamb and slaughters it on behalf of the entire family. The Gemara asks: **But perhaps there too** there is agency **since** the one slaughtering the animal **has partnership with them?** The Gemara rejects this: **If so, why do I** need **two verses** to teach the same *halakha*? **If** the *halakha* stated in this verse **is not applicable for where it belongs,** i.e., with regard to an agent who is a partner in the offering, **apply it to where it does not belong,** so that even one who does not have a share in the offering can act as an agent.


###### Kiddushin 42a:4
[Kiddushin 42a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/42a:4)

הַאי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְרַבִּי יִצְחָק. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: ״אִישׁ״ זוֹכֶה, וְלֹא הַקָּטָן זוֹכֶה. הָהוּא מֵ״אִישׁ לְפִי אׇכְלוֹ״ נָפְקָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this: **This** verse **is required for him to** teach another *halakha*, **that of Rabbi Yitzḥak, as Rabbi Yitzḥak says:** This verse is the source for the *halakha* that **a man,** i.e., an adult, **can acquire** an item on behalf of others, **but** that **a minor cannot acquire** an item on behalf of others. The Gemara answers: **That** *halakha*, that only an adult can acquire an item on behalf of others, **is derived from** the verse: **“According to every man’s eating** you shall make your count for the lamb” (Exodus 12:4). By employing the term “man,” which indicates an adult, the verse teaches that only an adult can acquire an item on behalf of others.


###### Kiddushin 42a:5
[Kiddushin 42a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/42a:5)

וְאַכַּתִּי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ דְּשׁוֹחֲטִין אֶת הַפֶּסַח עַל הַיָּחִיד. סָבַר לַהּ כְּמַאן דְּאָמַר: אֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין אֶת הַפֶּסַח עַל הַיָּחִיד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks another question: **And still** the verse “according to every man’s eating” **is required for him** to teach the *halakha* **that one may slaughter a Paschal offering for an individual.** It does not have to be “a lamb, according to their fathers’ houses,” as implied by the previous verse. A lamb may be slaughtered even by one person, i.e., “every man” for himself. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yonatan **holds in accordance with** the opinion of **the one who says** that **one may not slaughter a Paschal offering for an individual.**


###### Kiddushin 42a:6
[Kiddushin 42a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/42a:6)

וְאֶלָּא הָא דְּאָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר רַב: מִנַּיִן שֶׁשְּׁלוּחוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם כְּמוֹתוֹ? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְנָשִׂיא אֶחָד נָשִׂיא אֶחָד מִמַּטֶּה״. תִּיפּוֹק לֵיהּ שְׁלִיחוּת מֵהָכָא! וְתִיסְבְּרָא דְּהָא שְׁלִיחוּת הוּא? וְהָא קְטַנִּים לָאו בְּנֵי שְׁלִיחוּת נִינְהוּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks a question from a different source: **But** consider **that** which **Rav Giddel says** that **Rav says: From where** is it derived **that** the legal status of **a person’s agent is like** that of **himself?** It is **as it is stated** with regard to the division of Eretz Yisrael among the Jewish people: **“And you shall take one prince of every tribe,** to take possession of the land” (Numbers 34:18). This indicates that the prince of each tribe acted as the agent to claim the land for each member of his tribe. **Let** the *halakha* of **agency be derived from here;** why is there a need to have the sources quoted above? The Gemara answers: **And** how can **you understand that this** process of the princes claiming the land **was** due to **agency? But minors cannot be** involved in **agency,** and the princes claimed the land for all members of their tribe, adults and minors alike.


###### Kiddushin 42a:7
[Kiddushin 42a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/42a:7)

אֶלָּא, כִּי הָא דְּרָבָא בַּר רַב הוּנָא. דְּאָמַר רָבָא בַּר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר רַב: מִנַּיִן שֶׁזָּכִין לְאָדָם שֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְנָשִׂיא אֶחָד נָשִׂיא אֶחָד״. וְתִיסְבְּרַאּ זְכוּת הִיא? הָא חוֹבָה נָמֵי אִיכָּא, דְּאִיכָּא דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ בְּהַר, וְלָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ בְּבִקְעָה, וְאִיכָּא דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ בְּבִקְעָה וְלָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ בְּהַר!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** the distribution of the land by the princes follows a different principle, **like that** statement **of Rava bar Rav Huna, as Rava bar Rav Huna says** that **Rav Giddel says** that **Rav says: From where** is it derived **that one can act in a person’s interest in his absence?** It is **as** it **is stated: “And** you shall take **one prince.”** The princes were not appointed as agents and could act for the benefit of the minors. The Gemara asks: **And** how can **you understand** that **it is a benefit? But it was also** to their **disadvantage, as there is** one person **for whom it is preferable to him** to receive a portion **on a hill and it is not preferable to him** to receive a portion **in a valley, and there is** one person **for whom it is preferable to him** to receive a portion **in a valley and it is not preferable to him** to receive a portion **on a hill.** The prince might claim land for members of his tribe that they do not want, and one cannot act to another’s disadvantage in his absence.


###### Kiddushin 42a:8
[Kiddushin 42a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/42a:8)

וְאֶלָּא כִּדְרָבָא בַּר רַב הוּנָא. דְּאָמַר רָבָא בַּר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר רַב: מִנַּיִן לִיתוֹמִים שֶׁבָּאוּ לַחֲלוֹק בְּנִכְסֵי אֲבִיהֶן שֶׁבֵּית דִּין מַעֲמִידִין לָהֶם אַפּוֹטְרוֹפּוֹס לָחוּב וְלִזְכּוֹת? ״לָחוּב״ אַמַּאי? אֶלָּא: ״לָחוּב עַל מְנָת לִזְכּוֹת״ – תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְנָשִׂיא אֶחָד נָשִׂיא אֶחָד מִמַּטֶּה תִּקְחוּ״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** the verse is required to teach a different *halakha*, **like that** statement **of Rava bar Rav Huna, as Rava bar Rav Huna says** that **Rav Giddel says** that **Rav says: From where** is it derived **that** if **orphans came to divide their father’s property, that the court appoints a steward for them,** both **to** their **disadvantage and to** their **benefit?** Before the Gemara completes the quote, it analyzes the statement: **Why** would the court appoint a steward **to** their **disadvantage? Rather,** it means **to** their **disadvantage in order to** achieve their eventual **benefit.** Once a steward has been appointed to control the orphans’ estate, he has the authority to act to their temporary disadvantage if they are ultimately likely to benefit from the action. And the source of this *halakha* is as **the verse states: “And you shall take one prince of every tribe”** (Numbers 34:18).


###### Kiddushin 42a:9
[Kiddushin 42a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/42a:9)

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: יְתוֹמִים שֶׁבָּאוּ לַחְלוֹק בְּנִכְסֵי אֲבִיהֶם – בֵּית דִּין מַעֲמִידִים לָהֶם אַפּוֹטְרוֹפּוֹס, וּבוֹרְרִים לָהֶם חֵלֶק יָפֶה, וְאִם הִגְדִּילוּ – יְכוֹלִים לְמַחוֹת. וְרַב נַחְמָן דִּידֵיהּ אָמַר: אִם הִגְדִּילוּ אֵינָם יְכוֹלִים לְמַחוֹת, דְּאִם כֵּן מָה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ With regard to the *halakhot* of stewardship, **Rav Naḥman says** that **Shmuel says:** If **orphans came to divide their father’s property, the court appoints** a steward **for them, and they select for them,** i.e., for each of the orphans, **a fine portion. And when they have grown up,** the orphans **can protest** the division and demand redistribution of the property. **And Rav Naḥman said his own** statement: **When they have grown up, they cannot protest, as if so, what advantage** is there to **the power of the court** over an ordinary person? In other words, to strengthen the authority of the court, it is required that its decisions not be questioned later on.


###### Kiddushin 42a:10
[Kiddushin 42a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/42a:10)

וּמִי אִית לֵיהּ לְרַב נַחְמָן ״אִם כֵּן מָה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה״? וְהָתְנַן: שׁוּם הַדַּיָּינִים שֶׁפִּיחֲתוּ שְׁתוּת אוֹ הוֹתִירוּ שְׁתוּת – מִכְרָן בָּטֵל. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: מִכְרָן קַיָּים. (וְאָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל): אִם כֵּן – מָה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה! וְאָמַר רַב הוּנָא בַּר חִינָּנָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: הֲלָכָה כְּדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And is Rav Naḥman of** the opinion that there is a consideration of: **If so, what advantage** does **the court have** over an ordinary person? **But didn’t we learn** in a mishna (*Ketubot* 99b): The *halakha* with regard to **the appraisal by the judges** of the value of a piece of property in order to sell it is as follows: **Where they decreased** the price by **one-sixth** of its market value **or added one-sixth** to its market value, **their sale is void. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Their sale is valid. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If so,** if the sale is void, then **what advantage** is there to **the power of the court** over an ordinary person? **And Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana says** that **Rav Naḥman says:** The ***halakha*** is **in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis.** This indicates that Rav Naḥman does not accept the consideration of: What advantage is there to the power of the court over an ordinary person?


###### Kiddushin 42a:11
[Kiddushin 42a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/42a:11)

לָא קַשְׁיָא:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: This is **not difficult.**