## Kiddushin Daf 43a

###### Kiddushin 43a:1
[Kiddushin 43a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43a:1)

נֵילַף מִינֵּיהּ! מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה מְעִילָה טְבִיחָה וּמְכִירָה שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד, וְכֹל שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד אֵין מְלַמְּדִין. מְעִילָה – הָא דַּאֲמַרַן, טְבִיחָה וּמְכִירָה מַאי הִיא? אָמַר קְרָא: ״וּטְבָחוֹ אוֹ מְכָרוֹ״ – מָה מְכִירָה עַל יְדֵי אַחֵר, אַף טְבִיחָה עַל יְדֵי אַחֵר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**let us derive** a principle from misuse of consecrated property, that an agent can be appointed to perform a transgression. The Gemara answers: This is not done, **because misuse** of consecrated property **and** the **slaughter or sale** of a stolen cow or sheep **are two verses that come as one, and any two verses that come as one do not teach** their common aspect to apply to other cases. The Gemara clarifies: The verse pertaining to **misuse** of consecrated property is **that which we said,** but **what is** the verse with regard to **slaughter or sale? The verse states: “And he slaughters it or sells it”** (Exodus 21:37), juxtaposing selling to slaughtering: **Just as a sale** is necessarily performed **by means of another,** since every transaction involves two parties, **so too slaughter** can likewise be performed **by means of another,** and the thief is liable even if the act of slaughtering is performed by his agent.


###### Kiddushin 43a:2
[Kiddushin 43a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43a:2)

דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל תָּנָא: ״אוֹ״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַשָּׁלִיחַ. דְּבֵי חִזְקִיָּה תָּנָא: ״תַּחַת״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַשָּׁלִיחַ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara quotes two other explanations. **The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught** that the word **“or”** in the verse “and he slaughters it or sells it,” serves **to include an agent. The school of Ḥizkiyya taught:** When the verse states with regard to sale or slaughter: “He shall pay five oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep” (Exodus 21:37), repetition of the word **“for”** is superfluous and serves **to include an agent.** It teaches that the one who appointed the agent is liable for the action of the agent.


###### Kiddushin 43a:3
[Kiddushin 43a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43a:3)

הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד אֵין מְלַמְּדִין. אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מְלַמְּדִין, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? גַּלִּי רַחֲמָנָא בִּשְׁחוּטֵי חוּץ, ״דָּם יֵחָשֵׁב לָאִישׁ הַהוּא דָּם שָׁפָךְ״ – הוּא וְלֹא שְׁלוּחוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **This works out well according to the one who said** that **two verses that come as one do not teach** a precedent that applies to other cases, **but according to the one who said** that two verses do **teach** a precedent, **what can be said?** Why not derive from the case of misuse of consecrated property and that of slaughter or sale that an agent can be appointed to perform a transgression? The Gemara answers: **The Merciful One reveals** in the Torah that an agent cannot be appointed to perform a transgression **in** the case of an offering **slaughtered outside** the Temple, as it states: **“It shall be considered blood for that [*hahu*] man; he has spilled blood”** (Leviticus 17:4). The emphasis of “that man” teaches that **he** is liable for his actions, **but** he is **not** liable for the actions of **his agent.**


###### Kiddushin 43a:4
[Kiddushin 43a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43a:4)

אַשְׁכְּחַן גַּבֵּי שְׁחוּטֵי חוּץ, בְּכׇל הַתּוֹרָה מְנָלַן? דְּיָלֵיף מִשְּׁחוּטֵי חוּץ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **We found** a source for the *halakha* that an agent cannot be appointed to perform a transgression **with regard to** the prohibition of offerings **slaughtered outside. From where do we** derive that this *halakha* applies **to the entire Torah?** The Gemara answers: It is **derived** as a principle **from** the case of offerings **slaughtered outside,** by means of analogy.


###### Kiddushin 43a:5
[Kiddushin 43a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43a:5)

אַדְּיָלֵיף מִשְּׁחוּטֵי חוּץ, נֵילַיף מֵהָנָךְ! הֲדַר כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא: ״וְנִכְרַת הָאִישׁ הַהוּא״ – אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְגוּפוֹ, תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: But **before deriving** that an agent cannot be appointed to perform a transgression **from** the case of offerings **slaughtered outside, let us derive** the *halakha* **from these** other cases, i.e., misuse of consecrated property and slaughter or sale, where the *halakha* is that an agent can be appointed to perform a transgression. The Gemara answers: **The Merciful One again writes** in that same verse in connection to the prohibition of slaughtering offerings outside the Temple: **“And that [*hahu*] man shall be cut off** from among his people” (Leviticus 17:4). **If** the *halakha* derived from the emphasis of the word *hahu* written in this part of the verse **is not needed for** this **matter itself,** since the verse already taught that he is liable only for his own act and not for that of his agent, **apply it to the matter of the entire Torah,** so that one is held liable only for one’s own actions and not for those of an agent.


###### Kiddushin 43a:6
[Kiddushin 43a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43a:6)

וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד אֵין מְלַמְּדִים, הָנֵי ״הָהוּא״ ״הָהוּא״ מַאי דָּרֵישׁ בְּהוּ? חַד, לְמַעוֹטֵי שְׁנַיִם שֶׁאוֹחֲזִים בְּסַכִּין וְשׁוֹחֲטִים, וְחַד, ״הוּא״ – וְלֹא אָנוּס, ״הוּא״ – וְלֹא שׁוֹגֵג, ״הוּא״ – וְלֹא מוּטְעֶה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And according to the one who says** that **two verses that come as one do not teach** a precedent, and there is no reason to learn from the misuse of consecrated property and slaughter or sale that one can appoint an agent to perform a transgression, **what does he interpret those** terms: **“That** man” and: **“That** man” to be teaching? Since he does not need to counter a derivation from the two verses, he should not require them to teach that one cannot appoint an agent to perform a transgression. The Gemara answers: **One** of them serves **to exclude** from liability the case of **two who hold a knife and slaughter** an offering outside together. **And** the other **one** emphasizes: **“That** man” is liable, **but not one** who is **compelled** to slaughter the animal; **“that** man” is liable, **but not** one who does so **unwittingly;** and **“that** man” is liable, **and not** one who **was mistaken,** e.g., one who did not know that the animal was an offering. In order to be liable one must have acted with full awareness and completely willingly.


###### Kiddushin 43a:7
[Kiddushin 43a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43a:7)

וְאִידָּךְ? מֵ״הוּא״ ״הָהוּא״. וְאִידָּךְ? ״הוּא״ ״הַהוּא״ לָא דָּרֵישׁ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** how does **the other** opinion, i.e., the one who holds that two verses that come as one do teach a precedent, which derives from the word “that [*hahu*]” that an agent cannot be appointed to perform a transgression, derive these *halakhot*? The Gemara answers: He derives them from the fact that the pronoun “*hahu*” is composed of two parts, the article *ha*, meaning: The, and the pronoun *hu*, meaning: He. He derives *halakhot* both **from “*hu*”** and from the additional article in **“*hahu*.”** Therefore, he is able to derive both the principle that an agent cannot be appointed to perform a transgression and the *halakhot* of two that slaughter and one who acts without full awareness. **And the other** opinion, i.e., the one who holds that two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent, which derives these *halakhot* from the entire word “*hahu*,” **does not interpret** the variation from **“*hu*”** to **“*hahu*.”** He holds that one cannot derive separate *halakhot* from each part of this word.


###### Kiddushin 43a:8
[Kiddushin 43a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43a:8)

וְהָא דְּתָנֵי: הָאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ: ״צֵא הֲרוֹג אֶת הַנֶּפֶשׁ״, הוּא – חַיָּיב, וְשׁוֹלְחָיו – פָּטוּר. שַׁמַּאי הַזָּקֵן אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם חַגַּי הַנָּבִיא: שׁוֹלְחָיו חַיָּיב, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אֹתוֹ הָרַגְתָּ בְּחֶרֶב בְּנֵי עַמּוֹן״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara questions the statement that there is no agency for transgressions: **But** there is **that which is taught** in a *baraita*: **One who says to his agent: Go kill a person, he,** the killer, **is liable** if he kills, **and the one who appointed him is exempt. Shammai the Elder says in the name of Haggai the prophet: The one who appointed him is liable, as it stated** with regard to David, who directed Joab to kill Uriah: **“Him you have slain with the sword of the children of Ammon”** (II Samuel 12:9). David was held responsible for the death of Uriah.


###### Kiddushin 43a:9
[Kiddushin 43a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43a:9)

מַאי טַעְמֵיהּ דְּשַׁמַּאי הַזָּקֵן? קָסָבַר: שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד מְלַמְּדִין, וְ״הוּא״ ״הַהוּא״ לָא דָּרֵישׁ. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: לְעוֹלָם דָּרֵישׁ, וּמַאי חַיָּיב – חַיָּיב בְּדִינֵי שָׁמַיִם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What is the reason of Shammai the Elder?** How can he say that there is agency for transgression? The Gemara answers: **He holds** that **two verses that come as one do teach** a precedent, and therefore he learns from the two cases of misuse of consecrated property and slaughter or sale that there is agency for transgression. **And** as for the derivation from one who slaughters an offering outside the Temple, which teaches that there is no agent for transgression, Shammai **does not interpret** the variation from **“*hu*”** to **“*hahu*.” And if you wish, say** instead: **Actually** it is possible that he does **interpret** the variation, and he agrees that there is no agent for transgression. **And what** is the meaning of Shammai’s statement that the one who appoints him is **liable?** It means he is **liable according to the laws of Heaven,** although he cannot be punished by a human court.


###### Kiddushin 43a:10
[Kiddushin 43a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43a:10)

מִכְּלָל דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: אֲפִילּוּ מִדִּינֵי שָׁמַיִם נָמֵי פָּטוּר?! אֶלָּא: דִּינָא רַבָּה וְדִינָא זוּטָא אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **By inference,** does this mean **that the first *tanna* holds** that **he is exempt even according to the laws of Heaven?** The one who appointed him must bear some responsibility. **Rather,** the first *tanna* also agrees that the one who appointed the killer is liable according to the laws of Heaven, and **the** difference **between them** pertains to **a great judgment and a small judgment.** According to Shammai, his liability is great, to the extent that Heaven considers him fully responsible, whereas the first *tanna* holds that his liability is of a lesser degree.


###### Kiddushin 43a:11
[Kiddushin 43a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43a:11)

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: שָׁאנֵי הָתָם דְּגַלִּי רַחֲמָנָא: ״אֹתוֹ הָרַגְתָּ בְּחֶרֶב בְּנֵי עַמּוֹן״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you wish, say** instead: Everyone agrees that there is no agent for transgression. Nevertheless, Shammai holds that **there,** with regard to killing, it **is different, since the Merciful One reveals: “Him you have slain with the sword of the children of Ammon,”** explicitly rendering David accountable for this transgression and indicating that killing is different from all other transgressions.


###### Kiddushin 43a:12
[Kiddushin 43a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43a:12)

וְאִידַּךְ: הֲרֵי לְךָ כְּחֶרֶב בְּנֵי עַמּוֹן, מָה חֶרֶב בְּנֵי עַמּוֹן – אֵין אַתָּה נֶעֱנָשׁ עָלָיו, אַף אוּרִיָּה הַחִתִּי – אִי אַתָּה נֶעֱנָשׁ עָלָיו. מַאי טַעְמָא – מוֹרֵד בַּמַּלְכוּת הֲוָה, דְּקָאָמַר לֵיהּ: ״וַאדֹנִי יוֹאָב וְעַבְדֵי אֲדֹנִי עַל פְּנֵי הַשָּׂדֶה חֹנִים״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And the other** opinion, i.e., the first *tanna*, who holds that the one who appoints the killer is exempt, explains the verse as follows: **Behold** this killing is **for you like the sword of Ammon. Just as you are not punished** for those killed by **the sword of Ammon** in the course of the war, **so too you are not punished for** the death of **Uriah the Hittite,** not even according to the laws of Heaven. **What is the reason** for this? Uriah **was a rebel against the monarchy** and was consequently liable to the death penalty, **as he said to** King David: **“And my lord Joab, and the servants of my lord, are encamped in the open field”** (II Samuel 11:11). By referring to Joab as his lord in front of the king, he indicated that he answered to Joab rather than to the king, which is tantamount to rebellion.


###### Kiddushin 43a:13
[Kiddushin 43a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43a:13)

אָמַר רָבָא: אִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר סָבַר שַׁמַּאי שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד מְלַמְּדִין, וְ״הוּא״ ״הַהוּא״ לָא דָּרֵישׁ, מוֹדֶה בְּאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ ״צֵא בְּעוֹל אֶת הָעֶרְוָה״ וֶ״אֱכוֹל אֶת הַחֵלֶב״ שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב, וְשׁוֹלְחָיו פָּטוּר. שֶׁלֹּא מָצִינוּ בְּכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ זֶה נֶהֱנֶה וְזֶה מִתְחַיֵּיב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said: If you say** that **Shammai holds** that **two verses that come as one do teach** a precedent, **and he does not interpret** the variation from **“*hu*”** to **“*hahu*,”** the combination of which would result in him holding that there is agency for transgression in all cases, even he **concedes with regard to one who says to his agent: Go and engage in sexual intercourse with a forbidden relative,** or: Go **and eat** forbidden **fat, that** the agent **is liable and the one who appointed him is exempt, as we have not found in the entire Torah** a case where **this** person physically **benefits** from the transgression **but that** one **becomes liable.**


###### Kiddushin 43a:14
[Kiddushin 43a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43a:14)

אִיתְּמַר, רַב אָמַר: שָׁלִיחַ נַעֲשֶׂה עֵד. דְּבֵי רַבִּי שֵׁילָא אָמְרִי: אֵין שָׁלִיחַ נַעֲשֶׂה עֵד. מַאי טַעְמָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי שֵׁילָא? אִילֵּימָא מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא אֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״הֱוֵי לִי עֵד״ – אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה קִידֵּשׁ אִשָּׁה בִּפְנֵי שְׁנַיִם וְלָא אָמַר לָהֶם: ״אַתֶּם עֵדַיי״ – הָכִי נָמֵי דְּלָא הָווּ קִידּוּשֵׁי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **It was stated** that *amora’im* engaged in a dispute concerning the following issue: **Rav says: An agent can become a witness.** If one was appointed as an agent to perform a certain task, he can then serve as a witness that the action was performed. **In the school of Rabbi Sheila they say: An agent cannot become a witness.** The Gemara asks: **What is the reason of the school of Rabbi Sheila? If we say** it is **because** the one who appointed him **did not say to** the agent: **Be a witness for me,** and appointed him only as an agent; **if that is so,** if one **betrothed a woman in the presence of two** people **and did not say to them: You are my witnesses, so too** would they hold **that it is not a betrothal?** It is not necessary to explicitly appoint witnesses.


###### Kiddushin 43a:15
[Kiddushin 43a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43a:15)

אֶלָּא, רַב אָמַר: שָׁלִיחַ נַעֲשֶׂה עֵד – אַלּוֹמֵי קָא מְאַלֵּימְנָא לְמִילְּתֵיהּ. דְּבֵי רַבִּי שֵׁילָא אָמְרִי: אֵין שָׁלִיחַ נַעֲשֶׂה עֵד – כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר מָר: ״שְׁלוּחוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם כְּמוֹתוֹ״ – הָוֵה לֵיהּ כְּגוּפֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** the dispute is as follows. **Rav says: An agent can become a witness,** since **we strengthen his words** of testimony because he attests to a matter of which he is certain, as he is the one that performed the action. **In the school of Rabbi Sheila they say: An agent cannot become a witness. Since the Master said** that the legal status of **a person’s agent is like** that of **himself,** the agent **is considered like** the one who appointed him **himself.** Just as one cannot testify with regard to a matter that concerns himself, the same applies to one’s agent.


###### Kiddushin 43a:16
[Kiddushin 43a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43a:16)

מֵיתִיבִי: אָמַר לִשְׁלֹשָׁה ״צְאוּ וְקַדְּשׁוּ לִי הָאִשָּׁה״ – אֶחָד שָׁלִיחַ וּשְׁנַיִם עֵדִים, דִּבְרֵי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי. וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: כּוּלָּם שְׁלוּחִין הֵן, וְאֵין שָׁלִיחַ נַעֲשֶׂה עֵד. עַד כָּאן לָא פְּלִיגִי אֶלָּא בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, אֲבָל בִּשְׁנַיִם – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל לָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**The Gemara raises an objection** from a *baraita* to the statement of Rav: If one **said to three** people: **Go out and betroth the woman for me,** then **one** of them is the **agent** for the betrothal **and two** of them serve as **witnesses;** this is **the statement of Beit Shammai. And Beit Hillel say: They are all** potential **agents, and** as **an agent cannot become a witness** none of them can be witnesses. Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel **disagree only with regard to** a case where one said this to **three** people. **But with regard to two** people, **all agree** that agents are **not** able to serve as witnesses.


###### Kiddushin 43a:17
[Kiddushin 43a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43a:17)

הוּא דְּאָמַר כִּי הַאי תַּנָּא, דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר, בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: שָׁלִיחַ וְעֵד אֶחָד. וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: שָׁלִיחַ וּשְׁנֵי עֵדִים. וְרַב כְּבֵית שַׁמַּאי?! אֵיפוֹךְ. וְרַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא מַתְנִי אִיפְּכָא: רַב אָמַר: אֵין שָׁלִיחַ נַעֲשֶׂה עֵד, דְּבֵי רַבִּי שֵׁילָא אָמְרִי: שָׁלִיחַ נַעֲשֶׂה עֵד. וְהִילְכְתָא: שָׁלִיחַ נַעֲשֶׂה עֵד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: It was **he,** Rav, **who said** his ruling **in accordance with** the opinion of **that *tanna*,** i.e., the version of Beit Shammai as presented by Rabbi Natan. **As it is taught** in a *baraita*: **Rabbi Natan says: Beit Shammai say** that **the agent and one witness** are sufficient to carry out the agency and testify, **and Beit Hillel say: The agent and two witnesses** are needed. The Gemara questions this explanation: **And** would **Rav** rule **in accordance with** the opinion of **Beit Shammai?** The Gemara answers: **Reverse** the opinions, so that it is Beit Hillel who said that the agent and one witness suffice. **And Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, taught** the dispute of the *amora’im* in the **opposite** manner. **Rav says: An agent cannot become a witness,** and **in the school of Rabbi Sheila they say: An agent can become a witness.** The Gemara concludes: **And the *halakha*** is that **an agent can become a witness.**


###### Kiddushin 43a:18
[Kiddushin 43a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43a:18)

אָמַר רָבָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: אָמַר לִשְׁנַיִם: ״צְאוּ וְקַדְּשׁוּ לִי אֶת הָאִשָּׁה״ – הֵן הֵן שְׁלוּחָיו, הֵן הֵן עֵדָיו. וְכֵן בְּגֵירוּשִׁין,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava says** that **Rav Naḥman says:** It follows that if one **said to two** people: **Go and betroth the woman for me, the very same** people who are **his agents** for the betrothal **are his witnesses. And a similar** *halakha* is true **with regard to divorce:** If a man sent a bill of divorce to his wife with two people, they serve both as agents of delivery and as witnesses to the divorce.