## Kiddushin Daf 43b

###### Kiddushin 43b:1
[Kiddushin 43b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43b:1)

וְכֵן בְּדִינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And a similar** *halakha* applies **with regard to** cases of **monetary law.** If one appoints agents to perform a transaction for him, e.g., paying a debt to his creditor, they can testify that he has paid.


###### Kiddushin 43b:2
[Kiddushin 43b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43b:2)

וּצְרִיכָא דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן בְּקִידּוּשִׁין – מִשּׁוּם דִּלְמֵיסְרַהּ קָאָתֵי, אֲבָל גֵּירוּשִׁין – נֵיחוּשׁ שֶׁמָּא עֵינָיו נָתַן בָּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara comments: **And** it is **necessary** for Rav Naḥman to teach this *halakha* in each of these legal domains, **as had he taught us** this *halakha* **only in** the case of **betrothal** one could say that the agents can serve as witnesses **because** they **are coming to render her forbidden** to everyone else, and therefore there is no reason to suspect them of lying, as their testimony renders her forbidden to them as well. **But** with regard to **divorce, we should be concerned** that **perhaps** the agent **cast his eyes upon her** and is testifying falsely so that he can marry her.


###### Kiddushin 43b:3
[Kiddushin 43b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43b:3)

וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן גֵּירוּשִׁין – מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיתְּתָא לְבֵי תְרֵי לָא חַזְיָא, אֲבָל מָמוֹנָא – אֵימָא: הָנֵי מִיפְלָג פָּלְגִי. צְרִיכִי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And had** Rav Naḥman **taught us** this *halakha* only in the case of **divorce,** it could have been said that the agents are not suspected of lying **because a woman is not fit for** marrying **two** people, and since they testify as a pair there is no concern that they both might have designs upon her. **But** with regard to **money,** one might **say** that **these** two can **divide** it between them, and perhaps they never paid the debt but kept the money themselves. Therefore, all the examples **are necessary.**


###### Kiddushin 43b:4
[Kiddushin 43b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43b:4)

מַאי קָסָבַר? אִי קָסָבַר הַמַּלְוֶה חֲבֵירוֹ בְּעֵדִים צָרִיךְ לְפוֹרְעוֹ בְּעֵדִים – הָנֵי נוֹגְעִים בְּעֵדוּת נִינְהוּ, דְּאִי אָמְרִי: ״לָא פְּרַעְנֵיהּ״ אָמַר לְהוּ: ״פְּרָעוּנִי״!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What does** Rav Naḥman **hold? If he holds** that in the case of **one who lends** money to **another in** the presence of **witnesses,** the debtor **must repay him in** the presence of **witnesses,** then **these** agents **are affected by their testimony. As, if they say: We did not repay him** but returned the money to the one who appointed us, then the one who appointed them will **say to them: Pay me** back the money I gave you to repay the debt. The agents are considered as the debtors of the one who appointed them, as they took money from him. They would not be deemed credible to state that they returned the money to the one who appointed them, as they do not have witnesses that they did so. Consequently, they have a financial incentive to testify falsely that they fulfilled their agency and repaid the debt.


###### Kiddushin 43b:5
[Kiddushin 43b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43b:5)

אֶלָּא לְעוֹלָם קָסָבַר: הַמַּלְוֶה אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ בְּעֵדִים אֵין צָרִיךְ לְפוֹרְעוֹ בְּעֵדִים, וּמִגּוֹ דְּיָכְלִי לְמֵימַר: ״אַהְדְּרִינְהוּ לְלֹוֶה״, יְכוֹלִין לְמֵימַר: ״פְּרַעְנֵיהּ לְמַלְוֶה״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** Rav Naḥman **actually holds** that in the case of **one who lends** money to **another in** the presence of **witnesses,** the debtor **does not need to repay him in** the presence of **witnesses. And since** the agents **are able to say: We returned** the money **to the debtor,** even without there being witnesses to substantiate their claim, **they can** also be deemed credible **to say: We repaid the creditor,** as they have no financial incentive to lie.


###### Kiddushin 43b:6
[Kiddushin 43b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43b:6)

וְהַשְׁתָּא דְּתַקּוּן רַבָּנַן שְׁבוּעַת הֶיסֵּת – מִשְׁתַּבְעִי הָנֵי עֵדִים דְּיָהֵיבְנָא לֵיהּ, וּמִשְׁתְּבַע מַלְוֶה דְּלָא שָׁקֵיל לֵיהּ, וּפָרַע לֵיהּ לֹוֶה לְמַלְוֶה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara comments: **And now,** since the time of Rav Naḥman, **when the Sages instituted an oath of inducement,** an oath instituted by the Sages in a case where a defendant completely denies a claim, these witnesses are affected by their testimony. If they were to claim that they returned the money to the one who appointed them, they would be required to take an oath of inducement to that effect. Consequently, they have an incentive to lie and claim that they fulfilled their agency and repaid the loan. Therefore, their testimony that they fulfilled their agency is not deemed credible. Instead, **these witnesses take an oath** in court **that they gave** the money **to him,** i.e., the lender, **and** the **lender** in turn **takes an oath that he did not take** the money owed to him, **and** then **the debtor pays the lender** his debt a second time, as the Sages ruled in similar cases.


###### Kiddushin 43b:7
[Kiddushin 43b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43b:7)

הָאִישׁ מְקַדֵּשׁ אֶת בִּתּוֹ. תְּנַן הָתָם: נַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה – הִיא וְאָבִיהָ מְקַבְּלִין אֶת גִּיטָּהּ. אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: אֵין שְׁתֵּי יָדַיִם זוֹכוֹת כְּאֶחָד, אֶלָּא אָבִיהָ מְקַבֵּל אֶת גִּיטָּהּ. וְכֹל שֶׁאֵין יְכוֹלָה לִשְׁמוֹר אֶת גִּיטָּהּ – אֵין יְכוֹלָה לְהִתְגָּרֵשׁ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches that **a man can betroth his daughter** to a man when she is a young woman. **We learned** in a mishna **there** (*Gittin* 64b): With regard to **a betrothed young woman, she and her father** are each eligible to **receive her bill of divorce. Rabbi Yehuda said: Two hands do not** have the right to **acquire** an item on behalf of one person **as one.** If the young woman is able to acquire an item on her own, her father cannot receive her bill of divorce. Conversely, if she is not able to acquire an item on her own, only her father can receive the bill of divorce. **Rather, her father** alone **receives her bill of divorce** on her behalf. The mishna states another principle: **And any** female **who is unable to safeguard her bill of divorce,** either due to her young age or mental incompetence, **is unable to be divorced,** since a bill of divorce is effective only for one who understands the severing of ties that a divorce engenders.


###### Kiddushin 43b:8
[Kiddushin 43b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43b:8)

אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: כְּמַחְלוֹקֶת לְגֵירוּשִׁין, כָּךְ מַחְלוֹקֶת לְקִידּוּשִׁין. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: מַחְלוֹקֶת לְגֵירוּשִׁין, אֲבָל לְקִידּוּשִׁין – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אָבִיהָ וְלֹא הִיא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Reish Lakish says: Just as** there is **a dispute with regard to divorce,** as to whether both a young woman and her father can accept her bill of divorce or only the father can do so, **so too** there is **a dispute with regard to betrothal. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute is with regard to divorce, but** with regard to **betrothal everyone agrees** that **her father** has the right to accept it **but not her.**


###### Kiddushin 43b:9
[Kiddushin 43b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43b:9)

וְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: מַאי טַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּנַן? גֵּירוּשִׁין, דְּמַכְנֶסֶת עַצְמָהּ לִרְשׁוּת אָבִיהָ – בֵּין הִיא וּבֵין אָבִיהָ. קִידּוּשִׁין, דְּמַפְקַעַת עַצְמָהּ מֵרְשׁוּת אָבִיהָ – אָבִיהָ וְלֹא הִיא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: What is the reason of Rabbi Yoḥanan, in accordance with** the opinion **of the Rabbis,** that there is a distinction between divorce and betrothal? In the case of **divorce, when she brings herself** back **into her father’s authority** by means of the bill of divorce, it is considered as though the father has obtained the bill of divorce via his daughter, and therefore **either she or her father** can receive it. In the case of **betrothal, where she removes herself from her father’s authority,** she cannot do this by herself. Consequently, only **her father** can accept the betrothal, **but not her.**


###### Kiddushin 43b:10
[Kiddushin 43b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/43b:10)

וַהֲרֵי מַאֲמָר, דְּמַפְקַעַת עַצְמָהּ מֵרְשׁוּת אָבִיהָ, וּתְנַן:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But isn’t there** the case of **levirate betrothal,** where the *yevama* **removes herself from her father’s authority, and** yet **we learned** in a *baraita*: