## Kiddushin Daf 44a

###### Kiddushin 44a:1
[Kiddushin 44a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/44a:1)

קְטַנָּה מִן הָאֵירוּסִין – אֵין עוֹשִׂים בָּהּ מַאֲמָר אֶלָּא מִדַּעַת אָבִיהָ. וְהַנַּעֲרָה – בֵּין מִדַּעַת עַצְמָהּ בֵּין מִדַּעַת אָבִיהָ, (מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּקִידּוּשִׁין).

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
If **a minor girl** was widowed **after** her **betrothal,** a surviving brother of her betrothed **can perform levirate betrothal only with the consent of her father. And** in the case of **a young woman,** he can do so **either with her consent [*mida’at atzmah*] or with the consent of her father, unlike** the *halakha* **with regard to** standard **betrothal.** This indicates that a young woman can accept levirate betrothal on her own, despite the fact that it removes her from her father’s authority.


###### Kiddushin 44a:2
[Kiddushin 44a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/44a:2)

אֶלָּא אִי אִיתְּמַר, הָכִי אִיתְּמַר: אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: מַאי טַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּנַן? קִידּוּשִׁין, דְּמִדַּעְתַּהּ – אָבִיהָ וְלָא הִיא. גֵּירוּשִׁין, דִּבְעַל כֻּרְחַהּ – בֵּין הִיא בֵּין אָבִיהָ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, if** it **was stated, it was stated like this: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: What is** the **reason of Rabbi Yoḥanan, in accordance with** the opinion of **the Rabbis?** With regard to **betrothal, which** takes effect only **with** the **consent** of the one who accepts the betrothal, **her father** can accept it **but not her,** since betrothal requires his approval. With regard to a bill of **divorce,** which can be given **without her consent, either she or her father** can receive it.


###### Kiddushin 44a:3
[Kiddushin 44a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/44a:3)

הֲרֵי מַאֲמָר, דְּמִדַּעְתַּהּ, וְקָתָנֵי: בֵּין הִיא וּבֵין אָבִיהָ! הָתָם בְּמַאֲמָר דִּבְעַל כֻּרְחַהּ, וְרַבִּי הִיא. דְּתַנְיָא: הָעוֹשֶׂה מַאֲמָר בִּיבִמְתּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעְתָּהּ, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: קָנָה, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים לֹא קָנָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But isn’t levirate betrothal** valid only **with her consent,** like other betrothals, **and** yet **it teaches** in the *baraita* that **either she or her father** can accept it? The Gemara answers: **There** it is referring **to levirate betrothal that is** performed **against her will, and it is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi. **As it is taught** in a *baraita*: If a *yavam* **performs levirate betrothal with his *yevama* without her consent, Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi **says:** The *yavam* **acquires** her. **And the Rabbis say: He does not acquire** her.


###### Kiddushin 44a:4
[Kiddushin 44a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/44a:4)

מַאי טַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי? גָּמַר מִבִּיאָה דִיבָמָה, מָה בִּיאָה דִיבָמָה בְּעַל כֻּרְחַהּ – אַף הָכָא נָמֵי בְּעַל כֻּרְחַהּ. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: יָלְפִינַן מִקִּידּוּשִׁין, מָה קִידּוּשִׁין דְּמִדַּעְתַּהּ – אַף הָכָא נָמֵי דְּמִדַּעְתַּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara clarifies: **What is the reason of Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi? **He derives** the *halakha* of levirate betrothal **from** the *halakha* of **sexual intercourse that** a *yavam* engages in with **a *yevama*: Just as intercourse with** the ***yevama*** renders her acquired even if it is done **against her will, so too here,** in the case of levirate betrothal, the *yavam* can betroth her **against her will. And the Rabbis hold** that **we derive** the *halakha* of levirate betrothal **from** standard **betrothal: Just as betrothal** can be performed only **with her consent, so too here,** levirate betrothal can be performed only **with her consent.**


###### Kiddushin 44a:5
[Kiddushin 44a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/44a:5)

בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? רַבִּי סָבַר: מִילֵּי דִיבָמָה מִיבָמָה הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: קִידּוּשִׁין מִקִּידּוּשִׁין הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara clarifies: **With regard to what do they disagree? Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi **holds** that **one should derive matters** involving **a *yevama* from** other matters involving **a *yevama*,** and the marriage between a *yevama* and a *yavam* can be formalized against her will. **And the Rabbis hold** that **one should derive** matters involving **betrothal from** the *halakhot* of **betrothal,** as levirate betrothal is structured like standard betrothal in other respects.


###### Kiddushin 44a:6
[Kiddushin 44a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/44a:6)

הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא כִּדְקָא מְתָרֵץ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: ״מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּקִידּוּשִׁין״. אֶלָּא נֵימָא תֶּיהְוֵי תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ? אָמַר לָךְ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, דְּאָמַר: אֵין שְׁתֵּי יָדַיִם זוֹכוֹת כְּאַחַת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara comments: **So too, it is reasonable** to rule with regard to betrothal **as Rabbi Yoḥanan explains,** that only the father can accept betrothal, **from** the fact **that it teaches** in the **latter clause** of the *baraita* that with regard to levirate betrothal, in the case of **a young woman,** the *yavam* can perform it either with her consent or with the consent of her father, **unlike** the *halakha* **with regard to** standard **betrothal.** This indicates that she can be betrothed in standard betrothal only with her father’s agreement. The Gemara asks: **Then shall we say** that **this should be a conclusive refutation of** the opinion of **Reish Lakish,** who holds that according to the Rabbis a young woman can also accept her own betrothal? The Gemara answers: **Reish Lakish** could have **said to you:** In accordance with **whose** opinion **is this** *baraita*? **It is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda, who says: Two hands do not acquire** an item **as one.**


###### Kiddushin 44a:7
[Kiddushin 44a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/44a:7)

אִי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּקִידּוּשִׁין?! מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּגֵירוּשִׁין מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! אִין הָכִי נָמֵי, אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא מַאֲמָר דְּדָמֵי לְקִידּוּשִׁין, תְּנָא נָמֵי: מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּקִידּוּשִׁין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **If** it is in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda,** why does the *baraita* state: **Unlike** the *halakha* **with regard to** standard **betrothal? It should** have stated: **Unlike** the *halakha* **with regard to divorce,** as Rabbi Yehuda stated his opinion in the mishna with regard to divorce, not betrothal. The Gemara answers: **Yes, it is indeed so,** it should have referred to divorce, but **since it taught** the *halakha* of **levirate betrothal, which** is **similar to betrothal, it also taught: Unlike** the *halakha* **with regard to** standard **betrothal.**


###### Kiddushin 44a:8
[Kiddushin 44a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/44a:8)

וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, מַאי שְׁנָא מַאֲמָר? הוֹאִיל וּזְקוּקָה וְעוֹמֶדֶת. הַשְׁתָּא דְּאָתֵית לְהָכִי, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן נָמֵי לָא תִּיקְשֵׁי לָךְ מֵעִיקָּרָא: שָׁאנֵי מַאֲמָר, הוֹאִיל וּזְקוּקָה וְעוֹמֶדֶת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** according to the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda,** in **what** way **is levirate betrothal different from** divorce? Why can a young woman accept the former but not receive a bill of divorce, when both levirate betrothal and divorce can be performed without her consent? The Gemara answers: The *halakha* of levirate betrothal is different. **Since she is bonded** to the *yavam* **and standing** in wait for him, acceptance of the betrothal money by the *yevama* suffices to effect the levirate betrothal. The Gemara comments: **Now that you have arrived at this** explanation, the statement of **Rabbi Yoḥanan also should not pose a difficulty for you from the outset.** One cannot question his statement with regard to the Rabbis’ opinion in the case of betrothal. **Levirate betrothal is different, since** the *yevama* **is bonded** to the *yavam* **and standing** in wait for him.


###### Kiddushin 44a:9
[Kiddushin 44a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/44a:9)

תְּנַן: הָאִישׁ מְקַדֵּשׁ אֶת בִּתּוֹ כְּשֶׁהִיא נַעֲרָה, בּוֹ וּבִשְׁלוּחוֹ. בּוֹ וּבִשְׁלוּחוֹ – אִין, בָּהּ וּבִשְׁלוּחָהּ – לָא, תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ! אָמַר לָךְ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הָא נָמֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**We learned** in the mishna that **a man can betroth his daughter** to a man **when she is a young woman, by himself or by** means of **his agent.** The Gemara analyzes this: **Yes,** he can betroth her **by himself or by** means of **his agent, but no,** she cannot become betrothed **by herself or by** means of **her agent.** This is **a conclusive refutation of Reish Lakish,** who holds that according to the opinion of the Rabbis a young woman can accept her own betrothal. The Gemara answers: **Reish Lakish** could have **said to you: This** mishna **too is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda.**


###### Kiddushin 44a:10
[Kiddushin 44a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/44a:10)

וּמִי מָצֵית מוֹקְמַתְּ לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? וְהָקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה: ״הִתְקַדְּשִׁי לִי בִּתְמָרָה זוֹ״, ״הִתְקַדְּשִׁי לִי בָּזוֹ״ וְאָמְרִינַן: מַאן תַּנָּא ״הִתְקַדְּשִׁי״ ״הִתְקַדְּשִׁי״?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But can you establish this** mishna **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda? But the last clause,** in the following mishna (46b), **teaches:** In the case of **one who says to a woman: Be betrothed to me with this date** and adds: **Be betrothed to me with that** date, she is betrothed only if one of them is worth one *peruta* on its own. **And we say: Who** is the *tanna* who **taught** that the two dates are valued separately only if he said: **Become betrothed** and: **Become betrothed,** in a separate statement when giving each date, but that if he said: Become betrothed, only once, the value of the two dates are added together?


###### Kiddushin 44a:11
[Kiddushin 44a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/44a:11)

וְאָמַר רַבָּה: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא, דְּאָמַר: עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר שְׁבוּעָה לְכׇל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rabba said: It is Rabbi Shimon, who says** that one is not liable to bring multiple offerings for taking false oaths to multiple people in the same utterance. For example, if one says: I take an oath that I do not have your item, nor yours, nor yours, he brings a single offering. This is the *halakha* **unless one states** an expression of **an oath to each and every one** of the plaintiffs, by stating: I take an oath I do not have yours; I take an oath I do not have yours, in which case he brings multiple offerings. Consequently, the *tanna* of this mishna is Rabbi Shimon, not Rabbi Yehuda.


###### Kiddushin 44a:12
[Kiddushin 44a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/44a:12)

וְכִי תֵּימָא כּוּלַּהּ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וּבִפְרָטֵי סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, וּמִי סָבַר לַהּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you would say** that the *tanna* of the **entire** mishna concerning betrothal is **Rabbi Yehuda, and** that **with regard to the specification** of separate oaths **he holds in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Shimon,** this cannot be. **But does he** in fact **hold in accordance** with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon with regard to the specification of separate oaths?


###### Kiddushin 44a:13
[Kiddushin 44a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/44a:13)

וְהָתַנְיָא: זֶה הַכְּלָל: כָּלַל – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת, פָּרַט – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: ״שְׁבוּעָה לֹא לָךְ, לֹא לָךְ, לֹא לָךְ״ – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: ״לֹא לָךְ, לֹא לָךְ, לֹא לָךְ וְלֹא לָךְ שְׁבוּעָה״ – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: לְעוֹלָם אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר שְׁבוּעָה לְכׇל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But isn’t it taught** in a *baraita*: **This is the principle** with regard to one’s liability to bring offerings for a false oath: If he **included** all the statements in one oath **he is liable** for **only one** oath, but if he **specified** them, **he is liable for each and every one;** this is **the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says:** If one said: I take **an oath** that I do not have your deposit, **nor yours, nor yours, nor yours,** and he was found to have taken a false oath, **he is liable** to bring an offering **for each and every one. Rabbi Eliezer says:** If he said: I do **not** have **yours, nor yours, nor yours, and nor yours,** I take **an oath,** then **he is liable for each and every one.** Since he stated the oath at the end, it refers back to each element of his statement. **Rabbi Shimon says: He is liable** to bring more than one offering **only if** he **states** an expression of **an oath for each and every one.** This indicates that Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with Rabbi Shimon with regard to the question of when oaths are considered distinct.


###### Kiddushin 44a:14
[Kiddushin 44a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/44a:14)

אֶלָּא: כּוּלַּהּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא, וּבִשְׁלִיחוּת סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** the Gemara explains in the opposite manner: The *tanna* of the **entire** mishna concerning betrothal is **Rabbi Shimon, and with regard to** the *halakha* of **agency he holds in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda,** that only the father of a young woman can appoint an agent to accept her betrothal or receive her bill of divorce.


###### Kiddushin 44a:15
[Kiddushin 44a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/44a:15)

רַבִּי אַסִּי לָא עָל לְבֵי מִדְרְשָׁא. אַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ לְרַבִּי זֵירָא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי אֲמוּר הָאִידָּנָא בֵּי מִדְרְשָׁא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַף אֲנָא לָא עֲיַילִ[י], רַבִּי אָבִין הוּא דְּעָיֵיל וַאֲמַר: חַבְרוּתָא כּוּלַּהּ כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן. וּצְוַוח רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ כִּי כְרוּכְיָא: ״וְיָצְאָה. וְהָיְתָה״, וְלֵיכָּא דְּאַשְׁגַּח בֵּיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: רַבִּי אָבִין בַּר סַמְכָא הוּא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין, כְּמִין יַמָּא לְטִיגְנֵי הוּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara relates: One day **Rabbi Asi did not go to the study hall. He found Rabbi Zeira** and **said to him: What was said today in the study hall?** Rabbi Zeira **said to him: I too did not go,** but **Rabbi Avin is the one who went, and he said: The entire coterie** sided **with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yoḥanan** that there is a difference between betrothal and divorce in the case of a young woman. **And Reish Lakish screamed** at them **like a crane:** Doesn’t the verse state: **“And she departs** out of his house **and** goes and **becomes** another man’s wife” (Deuteronomy 24:2), juxtaposing the *halakhot* of divorce and betrothal? **But no one paid any attention to him.** Rabbi Asi **said to him:** Is **Rabbi Avin reliable?** Can one be sure that he transmitted an accurate report? Rabbi Zeira **said to him: Yes,** in this case he can be trusted, since the elapsed time **was** only **like** the interval between catching a fish **from the sea** and bringing it **to a frying pan [*tignei*].**


###### Kiddushin 44a:16
[Kiddushin 44a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/44a:16)

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: אֲנָא, לָא רַבִּי אָבִין בְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא, וְלָא רַבִּי אָבִין בַּר כָּהֲנָא, אֶלָּא רַבִּי אָבִין סְתָם. לְמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ? לְמִירְמֵא דִּידֵיהּ אַדִּידֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says:** When **I** quote this statement, I do **not** state it in the name of **Rabbi Avin, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, nor Rabbi Avin bar Kahana, but** in the name of **Rabbi Avin, without specification.** The Gemara asks: **What difference is there?** Why does it matter which Rabbi Avin is cited as the source of this statement? The Gemara answers: It would matter if one were **to raise a contradiction between** one of **his** rulings and another one of **his** rulings. If there were to be a conflicting opinion attributed to a specific Rabbi Avin, e.g., Rabbi Avin, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, it would not be a true contradiction, as this statement might have been issued by a different Rabbi Avin.


###### Kiddushin 44a:17
[Kiddushin 44a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/44a:17)

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רָבָא מֵרַב נַחְמָן:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava asked Rav Naḥman:**