## Kiddushin Daf 48a

###### Kiddushin 48a:1
[Kiddushin 48a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/48a:1)

הַמּוֹכֵר שְׁטַר חוֹב לַחֲבֵירוֹ, וְחָזַר וּמְחָלוֹ – מָחוּל, וַאֲפִילּוּ יוֹרֵשׁ מוֹחֵל. דְּמָר אִית לֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל. וּמָר לֵית לֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
In the case of **one who sells a promissory note to another, and** he, the seller, **went back and forgave** the debtor his debt, **it is forgiven,** since the debtor essentially had a non-transferable obligation to the creditor alone. **And even** the creditor’s **inheritor can forgive** the debt. It can be explained **that** one **Sage,** i.e., the Rabbis, **is of** the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion **of Shmuel.** Since the man can forgive the debt, the woman will not rely on her ability to collect using the promissory note she has received for her betrothal. **And** one **Sage,** Rabbi Meir, **is not of** the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion **of Shmuel;** the woman relies on her ability to collect using the promissory note and is betrothed.


###### Kiddushin 48a:2
[Kiddushin 48a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/48a:2)

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִית לְהוּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל, וְהָכָא בְּאִשָּׁה קָמִיפַּלְגִי. מָר סָבַר: אִשָּׁה סָמְכָה דַּעְתַּהּ, מֵימָר אָמְרָה: לָא שָׁבֵיק לֵיהּ לְדִידִי וּמָחֵל לֵיהּ לְאַחֲרִינֵי, וּמָר סָבַר: אִשָּׁה נָמֵי לָא סָמְכָה דַּעְתַּהּ

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you wish, say** instead **that everyone is of** the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion **of Shmuel, and here** they **disagree with regard to a woman** who is becoming betrothed. One **Sage,** Rabbi Meir, **holds** that **a woman relies** on a promissory note she receives, since **she says** to herself: **He would not leave** aside **my** benefit **and forgive** the debt **of others. And** one **Sage,** i.e., the Rabbis, **holds** that **even a woman** who received the promissory note for betrothal **does not rely** on being able to collect the debt, since she is concerned he might forgive it.


###### Kiddushin 48a:3
[Kiddushin 48a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/48a:3)

בְּמִלְוָה עַל פֶּה. בְּמַאי פְּלִיגִי? בִּדְרַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב, דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: מָנֶה לִי בְּיָדְךָ, תְּנֵהוּ לִפְלוֹנִי בְּמַעֲמַד שְׁלָשְׁתָּן – קָנָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Having enumerated several possibilities for the dispute in the case of a loan with a promissory note, the Gemara explains the dispute in the case of a loan by oral agreement: In the case of one who betroths a woman **with a loan** by **oral** agreement, **with regard to what do they disagree?** They disagree **with regard to** the statement **of Rav Huna,** who quoted a statement that **Rav says, as Rav Huna says** that **Rav says:** If one said to another: **I have one hundred dinars in your possession, give it to so-and-so,** if he stated this **in the presence of** all **three** parties, i.e., the one who had the money, the one who was the owner of the money, and the intended recipient, the intended recipient **has acquired** it.


###### Kiddushin 48a:4
[Kiddushin 48a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/48a:4)

מָר סָבַר: כִּי קָאָמַר רַב הָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּפִקָּדוֹן, אֲבָל מִלְוָה – לָא. וּמָר סָבַר: לָא שְׁנָא מִלְוָה וְלָא שְׁנָא פִּקָּדוֹן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
One **Sage,** i.e., the Rabbis, **holds** that **when Rav said** that it can be acquired in the presence of all three parties, **this applies in** the case of **a deposit,** since the item is intact. **But** in the case of **a loan,** which is meant to be spent, he did **not** rule that it can be transferred this way, since there is no actual money but merely a debt. **And** one **Sage,** Rabbi Meir, **holds:** There **is no difference** whether it is **a loan or a deposit.** The third party acquires it in both cases. A woman is therefore betrothed if he gave her a loan in the above manner.


###### Kiddushin 48a:5
[Kiddushin 48a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/48a:5)

נֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי: ״הִתְקַדְּשִׁי לִי בִּשְׁטָר״ – רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: שָׁמִין אֶת הַנְּיָיר, אִם יֵשׁ בּוֹ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וְאִם לָאו – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara again suggests: **Let us say** that Rav’s statement that one cannot betroth a woman with a loan is **subject to** a dispute between ***tanna’im*.** A *baraita* teaches: If one says to a woman: **Be betrothed to me with a document, Rabbi Meir says she is not betrothed, and Rabbi Elazar says she is betrothed, and the Rabbis say** the court **appraises the paper** the document is written on: **If** the paper itself **has the value of one *peruta*, she is betrothed. But if not, she is not betrothed.**


###### Kiddushin 48a:6
[Kiddushin 48a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/48a:6)

הַאי שְׁטָר הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא שְׁטַר חוֹב דַּאֲחֵרִים – קַשְׁיָא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר אַדְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר. אֶלָּא בִּשְׁטַר חוֹב דִּידַהּ, וּבִמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּמִלְוָה קָא מִיפַּלְגִי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara clarifies the case of this *baraita*: **What are the circumstances** of **this document? If we say** it is **a promissory note** of a debt owed him **by others,** then the statement **of Rabbi Meir** is **difficult** in light of another statement **of Rabbi Meir,** as he stated in the previous *baraita* that a woman can be betrothed by giving her a promissory note. **Rather,** this *baraita* must be referring **to a promissory note of** a debt owed him by **her, and they disagree with regard to** the *halakha* of **one who betroths** a woman **with a loan.**


###### Kiddushin 48a:7
[Kiddushin 48a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/48a:7)

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק, הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן כְּגוֹן שֶׁקִּדְּשָׁהּ בִּשְׁטָר שֶׁאֵין עָלָיו עֵדִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says** that this is not necessarily so. **With what are we dealing here?** With a case **where he betrothed her with a document** of betrothal **that had no witnesses to it.**


###### Kiddushin 48a:8
[Kiddushin 48a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/48a:8)

וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר לְטַעְמֵיהּ דְּאָמַר: עֵדֵי חֲתִימָה כָּרְתִי, וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר לְטַעְמֵיהּ דְּאָמַר: עֵדֵי מְסִירָה כָּרְתִי, וְרַבָּנַן מְסַפְּקָא לְהוּ אִי כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר אִי כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, הִלְכָּךְ שָׁמִין אֶת הַנְּיָיר, אִם יֵשׁ בּוֹ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וְאִם לָאו אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rabbi Meir** conforms **to his** standard line of **reasoning, as he says** with regard to a bill of divorce: **Signatory witnesses** on the bill of divorce **effect** the divorce, and the same applies to a document of betrothal. Since no witnesses signed the document, it cannot be used for betrothal. **And Rabbi Elazar** conforms **to his** standard line of **reasoning, as he says: Witnesses to the transmission** of the bill of divorce **effect** the divorce, and she is betrothed if the document was handed over in the presence of witnesses. **And the Rabbis are uncertain if** the *halakha* is **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Meir** or **if** it is **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Elazar. Therefore,** they rule that the betrothal is not effected by means of the document, but it is betrothal effected by means of giving an item worth money. The court **appraises the paper: If it has the value of one *peruta*, she is betrothed. But if not, she is not betrothed.**


###### Kiddushin 48a:9
[Kiddushin 48a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/48a:9)

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא, כְּגוֹן שֶׁכְּתָבוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ, וּבִדְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ קָמִיפַּלְגִי. דְּבָעֵי רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: שְׁטַר אֵירוּסִין שֶׁכְּתָבוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ, מַהוּ? הֲוָיָה לִיצִיאָה מַקְּשִׁינַן, מָה יְצִיאָה בָּעֵינַן לִשְׁמָהּ, אַף הֲוָיָה נָמֵי בָּעֵינַן לִשְׁמָהּ. אוֹ דִלְמָא: הֲוָיוֹת לַהֲדָדֵי מַקְּשִׁינַן, מָה הֲוָיָה דְכֶסֶף לָא בָּעֵינַן לִשְׁמָהּ, אַף הֲוָיָה דִשְׁטָר לָא בָּעֵינַן לִשְׁמָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you wish, say** instead that this *baraita* is referring to a case **where he wrote** the document of betrothal **not for her sake,** i.e., not for this particular woman’s sake. **And they disagree with regard to** a statement **of Reish Lakish, as Reish Lakish asks: What is** the *halakha* of **a document of betrothal that** the scribe **wrote not for her sake?** The Gemara clarifies the question: Do **we juxtapose becoming** a wife through betrothal **to leaving** a marriage through divorce and say: **Just as** in the document that causes her to **leave** the marriage **we require** that it be written **for her sake, so too,** in the document that causes her to **become** betrothed **we require** that it be written **for her sake as well. Or perhaps we juxtapose** different ways of **becoming** betrothed **to each other: Just as** in the act of **becoming** betrothed by means **of money we do not require** that money be minted **for her sake** and he can use any money, **so too,** with regard to the act of **becoming** betrothed by means **of a document, we do not require** that it be written **for her sake.**


###### Kiddushin 48a:10
[Kiddushin 48a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/48a:10)

בָּתַר דְּבַעְיַהּ הֲדַר פַּשְׁטַהּ: ״וְיָצְאָה... וְהָיְתָה״, מַקִּישׁ הֲוָיָה לִיצִיאָה. מָר אִית לֵיהּ דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, וּמָר לֵית לֵיהּ דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**After** Reish Lakish **raised the dilemma,** he **then resolved it:** The verse states: **“And she departs** out of his house and goes **and becomes** another man’s wife” (Deuteronomy 24:2). The verse thereby **juxtaposes** the verb **becoming to** the verb **leaving,** so a bill of divorce and a document of betrothal must be written for her sake to be valid. **One Sage,** Rabbi Meir, **is of** the opinion that the *halakha* is in accordance with the opinion **of Reish Lakish,** and maintains that she is not betrothed if the document was not written for her sake. **And** one **Sage,** Rabbi Elazar, **is not of** the opinion that the *halakha* is in accordance with the opinion **of Reish Lakish.** The Rabbis remain uncertain, and therefore view the case as betrothal by means of giving an item worth money.


###### Kiddushin 48a:11
[Kiddushin 48a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/48a:11)

וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִית לְהוּ דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, וְהָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, שֶׁכְּתָבוֹ לִשְׁמָהּ וְשֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעְתָּהּ. וּבִפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרָבָא וְרָבִינָא, וְרַב פָּפָּא וְרַב שֵׁרֵבְיָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי. דְּאִיתְּמַר: כְּתָבוֹ לִשְׁמָהּ וְשֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעְתָּהּ, רָבָא וְרָבִינָא אָמְרִי: מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, רַב פָּפָּא וְרַב שֵׁרֵבְיָא אָמְרִי: אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you wish, say** instead **that everyone is of** the opinion that the *halakha* is in accordance with the opinion **of Reish Lakish, and with what are we dealing here?** With a case **where he wrote** the document **for her sake but unbeknownst to her. And** they **disagree concerning the dispute between Rava and Ravina, and Rav Pappa and Rav Sherevya, as it was stated** that these *amora’im* engaged in a dispute with regard to the following issue: If **he wrote** a document of betrothal **for her sake but unbeknownst to her** and gave it to her for betrothal, **Rava and Ravina say she is betrothed; Rav Pappa and Rav Sherevya say she is not betrothed.**


###### Kiddushin 48a:12
[Kiddushin 48a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/48a:12)

נֵימָא כְּהָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי, דְּתַנְיָא: ״עֲשֵׂה לִי שִׁירִים נְזָמִים וְטַבָּעוֹת, וְאֶקַּדֵּשׁ אֲנִי לָךְ״, כֵּיוָן שֶׁעֲשָׂאָן – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ מָמוֹן לְיָדָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara again suggests: **Let us say** that Rav’s statement that one cannot betroth a woman with a loan is **subject to** a dispute between **these *tanna’im*, as it is taught** in a *baraita*: If a woman gave gold to a goldsmith, instructing him: **Make bracelets, earrings, and rings for me, and I will be betrothed to you** as payment for your work, **once he has made them she is betrothed;** this is **the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: She is not betrothed until money enters her possession.**


###### Kiddushin 48a:13
[Kiddushin 48a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/48a:13)

הַאי מָמוֹן הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא אוֹתוֹ מָמוֹן, מִכְּלָל דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: אֲפִילּוּ אוֹתוֹ מָמוֹן נָמֵי לָא! אֶלָּא בְּמַאי כּוּ מִקַּדְּשָׁא? אֶלָּא לָאו בְּמָמוֹן אַחֵר, וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ בִּמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּמִלְוָה קָמִיפַּלְגִי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What are the circumstances** of **this money** mentioned by the Rabbis? **If we say** it means **that** very **money,** i.e., the jewelry she requested, then **by inference the first *tanna*,** Rabbi Meir, **holds** that **even that** same **money is also not** required to be given for her to be betrothed, but she is betrothed as soon as he made the jewelry. **But with what** does he betroth her? It is only **with** the jewelry that she **is betrothed,** since he has given her nothing but the jewelry. **Rather, is** the statement of the Rabbis **not** referring to when he betroths her **with** the **other money,** i.e., the payment she owes him for his service, and they hold that she is not betrothed? **And conclude from it** that Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis **disagree with regard to one who betroths** a woman **with a loan,** since the payment she owes him for making the rings is like a loan.


###### Kiddushin 48a:14
[Kiddushin 48a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/48a:14)

וְסָבְרִי דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא יֶשְׁנָהּ לִשְׂכִירוּת מִתְּחִלָּה [וְעַד] סוֹף וְהָוֵה מִלְוָה. מַאי לָאו בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּמָר סָבַר: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּמִלְוָה מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וּמָר סָבַר: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּמִלְוָה אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara clarifies: **And** it must be **they hold that everyone agrees** that the obligation to pay **a wage is** incurred continuously **from the beginning** of the period he was hired **to** its **end,** i.e., the obligation to pay for a service begins when the hired party starts to work, and the sum owed increases as he proceeds. **And it is** therefore **a loan,** as when he gives her the finished article she was already obligated to pay for the work he had performed earlier. **What, is it not** the case that they **disagree with regard to this,** i.e., **that** one **Sage,** Rabbi Meir, **holds** that in the case of **one who betroths** a woman **with a loan, she is betrothed, and** one **Sage,** the Rabbis, **holds** that in the case of **one who betroths** a woman **with a loan, she is not betrothed?**


###### Kiddushin 48a:15
[Kiddushin 48a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/48a:15)

לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא מְקַדֵּשׁ בְּמִלְוָה אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וְהָכָא – בְּיֶשְׁנָהּ לִשְׂכִירוּת מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף קָמִיפַּלְגִי, מָר סָבַר:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this: **No,** it is possible that **everyone** agrees that in the case of **one who betroths** a woman **with a loan, she is not betrothed, and here** they in fact **disagree** over the question of whether or not the obligation to pay **a wage is** incurred continuously **from the beginning** of the period he was hired **to** its **end.** One **Sage,** Rabbi Meir, **holds:**