## Kiddushin Daf 4b

###### Kiddushin 4b:1
[Kiddushin 4b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/4b:1)

קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן ״וְיָצְאָה חִנָּם כּוּ׳״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Therefore the superfluous phrase: **“Then shall she go out for nothing,** without money” (Exodus 21:11), **teaches us** that even an *ailonit* can be sold as a Hebrew maidservant and is released upon reaching adulthood.


###### Kiddushin 4b:2
[Kiddushin 4b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/4b:2)

וּלְמָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי, דְּאָמַר: וְלָאו קַל וָחוֹמֶר הוּא, הָא אָמְרִינַן מִילְּתָא דְּאָתְיָא בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר טָרַח וְכָתַב לַהּ קְרָא! הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּלֵיכָּא לְשַׁנּוֹיֵי, אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא לְשַׁנּוֹיֵי – מְשַׁנִּינַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And according to** the opinion of **Mar bar Rav Ashi, who said: But is it not an *a fortiori*** inference that adulthood releases a woman from her master’s authority, how does he respond to the fact that **we say** in general, with regard to **a matter that can be derived through an *a fortiori*** inference, the **verse** nevertheless **takes the trouble and writes it** explicitly? The Gemara answers: **That matter** applies only where there **is no** other way **to resolve** the difficulty of why a *halakha* is written when it could be derived through an *a fortiori* inference. **But when there is** another, more substantial way **to resolve** the difficulty, **one resolves** it in that manner.


###### Kiddushin 4b:3
[Kiddushin 4b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/4b:3)

וְתַנָּא מַיְיתֵי לַהּ מֵהָכָא, דְּתַנְיָא: ״כִּי יִקַּח אִישׁ אִשָּׁה וּבְעָלָהּ וְהָיָה אִם לֹא תִמְצָא חֵן בְּעֵינָיו כִּי מָצָא בָהּ וְגוֹ׳״ – אֵין קִיחָה אֶלָּא בְּכֶסֶף. וְכֵן הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״נָתַתִּי כֶּסֶף הַשָּׂדֶה קַח מִמֶּנִּי״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara notes: **And a *tanna* cites** the *halakha* that a woman can be betrothed with money **from here,** a different source. **As it is taught** in a *baraita* that when the verse states: **“When a man takes a woman and engages in sexual intercourse with her, and it comes to pass, if she finds no favor in his eyes, because he has found** some unseemly matter **in her,** and he writes her a scroll of severance” (Deuteronomy 24:1), in this verse, the term **taking is only with money. And so it says: “I will give money for the field; take it from me”** (Genesis 23:13).


###### Kiddushin 4b:4
[Kiddushin 4b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/4b:4)

וַהֲלֹא דִּין הוּא: וּמָה אָמָה הָעִבְרִיָּה שֶׁאֵינָהּ נִקְנֵית בְּבִיאָה – נִקְנֵית בְּכֶסֶף, זוֹ, שֶׁנִּקְנֵית בְּבִיאָה – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁתִּקָּנֶה בְּכֶסֶף?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But** is there any need for this derivation? Could this **not** be derived through an *a fortiori* **inference,** as follows: **And if** a Hebrew **maidservant, who cannot be acquired** as a maidservant **through intercourse,** nevertheless **can be acquired through money, is it not logical that this** woman, **who can be acquired through intercourse** for the purpose of betrothal, **can** likewise **be acquired through money?**


###### Kiddushin 4b:5
[Kiddushin 4b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/4b:5)

יְבָמָה תּוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁנִּקְנֵית בְּבִיאָה וְאֵינָהּ נִקְנֵית בְּכֶסֶף! מָה לִיבָמָה, שֶׁכֵּן אֵין נִקְנֵית בִּשְׁטָר, תֹּאמַר בְּזוֹ, שֶׁנִּקְנֵית בִּשְׁטָר!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Nevertheless, this *a fortiori* inference can be refuted. **A *yevama* proves** otherwise, **as she is acquired** by the *yavam* **through intercourse, and** yet **she cannot be acquired through money.** The Gemara rejects this refutation: **What** is unique about **a *yevama*** is **that** she **cannot be acquired through a document. Will you say** that the same applies **to this** woman, **who can be acquired through a document** for the purpose of betrothal, and consequently the acquisition of money applies to her as well?


###### Kiddushin 4b:6
[Kiddushin 4b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/4b:6)

תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כִּי יִקַּח אִישׁ״. הָא לְמָה לִי קְרָא, הָא אָתְיָא לַהּ! אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר מֵעִיקָּרָא דְּדִינָא פִּירְכָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara reiterates its question. **The verse states: “When a man takes** a woman.” **Why do I** need **a verse** for **this** purpose? **It was** already **derived** through this *a fortiori* inference, as the proposed refutation of this inference was rejected. **Rav Ashi said:** It is needed **because one can say that** the **refutation of the** *a fortiori* **inference** is present **from the outset,** i.e., there is a difficulty with the comparison between a woman and a Hebrew maidservant.


###### Kiddushin 4b:7
[Kiddushin 4b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/4b:7)

מֵהֵיכָא קָא מַיְיתֵית לַהּ – מֵאָמָה הָעִבְרִיָּה. מָה לְאָמָה הָעִבְרִיָּה, שֶׁכֵּן יוֹצְאָה בְּכֶסֶף, תֹּאמַר בְּזוֹ, שֶׁאֵינָהּ יוֹצְאָה בְּכֶסֶף. תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״כִּי יִקַּח אִישׁ״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Ashi elaborates: **From where do you derive** that a woman can be betrothed with money? It is derived through an *a fortiori* inference **from** the case of **a Hebrew maidservant.** This derivation can be refuted. **What** is unique **about a Hebrew maidservant is that** she can be **released with money,** i.e., she pays her master her value as a maidservant and she is then freed, and therefore she can likewise be acquired through money. **Will you say** the same with regard to **this** woman, **who cannot be released,** i.e., divorced, **through money?** Since this *a fortiori* inference is rejected, one must rely on the source cited in the *baraita*, that **the verse states: “When a man takes.”**


###### Kiddushin 4b:8
[Kiddushin 4b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/4b:8)

וְאִיצְטְרִיךְ לְמִיכְתַּב ״וְיָצְאָה חִנָּם״, וְאִיצְטְרִיךְ לְמִיכְתַּב ״כִּי יִקַּח אִישׁ״. דְּאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״כִּי יִקַּח״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: קִידּוּשִׁין דִּיהַב לַהּ בַּעַל – דִּידַהּ הָווּ, כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״וְיָצְאָה חִנָּם״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
After mentioning an additional proof for the option of betrothal with money, the Gemara comments: **And it was necessary** for the Torah **to write,** with regard to a Hebrew maidservant: **“Then shall she go out for nothing,” and it was** also **necessary to write: “When a man takes** a woman.” **As, if the Merciful One had written** only: **“When he takes,” I would say:** The **betrothal money that the husband gives her is** invariably **hers.** Therefore, **the Merciful One writes: “Then shall she go out for nothing,”** to teach that when she is not an adult her father has the right to her betrothal money.


###### Kiddushin 4b:9
[Kiddushin 4b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/4b:9)

וְאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״וְיָצְאָה חִנָּם״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: הֵיכָא דְּיָהֲבָה לֵיהּ אִיהִי לְדִידֵיהּ וְקִידְּשַׁתּוּ – הָווּ קִידּוּשֵׁי, כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״כִּי יִקַּח״ – וְלָא ״כִּי תִּקַּח״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** conversely, **had the Merciful One written** only: **“Then shall she go out for nothing,” I would say** that in a case **where she gave him** money **and betrothed him, it is** a valid **betrothal,** as this verse does not specify who gives the money to whom. Therefore, **the Merciful One writes: “When he takes,” and not: When she takes,** to teach that only a man may betroth a woman, not vice versa.


###### Kiddushin 4b:10
[Kiddushin 4b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/4b:10)

״וּבְעָלָהּ״ – מְלַמֵּד שֶׁנִּקְנֵית בְּבִיאָה. וַהֲלֹא דִּין הוּא: וּמָה יְבָמָה שֶׁאֵין נִקְנֵית בְּכֶסֶף – נִקְנֵית בְּבִיאָה, זוֹ, שֶׁנִּקְנֵית בְּכֶסֶף – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁנִּקְנֵית בְּבִיאָה?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The *baraita* continues to interpret the verse. The phrase: **“And engages in sexual intercourse with her”** (Deuteronomy 24:1), **teaches that** a woman **can be acquired through intercourse.** Why is it necessary for the verse to state this explicitly? Could this **not** be derived through an *a fortiori* **inference: And if a *yevama*, who cannot be acquired through money, can be acquired through intercourse, is it not logical that this** woman, **who can be acquired through money,** as derived above, **can** also **be acquired through intercourse?**


###### Kiddushin 4b:11
[Kiddushin 4b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/4b:11)

אָמָה הָעִבְרִיָּה תּוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁנִּקְנֵית בְּכֶסֶף וְאֵין נִקְנֵית בְּבִיאָה. מָה לְאָמָה הָעִבְרִיָּה, שֶׁאֵין קִנְיָנָהּ לְשׁוּם אִישׁוּת, תֹּאמַר בְּזוֹ, שֶׁקִּנְיָנָהּ לְשׁוּם אִישׁוּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara counters: The case of **a Hebrew maidservant proves** otherwise, **as she is acquired through money and** yet she **cannot be acquired through intercourse.** The Gemara dismisses this refutation: **What** is distinct about **a Hebrew maidservant** is **that her acquisition is not for the sake of marriage,** as she is acquired as a servant. **Will you say** the same **with regard to this** woman, **whose acquisition is for the sake of marriage?** Therefore, it is logical that a woman can be acquired through sexual intercourse.


###### Kiddushin 4b:12
[Kiddushin 4b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/4b:12)

תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וּבְעָלָהּ״. וּלְמָה לִי קְרָא, הָא אָתְיָא לַהּ! אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר מֵעִיקָּרָא דְּדִינָא פִּירְכָא: מֵהֵיכָא קָא מַיְיתֵית לַהּ – מִיְּבָמָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara reiterates its question. **The verse states: “And engages in sexual intercourse with her.” But why do I** need **a verse** for this purpose? **It was** already **derived** through the above *a fortiori* inference. **Rav Ashi said:** It is needed **because it** is possible **to say that** the **refutation of the** *a fortiori* **inference** is present **from the outset. From where do you derive** that intercourse is a mode of acquisition? **From** the case of **a *yevama*.**


###### Kiddushin 4b:13
[Kiddushin 4b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/4b:13)

מָה לִיבָמָה, שֶׁכֵּן זְקוּקָה וְעוֹמֶדֶת, תֹּאמַר בָּזוֹ, שֶׁאֵין זְקוּקָה וְעוֹמֶדֶת. תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וּבְעָלָהּ״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
One could say: **What** is unique about **a *yevama*** is that she **is bound** to the *yavam* **and stands** waiting for him to act, and for this reason sexual intercourse is sufficient to render her his wife. **Will you say** the same **with regard to this** woman, **who is not bound and** is not **standing** waiting for anyone? It is therefore possible that intercourse is not enough to acquire a woman in ordinary circumstances. Consequently, the *a fortiori* inference does not bear close scrutiny. For this reason an additional proof is required, that **the verse states: “And engages in sexual intercourse with her.”**