## Kiddushin Daf 50a

###### Kiddushin 50a:1
[Kiddushin 50a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/50a:1)

״יַקְרִיב אֹתוֹ״ – מְלַמֵּד שֶׁכּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ. יָכוֹל בְּעַל כׇּרְחוֹ – תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לִרְצֹנוֹ״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
With regard to one who pledges to bring a burnt-offering, the verse states: “If his offering be a burnt-offering of the herd, he shall offer it a male without blemish; he shall bring it to the door of the Tent of Meeting, according to his will, before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:3). The seemingly superfluous words **“he shall offer it” teaches that they coerce him** to bring the offering. I **might** have thought that it can be offered entirely **against his will,** by taking it from his possession and sacrificing it; therefore, **the verse states: “According to his will.”**


###### Kiddushin 50a:2
[Kiddushin 50a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/50a:2)

הָא כֵּיצַד? – כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר: ״רוֹצֶה אֲנִי״. וְאַמַּאי? הָא בְּלִבֵּיהּ לָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ! אֶלָּא לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן: דְּבָרִים שֶׁבַּלֵּב אֵינָן דְּבָרִים? וְדִילְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דַּאֲנַן סָהֲדִי דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ בְּכַפָּרָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**How** can **these** texts be reconciled? **They coerce him until he says: I want** to bring the offering. The Gemara asks: **But why** should this be effective; **but in his heart it is not satisfactory for him** to bring the offering, and it is not according to his will. **Rather, is it not because we say:** Unspoken **matters that** remain **in the heart are not** significant **matters,** and his intention is rendered irrelevant by his explicit statement? The Gemara rejects this: **But perhaps there it is different, since** it **is clear to us that it is satisfactory for him to** achieve **atonement,** despite his earlier statement to the contrary.


###### Kiddushin 50a:3
[Kiddushin 50a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/50a:3)

אֶלָּא מִסֵּיפָא: וְכֵן אַתָּה מוֹצֵא בְּגִיטֵּי נָשִׁים וְשִׁחְרוּרֵי עֲבָדִים, כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר: ״רוֹצֶה אֲנִי״. וְאַמַּאי? הָא בְּלִבֵּיהּ לָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ! אֶלָּא לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן דְּבָרִים שֶׁבַּלֵּב אֵינָן דְּבָרִים? וְדִילְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, מִשּׁוּם דְּמִצְוָה לִשְׁמוֹעַ דִּבְרֵי חֲכָמִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** the Gemara derives a proof **from the latter clause** of that same *baraita*: **And similarly, you find with bills of divorce of women and** bills **of manumission of slaves** that when the court rules that a man must divorce his wife or free his slave and he does not want to, **they coerce him until he says: I want** to divorce my wife, or: I want to free my slave. **But why** should this be effective; **but in his heart it is not satisfactory for him** to divorce her or to free him. **Rather, is it not because we say** that unspoken **matters that** remain **in the heart are not** significant **matters?** The Gemara rejects this proof as well: **But perhaps there it is different, because it is a mitzva to listen** to the **statements of the Sages,** and the assumption is that when he is required to divorce his wife or free his slave, his true desire is to perform the mitzva.


###### Kiddushin 50a:4
[Kiddushin 50a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/50a:4)

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף, מֵהָכָא: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ אֶת הָאִשָּׁה וְאָמַר: כְּסָבוּר הָיִיתִי שֶׁהִיא כֹּהֶנֶת וַהֲרֵי הִיא לְוִיָּה, לְוִיָּה וְנִמְצֵאת כֹּהֶנֶת, עֲנִיָּיה וַהֲרֵי הִיא עֲשִׁירָה, עֲשִׁירָה וַהֲרֵי הִיא עֲנִיָּיה – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁלֹּא הִטְעַתּוּ. וְאַמַּאי? הָא קָאָמַר כְּסָבוּר הָיִיתִי! אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן דְּבָרִים שֶׁבַּלֵּב אֵינָן דְּבָרִים. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: דִּלְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דִּלְחוּמְרָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, Rav Yosef says:** The proof is **from here** (64a): In the case of **one who betroths a woman and he said: I thought that she was** the daughter of **a priest, and she is** in fact the daughter of **a Levite;** or I thought **she** was the daughter of **a Levite, and she is found** to be the daughter of **a priest;** I thought **she** was **poor, and she is wealthy;** or I thought **she** was **wealthy, and she is poor, she is betrothed** despite his mistaken assumption, **because she did not mislead him. But why** is she betrothed; **but he said: I thought** that she had a different characteristic, and he betrothed her with that in mind? **Rather,** it is **because we say** that unspoken **matters that** remain **in the heart are not** significant **matters. Abaye said to him: Perhaps it is different there, since** the ruling there is that she requires a bill of divorce only **as a stringency,** and they are not definitively betrothed.


###### Kiddushin 50a:5
[Kiddushin 50a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/50a:5)

אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, מֵהָכָא: בְּכוּלָּם, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאָמְרָה ״בְּלִבִּי הָיָה לְהִתְקַדֵּשׁ לוֹ״ – אַף עַל פִּי כֵן אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. וְאַמַּאי? הָא קָאָמְרָה ״בְּלִבִּי הָיָה״! וְדִילְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּכֵיוָן דְּאַתְנִיה לָאו כֹּל כְּמִינַּהּ דְּעָקְרָא לֵהּ לִתְנָאֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, Abaye said** that the proof is **from here,** from the mishna: **And in all these** cases, **despite** the fact **that she** later **stated: I intended to become betrothed to him nevertheless, she is not betrothed. But why** should her betrothal not take effect at all; **but she said: I intended** to become betrothed? This clause of the mishna teaches that unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant. The Gemara rejects this proof: **But perhaps it is different there, as, since he stipulated** explicitly that a certain condition was true, **it is not in her power to uproot his condition** through thoughts alone.


###### Kiddushin 50a:6
[Kiddushin 50a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/50a:6)

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָבִין: עוֹבָדָא הֲוָה בֵּי רַב חִסְדָּא, וְרַב חִסְדָּא בֵּי רַב הוּנָא, וּפַשְׁטוּהָ מֵהָא: הָאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ: ״הָבֵא לִי מִן הַחַלּוֹן אוֹ מִן הַדְּלוֹסְקָמָא״, וְהֵבִיא לוֹ. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאָמַר בַּעַל הַבַּיִת: ״לֹא הָיָה לִי בְּלִבִּי אֶלָּא עַל זֶה״, כֵּיוָן שֶׁהֵבִיא לוֹ מִזֶּה – בַּעַל הַבַּיִת מָעַל. וְאַמַּאי? הָא קָאָמַר ״בְּלִבִּי״! אֶלָּא לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן דְּבָרִים שֶׁבַּלֵּב אֵינָן דְּבָרִים?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin says: There was an incident** of this kind in **Rav Ḥisda’s study hall, and Rav Ḥisda** brought the case to **Rav Huna’s study hall, and they resolved it from this** mishna (*Me’ila* 21a): In the case of **one who says to his agent: Bring me** such and such an item **from the window** ledge **or from the box [*hadeluskema*],** forgetting that the item in question was consecrated property and any use of it would constitute misuse of consecrated property, **and** the agent **brought it to him,** then **although** at that point **the owner said: My intention was** that you bring the item **only from this** other place, **once he brought** the item **to him from that** place that he had mentioned, once the agent uses it **the owner** is liable for **having misused** consecrated property. **But why** should he be responsible; **but he said: My intention** was for the other place, so the agent did not fulfill his mission. **Rather, is it not because we say** that unspoken **matters that** remain **in the heart are not** significant **matters?**


###### Kiddushin 50a:7
[Kiddushin 50a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/50a:7)

וְדִלְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דִּלְמִיפְטַר נַפְשֵׁיהּ מִקׇּרְבָּן קָאָתֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this: **But perhaps it is different there,** since it is suspected **that he is coming to exempt himself from** bringing **an offering** for his misuse by claiming that he intended a different item. Since there is cause to question the truth of his statement that he had intended that the agent bring the item from the other place, his claim is not accepted. This cannot serve as a proof that in general, unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant.


###### Kiddushin 50a:8
[Kiddushin 50a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/50a:8)

הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵימַר מֵזִיד הֲוָה! לָא עֲבִיד אִינִישׁ דִּמְשַׁוֵּי נַפְשֵׁיהּ רַשִּׁיעָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara responds: If all he wanted to do was exempt himself from the obligation to bring an offering, **he could have said** that the misuse **was intentional,** as one who misuses consecrated property intentionally is not obligated to bring an offering. Therefore, there is no cause to question the truth of his statement that he had intended that the agent bring the item from the other place. The Gemara counters: **It is not common** for **a person to place himself** in the category of **a wicked person** by claiming to have committed a transgression intentionally. Therefore, once again, there is cause to question the truth of his statement that he had intended that the agent bring the item from the other place.


###### Kiddushin 50a:9
[Kiddushin 50a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/50a:9)

הֲוָה לֵיהּ לוֹמַר ״נִזְכַּרְתִּי״, דִּתְנַן: נִזְכַּר בַּעַל הַבַּיִת, וְלֹא נִזְכַּר שָׁלִיחַ – שָׁלִיחַ מָעַל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara continues to ask: To exempt himself from the obligation to bring an offering, **he could have said:** After the agent left **I remembered** that it was consecrated property. Such a claim would also have rendered him exempt, **as we learned** in that same mishna (*Me’ila* 21a): If one sent an agent to bring a particular item, and **the owner remembered** that it was consecrated **and the agent did not remember** but proceeded to fulfill his agency, it is **the agent** who has **misused** consecrated property and is liable to bring an offering, not the one who designated him, since the latter remembered and canceled the agency. There is no cause to question the truth of his statement that he had intended that the agent bring the item from the other place. Therefore, the fact that this statement is not accepted can serve as a proof that in general, unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant.


###### Kiddushin 50a:10
[Kiddushin 50a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/50a:10)

הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דְּזַבְּנִינְהוּ לְנִיכְסֵיהּ אַדַּעְתָּא לְמִיסַּק לְאַרְעָא דְיִשְׂרָאֵל. סְלֵיק וְלָא אִיתְּדַר לֵיהּ. אָמַר רָבָא: כֹּל דְּסָלֵיק – אַדַּעְתָּא לְמֵידַר הוּא, וְהָא לָא אִיתְּדַר לֵיהּ. אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי: אַדַּעְתָּא לְמִיסַּק, וְהָא סְלֵיק לֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara relates: There was **a certain man who sold his property with the intention of ascending to Eretz Yisrael** and explicitly stated this intention to the buyer. **He ascended** to Eretz Yisrael **but he was not able to settle** there. Upon his return to Babylonia, he sought to nullify the sale. **Rava said: Whoever ascends** to Eretz Yisrael does so **with the intention of settling** there, **and** as **he was not able to settle** there he can nullify the sale. **There are** those **who say** a different version, that Rava said the opposite: **He intended to ascend** to Eretz Yisrael, **and he ascended,** so he cannot nullify the sale.


###### Kiddushin 50a:11
[Kiddushin 50a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/50a:11)

הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דְּזַבְּנִינְהוּ לְנִיכְסֵיהּ אַדַּעְתָּא לְמִיסַּק לְאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל, לְסוֹף לָא סְלֵיק. אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אִי בָּעֵי, סָלֵיק. אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: אִי בָּעֵי, לָא סָלֵיק? מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ, דְּאִיתְיְלִיד אוּנְסָא בְּאוֹרְחָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara relates a similar incident: There was **a certain man who sold his property with the intention of ascending to Eretz Yisrael,** but **ultimately he did not ascend** there. **Rav Ashi said: If he** had **wanted** to do so, **he could have ascended.** Since the matter depended upon him, there are no grounds for nullifying the sale. **There are** those **who say** Rav Ashi said as follows: **If he** had **wanted** to do so, **couldn’t he have ascended?** Since nothing prevented him from leaving, the sale is not nullified. The Gemara asks: **What** is the difference **between** the two versions of Rav Ashi’s statement? The Gemara answers: **There is a** difference **between them** in a case **when circumstances beyond his control** occurred **along the way,** preventing him from going. According to the first version of the statement of Rav Ashi, the sale is upheld; but according to the second version, where Rav Ashi responded in the form of a question, the implication is that if there actually had been something that prevented him from ascending, the sale would be nullified.


###### Kiddushin 50a:12
[Kiddushin 50a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/50a:12)

**מַתְנִי׳** הָאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ: ״צֵא וְקַדֵּשׁ לִי אִשָּׁה פְּלוֹנִית בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״ וְהָלַךְ וְקִדְּשָׁהּ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. ״הֲרֵי הִיא בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״ וְקִדְּשָׁהּ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** In the case of **one who says to his agent: Go and betroth for me so-and-so in such and such a place, and** the agent **went and betrothed her in a different place, she is not betrothed,** since he instructed that the betrothal take place in a particular location. But if he said: Go and betroth the woman for me, **she is in such and such a place; and** the agent **betrothed her in a different place, she is betrothed,** since he did not mean that the agent should betroth her specifically there, but was merely telling him where to find her.


###### Kiddushin 50a:13
[Kiddushin 50a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/50a:13)

**גְּמָ׳** וּתְנַן נָמֵי גַּבֵּי גִיטִּין: הָאוֹמֵר ״תְּנוּ גֵּט זֶה לְאִשְׁתִּי בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״ וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר – פָּסוּל, ״הֲרֵי הִיא בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״ וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר – כָּשֵׁר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** The Gemara comments: **And we also learned** in a mishna **with regard to bills of divorce** (*Gittin* 65a): With regard to **one who says** to his agents: **Give this bill of divorce to my wife in such and such a place, and they gave** it **to her in another place,** the divorce is **invalid.** If he said to them: **She is in such and such a place, and they gave** it **to her in another place,** it is **valid.**


###### Kiddushin 50a:14
[Kiddushin 50a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/50a:14)

וּצְרִיכָא. דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן גַּבֵּי קִידּוּשִׁין – מִשּׁוּם דִּלְקָרוֹבַהּ קָאָתֵי, בְּהַאי אַתְרָא רָחֲמוּ לִי וְלָא מְמַלְּ[לִ]י מִילֵּי עִלָּוַי, בְּהַאי אַתְרָא סָנוּ לִי מְמַלְּ[לִ]י מִילֵּי עִלָּוַי. אֲבָל גַּבֵּי גִּיטִּין, דִּלְרַחוֹקַהּ קָאָתֵי, אֵימַר לָא אִיכְפַּת לֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara comments: **And** it is **necessary** to state this *halakha* with regard to both betrothal and divorce, **because had** the *tanna* **taught us** only **with regard to betrothal,** you might say: **In a case when he is coming to draw her near** to him through betrothal, he thinks: **They love me in this place and will not say** negative **remarks about me,** but **they hate me in that place and will say** negative **remarks about me.** Therefore, he told the agent to perform the betrothal in a certain place and is particular that it take place only there. **But with regard to bills of divorce, when he is coming to distance her** from him, you might **say he does not care** where the divorce itself is performed. The *tanna* therefore informs us that this is not the case.


###### Kiddushin 50a:15
[Kiddushin 50a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/50a:15)

וְאִי אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן גַּבֵּי גֵירוּשִׁין, בְּהַאי אַתְרָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּנִיבַּזֵּי, בְּהַאי אַתְרָא לָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ, אֲבָל גַּבֵּי קִידּוּשִׁין – אֵימָא לָא אִיכְפַּת לֵיהּ, צְרִיכָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** conversely, **if** the *tanna* **had taught us** only **with regard to divorce,** I would have said that he is particular only in the case of divorce, because **in this place** it is **acceptable for him to degrade himself** through divorce, whereas **in that place** it is **not acceptable for him** to do so; **but with regard to betrothal,** which involves no degradation, you might **say he does not care** where he betroths her. Therefore, it is **necessary** to state the *halakha* in both cases.


###### Kiddushin 50a:16
[Kiddushin 50a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/50a:16)

**מַתְנִי׳** הַמְקַדֵּשׁ אֶת הָאִשָּׁה עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין עָלֶיהָ נְדָרִים, וְנִמְצְאוּ עָלֶיהָ נְדָרִים – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. כְּנָסָהּ סְתָם וְנִמְצְאוּ עָלֶיהָ נְדָרִים – תֵּצֵא שֶׁלֹּא בִּכְתוּבָּה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** In the case of **one who betroths a woman on the condition that there are no vows** incumbent **upon her** to fulfill, **and it was found that there were vows** incumbent **upon her** to fulfill, **she is not betrothed,** since his condition was not fulfilled. If he **married her without specification, and it was found that there were vows** incumbent **upon her** to fulfill, the marriage takes effect. Nevertheless, he has the right to divorce her, and **she is divorced without** receiving payment of her **marriage contract,** as it is assumed that he would not have married her had he known that she was limited by her vows.


###### Kiddushin 50a:17
[Kiddushin 50a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/50a:17)

עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין עָלֶיהָ מוּמִין וְנִמְצְאוּ בָּהּ מוּמִין – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. כְּנָסָהּ סְתָם וְנִמְצְאוּ בָּהּ מוּמִין – תֵּצֵא שֶׁלֹּא בִּכְתוּבָּה. שֶׁכׇּל הַמּוּמִין הַפּוֹסְלִין בַּכֹּהֲנִים פּוֹסְלִין בַּנָּשִׁים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Similarly, if he betrothed her **on the condition that there are no blemishes upon her, and she was discovered to have blemishes, she is not betrothed.** In a case where he **married her without specification and she was discovered to have blemishes,** he has the right to divorce her, and **she is divorced without** receiving payment of her **marriage contract.** As to what is defined as a blemish, the rule is **that all the blemishes that disqualify priests** from performing the Temple service, as detailed in tractate *Bekhorot*, also **disqualify women** from receiving their marriage contract in case of divorce.


###### Kiddushin 50a:18
[Kiddushin 50a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/50a:18)

**גְּמָ׳** וּתְנַן נָמֵי גַּבֵּי כְתוּבּוֹת כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא! הָכָא, קִידּוּשִׁין אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ, תְּנָא כְּתוּבּוֹת אַטּוּ קִידּוּשִׁין, הָתָם, כְּתוּבּוֹת אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ, תְּנָא קִידּוּשִׁין אַטּוּ כְּתוּבּוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** The Gemara comments: **And we also learned** a mishna **like this with regard to** the *halakhot* of **marriage contracts,** as the same mishna appears in tractate *Ketubot* (72b). The Gemara explains: **Here** it **was necessary for** the *tanna* to mention this *halakha* with regard to **betrothal,** and **he taught** the *halakha* of **marriage contracts due to** teaching the *halakha* of **betrothal; there** it **was necessary for** the *tanna* to mention this *halakha* with regard to **marriage contracts,** and **he taught** the *halakha* of **betrothal due to** teaching the *halakha* of **marriage contracts.**


###### Kiddushin 50a:19
[Kiddushin 50a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/50a:19)

**מַתְנִי׳** הַמְקַדֵּשׁ שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים בְּשָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה, אוֹ אִשָּׁה אַחַת בְּפָחוֹת מִשָּׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁשָּׁלַח סִבְלוֹנוֹת לְאַחַר מִכָּאן

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** In the case of **one who betroths two women** together **with** an item **worth one *peruta*,** so that the value of each woman’s share was not worth one *peruta*, **or** who betroths **one woman with** an item **worth less than one *peruta*, despite** the fact **that he later sent** the traditional **gifts [*sivlonot*]** of a groom to the bride,