## Kiddushin Daf 56b

###### Kiddushin 56b:1
[Kiddushin 56b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/56b:1)

כְּשֶׁבָּרַח. וְטַעְמָא דְּבָרַח, הָא לֹא בָּרַח – קָנְסִינַן לְמוֹכֵר. וְנִקְנְסֵיהּ לְלוֹקֵחַ! לָאו עַכְבְּרָא גַּנָּב אֶלָּא חוֹרָא גַּנָּב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The case here is **where** the seller **fled** with the money, and there is no way of voiding the sale and returning the money to the purchaser. The Gemara comments: **And the reason is that he fled, but had he not fled, we would penalize the seller** by requiring him to return the money. The Gemara asks: **And let us penalize the buyer** and require him to take an equivalent sum of money to Jerusalem. The Gemara answers: It is **not the mouse** that **steals, but the hole** that **steals.** In other words, a mouse cannot steal an item unless he has a hole in which to hide it. Here too, the money would not have been desacralized without the help of the seller.


###### Kiddushin 56b:2
[Kiddushin 56b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/56b:2)

וְאִי לָא עַכְבְּרָא, חוֹרָא מַאי קָעָבֵיד? מִסְתַּבְּרָא, כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא אִיסּוּרָא – הָתָם קָנְסִינַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara questions this logic: **But if not** for the **mouse, what has the hole done?** Since they both are integral to the prohibited act, each of them is deserving of a penalty. The Gemara answers: **It stands to reason** that **anywhere that the forbidden** item **is,** i.e., anywhere that the money is, and in this case it is with the seller, **there we** should **penalize.**


###### Kiddushin 56b:3
[Kiddushin 56b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/56b:3)

**מַתְנִי׳** הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּעׇרְלָה, בְּכִלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם, בְּשׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל, וּבְעֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה, בְּצִפּוֹרֵי מְצוֹרָע, וּבִשְׂעַר נָזִיר, וּפֶטֶר חֲמוֹר, וּבָשָׂר בְּחָלָב, וְחוּלִּין שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטוּ בַּעֲזָרָה – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. מְכָרָן וְקִידֵּשׁ בִּדְמֵיהֶן – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** With regard to **one who betroths** a woman **with *orla*,** i.e., fruit grown during a tree’s first three years, or **with diverse kinds in a vineyard,** i.e., grain and grapes planted together, or **with an ox that is** sentenced to be **stoned, or with a heifer whose neck is broken,** or **with** the **leper’s birds** which are designated for his offering, **or with a nazirite’s hair, or** with **a firstborn donkey, or** with **meat** cooked **in milk, or** with **non-sacred** animals **that were slaughtered in the** Temple **courtyard,** if he betroths her with any of these items, the woman **is not betrothed,** since it is prohibited to derive benefit from any of these items. By contrast, if **one sold them and betrothed** a woman **with** the **money** received from **their** sale, **she is betrothed,** as in these cases one may derive benefit from the money he receives in exchange for the forbidden item.


###### Kiddushin 56b:4
[Kiddushin 56b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/56b:4)

**גְּמָ׳** בְּעׇרְלָה מְנָלַן? דְּתַנְיָא: ״עֲרֵלִים לֹא יֵאָכֵל״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא אִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה, הֲנָאָה מִנַּיִן? שֶׁלֹּא יֵהָנֶה מִמֶּנּוּ, וְלֹא יִצְבַּע בּוֹ, וְלֹא יַדְלִיק בּוֹ אֶת הַנֵּר? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וַעֲרַלְתֶּם אֶת עׇרְלָתוֹ״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת כּוּלָּם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** The Gemara explains the source of the *halakha* that it is prohibited to derive benefit from the items mentioned in the mishna. **With *orla*: From where do we** derive that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from *orla*? The Gemara answers: **As it is taught** in a *baraita*: “And shall have planted all manner of trees for food, then you shall count the fruit thereof as forbidden; three years shall it be as **forbidden [*arelim*]** to you; **it shall not be eaten”** (Leviticus 19:23). From this verse, **I have** derived **only a prohibition** against **eating** it. **From where** do I derive that one may not even derive **benefit** from it? From where do we derive **that one may not** derive **benefit from it** in another manner, **and one may not paint with** the dye that can be extracted from the fruit, **and one may not light a lamp with** its oil? **The verse states: “Then you shall count the fruit thereof [*orlato*] as forbidden [*araltem*]”** (Leviticus 19:23), **to include all these** types of benefit in the prohibition.


###### Kiddushin 56b:5
[Kiddushin 56b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/56b:5)

בְּכִלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם מְנָלַן? אָמַר חִזְקִיָּה: אָמַר קְרָא: ״פֶּן תִּקְדַּשׁ״ – פֶּן תּוּקַד אֵשׁ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The mishna stated that one may not betroth a woman **with diverse kinds in a vineyard. From where do we** derive that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from diverse kinds in a vineyard? **Ḥizkiyya said: The verse states:** “You shall not sow your vineyard with diverse kinds; lest the growth of the seed that you have sown be forbidden [*pen tikdash*], together with the yield of the vineyard” (Deuteronomy 22:9). Ḥizkiyya expounds **“lest** the growth of the seed that you have sown **be forbidden [*pen tikdash*]”** as: **Lest it be burned [*pen tukad esh*],** indicating that the seed of diverse kinds must be destroyed by fire, so that no benefit is derived from it.


###### Kiddushin 56b:6
[Kiddushin 56b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/56b:6)

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: ״פֶּן יִהְיֶה קֹדֶשׁ״. אִי מָה קֹדֶשׁ תּוֹפֵס אֶת דָּמָיו וְיוֹצֵא לְחוּלִּין – אַף כִּלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם תּוֹפֵס אֶת דָּמָיו וְיוֹצֵא לְחוּלִּין! אֶלָּא מְחַוַּורְתָּא כִּדְחִזְקִיָּה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ashi says** that the phrase “*pen tikdash*” indicates that it is comparable to consecrated property, as if it said: **Lest it become consecrated [*kodesh*],** and one is therefore prohibited from deriving benefit from it, just as one may not derive benefit from consecrated property. The Gemara questions Rav Ashi’s interpretation: **If** diverse kinds in a vineyard is compared to consecrated property, then **just as consecrated** property **transfers** its sanctity to the **money** with which **it** is redeemed **and becomes desacralized, so too, diverse kinds in a vineyard** should **transfer** their sanctity to the **money** with which **they** are redeemed **and become desacralized.** Contrary to this logic, the mishna taught that if one sells diverse kinds in a vineyard, the proceeds can be used for betrothal, indicating that it is not forbidden to derive benefit from this money. **Rather, it is clear** that the correct derivation is **as** that **of Ḥizkiyya.**


###### Kiddushin 56b:7
[Kiddushin 56b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/56b:7)

״שׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל״ מִנַּיִן? דְּתַנְיָא: מִמַּשְׁמָע שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״סָקוֹל יִסָּקֵל הַשּׁוֹר״ – אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁנְּבֵילָה הִיא, וּנְבֵילָה אֲסוּרָה בַּאֲכִילָה? מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לֹא יֵאָכֵל אֶת בְּשָׂרוֹ״? מַגִּיד לָךְ שֶׁאִם שְׁחָטוֹ לְאַחַר שֶׁנִּגְמַר דִּינוֹ – אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara continues its analysis of the mishna: **From where** is it derived that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from **an ox that is** sentenced to be **stoned?** The Gemara answers: **As it is taught** in a *baraita*: It is taught **by inference from** that **which is stated** with regard to an ox that killed a person: “And if an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die, **the ox shall be stoned,** and its flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be clear” (Exodus 21:28). **Don’t I know** from this verse **that** the stoning makes it an unslaughtered **animal carcass, and it is prohibited to eat** an unslaughtered **animal carcass? What** is the meaning when **the verse states: “Its flesh shall not be eaten”?** The verse **is telling you that** even **if one slaughtered** the ox **after its verdict had been reached** but before it was stoned, it is still **prohibited to eat** it.


###### Kiddushin 56b:8
[Kiddushin 56b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/56b:8)

בַּהֲנָאָה מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וּבַעַל הַשּׁוֹר נָקִי״. מַאי מַשְׁמַע? שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן זוֹמָא אוֹמֵר: כְּאָדָם שֶׁאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ: ״יָצָא פְּלוֹנִי נָקִי מִנְּכָסָיו וְאֵין לוֹ בָּהֶם הֲנָאָה שֶׁל כְּלוּם״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The *baraita* continues: **From where** is it derived that one is prohibited **from** deriving **benefit** from the ox as well? **The verse states: “But the owner of the ox shall be clear.”** The Gemara asks: **From where may** it **be inferred** that one may not derive benefit from this ox? **Shimon ben Zoma says:** This is **like a person who says to another: So-and-so was left clear [*naki*] of his property, and he has no benefit from it at all.** Similarly, “But the owner of the ox shall be clear” means that he may not derive any benefit from the ox.


###### Kiddushin 56b:9
[Kiddushin 56b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/56b:9)

מִמַּאי דְּהַאי ״לֹא יֵאָכֵל אֶת בְּשָׂרוֹ״ לְהֵיכָא דְּשָׁחֵיט לְאַחַר שֶׁנִּגְמַר דִּינוֹ הוּא דַּאֲתָא? דִּילְמָא הֵיכָא דְּשָׁחֵיט לְאַחַר שֶׁנִּגְמַר דִּינוֹ שְׁרֵי, וְהָא ״לֹא יֵאָכֵל״ – הֵיכָא דְּסַקְלֵיהּ מִיסְקָל הוּא דַּאֲתָא, וְכִדְרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **From where** is it known **that this** phrase: **“Its flesh shall not be eaten,” comes** to teach a *halakha* with regard **to** a case **where he slaughtered** the ox **after its verdict was reached,** but before it was stoned? **Perhaps it is permitted** to eat the ox **if he slaughtered** it **after its verdict had been reached. And this** phrase: **“Shall not be eaten,” comes** to teach a *halakha* with regard to a case **where they** had already **stoned it,** but not to teach a prohibition against eating it, as that is already known due to the fact that it was stoned. Rather, it comes to prohibit deriving benefit from the ox, **and** that would be **in accordance with** the statement **of Rabbi Abbahu** who **says** the following, citing **Rabbi Elazar.**


###### Kiddushin 56b:10
[Kiddushin 56b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/56b:10)

דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לֹא יֹאכַל״ ״לֹא תֹאכַל״ וְ״לֹא תֹאכְלוּ״ – אֶחָד אִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה וְאֶחָד אִיסּוּר הֲנָאָה, עַד שֶׁיִּפְרֹט לְךָ הַכָּתוּב כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁפָּרַט לְךָ בִּנְבֵילָה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara continues the question: **As Rabbi Abbahu says** that **Rabbi Elazar says** that **wherever it is stated: “It shall not be eaten”;** or **“you,”** singular, **“shall not eat”; or “you,”** plural, **“shall not eat”; both a prohibition** against **eating and a prohibition** against deriving **benefit** are indicated. This is so **unless the verse specifies for you** that one may derive benefit, **in the manner that it specified for you with regard to an animal carcass,** from which the verse explicitly permits one to derive benefit, as it states: “You may sell it to a foreigner” (Deuteronomy 14:21). Here, too, with regard to the ox that is stoned, the phrase: “Its flesh shall not be eaten,” may serve to teach that one may not derive benefit from the stoned ox.


###### Kiddushin 56b:11
[Kiddushin 56b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/56b:11)

הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּנָפְקָא לַן אִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה מִ״לֹּא יֹאכַל״, הָכָא אִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה מִ״סָּקוֹל יִסָּקֵל״ נָפְקָא. דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ לְאִיסּוּר הֲנָאָה הוּא דִּכְתִיב, נִכְתּוֹב קְרָא: ״לֹא יֵהָנֶה״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **This statement** of Rabbi Abbahu **applies only** to a case **where we derive the prohibition** against **eating from the words: “It may not be eaten,”** which is interpreted to include any manner of consumption. But **here, the prohibition** against **eating is derived from: “It shall be stoned,”** from which it is understood that since the ox becomes an unslaughtered animal carcass, it may not be eaten. **As if it enters your mind that** the phrase: “Its flesh may not be eaten,” **is written to prohibit** one from deriving **benefit, let the verse state: “One may not derive benefit.”** Why does it refer to eating if that prohibition has already been derived?


###### Kiddushin 56b:12
[Kiddushin 56b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/56b:12)

אִי נָמֵי: ״לֹא יֵאָכֵל״, ״אֶת בְּשָׂרוֹ״ לְמָה לִי?! אַף עַל גַּב דְּשַׁחְטֵיהּ כְּעֵין בָּשָׂר – אָסוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Alternatively,** even if one would say that the phrase: **“It shall not be eaten,”** can be used to indicate that it is prohibited to derive benefit from the ox, **why do I** need the additional words **“its flesh”?** These words must teach that **although he slaughtered** the ox **like** one does with kosher **meat,** after it was condemned to be stoned, it remains **forbidden** and cannot be eaten.


###### Kiddushin 56b:13
[Kiddushin 56b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/56b:13)

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ מָר זוּטְרָא: וְאֵימָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּבָדַק צוּר וְשָׁחַט בָּהּ, דְּמִיחֲזֵי כִּסְקִילָה, אֲבָל שַׁחְטֵיהּ בְּסַכִּין – לָא! מִידֵּי סַכִּין בְּאוֹרָיְיתָא כְּתִיב? וְעוֹד תַּנְיָא: בַּכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין, בֵּין בְּצוֹר, בֵּין בִּזְכוּכִית, בֵּין בִּקְרוּמִית שֶׁל קָנֶה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Mar Zutra objects to this: But say** that **this** prohibition against eating the ox **applies** only **where he examined** a sharp **stone** to ensure that it had no nicks, **and slaughtered with it** in a halakhically acceptable manner. That action could **be considered like stoning,** since in any event the ox was killed by a stone. The Torah teaches that even if it was killed in this manner, one is prohibited from eating it. **But** if **he slaughtered it with a knife,** he should **not** be prohibited from eating it. The Gemara expresses surprise at this reasoning: **Was a knife written in the Torah?** If one slaughters the animal in a halakhically acceptable manner, this is called slaughtering, not stoning. **And moreover, it is taught** in a *baraita* (*Tosefta*, *Ḥullin* 1:2): One may **slaughter with anything** that cuts cleanly, **whether with a stone, whether with glass, whether with the stalk of a reed.** Consequently, there is no difference in the *halakha* with regard to using a knife or a sharp stone.


###### Kiddushin 56b:14
[Kiddushin 56b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/56b:14)

וְהַשְׁתָּא דְּנָפְקָא לַן אִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה וְאִיסּוּר הֲנָאָה תַּרְוַיְיהוּ מִ״לֹּא יֵאָכֵל״, הַאי ״בַּעַל הַשּׁוֹר נָקִי״ לְמַאי אֲתָא? לַהֲנָאַת עוֹרוֹ. סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: ״לֹא יֵאָכֵל אֶת בְּשָׂרוֹ״ כְּתִיב, בְּשָׂרוֹ אָסוּר וְעוֹרוֹ מוּתָּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And now that we have derived** both **the prohibition** against **eating and the prohibition** against **benefiting** from an ox sentenced to be stoned **from: “It shall not be eaten,” what** *halakha* **does that** other phrase: **“But the owner of the ox shall be clear,” come** to teach? The Gemara answers: It comes **to** teach the prohibition against deriving **benefit** from **its hide** after it has been killed. Were it not for this phrase, it might **enter your mind to say** that since **it is written: “Its flesh shall not be eaten,”** only **its flesh is forbidden, but its hide is permitted.** Therefore, the words “and the owner of the ox is clean” teach that its hide is forbidden as well.


###### Kiddushin 56b:15
[Kiddushin 56b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/56b:15)

וּלְהָנָךְ תַּנָּאֵי דְּמַפְּקִי לֵיהּ הַאי ״בַּעַל הַשּׁוֹר נָקִי״ לַחֲצִי כּוֹפֶר וְלִדְמֵי וַלְדוֹת, הֲנָאַת עוֹרוֹ מְנָא לְהוּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** according **to those *tanna’im* who expound this** phrase: **“The owner of the ox shall be clear,” to** teach that the owner of an innocuous ox, i.e., one that is not known to cause damage with the intent to injure, is exempt from the payment of **half** of the **indemnity** incurred if that ox killed a person, or that he is exempt from **payment** of damages **for** miscarried **offspring** if his ox gores a pregnant woman and causes her to miscarry; **from where do they** derive this prohibition against **benefiting from** the ox’s **hide?**


###### Kiddushin 56b:16
[Kiddushin 56b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/56b:16)

מֵ״אֶת בְּשָׂרוֹ״, אֶת הַטָּפֵל לִבְשָׂרוֹ. וְאִידַּךְ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: They derive it **from** the wording: **“Its flesh** may not be eaten [*velo ye’akhel **et besaro*****].”** The verse could have been formulated: *Velo ye’akhel besaro*, which already means: And its flesh shall not be eaten. The addition of the word “*et*” teaches that the prohibition applies also to **that which is secondary to the flesh,** i.e., the hide. The Gemara asks: **And the other** *tanna*, who derives the prohibition against benefiting from the hide from the verse: “But the owner of the ox shall be clear,” what does he learn from the additional word “*et*”?