## Kiddushin Daf 59b

###### Kiddushin 59b:1
[Kiddushin 59b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/59b:1)

מַעֲשֶׂה מוֹצִיא מִיַּד מַעֲשֶׂה וּמִיַּד מַחְשָׁבָה, מַחְשָׁבָה אֵין מוֹצִיאָה לֹא מִיַּד מַעֲשֶׂה וְלֹא מִיַּד מַחְשָׁבָה. בִּשְׁלָמָא מִיַּד מַעֲשֶׂה לָא מַפְּקָה, דְּלָא אָתֵי דִּיבּוּר וּמְבַטֵּל מַעֲשֶׂה, אֶלָּא מִיַּד מַחְשָׁבָה מִיהָא תַּפֵּיק!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**An action** undertaken to improve the vessel **negates** both the status created by an earlier **action** that supposedly completed the vessel **and** the status created by the **thought** not to perform more work on the vessel. In that case the vessel cannot contract ritual impurity until the craftsman has finished working on it. By contrast, **a thought** to improve the vessel **negates neither** status created by **action nor** status created by **thought.** Reish Lakish finds this difficult for the following reason: **Granted,** thought **does not negate action, as a statement does not come and nullify action. But it should at least offset thought.** This *halakha* indicates that a statement does not nullify a previous statement.


###### Kiddushin 59b:2
[Kiddushin 59b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/59b:2)

שָׁאנֵי מַחְשָׁבָה דְּטוּמְאָה, דְּכִי מַעֲשֶׂה דָּמֵי, וְכִדְרַב פָּפָּא. דְּרַב פָּפָּא רָמֵי: כְּתִיב: ״כִּי יִתֵּן״, וְקָרֵינַן: ״כִּי יוּתַּן״. הָא כֵּיצַד?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **Thought** in the case **of ritual impurity is different, as** it **is considered like action, and** this is **in accordance with** the opinion **of Rav Pappa. As Rav Pappa raises a contradiction:** With regard to the *halakha* that produce must become wet in order for it to contract ritual impurity, the verse states: “But if water is placed [*vekhi yuttan*] upon the seed, and any part of a carcass falls upon it, it is impure” (Leviticus 11:38). The word *yuttan* is written defective, and **is written** as if it says ***ki yitten*.** Accordingly, this would mean that one must actively place the water on the produce. Yet **we read** it, based on the tradition as to its correct pronunciation, **“*ki yuttan*,”** which includes any situation where the produce becomes wet. **How so?** How can the way the verse is written and the way it is read be reconciled?


###### Kiddushin 59b:3
[Kiddushin 59b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/59b:3)

״כִּי יוּתַּן״ דֻּומְיָא ״דְּכִי יִתֵּן״. מָה ״יִתֵּן״ דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ, אַף ״יוּתַּן״, דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Pappa explains that the standard of **“if water is placed [*ki yuttan*]”** is **similar to: If one places [*ki yitten*]; just as** the term **places [*yitten*]** indicates **that** it is **satisfactory to** the owner for the produce to become wet, as he himself is placing the water, **so too,** the term **“is placed [*yuttan*]”** means **that** it is **satisfactory to** the owner that the produce becomes wet, despite the fact that he did not place the water himself. This is proof that thought is equivalent to action with regard to ritual impurity, as if one is satisfied with the produce becoming wet it is considered as though he actively placed the water himself. By the same reasoning, thought which renders a vessel susceptible to ritual impurity is powerful enough to require an action to counteract its effect.


###### Kiddushin 59b:4
[Kiddushin 59b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/59b:4)

רַב זְבִיד מַתְנֵי לְהָא שְׁמַעְתְּתָא אַהָא: וְכֵן הִיא שֶׁנָּתְנָה רְשׁוּת לִשְׁלוּחָהּ לְקַדְּשָׁהּ, וְהָלְכָה הִיא וְקִדְּשָׁהּ אֶת עַצְמָהּ, אִם שֶׁלָּהּ קָדְמוּ – קִידּוּשֶׁיהָ קִידּוּשִׁין, וְאִם שֶׁל שְׁלוּחָהּ קָדְמוּ – אֵין קִידּוּשֶׁיהָ קִידּוּשִׁין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara presents another version of the discussion: **Rav Zevid taught this** dispute **with regard to this** *halakha*: **And similarly,** in a case **where she gave permission to her agent to accept betrothal for her and she** subsequently **went and accepted betrothal herself** from someone else, **if her** betrothal **came first, her betrothal is** a valid **betrothal, but if** the betrothal **of her agent came first, her betrothal is not a betrothal.**


###### Kiddushin 59b:5
[Kiddushin 59b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/59b:5)

לֹא קִדְּשָׁהּ אֶת עַצְמָהּ וְחָזְרָה בָּהּ, מַהוּ? רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: חוֹזֶרֶת, וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: אֵינָהּ חוֹזֶרֶת. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: חוֹזֶרֶת, אָתֵי דִּיבּוּר וּמְבַטֵּל דִּיבּוּר. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: אֵינָהּ חוֹזֶרֶת, לָא אָתֵי דִּיבּוּר וּמְבַטֵּל דִּיבּוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Sages discuss this *halakha*: If she did **not accept betrothal herself and retracted** her appointment of the agent, **what is** the *halakha*? **Rabbi Yoḥanan says: She can retract** her appointment; **and Reish Lakish says: She cannot retract** her appointment. The Gemara clarifies their respective opinions. **Rabbi Yoḥanan said: She can retract** her appointment, as **a statement comes and nullifies** a previous **statement,** by which she appointed the agent. **Reish Lakish said: She cannot retract** her appointment, as **a statement does not come and nullify** a previous **statement.**


###### Kiddushin 59b:6
[Kiddushin 59b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/59b:6)

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: בִּיטֵּל, אִם עַד שֶׁלֹּא תָּרַם בִּיטֵּל – אֵין תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה! אָמַר רָבָא: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, כְּגוֹן שֶׁקָּדַם בַּעַל הַבַּיִת וְתָרַם אֶת כִּרְיוֹ, דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ מַעֲשֶׂה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish** from the aforementioned mishna (*Terumot* 3:4) with regard to one who appointed an agent to separate *teruma* on his behalf and subsequently **canceled** the agency: **If he canceled** the appointment **before** the agent **separated *teruma*, his *teruma* is not *teruma*.** This shows that a statement nullifies a previous statement. **Rava says: With what are we dealing here?** With a case **where the homeowner preceded** the agent **and separated *teruma*** from **his heap** himself, **which is an action,** and an action certainly nullifies a statement.


###### Kiddushin 59b:7
[Kiddushin 59b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/59b:7)

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: כׇּל הַכֵּלִים יוֹרְדִים לִידֵי טוּמְאָתָן בְּמַחְשָׁבָה, וְאֵין עוֹלִין מִטּוּמְאָתָן אֶלָּא בְּשִׁינּוּי מַעֲשֶׂה. מַעֲשֶׂה מוֹצִיא מִיַּד מַעֲשֶׂה וּמִיַּד מַחְשָׁבָה, מַחְשָׁבָה אֵינָהּ מוֹצִיאָה לֹא מִיַּד מַעֲשֶׂה וְלֹא מִיַּד מַחְשָׁבָה. בִּשְׁלָמָא מִיַּד מַעֲשֶׂה לָא מַפְּקָה, לָא אָתֵי דִּיבּוּר וּמְבַטֵּל מַעֲשֶׂה, אֶלָּא מִיַּד מַחְשָׁבָה מִיהָא תַּפֵּיק!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Reish Lakish raised an objection to** Rabbi Yoḥanan: **All vessels descend into their** state of contracting **ritual impurity by means of thought. But they ascend from their** state of **ritual impurity only by means of a change** resulting from **an action. An action** undertaken to improve the vessel **negates** both the status created by an earlier **action** that supposedly completed the vessel **and** the status created by the **thought** not to perform more work on the vessel. By contrast, **a thought** to improve the vessel **negates neither** status created by **action nor** status created by **thought.** Reish Lakish explains his objection: **Granted,** thought **does not negate action,** as **a statement does not come and nullify action. But it should at least offset thought.**


###### Kiddushin 59b:8
[Kiddushin 59b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/59b:8)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שָׁאנֵי מַחְשָׁבָה דְּטוּמְאָה דְּכִי מַעֲשֶׂה דָּמֵי, וְכִדְרַב פָּפָּא. דְּרַב פָּפָּא רָמֵי: כְּתִיב: ״כִּי יִתֵּן״, וְקָרֵינַן: ״כִּי יוּתַּן״. הָא כֵּיצַד? ״כִּי יוּתַּן״ דֻּומְיָא ״דָּיִתֵּן״, מָה ״יִתֵּן״ דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ אַף ״יוּתַּן״ נָמֵי דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabbi Yoḥanan **said to** Reish Lakish: **Thought** in the case **of ritual impurity is different, as** it **is considered like action, and** this is **in accordance with** the opinion **of Rav Pappa. As Rav Pappa raises a contradiction:** The word *yuttan* is written defective, and **is written** as if it says ***ki yitten*.** Yet **we read** it **“*ki yuttan*.” How so?** The standard of **“if water is placed [*ki yuttan*]”** is **similar to: If one places [*ki yitten*]; just as** the term **places [*yitten*]** indicates **that** it is **satisfactory to** the owner for the produce to become wet, as he himself is placing the water, **so too,** the term **“is placed [*yuttan*]”** means **that** it is **satisfactory to** the owner that the produce becomes wet, despite the fact that he did not place the water himself.


###### Kiddushin 59b:9
[Kiddushin 59b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/59b:9)

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הַשּׁוֹלֵחַ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתּוֹ וְהִגִּיעַ בַּשָּׁלִיחַ אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁלַח אַחֲרָיו שָׁלִיחַ וְאָמַר לוֹ: ״גֵּט שֶׁנָּתַתִּי לְךָ בָּטֵל הוּא״ – הֲרֵי זֶה בָּטֵל תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, תְּיוּבְתָּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish:** With regard to **one who sends a bill of divorce to his wife, and** later the husband **encountered the agent or sent** another **agent after him and** in this manner **said to him: The bill of divorce that I gave you is nullified, it is thereby nullified.** This indicates that the appointment of an agent can be nullified even by a statement. The Gemara concludes: **The refutation** of the opinion **of Reish Lakish is** in fact **a conclusive refutation.**


###### Kiddushin 59b:10
[Kiddushin 59b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/59b:10)

וְהִילְכְתָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּקַמַּיְיתָא. וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר: שָׁאנֵי נְתִינַת מָעוֹת לְיַד אִשָּׁה דִּכְמַעֲשֶׂה דָּמֵי, אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי אָתֵי דִּיבּוּר וּמְבַטֵּל דִּיבּוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara adds: **And the *halakha*** is **in accordance with** the opinion **of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and** this is **even according to the first** version of their dispute, with regard to a woman who retracts from her betrothal after accepting the money for it. **And even though there is** room **to say** that **giving money to a woman** for betrothal **is different, as it is considered like an action, even so, a statement comes and nullifies** a previous **statement** with regard to her consent to the betrothal, provided that the betrothal has yet to take effect.


###### Kiddushin 59b:11
[Kiddushin 59b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/59b:11)

קַשְׁיָא הִילְכְתָא אַהִילְכְתָא. אָמְרַתְּ: הִילְכְתָא כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וְקַיְימָא לַן הִילְכְתָא כְּרַב נַחְמָן, דְּאִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: מַהוּ שֶׁיַּחֲזוֹר וִיגָרֵשׁ בּוֹ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **The *halakha*** recorded here is **difficult** with regard to **the *halakha*** recorded elsewhere. **You said** that **the *halakha*** is **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yoḥanan, and** yet **we maintain** that **the *halakha*** is **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rav Naḥman. As a dilemma was raised before** the Sages: **What is** the *halakha* in the case of a bill of divorce sent by an agent that the husband nullified before it was received by his wife? Can the husband **return and divorce** his wife **with** the very same bill of divorce?


###### Kiddushin 59b:12
[Kiddushin 59b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/59b:12)

רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: חוֹזֵר וּמְגָרֵשׁ בּוֹ, רַב שֵׁשֶׁת אָמַר: אֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר וּמְגָרֵשׁ בּוֹ. וְקַיְימָא לַן הִילְכְתָא כְּוָתֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן! נְהִי דְּבַטְּלֵיהּ מִתּוֹרַת שְׁלִיחַ, מִתּוֹרַת גֵּט לָא בַּטְּלֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Naḥman says:** He **can return and divorce** her **with it,** and **Rav Sheshet says: He cannot return and divorce** her **with it. And we maintain** that **the *halakha*** is **in accordance with** the opinion **of Rav Naḥman** in this case. By contrast, according to the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan, since the husband has nullified the bill of divorce it should no longer be valid. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as, **although** the husband **has nullified** the agent **from his status as an agent, he has not nullified** the bill of divorce itself **from its status as a bill of divorce.**


###### Kiddushin 59b:13
[Kiddushin 59b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/59b:13)

מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לַשֵּׁנִי. אָמַר רַב: מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לַשֵּׁנִי לְעוֹלָם, וּשְׁמוּאֵל אֲמַר: מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לַשֵּׁנִי עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם, לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם פָּקְעִי קִידּוּשֵׁי שֵׁנִי וְגָמְרִי קִידּוּשֵׁי רִאשׁוֹן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches that if a man betroths a woman and stipulates that the betrothal will take effect in thirty days’ time and another man betroths her within that period, **she is betrothed to the second** man. **Rav says: She is betrothed to the second forever,** i.e., the betrothal is fully effective, **and Shmuel says: She is betrothed to the second until** the **thirty days** pass. **After thirty days** have passed, **the betrothal of the second lapses, and the** earlier **betrothal of the first** man **is completed.**


###### Kiddushin 59b:14
[Kiddushin 59b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/59b:14)

יָתֵיב רַב חִסְדָּא וְקָא קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ: קִידּוּשֵׁי שֵׁנִי בְּמַאי פָּקְעִי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב יוֹסֵף: מָר אַרֵישָׁא מַתְנֵי לַהּ וְקַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ, רַב יְהוּדָה אַסֵּיפָא מַתְנֵי לַהּ וְלָא קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ḥisda sat and** found this **difficult: By what** means is the **betrothal of the second** man **abrogated?** When the second betrothal took effect, the first betrothal was not yet in effect. Why, then, is the second betrothal abrogated? **Rav Yosef said to him: The Master teaches** this dispute **with regard to the first clause** of the mishna, **and** therefore **he** finds it **difficult,** whereas **Rav Yehuda teaches** it with regard **to the latter clause** of the mishna, **and** consequently **he does not** find it **difficult.**


###### Kiddushin 59b:15
[Kiddushin 59b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/59b:15)

״מֵעַכְשָׁיו וּלְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם״ וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רַב: מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת וְאֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לְעוֹלָם. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת וְאֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת אֶלָּא עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם, לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים פָּקְעִי קִידּוּשֵׁי שֵׁנִי וְגָמְרִי קִידּוּשֵׁי רִאשׁוֹן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Yehuda’s version of the dispute is as follows: The mishna teaches that if the first man says to her: You are hereby betrothed to me **from now and after thirty days,** and another man betrothed her within those thirty days, there is uncertainty whether she is betrothed or whether she is not betrothed. **Rav says:** This means that there is uncertainty whether **she is betrothed or** whether **she is not betrothed forever,** and her only option is to receive a bill of divorce from both men. **And Shmuel says:** There is uncertainty whether **she is betrothed or** whether **she is not betrothed only until thirty days** have elapsed, whereas **after thirty** days **the betrothal of the second** is **abrogated, and the betrothal of the first is completed.**


###### Kiddushin 59b:16
[Kiddushin 59b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/59b:16)

לְרַב מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ אִי תְּנָאָה הֲוַאי, אִי חֲזָרָה הֲוַאי. לִשְׁמוּאֵל פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ דִּתְנָאָה הֲוַאי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains their respective opinions: **Rav is uncertain** what the first man meant. **Is it a condition,** i.e., the man is saying: If I do not change my mind within thirty days, you are betrothed to me from now, or **is it a retraction,** that is, he immediately retracted after he said: From now, in favor of a betrothal that will take effect only after thirty days have elapsed. This uncertainty remains even after the end of the thirty days. **It is obvious to Shmuel that it is a condition.** Consequently, the uncertainty whether or not she is betrothed to the second man applies during the thirty-day period, as the first man might yet change his mind. After the completion of thirty days, the betrothal from the first man retroactively takes effect from the moment he gave it, and therefore the betrothal of the second man is abrogated.


###### Kiddushin 59b:17
[Kiddushin 59b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/59b:17)

וּבִפְלוּגְתָּא דְּהָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי, דְּתַנְיָא: ״מֵהַיּוֹם וּלְאַחַר מִיתָה״ – גֵּט וְאֵינוֹ גֵּט, דִּבְרֵי חֲכָמִים. רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: כָּזֶה גֵּט.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara comments: **And** Rav and Shmuel disagree **in the dispute between these *tanna’im*. As it is taught** in a *baraita*: If one says to his wife upon giving her a bill of divorce that it should take effect: **From today and after** my **death,** there is uncertainty whether it **is** a valid **bill of divorce or** whether it **is not a** valid **bill of divorce.** This is **the statement of the Rabbis.** The Rabbis are uncertain whether he meant that the bill of divorce should take effect retroactively from that moment, in which case it is valid; or whether he changed his mind and meant for it to take effect only after his death, which would mean that it is not a valid bill of divorce. **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi **says:** A document **like this** is a valid **bill of divorce.** The husband meant his statement as a condition that the bill of divorce should, after his death, take effect retroactively from now, and therefore it is a valid bill of divorce.


###### Kiddushin 59b:18
[Kiddushin 59b:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/59b:18)

וְנֵימָא רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּנַן, וְנֵימָא שְׁמוּאֵל הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי! צְרִיכָא. דְּאִילּוּ אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּנַן, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: הָתָם דִּלְרַחוֹקַהּ קָאָתֵי, אֲבָל הָכָא, דִּלְקָרוֹבַהּ קָאָתֵי, אֵימָא מוֹדֶה לֵיהּ לִשְׁמוּאֵל דִּתְנָאָהּ הֲוַאי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And let Rav,** instead of explaining his own opinion, **say** that the ***halakha*** is **in accordance with** the opinion of **the Rabbis, and let Shmuel say** that the ***halakha*** is **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi. The Gemara answers: It is **necessary** for Rav and Shmuel to state their disagreement explicitly. **As had Rav** merely **said** that the ***halakha*** is **in accordance with** the opinion of **the Rabbis, I would say: There,** in the case of a bill of divorce, **when he comes to distance her** from himself, one can say that he has changed his mind with regard to the divorce. **But here,** in the case of betrothal, **when he comes to draw her near,** you might **say** that Rav **concedes to Shmuel that it is** certainly **a condition,** as he wants to betroth her as soon as possible.


###### Kiddushin 59b:19
[Kiddushin 59b:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/59b:19)

וְאִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: הָתָם הוּא דְּאֵין גֵּט לְאַחַר מִיתָה. אֲבָל הָכָא דְּיֵשׁ קִידּוּשִׁין לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים, אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַב, צְרִיכָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** conversely, **had Shmuel said** only that the ***halakha*** is **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi, **I would say: It is** in that case **there** that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said it is a valid bill of divorce, **as there is no bill of divorce after death,** and therefore it is unlikely that he changed his mind and attempted to give a bill of divorce that will take effect only after the death of the husband. **But here, where there is** the possibility of **betrothal after thirty** days, and he might well have intended to retract the betrothal, you might **say** that **Shmuel concedes to Rav.** Consequently, it was **necessary** to state the dispute between Rav and Shmuel concerning betrothal in explicit terms.


###### Kiddushin 59b:20
[Kiddushin 59b:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/59b:20)

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: וּלְטַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַב, בָּא אֶחָד וְאָמַר לָהּ: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי מֵעַכְשָׁיו וּלְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם״, וּבָא אַחֵר וְאָמַר לָהּ: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי מֵעַכְשָׁיו וּלְאַחַר עֶשְׂרִים יוֹם״

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Abaye said: And according to the reasoning of Rav,** if **one** man **came and said** the following ambiguous statement **to her: You are hereby betrothed to me from now and after thirty days. And another** man **came** during these thirty days **and said to her: You are hereby betrothed to me from now and after twenty days,**