## Kiddushin Daf 5a

###### Kiddushin 5a:1
[Kiddushin 5a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/5a:1)

וּמִנַּיִן שֶׁאַף בִּשְׁטָר? וְדִין הוּא: וּמָה כֶּסֶף, שֶׁאֵין מוֹצִיא – מַכְנִיס, שְׁטָר, שֶׁמּוֹצִיא – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁמַּכְנִיס?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The *baraita* continues to discuss the modes of betrothal: **And from where** is it derived that a woman can be acquired **even by** means of **a document?** The Gemara answers: This **is a logical derivation,** made by an *a fortiori* inference: **And if money, which does not release** a woman from her husband, nevertheless can **bring** her **into** a husband’s domain by betrothal, **is it not logical that a document, which releases** a woman from her husband in the form of a bill of divorce, **can bring** her **into** a husband’s domain by betrothal?


###### Kiddushin 5a:2
[Kiddushin 5a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/5a:2)

מָה לְכֶסֶף, שֶׁכֵּן פּוֹדִין בּוֹ הֶקְדֵּשׁ וּמַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי. תֹּאמַר שְׁטָר, שֶׁאֵין פּוֹדִין בּוֹ הֶקְדֵּשׁ וּמַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְנָתַן הַכֶּסֶף וְקָם לוֹ״!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara refutes this claim: **What** is unique about **money** is that it can effect acquisition in many contexts, **as one can redeem with it consecrated** property **and second tithe. Will you say** that the same also applies to **a document, with which one cannot redeem consecrated** property **and second tithe?** The proof that one may redeem consecrated property only by means of money is **that it is written: “And he will give the money and it will be assured to him”** (see Leviticus 27:19). Consequently, this *halakha* cannot be derived by logical reasoning.


###### Kiddushin 5a:3
[Kiddushin 5a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/5a:3)

אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְיָצְאָה״ ״וְהָיְתָה״ – מַקִּישׁ הֲוָיָה לִיצִיאָה: מָה יְצִיאָה בִּשְׁטָר – אַף הֲוָיָה נָמֵי בִּשְׁטָר. וְאַקֵּישׁ נָמֵי, יְצִיאָה לַהֲוָיָה: מָה הֲוָיָה בַּכֶּסֶף – אַף יְצִיאָה בְּכֶסֶף!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Therefore, **the verse states: “And she leaves** his house and goes **and becomes** another man’s wife” (Deuteronomy 24:2). This verse **juxtaposes becoming,** i.e., betrothal, **to leaving,** i.e., divorce. **Just as leaving** is performed **through a document,** i.e., a bill of divorce, **so too, becoming** can be performed **through a document.** The Gemara asks: **And let one also juxtapose leaving to becoming,** in the opposite direction: **Just as becoming is** performed **through money, so too, leaving** can be effected **through money.**


###### Kiddushin 5a:4
[Kiddushin 5a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/5a:4)

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: יֹאמְרוּ: כֶּסֶף מַכְנִיס, כֶּסֶף מוֹצִיא, סָנֵיגוֹר יֵעָשֶׂה קָטֵיגוֹר? אִי הָכִי, שְׁטָר נָמֵי יֹאמְרוּ: שְׁטָר מוֹצִיא, שְׁטָר מַכְנִיס, קָטֵיגוֹר יֵעָשֶׂה סָנֵיגוֹר?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Abaye says:** If so, people **will say: Money brings in and money releases;** if so, can **an advocate [*saneigor*] become a prosecutor [*kateigor*]?** It is improper for the same mode that draws man and woman together to be used for the termination of their relationship. The Gemara asks: **If so,** then with regard to **a document too, they will say: A document brings in and a document releases;** if so, can **a prosecutor become an advocate?**


###### Kiddushin 5a:5
[Kiddushin 5a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/5a:5)

מִילֵּי דְּהַאי שְׁטָרָא לְחוֹד וּמִילֵּי דְּהַאי שְׁטָרָא לְחוֹד. הָכָא נָמֵי, הַאי כַּסְפָּא לְחוֹד וְהַאי כַּסְפָּא לְחוֹד! טִיבְעָא מִיהָא חַד הוּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **The words of this** betrothal **document are discrete,** i.e., distinct, **and the words of this** divorce **document are discrete,** i.e., the two documents differ in content. The Gemara asks: **Here too, this money is discrete and this money is discrete,** as one coin is for the betrothal and a different coin is used for the divorce. The Gemara answers: **In any event, the coin** itself **is one,** i.e., there is no noticeable difference between the coin used for betrothal and one that would be used for divorce. The same cannot be said with regard to documents, as particular texts serve specific purposes, and the same document could not be used for both betrothal and divorce.


###### Kiddushin 5a:6
[Kiddushin 5a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/5a:6)

רָבָא אָמַר: אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְכָתַב לָהּ״ בִּכְתִיבָה מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת, וְאֵינָהּ מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת בְּכֶסֶף. וְאֵימָא: בִּכְתִיבָה מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת – וְאֵינָהּ מִתְקַדֶּשֶׁת בִּכְתִיבָה! הָא כְּתִיב ״וְיָצְאָה״ ״וְהָיְתָה״ מַקִּישׁ וְכוּ׳.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said:** The *halakha* that a woman cannot be divorced by means of money is derived from a different source. **The verse states: “And he writes her** a scroll of severance” (Deuteronomy 24:3). This indicates that a woman **is divorced** only **through writing and she is not divorced through money.** The Gemara asks: **But** as this point is not stated explicitly and is inferred from the verse, one can instead **say** the following interpretation: **She is divorced through writing, and she is not betrothed through writing.** The Gemara rejects this suggestion. It is **written: “And she leaves and becomes”** (Deuteronomy 24:2), which **juxtaposes** betrothal to divorce, indicating that betrothal can be effected with a document.


###### Kiddushin 5a:7
[Kiddushin 5a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/5a:7)

וּמָה רָאִיתָ? מִסְתַּבְּרָא קָאֵי בְּגֵירוּשִׁין מְמַעֵט גֵּירוּשִׁין, קָאֵי בְּגֵירוּשִׁין וּמְמַעֵט קִידּוּשִׁין?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And what did you see** that you interpreted the verses in this manner? One can say the reverse, that the juxtaposition between betrothal and divorce teaches that in both cases money is effective, while the verse: “And he writes her,” means that she can be divorced but not betrothed through writing. The Gemara answers: **It stands to reason** that when the verse is **referring to divorce** it **excludes** a different mode of **divorce.** Would a verse be **referring to divorce and exclude** a mode of **betrothal?**


###### Kiddushin 5a:8
[Kiddushin 5a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/5a:8)

וּלְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, דְּאַפֵּיק לֵיהּ לְהַאי קְרָא לִדְרָשָׁא אַחֲרִינָא, שֶׁאֵינָהּ מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת בְּכֶסֶף מְנָא לֵיהּ? אָמַר קְרָא: ״סֵפֶר כְּרִיתֻת״ – סֵפֶר כּוֹרְתָהּ, וְאֵין דָּבָר אַחֵר כּוֹרְתָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And according to** the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who derives a different exposition from this verse, from where does he** derive **that** a woman **cannot be divorced through money?** The Gemara answers that **the verse states: “A scroll of severance,”** which teaches: **A scroll,** i.e., a written document, **severs her** from her husband, **and nothing else severs her** from him.


###### Kiddushin 5a:9
[Kiddushin 5a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/5a:9)

וְרַבָּנַן, הַאי ״כְּרִיתֻת״, מַאי עָבְדִי לֵיהּ? מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְדָבָר הַכּוֹרֵת בֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** with regard to **the Rabbis,** who disagree with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, **what do they do with this** verse: “A scroll of **severance”?** How do they interpret it? The Gemara answers: They **require it for** the *halakha* that a document of divorce must be **a matter that** entirely **severs him from her.** The text of the bill of divorce must completely terminate the relationship between them.


###### Kiddushin 5a:10
[Kiddushin 5a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/5a:10)

כִּדְתַנְיָא: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטֵּיךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁלֹּא תִּשְׁתִּי יַיִן״, ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁלֹּא תֵּלְכִי לְבֵית אָבִיךְ לְעוֹלָם״ – אֵין זֶה כְּרִיתוּת. ״כָּל שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם״ – הֲרֵי זֶה כְּרִיתוּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
This is **as it is taught** in a *baraita* (*Tosefta*, *Gittin* 5:12) that if a husband says to his wife: **This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will not** ever **drink wine,** or: **On the condition that you will never go to your father’s house, that is not** an act of **severance,** as she remains restricted by him indefinitely. If he stipulates that she may not do so for **thirty days, that is** an act of **severance.** The Rabbis derive from the term severance that any indefinite condition prevents the divorce from taking effect.


###### Kiddushin 5a:11
[Kiddushin 5a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/5a:11)

וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי? מִכָּרֵת כְּרִיתֻת קָא נָפְקָא לֵיהּ. וְרַבָּנַן? כָּרֵת כְּרִיתֻת לָא מַשְׁמַע לְהוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili,** from where does he derive this requirement that a bill of divorce must completely sever the ties between husband and wife? The Gemara answers that **he derives it from** the fact that the verse does not utilize the basic form of the word severance, i.e., ***karet*,** but rather its conjugate, ***keritut*.** This indicates an additional principle that is derived from the term. The Gemara asks: **And** what do **the other** Sages derive from the seemingly superfluous use of this word? The Gemara answers: **They do not interpret** the distinction between ***karet*** and ***keritut*.**


###### Kiddushin 5a:12
[Kiddushin 5a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/5a:12)

חֲדָא מֵחֲדָא לָא אָתְיָא, תֵּיתֵי חֲדָא מִתַּרְתֵּי! הֵי תֵּיתֵי? לָא לִיכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בִּשְׁטָר, וְתֵיתֵי מֵהָנָךְ – מָה לְהָנָךְ שֶׁכֵּן הֲנָאָתָן מְרוּבָּה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara asks: It has been shown that **one** mode of betrothal **cannot be derived from another** mode of betrothal, as explained in the *baraita*, but why not **let one be derived from** the other **two** methods? The Gemara answers: This is not possible, as, **which** method **will be derived** from the others? If you say: **Let the Merciful One not write** that a woman can be betrothed **through a document, and** one can **derive** this mode of acquisition **from these** modes of acquisition, i.e., intercourse and money, this claim can be refuted. **What** is unique **about these** other modes is that **their benefit is great,** relative to a document, as a woman experiences no enjoyment upon receiving a document.


###### Kiddushin 5a:13
[Kiddushin 5a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/5a:13)

לָא נִיכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בְּבִיאָה, וְתֵיתֵי מֵהָנָךְ – מָה לְהָנָךְ שֶׁכֵּן קִנְיָנָן מְרוּבֶּה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
And if you say: **Let the Merciful One not write** that a woman can be acquired **through sexual intercourse, and** one can **derive** this mode **from these** modes of acquisition, i.e., money and a document, this too is not possible, as, **what** is unique **about these** modes of betrothal is that **their acquisition is great.** In other words, these modes of acquisition apply in many other situations. Therefore, one cannot derive the unusual acquisition of sexual intercourse from these methods.


###### Kiddushin 5a:14
[Kiddushin 5a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/5a:14)

לָא נִיכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בְּכֶסֶף, וְתֵיתֵי מֵהָנָךְ – מָה לְהָנָךְ שֶׁכֵּן יֶשְׁנָן בְּעַל כׇּרְחָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
If you say: **Let the Merciful One not write** that a woman can be acquired **through money, and** one can **derive** this mode **from these** other modes of acquisition, this is also not possible, as **what** is unique **about these** is that they apply **against her will.** A *yavam* acquires a *yevama* through intercourse even against her will, while a document releases a woman from marriage without her consent in the case of a bill of divorce.


###### Kiddushin 5a:15
[Kiddushin 5a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/5a:15)

וְכִי תֵּימָא כֶּסֶף נָמֵי בְּעַל כׇּרְחָהּ, בְּאָמָה הָעִבְרִיָּה – בְּאִישׁוּת מִיהָא לָא אַשְׁכְּחַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you would say** that **money also** applies **against her will,** in the case **of a Hebrew maidservant,** whose father can sell her to a master without her consent, enabling one to therefore derive from the other two modes of acquisition, i.e., intercourse and a document, that a woman can be acquired through money, this opinion can be refuted as well: **In any event, with regard to marriage, we do not find** a case in which a woman can be acquired through money against her will. Consequently, none of these modes of acquisition can be derived from any of the others.


###### Kiddushin 5a:16
[Kiddushin 5a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/5a:16)

אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: חוּפָּה קוֹנָה מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה כֶּסֶף שֶׁאֵינוֹ מַאֲכִיל בִּתְרוּמָה – קוֹנֶה, חוּפָּה שֶׁמַּאֲכֶלֶת בִּתְרוּמָה – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁתִּקְנֶה?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rav Huna says:** The ceremony of the wedding **canopy effects acquisition** of the woman, as is derived **through an *a fortiori*** inference: **If money, which does not enable** the wife **to partake of *teruma*,** as the daughter of a non-priest betrothed to a priest may not yet partake of *teruma*, **effects acquisition** of a woman for betrothal, **is it not logical that** a wedding **canopy, which enables her to partake of *teruma*,** as once a woman has entered the wedding canopy it is permitted for her to partake of *teruma* due to her husband the priest, **should** also **effect acquisition** of a woman by her husband?


###### Kiddushin 5a:17
[Kiddushin 5a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/5a:17)

וְכֶסֶף אֵינוֹ מַאֲכִיל? וְהָאָמַר עוּלָּא: דְּבַר תּוֹרָה, אֲרוּסָה בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל אוֹכֶלֶת בִּתְרוּמָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְכֹהֵן כִּי יִקְנֶה נֶפֶשׁ קִנְיַן כַּסְפּוֹ״, וְהַאי ״קִנְיַן כַּסְפּוֹ הוּא״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And does** betrothal **money not enable** a woman **to partake of** *teruma*? **But didn’t Ulla say: By Torah law the daughter of a non-priest** who is **betrothed** to a priest may **partake of *teruma*** immediately upon her betrothal, **as it is stated: “But if a priest buy any soul, the acquisition of his money,** he may eat of it” (Leviticus 22:11), **and this** woman **is** considered **the acquisition of his money.**


###### Kiddushin 5a:18
[Kiddushin 5a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/5a:18)

וּמַה טַּעַם אָמְרוּ אֵינָהּ אוֹכֶלֶת – גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יִמְזְגוּ לָהּ כּוֹס בְּבֵית אָבִיהָ וְתַשְׁקֶנּוּ לְאָחִיהָ וְלַאֲחוֹתָיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And what is the reason** that the Sages **said** that **she may not partake** of *teruma*? It is a rabbinic **decree lest they pour her a cup** of *teruma* wine **in her father’s house,** where she is staying before her marriage, **and she give to her brothers and sisters to drink,** as it is prohibited for them to partake of *teruma*. If so, by Torah law a woman may partake of *teruma* once she has been betrothed with money. Consequently, the above *a fortiori* inference that entering a wedding canopy can effect betrothal is invalid.


###### Kiddushin 5a:19
[Kiddushin 5a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/5a:19)

אֶלָּא פְּרֵיךְ הָכִי: וּמָה כֶּסֶף שֶׁאֵינוֹ גּוֹמֵר – קוֹנֶה,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** the Gemara emends Rav Huna’s statement and says that **he refutes** the opinion that entering a wedding canopy does not effect betrothal **as follows: If money, which does not complete** the acquisition of a woman, as a young woman remains under her father’s authority with regard to certain issues, nevertheless **effects acquisition** of her for the stage of betrothal,