## Kiddushin Daf 63a

###### Kiddushin 63a:1
[Kiddushin 63a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/63a:1)

״לֹא תַסְגִּיר עֶבֶד אֶל אֲדֹנָיו״, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: בְּלוֹקֵחַ עֶבֶד עַל מְנָת לְשַׁחְרְרוֹ הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: כְּגוֹן דִּכְתַב לֵיהּ: ״לִכְשֶׁאֶקָּחֲךָ, הֲרֵי עַצְמְךָ קָנוּי לְךָ מֵעַכְשָׁיו״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
With regard to the verse: **“You shall not deliver a slave to his master”** (Deuteronomy 23:16), **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi **says: The verse is speaking of one who acquires a slave,** not to enslave him but **in order to emancipate him.** The court may not deliver the slave to this master, as this master has no right to enslave him. The Gemara asks: **What are the circumstances** of this case? **Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: For example, if** the new master **wrote to** the slave in his bill of manumission: **When I will purchase you, you are hereby acquired to yourself from now.** In that case the slave acquires himself from that moment, despite the fact that the buyer does not own him. This shows that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains that a person can transfer an item that has not yet entered the world, as one can emancipate his slave before acquiring him.


###### Kiddushin 63a:2
[Kiddushin 63a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/63a:2)

רַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּתַנְיָא: הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי לְאַחַר שֶׁאֶתְגַּיֵּיר״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתִּתְגַּיְּירִי״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁאֶשְׁתַּחְרֵר״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתִּשְׁתַּחְרְרִי״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁיָּמוּת בַּעְלִיךְ״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתָּמוּת אֲחוֹתִיךְ״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁיַּחְלוֹץ לָךְ יְבָמִיךְ״ – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הַסַּנְדְּלָר אוֹמֵר: אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Meir** also holds that one can transfer an entity that has not yet come into the world, **as it is taught** in a *baraita*: With regard to **one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me after I convert,** or: **After you convert,** or: **After I am emancipated,** or: **After you are emancipated,** or: **After your husband dies,** or: **After your sister dies,** or: **After your *yavam* performs *ḥalitza* for you, she is not betrothed. Rabbi Meir** disagrees and **says: She is betrothed. Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar says: She is not betrothed.**


###### Kiddushin 63a:3
[Kiddushin 63a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/63a:3)

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הַנָּשִׂיא אוֹמֵר: מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. וּמָה טַעַם אָמְרוּ ״אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת״ – מִשּׁוּם אֵיבָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says** that in some of these cases, by Torah law **she is betrothed. And** for **what reason did** the Sages **say she is not betrothed? Due to enmity.** Giving betrothal to a married woman that will take effect after her husband dies can engender enmity between the woman and her husband. Giving betrothal to one sister that depends on the death of the other can engender enmity between the sisters. Nevertheless, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintain that one can betroth a woman who is currently forbidden to him.


###### Kiddushin 63a:4
[Kiddushin 63a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/63a:4)

וְנִחְשׁוֹב נָמֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הַנָּשִׂיא! הַיְינוּ רַבִּי, הַיְינוּ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הַנָּשִׂיא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And let us also count Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi** among those who maintain that a person can acquire an entity that has not yet come into the world. The reason it asks is that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is merely called Rabbi above. The Gemara answers: **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi **is** the same as **Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi;** they are one person.


###### Kiddushin 63a:5
[Kiddushin 63a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/63a:5)

וְנִחְשׁוֹב נָמֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, דְּתַנְיָא: ״קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁאֲנִי עוֹשָׂה לְפִיךָ״ – אֵין צָרִיךְ לְהָפֵר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And let us also count Rabbi Akiva, as it is taught** in a mishna (see *Nedarim* 85a): If a woman stated a vow to her husband: **I will** not **produce** anything **for you,** including the work that she is obligated to do for him according to the terms of her marriage contract, as **that is *konam*,** i.e., forbidden like an offering, for me, her husband **need not nullify** the vow at all. It is automatically void, since she is obligated to perform those tasks.


###### Kiddushin 63a:6
[Kiddushin 63a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/63a:6)

רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: יָפֵר, שֶׁמָּא תַּעֲדִיף עָלָיו יָתֵר מִן הָרָאוּי לוֹ. הָאִיתְּמַר עֲלַהּ, אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: בְּאוֹמֶרֶת: ״יִקְדְּשׁוּ יָדַי לְעוֹשֵׂיהֶם״, וְיָדַיִם אִיתַנְהוּ בָּעוֹלָם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Akiva says: He should** nevertheless **nullify** the vow, as **perhaps she will exceed** the required amount of work and do **more for him than is fitting for him** to receive. If she does more than the fixed amount of work that a woman is obligated to perform for her husband, the vow will be valid with respect to the excess to which he is not legally entitled, and he might inadvertently come to benefit from something that is forbidden to him. That excess is an entity that has not yet come into the world. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: **Wasn’t it** already **stated with regard to** this ruling that **Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, says:** This is referring **to** a woman **who says: Let my hands be sanctified to their Maker?** She sanctifies her actual hands, **and** these **hands exist in the world;** therefore the vow takes effect.


###### Kiddushin 63a:7
[Kiddushin 63a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/63a:7)

**מַתְנִי׳** הָאוֹמֵר לָאִשָּׁה ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֲדַבֵּר עָלַיִךְ לַשִּׁלְטוֹן״, ״וְאֶעֱשֶׂה עִמָּךְ כְּפוֹעֵל״, דִּבֵּר עָלֶיהָ לַשִּׁלְטוֹן וְעָשָׂה עִמָּהּ כְּפוֹעֵל – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וְאִם לָאו – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** With regard to **one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I will speak** in **your** favor **to the authorities,** e.g., to help her address some legal matter, or: On the condition that **I will act for you as a laborer,** if **he spoke** in **her** favor **to the authorities or acted for her as a laborer, she is betrothed. But if not, she is not betrothed.**


###### Kiddushin 63a:8
[Kiddushin 63a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/63a:8)

**גְּמָ׳** אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: וְהוּא שֶׁנָּתַן לָהּ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה. וּבְשָׂכָר לָא? וְהָתַנְיָא: בִּשְׂכַר שֶׁהִרְכַּבְתִּיךְ עַל הַחֲמוֹר שֶׁהוֹשַׁבְתִּיךְ בְּקָרוֹן אוֹ בִּסְפִינָה – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** **Reish Lakish says: And this** *halakha* applies only **if he gave her** an item **worth one *peruta*** at the time of the betrothal. She is not betrothed via his recommendation to the authorities or via the work itself, as these are merely conditions appended to the betrothal. The Gemara asks: **And** is she **not** betrothed **by the** monetary **value** of his recommendation or action? **But isn’t it taught** in a *baraita* that if one says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me **by** the monetary **value** you received **when I had you ride on a donkey,** or: By the monetary value you received **when I had you sit on a wagon [*karon*], or:** By the monetary value you received when I had you ride **in a boat, she is not betrothed,** as she has already done the action and therefore owes him this debt, and one cannot betroth a woman with a loan.


###### Kiddushin 63a:9
[Kiddushin 63a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/63a:9)

בִּשְׂכַר שֶׁאַרְכִּיבִךְ עַל הַחֲמוֹר, שֶׁאוֹשִׁיבִךְ בְּקָרוֹן אוֹ בִּסְפִינָה – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. וְכִי תֵּימָא הָכָא נָמֵי בְּדִיהַב לַהּ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה, וְהָא בִּשְׂכַר קָאָמַר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
But if he says to her: **By** the monetary **value** you will receive **when I will have you ride on a donkey,** or: By the monetary value you will receive **when I will have you sit on a wagon, or:** By the monetary value you will receive when I will have you ride **in a boat, she is betrothed. And if you would say** that **here too,** it is referring **to** a case **where he gave her** an item **worth one *peruta*,** the *baraita* **says: By** the monetary **value,** which indicates that she is betrothed via this sum.


###### Kiddushin 63a:10
[Kiddushin 63a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/63a:10)

וְעוֹד תַּנְיָא: שֵׁב עִמִּי בְּצַוְותָּא וְאֶקַּדֵּשׁ לָךְ, שְׂחוֹק לְפָנַי, רְקוֹד לְפָנַי, עֲשֵׂה כַּדִּימוֹס הַזֶּה – שָׁמִין, אִם יֵשׁ בּוֹ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וְאִם לָאו – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. וְכִי תֵּימָא, הָכָא נָמֵי בְּדִיהַב לַהּ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה, וְהָא שָׁמִין אוֹתוֹ קָאָמַר! תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And furthermore, it is taught** in a *baraita* that if a woman says to a man: **Sit together with me and I will be betrothed to you,** or: **Perform entertainment before me,** or: **Dance before me,** or: **Perform** work for me **like this layer [*dimus*]** of a building, the court **appraises** the monetary value of his action. **If** the action he performs for her **is worth the value of one *peruta*, she is betrothed, but if not, she is not betrothed. And if you would say** that **here too,** it is referring to a case **where he gave her** an item **worth one *peruta*,** and the betrothal is with that; **but** the *baraita* **says:** The court **appraises it.** If this were merely a condition, there would be no need for an appraisal. Isn’t this **a conclusive refutation** of the opinion of **Reish Lakish?**


###### Kiddushin 63a:11
[Kiddushin 63a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/63a:11)

אָמַר לָךְ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הַאי תַּנָּא בָּרָא סָבַר: אֵינָהּ לִשְׂכִירוּת אֶלָּא לְבַסּוֹף. וְתַנָּא דִידַן סָבַר יֶשְׁנָהּ לִשְׂכִירוּת מִתְּחִילָּה וְעַד סוֹף.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers that **Reish Lakish** could have **said to you: This *tanna* of the *baraita* maintains** that the obligation to pay a person’s **wage** is incurred **only at the end** of the period for which he was hired. Consequently, she is betrothed via money rather than by a loan. **And the *tanna* of our** mishna **maintains** that the obligation to pay **a wage is** incurred continuously **from the beginning** of the period he was hired **to** its **end.** Since the debt accumulates throughout the duration that the service is performed, by the time he has finished the work she owes him the entire sum, and a debt cannot be used for a betrothal.


###### Kiddushin 63a:12
[Kiddushin 63a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/63a:12)

וּמַאי דּוּחְקֵיהּ דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ לְאוֹקוֹמַיהּ לְמַתְנִיתִין בְּיֶשְׁנָהּ לִשְׂכִירוּת מִתְּחִילָּה וְעַד סוֹף, וּבְדִיהַב לַהּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And what forces Reish Lakish to establish the mishna in** accordance with the opinion **that** the obligation to pay **a wage is** incurred continuously **from the beginning** of the period he was hired **to** its **end, and** that it is referring to a case **where he gave her** the value of one *peruta*? Why does he reject the possibility that the mishna is referring to one who did not give an extra *peruta*, and instead he betrothed her with the value of the service he performed, in accordance with the opinion that the obligation to pay a person’s wage is incurred only at the end of the period for which he was hired?


###### Kiddushin 63a:13
[Kiddushin 63a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/63a:13)

אָמַר רָבָא: מַתְנִיתִין קְשִׁיתֵיהּ, מַאי אִירְיָא דְּתָנֵי ״עַל מְנָת״? נִיתְנֵי ״בִּשְׂכַר״, אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: כֹּל ״עַל מְנָת״ הֵיכָא דִּיהַב לַהּ הוּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara replies: **Rava said** that **the mishna was difficult for** Reish Lakish: **Why does** the *tanna* **specifically teach: On the condition? Let him teach: By** the monetary **value,** as stated in the *baraita*. **Rather, conclude from** it that **any** statement of: **On the condition,** is referring to a stipulation, and therefore the mishna must be dealing with a case **where he has** already **given her** the value of one *peruta*. Consequently, the value of his service cannot be the money for the betrothal itself, and instead serves as a later condition.


###### Kiddushin 63a:14
[Kiddushin 63a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/63a:14)

**מַתְנִי׳** ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁיִּרְצֶה אַבָּא״, רָצָה הָאָב – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וְאִם לָאו – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. מֵת הָאָב – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. מֵת הַבֵּן – מְלַמְּדִין הָאָב לוֹמַר שֶׁאֵינוֹ רוֹצֶה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** With regard to one who betroths a woman and says to her that the betrothal is: **On the condition that** my **father will want** this betrothal, if his **father wants** it, **she is betrothed; but if not, she is not betrothed.** If **the father dies, she is betrothed,** despite the fact that he did not reveal his wishes. If **the son dies, one instructs the father to say that he does not want** the betrothal, so that the betrothal will never have taken effect, thereby enabling her to avoid the requirement of levirate marriage.


###### Kiddushin 63a:15
[Kiddushin 63a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/63a:15)

**גְּמָ׳** מַאי ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁיִּרְצֶה אַבָּא״? אִילֵּימָא עַד דְּאָמַר אַבָּא ״אִין״, אֵימָא מְצִיעֲתָא: מֵת הָאָב – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וְהָא לָא אֲמַר ״אִין״! אֶלָּא:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** **What** is the meaning of: **On the condition that** my **father will want** this betrothal? **If we say** it means they are not married **until** his **father says yes,** indicating his agreement, then **say the middle clause** of the mishna: If **the father dies, she is betrothed. But** how can she be betrothed? After all, **he did not say yes,** and the condition was not fulfilled. **Rather,**