## Kiddushin Daf 77b

###### Kiddushin 77b:1
[Kiddushin 77b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/77b:1)

הֲרֵי גּוּפִין מוּחְלָקִים, הֲרֵי שֵׁמוֹת מוּחְלָקִים!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Aren’t they separate bodies,** i.e., three different people? **Aren’t they labels [*shemot*]** of **separate [*muḥlakim*]** prohibitions, since each one is forbidden in her own right? It is therefore clear that he should receive lashes for each act.


###### Kiddushin 77b:2
[Kiddushin 77b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/77b:2)

אֶלָּא שֶׁבָּא עַל אַלְמָנָה אַחַת שָׁלֹשׁ בִּיאוֹת. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּלָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ – פְּשִׁיטָא דְּאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** perhaps it means **that he engaged in three acts of intercourse with one widow.** The Gemara analyzes this possibility: **What are the circumstances? If they did not forewarn him** between each act, it **is obvious** that **he is liable** to receive **only one** set of lashes, for one must be forewarned in order to be liable to receive lashes, and here he was forewarned only once for the three acts. There would be no need to state this *halakha*.


###### Kiddushin 77b:3
[Kiddushin 77b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/77b:3)

אֶלָּא דְּאַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ אַכֹּל חֲדָא וַחֲדָא – אַמַּאי אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת? וְהָתְנַן: נָזִיר שֶׁהָיָה שׁוֹתֶה יַיִן כׇּל הַיּוֹם כּוּלּוֹ – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: ״אַל תִּשְׁתֶּה״ ״אַל תִּשְׁתֶּה״ וְהוּא שׁוֹתֶה – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** perhaps the case is **that they forewarned him for each and every one** of his acts of intercourse. But if that were the case, **why is he liable** to receive **only one** set of lashes? **But didn’t we learn** in a mishna (*Nazir* 42a): **A nazirite who was drinking wine** in violation of his naziriteship **the entire day is liable** to receive **only one** set of lashes. If **they said to him: Do not drink, do not drink,** i.e., he was forewarned several times, **and he** nevertheless **drinks, he is liable** to receive lashes **for each and every** time he was forewarned and proceeded to drink.


###### Kiddushin 77b:4
[Kiddushin 77b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/77b:4)

לָא צְרִיכָא, שֶׁבָּא עַל אַלְמְנַת רְאוּבֵן שֶׁהָיְתָה אַלְמְנַת שִׁמְעוֹן שֶׁהָיְתָה אַלְמְנַת לֵוִי. מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא הֲרֵי שֵׁמוֹת מוּחְלָקִים – קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן גּוּפִים מוּחְלָקִים בָּעֵינַן, וְלֵיכָּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **No,** it is **necessary** for a case **where he engaged in sexual intercourse** one time **with Reuven’s widow, who was** previously **Shimon’s widow, who was** previously **Levi’s widow. Lest you say** they are **separate labels** of prohibitions and he should be liable to receive three sets of lashes, since she was widowed from three different people, the *baraita* therefore **teaches us** that **we require separate bodies** for him to receive separate punishments, **and** as that is **not** the case here, he is liable to receive only one set of lashes.


###### Kiddushin 77b:5
[Kiddushin 77b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/77b:5)

״אַלְמָנָה וּגְרוּשָׁה וַחֲלָלָה זֹנָה״. הַאי תַּנָּא מַאי קָסָבַר? אִי קָסָבַר אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר – אִיפְּכָא נָמֵי! וְאִי קָסָבַר אֵין אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר – אֲפִילּוּ כַּסֵּדֶר הַזֶּה נָמֵי לָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The *baraita* teaches that if a High Priest engages in sexual intercourse with a woman who was **a widow, and** then was **a divorcée, and** then was **a *ḥalala*,** and then was **a *zona*,** if the changes to her status occurred in that order he is liable to receive lashes for each of them. The Gemara asks: **What does this *tanna* hold? If he holds** that **a prohibition takes effect** where another **prohibition** already exists, i.e., if an item or a person is rendered forbidden by a prohibition then another prohibition can take effect in addition to the first one, **the reverse** should **also** be the case, i.e., if she was initially a *zona* and subsequently became a *ḥalala*, the same two prohibitions should apply to her. **And if he holds** that **a prohibition does not take effect** where another **prohibition** already exists, he should **likewise not** be liable to receive more than one set of lashes **even** if they occurred **in this order.**


###### Kiddushin 77b:6
[Kiddushin 77b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/77b:6)

אָמַר רָבָא: הַאי תַּנָּא אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר לֵית לֵיהּ, אִיסּוּר מוֹסִיף אִית לֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said:** In general, **this *tanna* does not** accept the principle that **a prohibition takes effect** where **another prohibition** already exists, but **he holds** that it does take effect in the case of **an expanded prohibition.** If the second prohibition adds people to the category of those to whom the item is forbidden, then it takes effect in addition to the previous prohibition, which had a more limited range.


###### Kiddushin 77b:7
[Kiddushin 77b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/77b:7)

אַלְמָנָה אֲסוּרָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל וְשַׁרְיָא לְכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט. הָוְיָא לַהּ גְּרוּשָׁה, מִיגּוֹ דְּאִיתּוֹסַף לַהּ אִיסּוּרָא לְגַבֵּי כֹּהֵן הֶדְיוֹט – אִיתּוֹסַף לַהּ אִיסּוּרָא לְגַבֵּי כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל, וַעֲדַיִין שַׁרְיָא לְמֵיכַל בִּתְרוּמָה. הָוְיָא לַהּ חֲלָלָה, מִיגּוֹ דְּאִיתּוֹסַף אִיסּוּרָא לְמֵיכַל בִּתְרוּמָה – אִיתּוֹסַף אִיסּוּרָא לְגַבֵּי כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
In this case, **a widow is forbidden to a High Priest but is permitted to a common priest.** Once **she becomes a divorcée, since a prohibition has been added to her with regard to a common priest,** as a common priest is prohibited from marrying a divorcée, the **prohibition is** also **added to her with regard to a High Priest. And** at this stage, **she is still permitted to partake of *teruma*** if she is the daughter of a priest. When **she becomes a *ḥalala*** by engaging in sexual intercourse with a priest, **since a prohibition** for her **to eat *teruma* has been added,** the **prohibition** with regard to a *ḥalala* **is** also **added with regard to a High Priest** who engages in intercourse with her, in addition to the prohibitions of a widow and a divorcée. It is only if they occurred in this order that each prohibition adds to the previous one, but not if they happened in the reverse order.


###### Kiddushin 77b:8
[Kiddushin 77b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/77b:8)

אֶלָּא זוֹנָה – מַאי אִיסּוּר מוֹסִיף אִית בַּהּ? אָמַר רַב חָנָא בַּר רַב קַטִּינָא: הוֹאִיל וְשֵׁם זְנוּת פּוֹסֵל בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Yet, one could ask: **But** in the case of **a *zona*, what expanded prohibition is there with regard to her?** There is no additional prohibition with a *zona* beyond what is prohibited with regard to a *ḥalala*. **Rav Ḥana bar Rav Ketina said: Since the label of *zenut* disqualifies** her **in Israel,** it is viewed as an expanded prohibition. Although a *zona* as precisely defined in this context, i.e., a woman who engages in sexual intercourse with one who is unfit for her, is prohibited only to priests and does not add any prohibition beyond that of a *ḥalala*, the label of a *zona* in its broader sense, such as a married woman who commits adultery, does disqualify her to an Israelite, namely her husband. Therefore, there is a prohibition with regard to a *zona* that has a greater scope than the prohibition with regard to a *ḥalala*.


###### Kiddushin 77b:9
[Kiddushin 77b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/77b:9)

תָּנֵי תַּנָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב שֵׁשֶׁת: כׇּל שֶׁהוּא בְּ״יִקָּח״, הֲרֵי הוּא בְּ״לֹא יִקָּח״. כֹּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּ״יִקָּח״ אֵינוֹ בְּ״לֹא יִקָּח״ – פְּרָט לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל שֶׁבָּא עַל אֲחוֹתוֹ אַלְמָנָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**A *tanna* taught** a *baraita* **before Rav Sheshet:** The command addressed to the High Priest states: “A widow, or one divorced, or a *ḥalala*, or a *zona*, these shall he not take; but a virgin of his own people shall he take to wife” (Leviticus 21:14). **Any** woman **who is** included **in** the mitzva: **“Shall he take” is** included **in** the prohibition: **“Shall he not take”** if she becomes a widow or a divorcée. And **any** woman **who is not** included **in** the mitzva: **“Shall he take” is not** included **in** the prohibition: **“Shall he not take.”** This **excludes** the case **of a High Priest who engaged in intercourse with his widowed sister.** As his sister, she is forbidden to him even when she is a virgin, so the mitzva: “Shall he take” does not refer to her. Therefore, he does not transgress the prohibition: “Shall he not take” if he engages in intercourse with her after she had been widowed or divorced.


###### Kiddushin 77b:10
[Kiddushin 77b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/77b:10)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: דַּאֲמַר לָךְ, מַנִּי – רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא, דְּאָמַר: אֵין אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר. דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: הָאוֹכֵל נְבֵילָה בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים – פָּטוּר. דְּאִי רַבָּנַן, הָא אָמְרִי: אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Sheshet **said to him:** He **who said** this **to you,** in accordance with **whose** opinion did he teach it? **It is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Shimon, who says** as a principle: **A prohibition does not take effect** where another **prohibition** already exists. Therefore, his sister, who was already forbidden to him by virtue of being his sister, is not forbidden due to the additional prohibition: “Shall he not take.” **As it is taught** in a *baraita*: **Rabbi Shimon says: One who eats** an unslaughtered **animal carcass on Yom Kippur is exempt** from *karet* for eating on the fast day, since the prohibition against eating an animal carcass applied to it beforehand. **As, if** you say this *baraita* follows the opinion of **the Rabbis, don’t they say: A prohibition takes effect where another prohibition** already **exists?**


###### Kiddushin 77b:11
[Kiddushin 77b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/77b:11)

אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבָּנַן, כִּי אָמְרִי רַבָּנַן אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר – הָנֵי מִילֵּי אִיסּוּר חָמוּר עַל אִיסּוּר קַל, אֲבָל אִיסּוּר קַל עַל אִיסּוּר חָמוּר – לָא חָיֵיל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this: **You** can **even say** that the *baraita* is in accordance with the opinion of **the Rabbis, as when the Rabbis say** that **a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition** already **exists, that statement** applies only when the second prohibition is a more **severe prohibition,** e.g., eating on Yom Kippur, which takes effect in addition **to a light prohibition,** in this case, eating an unslaughtered animal carcass. **But a light prohibition does not take effect** in addition **to a severe prohibition.** In this case, the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with one’s sister, which is punishable by *karet*, is more severe than that of: “A widow or one divorced, or a *ḥalala*, or a *zona*, these shall he not take,” which is punishable by flogging.


###### Kiddushin 77b:12
[Kiddushin 77b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/77b:12)

אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי: הָא מַנִּי – רַבָּנַן הִיא, דְּאָמְרִי: אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר, וְכִי אָמְרִי רַבָּנַן אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר, הָנֵי מִילֵּי אִיסּוּר חָמוּר עַל אִיסּוּר קַל, אֲבָל אִיסּוּר קַל עַל אִיסּוּר חָמוּר – לָא חָיֵיל. דְּאִי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, הַשְׁתָּא אִיסּוּר חָמוּר עַל אִיסּוּר קַל לָא חָיֵיל, אִיסּוּר קַל עַל אִיסּוּר חָמוּר מִיבַּעְיָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**There are** those **who say** that Rav Sheshet said to the *tanna* as follows: In accordance with **whose** opinion **is this? It is** in accordance with the opinion of **the Rabbis, who say: A prohibition takes effect where another prohibition** already **exists. And when the Rabbis say** that **a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition** already **exists, that statement** applies when the second prohibition is a more **severe prohibition,** which takes effect in addition **to a light prohibition, but a light prohibition does not take effect** in addition **to a severe prohibition. As, if** it is in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Shimon, now** that he holds that even **a severe prohibition does not take effect** in addition **to a light prohibition, is** it **necessary** to say that **a light prohibition does not take effect** in addition **to a severe prohibition?** There would be no novelty in this ruling of the *baraita*.


###### Kiddushin 77b:13
[Kiddushin 77b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/77b:13)

מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: אִיסּוּר כְּהוּנָּה שָׁאנֵי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this: It is necessary, **lest you say** that **a prohibition** involving the **priesthood is different.** You might say that since there are many stringencies that apply only to priests, then with regard to prohibitions of the priesthood, a second prohibition should take effect in addition to a first one. He therefore **teaches us** that Rabbi Shimon holds that the second prohibition does not take effect even when it is one addressed to members of the priesthood.


###### Kiddushin 77b:14
[Kiddushin 77b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/77b:14)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְאַבָּיֵי: יִשְׂרָאֵל הַבָּא עַל אֲחוֹתוֹ – זוֹנָה מְשַׁוֵּי לַהּ. חֲלָלָה, מְשַׁוֵּי לַהּ אוֹ לָא מְשַׁוֵּי לַהּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rav Pappa said to Abaye:** In the case of **an Israelite who engages in intercourse with his sister,** this **makes her a *zona*** and she is forbidden to a priest. But does **he** also **make her a *ḥalala*** so that a priest who engages in intercourse with her is also liable for violating the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with a *ḥalala*, **or** perhaps **he does not make her** a *ḥalala*?


###### Kiddushin 77b:15
[Kiddushin 77b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/77b:15)

מִי אָמְרִינַן קַל וָחוֹמֶר: מֵחַיָּיבֵי לָאוִין הָוְיָא חֲלָלָה, מֵחַיָּיבֵי כָרֵיתוֹת לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן? אוֹ דִילְמָא אֵין חֲלָלָה אֶלָּא מֵאִיסּוּר כְּהוּנָּה? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֵין (אִיסּוּר) חֲלָלָה אֶלָּא מֵאִיסּוּר כְּהוּנָּה בִּלְבַד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The two sides of the question are as follows: **Do we say** that this is **an *a fortiori*** inference: If **she becomes a *ḥalala* by** engaging in sexual intercourse for which she **is liable** for violating only an ordinary **prohibition,** should she **not all the more so** be considered a *ḥalala* **by** engaging in intercourse for which she **is liable** to be punished by ***karet*? Or perhaps** the status of ***ḥalala*** results **only** from **a prohibition** addressed specifically to the **priesthood?** Abaye **said to him:** A prohibition with regard to **a *ḥalala*** results **only** from **a prohibition** addressed specifically to the **priesthood** and from that **alone.**


###### Kiddushin 77b:16
[Kiddushin 77b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/77b:16)

אָמַר רָבָא: מְנָא הָא מִילְּתָא דַּאֲמוּר רַבָּנַן ״אֵין חֲלָלָה אֶלָּא מֵאִיסּוּר כְּהוּנָּה״? דְּתַנְיָא: לֹא יֵאָמֵר גְּרוּשָׁה בְּכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל וְתֵיתֵי בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר מִכֹּהֵן הֶדְיוֹט, וַאֲנָא אָמֵינָא: הַשְׁתָּא לְכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט אֲסוּרָה, לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל מִיבַּעְיָא? לָמָּה נֶאֶמְרָה: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁחֲלוּקָה גְּרוּשָׁה מִזּוֹנָה וַחֲלָלָה בְּכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט, כָּךְ חֲלוּקָה בְּכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava says: From where is this matter that the Sages state,** that **a *ḥalala*** results **only** from **a prohibition** addressed specifically to the **priesthood,** derived? **As it is taught** in a *baraita*: The verse need **not** explicitly **state** that **a divorcée** is forbidden **to a High Priest, and** one could **derive it by** means of **an *a fortiori*** inference **from** the *halakha* of **a common priest. As I** can **state** the following argument: **Now** that a divorcée **is forbidden to a common priest, is** it **necessary** to state that she is forbidden **to a High Priest?** But if it is not necessary to mention it, **why** is the prohibition with regard to a divorcée to a High Priest **stated?** It is in order to teach the following: **Just as** the prohibition with regard to **a divorcée is distinct from** that of **a *zona* and a *ḥalala* in** the case of **a common priest,** as a divorcée is forbidden by a separate prohibition for which he is liable to be flogged, **so too,** the prohibition with regard to a divorcée is **distinct in** the case of **a High Priest,** and he will be liable to receive lashes for a separate prohibition if she was a *ḥalala* as well.


###### Kiddushin 77b:17
[Kiddushin 77b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/77b:17)

פְּשִׁיטָא, מִיגְרָע גָּרְעָה? אֶלָּא: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁחֲלוּקָה גְּרוּשָׁה מִזּוֹנָה וַחֲלָלָה בְּכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט – כָּךְ אַלְמָנָה חֲלוּקָה מִגְּרוּשָׁה וַחֲלָלָה זוֹנָה בְּכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara questions this statement: This **is obvious; is** the status of a High Priest any **lower** than that of a common priest? Since this *halakha* applied to him when he was a common priest, it certainly applies to him when he becomes a High Priest. His restrictions as a priest are not lessened when he becomes a High Priest. **Rather,** teach as follows: **Just as** the prohibition with regard to **a divorcée is distinct from** that of **a *zona* and a *ḥalala* in** the case of **a common priest,** since he is liable to receive lashes for each of the prohibitions, **so too, a widow is distinct from a divorcée, and a *ḥalala*,** and **a *zona* in** the case of **a High Priest,** and he is liable to receive lashes for each prohibition, despite the fact that they are stated in the same verse (see Leviticus 21:14).


###### Kiddushin 77b:18
[Kiddushin 77b:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/77b:18)

חֲלָלָה לָמָּה נֶאֶמְרָה? אֵין חֲלָלָה אֶלָּא מֵאִיסּוּר כְּהוּנָּה. זוֹנָה לָמָּה נֶאֶמְרָה? נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״זוֹנָה״, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״זוֹנָה״, מָה כָּאן זַרְעוֹ חוּלִּין, אַף לְהַלָּן זַרְעוֹ חוּלִּין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The *baraita* further asks: **Why is** the prohibition with regard to **a *ḥalala* stated** with regard to a High Priest, as she is forbidden to him even when he is a common priest? This repetition serves to teach that **a *ḥalala*** results **only from a prohibition** addressed specifically to the **priesthood. Why is** the prohibition with regard to **a *zona* stated** with regard to a High Priest, as she is forbidden to him even when he is a common priest? **It is stated here: “*Zona*”** (Leviticus 21:14), with regard to a High Priest, **and it is stated there: “*Zona*”** (Leviticus 21:7), with regard to a common priest. **Just as here,** in the case of a High Priest who engages in sexual intercourse with a *zona*, **his offspring are profaned,** in accordance with the verse: “And he shall not profane his offspring” (Leviticus 21:15), **so too there, in** the case of a common priest who engages in intercourse with a *zona*, **his offspring are profaned.**


###### Kiddushin 77b:19
[Kiddushin 77b:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/77b:19)

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: הִילְכָּךְ, כֹּהֵן הַבָּא עַל אֲחוֹתוֹ

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ashi says: Consequently, a priest who engages in intercourse with his sister**