## Kiddushin Daf 7a

###### Kiddushin 7a:1
[Kiddushin 7a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/7a:1)

וְאֶקַּדֵּשׁ לָךְ״ – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, מִדִּין עָרֵב. עָרֵב, לָאו אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא מָטֵי הֲנָאָה לִידֵיהּ – קָא מְשַׁעְבֵּיד נַפְשֵׁיהּ, הַאי אִיתְּתָא נָמֵי, אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא מָטֵי הֲנָאָה לִידַהּ – קָא מְשַׁעְבְּדָא וּמַקְנְיָא נַפְשַׁהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**and I will be betrothed to you** by means of these one hundred dinars that you give to that individual, **she is betrothed,** as derived **from** the ***halakha*** of **a guarantor.** How so? With regard to **a guarantor,** is it **not** the case that **he commits himself** to repaying the debt **even though he receives no benefit,** as the money from the loan is given to the debtor? And with regard to **this woman too, even though she receives no benefit,** as the one hundred dinars are given to someone else, nevertheless **she commits and transfers herself** to the man who gives the money.


###### Kiddushin 7a:2
[Kiddushin 7a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/7a:2)

״הֵילָךְ מָנֶה וְהִתְקַדְּשִׁי לִפְלוֹנִי״ – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, מִדִּין עֶבֶד כְּנַעֲנִי. עֶבֶד כְּנַעֲנִי, לָאו אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא קָא חָסֵר וְלָא מִידֵּי – קָא קָנֵי נַפְשֵׁיהּ, הַאי גַּבְרָא נָמֵי, אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא קָא חָסֵר וְלָא מִידֵּי – קָא קָנֵי לַהּ לְהַאי אִיתְּתָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara discusses a similar case: If a man gives one hundred dinars to a woman and says to her: **Here are one hundred dinars for you, and** with this money you **become betrothed to so-and-so, she is betrothed,** as derived **from** the ***halakha*** of emancipating **a Canaanite slave.** With regard to **a Canaanite slave,** is it **not** the case that **he acquires himself** and is freed when someone gives his master money to emancipate the slave, **even though he loses nothing** of his own? With regard to **this man too,** i.e., the third party, **even though he loses nothing** of his own, **he acquires this woman** by means of the other man’s payment.


###### Kiddushin 7a:3
[Kiddushin 7a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/7a:3)

״תֵּן מָנֶה לִפְלוֹנִי וְאֶקַּדֵּשׁ אֲנִי לוֹ״ – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, מִדִּין שְׁנֵיהֶם. עָרֵב, לָאו אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא קָא מָטֵי הֲנָאָה לִידֵיהּ – קָא מְשַׁעְבֵּד נַפְשֵׁיהּ, הַאי אִיתְּתָא נָמֵי, אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא קָא מָטֵי הֲנָאָה לִידַהּ – קָא מַקְנְיָא נַפְשַׁהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara discusses a similar case: A woman says to a man: **Give one hundred dinars to so-and-so and I will be betrothed to him.** If he gives the money, **she is betrothed,** as is derived **from** a combination of the ***halakha*** of **both of** these cases, that of a guarantor and a Canaanite slave. How so? With regard to **a guarantor,** is it **not** the case that **he commits himself** to repaying the debt **even though he receives no benefit?** With regard to **this woman too, even though she receives no benefit,** nevertheless **she commits and transfers herself.**


###### Kiddushin 7a:4
[Kiddushin 7a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/7a:4)

מִי דָּמֵי? עָרֵב, הַאי דְּקָא קָנֵי לֵיהּ קָא חָסַר מָמוֹנָא, הַאי גַּבְרָא קָא קָנֵי לַהּ לְהַאי אִיתְּתָא וְלָא קָא חָסַר וְלָא מִידֵּי! עֶבֶד כְּנַעֲנִי יוֹכִיחַ, דְּלָא קָא חָסַר מָמוֹנָא וְקָא קָנֵי נַפְשֵׁיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
This consideration alone is insufficient, as one could still ask: **Are** these cases **comparable?** In the case of **a guarantor, the one who acquires** the item in question, which in this case is the commitment of the guarantor, is the one **who loses money** when he gives the loan. By contrast, in the situation at hand, **this man,** the third party, **acquires the woman and loses nothing** of his own. Therefore, the Gemara comments: The emancipating of **a Canaanite slave can prove it, as he does not lose** his own **money and** nevertheless **he acquires himself.**


###### Kiddushin 7a:5
[Kiddushin 7a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/7a:5)

מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם הָךְ דְּקָא מַקְנֵי קָא קָנֵי, הָכָא הַאי אִיתְּתָא קָא מַקְנְיָא נַפְשַׁהּ וְלָא קָא קָנְיָא וְלָא מִידֵּי! עָרֵב יוֹכִיחַ, אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא קָא מָטֵי הֲנָאָה לִידֵיהּ מְשַׁעְבֵּד נַפְשֵׁיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
This consideration alone is insufficient, as one could still ask: **Are** these cases **comparable? There,** with regard to a slave, **the one who transfers** ownership **is the one who acquires** it, as the master transfers ownership of the slave to the slave, and he himself acquires the money from the donor. **Here, this woman transfers herself and she does not acquire anything.** Rather, in this regard the case of **a guarantor can prove it,** as **even though he receives no benefit** from the creditor, nevertheless, he **commits himself,** just like the woman in this case. In this manner one can derive that the woman is betrothed in this case from a combination of those two *halakhot*.


###### Kiddushin 7a:6
[Kiddushin 7a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/7a:6)

בָּעֵי רָבָא: ״הֵילָךְ מָנֶה וְאֶקַּדֵּשׁ אֲנִי לָךְ״ מַהוּ? אָמַר מָר זוּטְרָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב פָּפָּא: מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְמָר זוּטְרָא: אִם כֵּן, הָוֵה לֵיהּ נְכָסִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶם אַחְרָיוּת נִקְנִין עִם נְכָסִים שֶׁאֵין לָהֶם אַחְרָיוּת,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava raises a dilemma:** If a woman said to a man: **Here are one hundred dinars and I will be betrothed to you, what is** the *halakha*? **Mar Zutra said in the name of Rav Pappa: She is betrothed. Rav Ashi said to Mar Zutra: If so, this is** an example of a case in which **property that serves as a guarantee is acquired with property that is not guaranteed.** Land is property that serves as a guarantee, and, as derived by way of a verbal analogy, the same applies to people. Money is property that does not serve as a guarantee. Through his acquisition of the money, this man acquires the woman as well.


###### Kiddushin 7a:7
[Kiddushin 7a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/7a:7)

וַאֲנַן אִיפְּכָא תְּנַן: נְכָסִים שֶׁאֵין לָהֶם אַחְרָיוּת נִקְנִין עִם נְכָסִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶם אַחְרָיוּת בְּכֶסֶף בִּשְׁטָר וּבַחֲזָקָה! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִי סָבְרַתְּ דְּאָמְרָה לֵיהּ ״אַגַּב״? הָכָא בְּאָדָם חָשׁוּב עָסְקִינַן, דִּבְהָהִיא הֲנָאָה דְּקָא מְקַבֵּל מַתָּנָה מִינַּהּ גָּמְרָה וּמַקְנְיָא לֵיהּ נַפְשַׁהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Ashi asks: **But we learned the opposite** in a mishna (26a): **Property that does not serve as a guarantee can be acquired with property that serves as a guarantee through** giving **money, through** giving **a document, or through** taking **possession** of them. By contrast, property that serves as a guarantee cannot be acquired by means of acquiring property that does not serve as a guarantee. Mar Zutra **said to** Rav Ashi: **Do you maintain that she** wants her acquisition to be performed **by means of** money, i.e., he will acquire her as well through monetary acquisition? Not so, as **here we are dealing with an important man, as, due to the benefit** she receives from the fact **that he** consents to **accept a gift from her, she agrees to transfer herself** to him.


###### Kiddushin 7a:8
[Kiddushin 7a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/7a:8)

אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: וְכֵן לְעִנְיַן מָמוֹנָא. וּצְרִיכָא,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara reverts back to the earlier discussion with regard to the derivation from the cases of a guarantor and a Canaanite slave. **It was also stated in the name of Rava: And similarly, with regard to monetary matters,** one can conduct a valid acquisition in the modes derived from the cases of a guarantor and a Canaanite slave. The Gemara comments: **And** it is **necessary** to state this *halakha* with regard to both betrothal and monetary acquisitions.


###### Kiddushin 7a:9
[Kiddushin 7a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/7a:9)

דְּאִי אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן קִידּוּשִׁין, מִשּׁוּם דְּהָא אִיתְּתָא נִיחָא לַהּ בְּכׇל דְּהוּ כִּדְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, דְּאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: ״טָב לְמֵיתַב טַן דּוּ מִלְּמֵיתַב אַרְמְלוּ.״ אֲבָל מָמוֹנָא – אֵימָא לָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara elaborates: **As, had he taught us** only the case of **betrothal,** one would have said that this *halakha* applies specifically in that case, **because a woman is amenable** to be betrothed **with any** form of benefit, **in accordance with** the statement **of Reish Lakish. As Reish Lakish said:** There is a popular saying among women: **It is better to sit** as **two bodies,** i.e., be married, **than to sit** alone like a **widow.** A woman prefers any type of husband to being left alone. Consequently, she would be willing to commit herself to betrothal by any form of benefit. **But with regard to monetary matters,** one might **say** that these types of unusual acquisitions are **not** effective.


###### Kiddushin 7a:10
[Kiddushin 7a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/7a:10)

וְאִי אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן מָמוֹנָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיתְיְהִיב לִמְחִילָּה, אֲבָל קִידּוּשִׁין, אֵימָא לָא, צְרִיכָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** conversely, **if he had taught us** only that this is the *halakha* with regard to **monetary matters,** one might have said that it applies solely to a case of this kind, **because** a monetary claim **can be waived.** One can relinquish his claim to money that is in someone else’s possession without receiving anything in return. **But** with regard to **betrothal,** which does not entirely depend on the will and agreement of the woman, as she must actually receive her betrothal money, one might **say** that the *halakhot* of a guarantor and a Canaanite slave are **not** comparable to this case. Therefore, **it is necessary** to state that this is the *halakha* in both cases.


###### Kiddushin 7a:11
[Kiddushin 7a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/7a:11)

אָמַר רָבָא: ״הִתְקַדְּשִׁי לִי לְחֶצְיִי״ – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. ״חֶצְיֵיךְ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי״ – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרָבָא: מַאי שְׁנָא ״חֶצְיֵיךְ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי״ דְּאֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת – ״אִשָּׁה״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא וְלֹא חֲצִי אִשָּׁה, הָכִי נָמֵי – ״אִישׁ״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא וְלֹא חֲצִי אִישׁ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rava says** that if a man says to a woman: **Be betrothed to half of me, she is betrothed.** But if he said to her: **Half of you is betrothed to me, she is not betrothed. Abaye said to Rava: What is different** between the two cases **that** if he says: **Half of you is betrothed to me, she is not betrothed?** Is it because **the Merciful One states:** “When a man takes a woman, and marries her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), indicating he must take **“a woman,” and not half a woman? So too, the Merciful One states: “A man,” and not half a man.**


###### Kiddushin 7a:12
[Kiddushin 7a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/7a:12)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! הָתָם, אִיתְּתָא לְבֵי תְרֵי לָא חַזְיָא, אֶלָּא גַּבְרָא מִי לָא חֲזֵי לְבֵי תְרֵי? וְהָכִי קָאָמַר לַהּ – דְּאִי בָּעֵינָא לְמִינְסַב אַחֲרִיתִי – נָסֵיבְנָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rava **said to** Abaye: **How can** these cases **be compared? There, a woman is not eligible for two** men. If one attempts to betroth half a woman it means he wants to leave her other half for someone else. This is impossible, as a woman cannot be married to two men. **But isn’t a man eligible to** marry **two** women? **And** when he declares: Be betrothed to half of me, **this is what he is saying to her: If I wish to marry another** woman, **I will marry** another woman.


###### Kiddushin 7a:13
[Kiddushin 7a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/7a:13)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ מָר זוּטְרָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב מָרִי לְרָבִינָא: וְנִיפְשְׁטוּ לַהּ קִידּוּשֵׁי בְּכוּלַּהּ! מִי לָא תַּנְיָא: הָאוֹמֵר: ״רַגְלָהּ שֶׁל זוֹ עוֹלָה״ – תְּהֵא כּוּלָּהּ עוֹלָה?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: But** in a case where he says to her: Half of you is betrothed to me, **let the betrothal spread through all of her,** and she will be completely betrothed. **Isn’t it taught** in a *baraita* (*Tosefta*, *Temura* 1:5) that if **one says** about an animal: **The leg of this** animal **is a burnt-offering, all of it is a burnt-offering,** as the sanctity of the leg spreads throughout the animal’s entire body?


###### Kiddushin 7a:14
[Kiddushin 7a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/7a:14)

וַאֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵין כּוּלָּהּ עוֹלָה, הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּמַקְדִּישׁ דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין הַנְּשָׁמָה תְּלוּיָה בּוֹ, אֲבָל מַקְדִּישׁ דָּבָר שֶׁהַנְּשָׁמָה תְּלוּיָה בּוֹ – הָוְיָא כּוּלָּהּ עוֹלָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Mar Zutra adds: **And even according to the one who says** that **it is not entirely a burnt-offering, that statement** applies only **where he consecrated** the leg of the animal, which is **not a matter upon which** the animal’s **life depends.** It is possible for an animal to survive the removal of a leg. **But** if **one consecrates a matter upon which** the animal’s **life depends,** everyone agrees that **all of it is a burnt-offering.** Here too, as the woman cannot survive without half of her body, why doesn’t the betrothal spread throughout all of her?


###### Kiddushin 7a:15
[Kiddushin 7a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/7a:15)

מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם – בְּהֵמָה, הָכָא – דַּעַת אַחֶרֶת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this opinion: **Is it comparable? There,** in the case of the **animal,** it involves a creature without intellectual capacity. **Here,** the issue depends on **another mind,** that of the woman herself. The woman must indicate that she wants the betrothal to be effective.


###### Kiddushin 7a:16
[Kiddushin 7a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/7a:16)

הָא לָא דָּמְיָא אֶלָּא לְהָא דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בְּהֵמָה שֶׁל שְׁנֵי שׁוּתָּפִין, הִקְדִּישׁ חֶצְיָהּ וְחָזַר וּלְקָחָהּ וְהִקְדִּישָׁהּ – קְדוֹשָׁה, וְאֵינָהּ קְרֵיבָה,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**This** case **is comparable only to that** *halakha* **which Rabbi Yoḥanan says:** With regard to **an animal** that **belongs to two partners,** if one of them **consecrated** the **half of it** that belonged to him, **and** he **goes back and acquires** the other half from his partner **and consecrates** the other half, it is **consecrated,** despite the fact that it was consecrated on two separate occasions. **But** although it is consecrated, **it may not be sacrificed,** because when he first sanctified it the animal was not fit to be sacrificed. The consecration does not spread throughout the entire animal without the consent of the other partner. This flaw cannot be remedied and the animal is permanently disqualified from being sacrificed as an offering.


###### Kiddushin 7a:17
[Kiddushin 7a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/7a:17)

וְעוֹשָׂה תְּמוּרָה, וּתְמוּרָתָהּ כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But,** as it is consecrated now, this is enough to **render** a non-sacred animal that is exchanged with it **a substitute.** If one exchanges this animal with another, non-consecrated, animal, the second animal becomes consecrated as well. **And** yet **its substitution is like it,** i.e., it too is consecrated but may not be sacrificed either.


###### Kiddushin 7a:18
[Kiddushin 7a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Kiddushin/r/7a:18)

שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ תְּלָת:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara comments: One can **learn from** the statement **three** *halakhot*.