## Makkot Daf 8b

###### Makkot 8b:1
[Makkot 8b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/8b:1)

״טָמֵא יִהְיֶה״ – מִכׇּל מָקוֹם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**“He shall be impure”** (Numbers 19:13), indicating that the same *halakhot* apply **in any case,** unrelated to the manner in which he became impure.


###### Makkot 8b:2
[Makkot 8b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/8b:2)

הָהוּא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״טָמֵא יִהְיֶה״ – לְרַבּוֹת טְבוּל יוֹם, ״טוּמְאָתוֹ בוֹ״ – לְרַבּוֹת מְחוּסַּר כִּיפּוּרִים! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנָא מֵ״עוֹד טוּמְאָתוֹ״ קָא אָמֵינָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges: **He requires that** verse for a different derivation, **as that which is taught** in a *baraita*: The phrase **“He shall be impure”** serves **to include one who immersed that day** and whose purification process will be completed at nightfall. If he enters the Temple before nightfall, he is also liable to receive *karet*. The phrase later in that verse: **“His impurity is upon him,”** serves **to include one who has not yet** brought **an atonement** offering to complete the purification process, e.g., a leper or a *zav*. Rava **said to** Ravina: **I said** that the *halakha* that one rendered impure by a *met mitzva* is liable to receive *karet* is derived **from** the extraneous term “yet,” in the phrase later in that same verse: **“His impurity is yet** upon him,” which indicates that one is liable for entering the Temple in a state of impurity regardless of the manner in which he became impure. That is one version of the discussion.


###### Makkot 8b:3
[Makkot 8b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/8b:3)

אִיכָּא דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַהָא: ״בֶּחָרִישׁ וּבַקָּצִיר תִּשְׁבֹּת״, רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר חָרִישׁ שֶׁל שְׁבִיעִית וְקָצִיר שֶׁל שְׁבִיעִית, שֶׁהֲרֵי כְּבָר נֶאֱמַר ״שָׂדְךָ לֹא תִזְרָע וְכַרְמְךָ לֹא תִזְמֹר״, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ חָרִישׁ שֶׁל עֶרֶב שְׁבִיעִית שֶׁנִּכְנַס לִשְׁבִיעִית, וְקָצִיר שֶׁל שְׁבִיעִית שֶׁיָּצָא לְמוֹצָאֵי שְׁבִיעִית.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Some teach** this exchange **with regard to this** *baraita*: **“In plowing and in harvest you shall rest”** (Exodus 34:21). **Rabbi Akiva says:** This verse is referring to the Sabbatical Year. The Torah **does not need to state** the prohibition against **plowing** during the **Sabbatical** Year **or harvesting** during the **Sabbatical** Year, **as it is already stated: “You shall neither sow your field, nor prune your vineyard”** (Leviticus 25:4). What, then, is derived from this verse? **Rather,** it is derived that **even plowing** on the **eve of** the **Sabbatical** Year, **which** facilitates growth of crops when the **Sabbatical** Year **enters, and** the **harvest of** crops that grew during the **Sabbatical** Year, **which emerged** and were reaped after the **conclusion of the Sabbatical** Year, are prohibited.


###### Makkot 8b:4
[Makkot 8b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/8b:4)

רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר: מָה חָרִישׁ רְשׁוּת – אַף קָצִיר רְשׁוּת. יָצָא קְצִיר הָעוֹמֶר שֶׁהוּא מִצְוָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yishmael says:** This verse in Exodus is not referring to the Sabbatical Year; rather, the reference is to plowing and harvesting on Shabbat. **Just as plowing** is **optional,** as there is no case where there is a mitzva to plow per se, **so too,** the **harvesting** mentioned in the verse is **optional.** This serves to exclude from the prohibition **the harvesting of** barley for **the *omer*** offering, **which is a mitzva,** and is therefore permitted on Shabbat.


###### Makkot 8b:5
[Makkot 8b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/8b:5)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ הָהוּא מֵרַבָּנַן לְרָבָא: מִמַּאי דַּחֲרִישָׁה דִּרְשׁוּת? דִּלְמָא חֲרִישַׁת עוֹמֶר דְּמִצְוָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ הָכִי אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא ״תִּשְׁבֹּת״! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כֵּיוָן דְּאִם מָצָא חָרוּשׁ אֵינוֹ חוֹרֵשׁ, לָאו מִצְוָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**One of the Sages said to Rava: From where** does Rabbi Yishmael ascertain **that** the **plowing** mentioned in the verse is referring to plowing **that** is **optional? Perhaps** the reference is to **plowing** a field to grow barley for use in the ***omer*** offering, **which** is **a mitzva, and even so the Merciful One states: “You shall rest.”** Rava **said to him: Since if** one **found** the field already **plowed,** he need **not plow** the field but he may directly proceed to sow the barley in the plowed field, clearly, even if one plows a field to facilitate fulfillment of a mitzva, plowing is **not a mitzva** per se.


###### Makkot 8b:6
[Makkot 8b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/8b:6)

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרָבָא: יָצָא הָאָב הַמַּכֶּה אֶת בְּנוֹ, וְהָרַב הָרוֹדֶה אֶת תַּלְמִידוֹ, וּשְׁלִיחַ בֵּית דִּין. וְאַמַּאי? לֵימָא כֵּיוָן דְּאִילּוּ גְּמִיר לָאו מִצְוָה, הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי – לָאו מִצְוָה! הָתָם אַף עַל גַּב דִּגְמִיר נָמֵי מִצְוָה קָא עָבֵיד, דִּכְתִיב: ״יַסֵּר בִּנְךָ וִינִיחֶךָ״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Ravina raised an objection to** the opinion of **Rava** from the clause of the mishna that states that the example of the forest serves **to exclude a father who strikes his son, and a teacher who oppresses his student, and an agent of the court. And** according to your opinion, **why** are a father who strikes his son and a teacher who oppresses his student excluded from exile? **Let us say** with regard to a father who strikes his son: **Since if** the son was **learned,** it is **not a mitzva** to strike him, **now,** in a case where the son is not learned and he strikes him to facilitate his education **too,** it is **not a mitzva,** and therefore he should be exiled. Rava replied: **There, even if** the son **is learned,** the father **is performing a mitzva** by striking him from time to time, **as it is written: “Chastise your son, and he will give you rest; and he will give delight to your soul”** (Proverbs 29:17).


###### Makkot 8b:7
[Makkot 8b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/8b:7)

הֲדַר אָמַר רָבָא: לָאו מִילְּתָא הִיא דַּאֲמַרִי. קְצִירָה דּוּמְיָא דַּחֲרִישָׁה, מָה חֲרִישָׁה, מָצָא חָרוּשׁ – אֵינוֹ חוֹרֵשׁ, אַף קְצִירָה נָמֵי, מָצָא קָצוּר אֵינוֹ קוֹצֵר, וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ מִצְוָה, מָצָא קָצוּר אֵינוֹ קוֹצֵר?! מִצְוָה לִקְצוֹר וּלְהָבִיא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava then said: That which I said is nothing,** as there is a different proof that the verse is not referring to plowing that is a mitzva. Based on the juxtaposition of the two, it is derived that **harvesting** is **similar** to **plowing: Just as** in the case of **plowing,** if **one found** the field already **plowed, he** need **not plow,** as there is no case where there is a mitzva to plow per se, **so too** with regard to **harvesting as well,** as if **one found** the barley already **harvested, he** need **not harvest. And if it enters your mind** that the reference in the verse is to plowing and harvesting for the purpose of **a mitzva,** is it so that if **one found** the barley already **harvested, he** need **not harvest?** There is **a mitzva to harvest and bring** the barley for the *omer* offering. The prohibition in the verse applies only to harvesting that is optional.


###### Makkot 8b:8
[Makkot 8b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/8b:8)

**מַתְנִי׳** הָאָב גּוֹלֶה עַל יְדֵי הַבֵּן, וְהַבֵּן גּוֹלֶה עַל יְדֵי הָאָב. הַכֹּל גּוֹלִין עַל יְדֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, וְיִשְׂרָאֵל גּוֹלִין עַל יְדֵיהֶן, חוּץ מִגֵּר תּוֹשָׁב. וְגֵר תּוֹשָׁב אֵינוֹ גּוֹלֶה אֶלָּא עַל יְדֵי גֵּר תּוֹשָׁב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** **The father is exiled** to a city of refuge **due to** his unintentional murder of his **son. And the son is exiled due to** his unintentional murder of his **father. Everyone is exiled due to** their unintentional murder of **a Jew, and a Jew is exiled due to** his unintentional murder of any of **them, except for** the unintentional murder of **a gentile who resides in Eretz Yisrael and observes the seven Noahide mitzvot [*ger toshav*]. And a *ger toshav* is exiled only due to** his unintentional murder of **a *ger toshav*.**


###### Makkot 8b:9
[Makkot 8b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/8b:9)

**גְּמָ׳** הָאָב גּוֹלֶה עַל יְדֵי הַבֵּן. וְהָאָמְרַתְּ: יָצָא הָאָב הַמַּכֶּה אֶת בְּנוֹ! דִּגְמִיר. הָאָמְרַתְּ אַף עַל גַּב דִּגְמִיר מִצְוָה קָעָבֵיד! בִּשְׁוַלְיָא דְּנַגָּרֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** The mishna teaches: **The father is exiled** to a city of refuge **due to** his unintentional murder of his **son.** The Gemara asks: **But didn’t you say** in the previous mishna: **To exclude a father who strikes his son,** who is not exiled? The Gemara answers: This mishna is referring to a son **who is learned,** and there is no mitzva to strike him; therefore, since the striking is optional, the father is exiled. The Gemara asks: **But didn’t you say: Even if** the son **is learned,** the father **performs a mitzva** by striking his son? The Gemara answers: This ruling of the mishna is stated **with regard to a carpenter’s apprentice [*bishevaleya*].** Since the father is teaching his son carpentry, not Torah, there is no mitzva to strike him to spur him to study.


###### Makkot 8b:10
[Makkot 8b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/8b:10)

שְׁוַלְיָא דְּנַגָּרֵי – חַיּוּתֵאּ הִיא דְּלַמְּדֵיהּ! דִּגְמִיר אוּמָּנוּתָא אַחֲרִיתִי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges: In the case of **a carpenter’s apprentice,** his father **is teaching him a livelihood,** which is also a mitzva. The Gemara answers: The reference is to a son **who has** already **learned another craft,** and since he is able to earn his livelihood there is no mitzva to teach him a second craft.


###### Makkot 8b:11
[Makkot 8b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/8b:11)

וְהַבֵּן גּוֹלֶה עַל יְדֵי הָאָב כּוּ׳. וּרְמִינְהִי, ״מַכֵּה נֶפֶשׁ״ – פְּרָט לַמַּכָּה אָבִיו. אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: לָא קַשְׁיָא, הָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן וְהָא רַבָּנַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches: **And the son is exiled due to** his unintentional murder of his **father. And** the Gemara **raises a contradiction** from a *baraita*. It is written: “And a murderer shall flee there, one who strikes a person unintentionally” (Numbers 35:11), from which it is derived that **one who strikes a person** is exiled. This serves **to exclude one who strikes his father,** whose punishment for doing so intentionally is more severe than that of the standard intentional murderer, and therefore the son is not subject to exile. **Rav Kahana said:** This is **not difficult; this** *baraita* is in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Shimon, and that** mishna is in accordance with the opinion of **the Rabbis.** Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagree (*Sanhedrin* 50a) whether a son who kills his father intentionally is executed by strangulation or by the sword.


###### Makkot 8b:12
[Makkot 8b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/8b:12)

לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דְּאָמַר חֶנֶק חָמוּר מִסַּיִיף, שִׁגְגַת סַיִיף נִיתְּנָה לְכַפָּרָה, שִׁגְגַת חֶנֶק לֹא נִיתְּנָה לְכַפָּרָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**According to Rabbi Shimon, who says: Strangulation** is more **severe than** execution by the **sword,** which is why a son who kills his father is liable to be executed by strangulation, one who commits the **unwitting** violation of a prohibition generally punishable by execution by the **sword,** i.e., intentional murder of one who is not a parent, **is eligible for atonement** by means of exile; one who commits the **unwitting** violation of a prohibition generally punishable by the more severe death of **strangulation,** i.e., intentional murder of a parent, **is not eligible for atonement** by means of exile.


###### Makkot 8b:13
[Makkot 8b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/8b:13)

לְרַבָּנַן, דְּאָמְרִי סַיִיף חָמוּר מֵחֶנֶק, הוֹרֵג אָבִיו [בְּשׁוֹגֵג] שִׁגְגַת סַיִיף הוּא, וְשִׁגְגַת סַיִיף נִיתְּנָה לְכַפָּרָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
By contrast, **according to the Rabbis, who say:** Execution by the **sword** is more **severe than strangulation,** which is why a son who kills his father is liable to be executed by the sword, a son who **unintentionally kills his father** has performed **an unwitting** violation of a prohibition generally punishable by execution by the **sword. And** one who commits **an unwitting** violation of a prohibition generally punishable by execution by the **sword,** i.e., intentional murder of one who is not a parent, **is eligible for atonement** by means of exile.


###### Makkot 8b:14
[Makkot 8b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/8b:14)

רָבָא אָמַר: פְּרָט לְעוֹשֶׂה חַבּוּרָה בְּאָבִיו בְּשׁוֹגֵג. סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: כֵּיוָן דִּבְמֵזִיד בַּר קְטָלָא הוּא, בְּשׁוֹגֵג נָמֵי לִיגְלֵי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava says:** That which was derived in the *baraita* that one who strikes a person is exiled, to exclude one who strikes his father, who is not exiled, is not referring to a son who unintentionally kills his father, as in that case the son is certainly exiled. Rather, it is **to exclude one** who **inflicts a wound on his father unwittingly.** The novel element of this derivation is that **it enters your mind to say: Since** in a case **where** he wounded his father **intentionally, he is liable to be executed** like a murderer (see Exodus 21:15), if he did so **unwittingly, let him also be exiled** like an unintentional murderer. Therefore, this derivation **teaches us** that exile is administered specifically to an unintentional murderer, but it is not administered to the unwitting performer of any other transgression.


###### Makkot 8b:15
[Makkot 8b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/8b:15)

הַכֹּל גּוֹלִין עַל יְדֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכוּ׳. ״הַכֹּל גּוֹלִין עַל יְדֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל״ לְאֵיתוֹיֵי מַאי? לְאֵיתוֹיֵי עֶבֶד וְכוּתִי. תְּנֵינָא לְהָא דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: עֶבֶד וְכוּתִי גּוֹלֶה וְלוֹקֶה עַל יְדֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְיִשְׂרָאֵל גּוֹלֶה וְלוֹקֶה עַל יְדֵי כּוּתִי וְעֶבֶד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches: **Everyone is exiled due to** their unintentional murder of **a Jew,** and a Jew is exiled due to his unintentional murder of any of them. The Gemara asks: **Everyone is exiled due to** their unintentional murder of **a Jew: What** case that was not already specified does this phrase serve **to add?** The Gemara answers: It serves **to add** a Canaanite **slave and a Samaritan.** The Gemara notes: **We learn** by inference from this mishna **that which the Sages taught** explicitly in a *baraita*: A Canaanite **slave and a Samaritan are exiled and flogged due to a Jew, and a Jew is exiled and flogged due to a Samaritan and** a Canaanite **slave.**


###### Makkot 8b:16
[Makkot 8b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/8b:16)

בִּשְׁלָמָא עֶבֶד וְכוּתִי גּוֹלֶה עַל יְדֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְלוֹקֶה, גּוֹלֶה – דְּקַטְלֵיהּ, וְלוֹקֶה – דְּלַטְיֵיהּ. אֶלָּא יִשְׂרָאֵל גּוֹלֶה וְלוֹקֶה עַל יְדֵי כּוּתִי? בִּשְׁלָמָא גּוֹלֶה – דְּקַטְלֵיהּ, אֶלָּא לוֹקֶה, אַמַּאי? דְּלַטְיֵיהּ? ״וְנָשִׂיא בְעַמְּךָ לֹא תָאֹר״ – בְּעוֹשֶׂה מַעֲשֵׂה עַמְּךָ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara analyzes the *baraita*: **Granted, a slave and a Samaritan are exiled and flogged due to a Jew;** either of them is **exiled** in a case **where he killed** a Jew unintentionally, **and flogged** in a case **where he cursed** the Jew, thereby violating a Torah prohibition. **But** with regard to the *halakha* that **a Jew is exiled and flogged due to a Samaritan, granted,** the Jew is **exiled** in a case **where** he **killed** the Samaritan unintentionally, **but** the Jew **is flogged for** violating **what** prohibition? **For cursing** the Samaritan? Isn’t that prohibition derived from the verse: **“And a leader in your people you may not curse”** (Exodus 22:27), from which it is inferred that the prohibition is in effect only **with regard to** one who **performs an action** characteristic **of your people,** who comports himself as an observant, God-fearing Jew? Even if the conversion of the Samaritans was valid, they regularly violate numerous prohibitions, and they do not comport themselves as observant Jews.


###### Makkot 8b:17
[Makkot 8b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/8b:17)

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אַחָא בַּר יַעֲקֹב: כְּגוֹן שֶׁהֵעִיד בּוֹ וְהוּזַם. דִּכְווֹתֵיהּ גַּבֵּי עֶבֶד, שֶׁהֵעִיד בּוֹ וְהוּזַם, עֶבֶד בַּר עֵדוּת הוּא? אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִיקָא: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, כְּגוֹן שֶׁהִכָּהוּ הַכָּאָה

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said:** This *baraita* is not referring to lashes administered for cursing; rather, one is flogged in a case **where** a Jew **testified against** a Samaritan and a Samaritan testified against a Jew **and he was rendered a conspiring witness.** The Gemara asks: Does that mean that **in the corresponding** situation **with regard to** a Canaanite **slave,** a slave is flogged in a case **where** he **testified against** a Jew **and was rendered a conspiring witness? Is a slave eligible to** give **testimony? Rather, Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: What are we dealing with here?** The Jew is flogged due to a slave and a Samaritan, and the slave and the Samaritan are flogged due to the Jew in a case **where one struck** the other with **a blow**