## Makkot Daf 9a

###### Makkot 9a:1
[Makkot 9a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/9a:1)

שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הִכָּהוּ הַכָּאָה שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה – לוֹקֶה. וְלָא מַקְּשִׁינַן הַכָּאָה לִקְלָלָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**that does not have** the capacity to cause damage **worth one *peruta*, as Rabbi Ami says** that **Rabbi Yoḥanan says:** Although one who strikes another pays damages and is not flogged, if **he struck him** with **a blow that does not have** the capacity to cause damage **worth one *peruta*,** since there is no payment, **he is flogged** for violating a Torah prohibition. The Gemara comments: **And** according to this opinion, contrary to those who hold that based on their virtual juxtaposition (see Exodus 21:15, 17) or on an analogy between them, the *halakhot* of striking and cursing are identical, **we do not liken striking to cursing.** Therefore, although one is flogged for cursing another only if the other comports himself as an observant, God-fearing Jew, one is liable for striking another even if the other was a sinner, e.g., a Samaritan.


###### Makkot 9a:2
[Makkot 9a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/9a:2)

חוּץ מֵעַל יְדֵי גֵּר תּוֹשָׁב וְכוּ׳. אַלְמָא גֵּר תּוֹשָׁב גּוֹי הוּא. אֵימָא סֵיפָא: גֵּר תּוֹשָׁב גּוֹלֶה עַל יְדֵי גֵּר תּוֹשָׁב! אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: לָא קַשְׁיָא, כָּאן בְּגֵר תּוֹשָׁב שֶׁהָרַג גֵּר תּוֹשָׁב, כָּאן בְּגֵר תּוֹשָׁב שֶׁהָרַג יִשְׂרָאֵל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches: Everyone is exiled due to their unintentional murder of a Jew, and a Jew is exiled due to all of them, **except for** when it is **due to a *ger toshav*.** And a *ger toshav* is exiled due to his unintentional murder of a *ger toshav*. The Gemara comments: **Apparently,** one may conclude that **a *ger toshav* is a gentile,** and therefore he is not exiled when he unintentionally kills a Jew. **Say the latter clause** of the mishna: **A *ger toshav* is exiled due to** his unintentional murder of **a *ger toshav*,** indicating that his halakhic status is not that of a gentile, as gentiles are not liable to be exiled. There is an apparent contradiction between the two clauses in the mishna. **Rav Kahana said:** This is **not difficult. Here,** in the latter clause of the mishna, it is **in** the case of **a *ger toshav* who killed a *ger toshav*** that he is exiled; **there,** in the first clause, it is **in** the case of **a *ger toshav* who killed a Jew.** In the case described in the first clause he is not exiled, as his halakhic status is not that of a Jew, for whom the sin of unintentional murder of a Jew can be atoned through exile.


###### Makkot 9a:3
[Makkot 9a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/9a:3)

אִיכָּא דְּרָמֵי קְרָאֵי אַהֲדָדֵי, כְּתִיב: ״לִבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְלַגֵּר וְלַתּוֹשָׁב בְּתוֹכָם תִּהְיֶינָה שֵׁשׁ הֶעָרִים״, וּכְתִיב: ״וְהָיוּ לָכֶם הֶעָרִים לְמִקְלָט״, ״לָכֶם״ – וְלֹא לְגֵרִים! אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: לָא קַשְׁיָא, כָּאן – בְּגֵר תּוֹשָׁב שֶׁהָרַג יִשְׂרָאֵל, כָּאן – בְּגֵר תּוֹשָׁב שֶׁהָרַג גֵּר תּוֹשָׁב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**There are** those **who raised a contradiction between** two **verses. It is written: “For the children of Israel and for the stranger and for the resident [*velatoshav*] among them, shall** these **six cities be** for refuge” (Numbers 35:15), indicating that a *ger toshav* is exiled. **And it is written** in a previous verse: **“And the cities shall be for you for refuge”** (Numbers 35:12), from which it is inferred: A refuge **for you but not for a *ger*** *toshav*, indicating that a *ger toshav* is not exiled. **Rav Kahana said:** This is **not difficult. Here,** the verse that indicates that they are not exiled is **concerning a *ger toshav* who killed a Jew; there,** the verse that indicates that they are exiled is **concerning a *ger toshav* who killed a *ger toshav*.**


###### Makkot 9a:4
[Makkot 9a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/9a:4)

וּרְמִינְהִי: לְפִיכָךְ גֵּר וְגוֹי שֶׁהָרְגוּ – נֶהֱרָגִין. קָתָנֵי גֵּר דּוּמְיָא דְּגוֹי: מָה גּוֹי לָא שְׁנָא דִּקְטַל בַּר מִינֵּיהּ, וְלָא שְׁנָא דִּקְטַל דְּלָאו בַּר מִינֵיהּ – נֶהֱרָג, אַף גֵּר, לָא שְׁנָא דִּקְטַל בַּר מִינֵּיהּ וְלָא שְׁנָא קְטַל דְּלָאו בַּר מִינֵיהּ – נֶהֱרָג!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** the Gemara **raises a contradiction** to the *halakha* of the mishna from a *baraita*, which teaches: **Therefore, a *ger*** *toshav* **and a gentile who killed** a person **are killed,** even if they did so unintentionally. The Gemara infers based on the juxtaposition of a *ger toshav* and a gentile in the *baraita*: The *tanna* **teaches** the case of **a *ger*** *toshav* in a manner **similar** to the case of **a gentile: Just as** with regard to **a gentile** it is **no different** in a case **where he killed one of his kind,** a gentile, **and** it is **no different** in a case **where he killed one not of his kind,** a Jew, as in either case **he is executed** and is not exiled, **so too,** with regard to **a *ger*** *toshav*, it is **no different** in a case **where he killed one of his kind,** a *ger toshav*, **and** it is **no different** in a case **where he killed one not of his kind,** a Jew, as in either case **he is executed** and is not exiled.


###### Makkot 9a:5
[Makkot 9a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/9a:5)

אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: לָא קַשְׁיָא, כָּאן שֶׁהֲרָגוֹ דֶּרֶךְ יְרִידָה, כָּאן שֶׁהֲרָגוֹ דֶּרֶךְ עֲלִיָּיה. דֶּרֶךְ יְרִידָה, דְּיִשְׂרָאֵל גָּלֵי – אִיהוּ נָמֵי סַגִּי לֵיהּ בְּגָלוּת. דֶּרֶךְ עֲלִיָּיה, דְּיִשְׂרָאֵל פָּטוּר – הוּא נֶהֱרָג.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ḥisda said:** The contradiction between the mishna and the *baraita* is **not difficult. Here,** the mishna is referring to a case **where he killed him in a downward** motion; **there,** the *baraita* is referring to a case **where he killed him in an upward** motion. Rav Ḥisda elaborates: If one *ger toshav* killed another *ger toshav* **in a downward** motion, which is a case **where** if the perpetrator were **a Jew,** he would **be exiled,** the *ger toshav* **also suffices with exile.** But if the *ger toshav* killed his counterpart **in an upward** motion, which is a case **where** if the perpetrator were **a Jew,** he would **be exempt** from exile, the *ger toshav* **is executed.**


###### Makkot 9a:6
[Makkot 9a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/9a:6)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: וְלָאו קַל וָחוֹמֶר הוּא? וּמָה דֶּרֶךְ יְרִידָה דְּיִשְׂרָאֵל גָּלֵי, אִיהוּ נָמֵי סַגִּי לֵיהּ בְּגָלוּת, דֶּרֶךְ עֲלִיָּיה, דְּיִשְׂרָאֵל פָּטוּר, אִיהוּ נֶהֱרָג?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said to him: And is it not** derived by means of **an *a fortiori*** inference to the contrary? **If** one unintentionally kills another in **a downward** motion, which is a case **where** if the perpetrator were **a Jew,** he would **be exiled,** the *ger toshav* **also suffices with exile** and nothing more, but if he killed in **an upward** motion, which is a case **where** if the perpetrator were **a Jew,** he would **be exempt** from exile, is **he killed?**


###### Makkot 9a:7
[Makkot 9a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/9a:7)

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: בְּאוֹמֵר מוּתָּר. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: אוֹמֵר מוּתָּר אָנוּס הוּא! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹמֵר, אוֹמֵר מוּתָּר – קָרוֹב לְמֵזִיד הוּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, Rava said:** The case in the *baraita* where a *ger toshav* is killed rather than exiled is **where** the *ger toshav* who killed another *ger toshav* **says** that **it is permitted** to kill the victim. If he killed him unintentionally he is exiled, in accordance with the ruling in the mishna. **Abaye said to him:** One who **says** that **it is permitted** to kill the victim **is a victim of circumstances beyond his control,** as he was unaware of the prohibition. Why, then, should he be executed? Rava **said to him:** That is not a problem, **as I say** that with regard to **one who says** that **it is permitted,** since he intended to kill the other, his action **borders on the intentional.**


###### Makkot 9a:8
[Makkot 9a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/9a:8)

וְאָזְדוּ לְטַעְמַיְיהוּ, דְּאִיתְּמַר: כְּסָבוּר בְּהֵמָה וְנִמְצָא אָדָם, גּוֹי וְנִמְצָא גֵּר תּוֹשָׁב. רָבָא אוֹמֵר: חַיָּיב, אוֹמֵר מוּתָּר קָרוֹב לְמֵזִיד הוּא. רַב חִסְדָּא אוֹמֵר: פָּטוּר, אוֹמֵר מוּתָּר אָנוּס הוּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara observes: **And** Rava and Rav Ḥisda **follow their** standard line of **reasoning, as** is indicated by the fact that **it was stated** that they disagree in the case of a *ger toshav* who killed a person. If **he thought** he was killing **an animal and it was discovered** that it was **a person,** or if he thought he was killing **a gentile and it was discovered** that he was **a *ger toshav*, Rava says** he is **liable** to be executed, as with regard to **one who says** that **it is permitted,** his action **borders on the intentional. Rav Ḥisda says** he is **exempt, as** one who **says** that **it is permitted** to kill the victim **is a victim of circumstances beyond his control.**


###### Makkot 9a:9
[Makkot 9a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/9a:9)

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב חִסְדָּא: ״הִנְּךָ מֵת עַל הָאִשָּׁה אֲשֶׁר לָקַחְתָּ״. מַאי לָאו בִּידֵי אָדָם?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava raised an objection to** the opinion of **Rav Ḥisda** from that which is written with regard to Abimelech, king of Gerar, who took Sarah, Abraham’s wife: “And God came to Abimelech in a dream of the night and said to him: **You shall die for the woman you took,** as she is a man’s wife” (Genesis 20:3). When Abimelech took Sarah he was under the impression that she was unmarried, as Abraham said that she was his sister. Despite the fact that Abimelech was one who says that it is permitted, he was liable to be executed for his action. **What, is it not** that he was liable to be executed **at the hand of** a court composed of **people,** indicating that one who says that it is permitted is liable?


###### Makkot 9a:10
[Makkot 9a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/9a:10)

לָא, בִּידֵי שָׁמַיִם. דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דִּכְתִיב: ״מֵחֲטוֹא לִי״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects that conclusion: **No,** it means that he was liable to be executed **at the hand of Heaven,** but not by a court. The Gemara adds: The language of the verses **is also precise** in this regard, **as it is written:** “And I also prevented you **from sinning against Me”** (Genesis 20:6), indicating that it was a sin vis-à-vis God and was not in the jurisdiction of a court of men.


###### Makkot 9a:11
[Makkot 9a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/9a:11)

וּלְטַעְמָיךְ, ״וְחָטָאתִי לֵאלֹהִים״ – לֵאלֹהִים וְלֹא לְאָדָם? אֶלָּא, דִּינוֹ מָסוּר לְאָדָם, הָכָא נָמֵי דִּינוֹ מָסוּר לָאָדָם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And according to your reasoning** that based on the formulation of the verse one concludes that it was a sin exclusively vis-à-vis God, where Joseph says to Potiphar’s wife: “And how can I perform this great evil, **and sin to God”** (Genesis 39:9), may one also infer that it was a sin **vis-à-vis God and not vis-à-vis man?** Joseph is referring to adultery, which is punishable by execution according to the Noahide laws as well. **Rather,** in that case it means that although he performed a sin vis-à-vis God, **his judgment is given over to** the ruling of **man; here too,** in the verse about Abimelech, it can be explained that although he performed a sin vis-à-vis God, **his judgment is given over to** the ruling of **man.** There is no proof from this verse with regard to the status of one who says that it is permitted to perform a transgression.


###### Makkot 9a:12
[Makkot 9a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Makkot/r/9a:12)

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרָבָא: ״הֲגוֹי גַּם צַדִּיק תַּהֲרֹג״! הָתָם כִּדְקָא מְהַדְּרִי עִלָּוֵיהּ: ״וְעַתָּה הָשֵׁב אֵשֶׁת הָאִישׁ כִּי נָבִיא הוּא״ –

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Abaye raised an objection to** the opinion of **Rava** from the reply of Abimelech: **“Will You even slay a righteous nation?”** (Genesis 20:4). God appears to accept Abimelech’s contention, as He did not respond by calling him wicked, indicating that one who says that it is permitted to perform a transgression is a victim of circumstances beyond his control. The Gemara rejects that understanding. **There,** the reason for the rejection of Abimelech’s contention **is as they responded to him** from Heaven: **“And now, restore the man’s wife, as he is a prophet”** (Genesis 20:7).