## Meilah Daf 4a

###### Meilah 4a:1
[Meilah 4a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Meilah/r/4a:1)

וְהָא קָתָנֵי: אִם אֲחֵרִים מֵבִיא לִידֵי פִּיגּוּל, הוּא עַצְמוֹ לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
With regard to Rava’s answer to Rav Ashi, the Gemara objects: **But didn’t** Ulla **teach** in justification of his opinion: **If** the taking of this handful **brings others,** i.e., the remainder of the meal offering, **into** a status of ***piggul*,** by means of the intent to consume it after its appointed time, with regard to the handful **itself,** is it **not all the more so** that it should be rendered *piggul* by this intent? If so, the same should likewise apply in the case of an offering of lesser sanctity that was slaughtered with the intent to consume it after its appointed time, i.e., it should be rendered *piggul* by this intent alone, regardless of intent during sprinkling.


###### Meilah 4a:2
[Meilah 4a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Meilah/r/4a:2)

הָא נָמֵי, אִיסּוּרָא דְּמַיְיתֵי לִידֵי פִּיגּוּל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: This is not difficult, as in **this** instance, **as well,** Ulla did not mean that it is full-fledged *piggul* by intent with regard to the taking of the handful alone. Rather, he meant that **a prohibited act** was performed upon it **which brings** it to a status of ***piggul*,** but the full status of *piggul* is attained only if there is also an improper intent at the time of the sacrificing of the handful.


###### Meilah 4a:3
[Meilah 4a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Meilah/r/4a:3)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: וְהָאָמַר אִילְפָא: מַחֲלוֹקֶת בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
There is a dispute in a mishna (*Zevaḥim* 29b) with regard to two consecutive improper intentions. Rabbi Yehuda maintains that if there first was intent to partake of an offering or to burn the portions consumed on the altar beyond its designated time, which renders it *piggul* and therefore one who consumes it would be liable to receive *karet*, and then there was intent to perform that act outside its designated area, which merely disqualifies the offering, it is *piggul*. But if the order is reversed, it is merely disqualified. The Rabbis rule that in either case it is only disqualified. With that mishna in mind, **Ravina said to Rav Ashi: But doesn’t Ilfa say:** This **disagreement** applies **in** a case where the different intentions occurred during the performance of **two** different sacrificial **rites?**


###### Meilah 4a:4
[Meilah 4a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Meilah/r/4a:4)

כְּגוֹן דְּאָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט סִימָן רִאשׁוֹן חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, וְסִימָן שֵׁנִי חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ״, אֲבָל בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא עֵירוּבֵי מַחְשָׁבוֹת הֲוַאי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Ilfa elaborated: **For example, if one said: I am hereby slaughtering** the **first one of the organs that must be severed in ritual slaughter,** i.e., either the trachea or the esophagus, with the intention of consuming the offering **beyond its** designated **time; and** he then slaughtered its **second** organ with the intention of consuming it **outside its** designated **area,** then these *halakhot* apply. **But** if both intentions occurred **in** the course of **one rite,** e.g., during the slaughtering of the same organ, then **everyone,** including Rabbi Yehuda, agrees that this **constitutes a mixture of intentions,** and the offering is not rendered *piggul*. This example indicates that slaughtering alone with intent beyond its designated time renders the offering *piggul*, contrary to the opinion of Rav Giddel.


###### Meilah 4a:5
[Meilah 4a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Meilah/r/4a:5)

הָכִי נָמֵי, לְכִי זָרֵיק תִּיגַּלֵּי מִילְּתָא. אִי בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת, אִי בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Ashi answered Ravina: **Indeed,** Rav Giddel agrees with this ruling. Although he maintains that slaughtering alone does not render an offering *piggul*, nevertheless, he agrees that **when** the blood is **sprinkled** afterward with *piggul* intent, it **will be revealed** whether there was *piggul* intent in the course of one rite or two rites. Consequently, **if** both intentions occurred **during one** sacrificial **rite,** everyone agrees that the offering is not *piggul*, despite the fact that the sprinkling was performed with *piggul* intent. But **if** the two intentions took place **during two** different sacrificial **rites,** then the question of whether it is *piggul* or merely disqualified is subject to the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis. Yet, the offering cannot be established as *piggul* until after the sprinkling.


###### Meilah 4a:6
[Meilah 4a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Meilah/r/4a:6)

אִי הָכִי, גַּבֵּי תוֹדָה נָמֵי, עַד דְּזָרֵיק!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises a difficulty: But **if so, with regard to a thanks offering,** where it is stated that if the priest slaughtered it with the intent to partake of it or to burn the portions consumed on the altar beyond its designated time, then the loaves are sanctified (see 3b), the intention only at the time of the slaughtering should **also** not render the offering *piggul* **until** the blood is **sprinkled.** Since the mishna is apparently referring to a regular case of *piggul*, it must be speaking of a situation where the sprinkling was also performed with the *piggul* intent, which is how Ilfa explained the mishna on *Zevaḥim* 29b. If so, according to Rav Giddel, who maintains that slaughtering with the intent of *piggul* does not bring offerings of lesser sanctity into the status of being subject to the *halakhot* of misuse, how could the loaves be considered sanctified?


###### Meilah 4a:7
[Meilah 4a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Meilah/r/4a:7)

מַאי ״קָדַשׁ״ – לִיפָּסֵל, דְּבָעֵי שְׂרֵיפָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: **What** does the mishna mean when it says that the loaves are considered **sanctified?** It does not mean that they are sanctified in the sense that they are subject to the *halakhot* of misuse. Rather, it means that they are sanctified to the extent that they have the possibility **to be disqualified,** to the extent **that** they **require burning** afterward.


###### Meilah 4a:8
[Meilah 4a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Meilah/r/4a:8)

לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ: הַפִּיגּוּל לְעוֹלָם מוֹעֲלִין בּוֹ. לָאו אַף עַל גַּב דְּאִיזְּרִיק דָּם, וּמְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Let us say** that the following *baraita* **supports** the opinion of Rav Giddel: With regard to an offering that is ***piggul*,** one who derives benefit **from it** is **always** liable for **misuse** of consecrated property. Does this **not** mean that the meat of an offering of the most sacred order is subject to the *halakhot* of misuse **even though** its **blood was sprinkled** with the intent to partake of it or to burn the portions consumed on the altar beyond its designated time? **And** if so, this **supports** Rav Giddel’s opinion.


###### Meilah 4a:9
[Meilah 4a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Meilah/r/4a:9)

לָא, דְּלֹא זָרַק הַדָּם. אִי דְּלֹא זָרַק הַדָּם, מַאי לְמֵימְרָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: **No,** one cannot cite a proof from this *baraita*, as it is possible that the *baraita* is referring to a case **where** the priest did **not** yet **sprinkle the blood,** and that is why the offering is subject to the *halakhot* of misuse. But once the blood is sprinkled with improper intent, the offering is no longer subject to the *halakhot* of misuse. The Gemara asks: **If** the *baraita* is dealing with a case **where** the priest did **not** yet **sprinkle the blood, what** is the purpose **of stating** it? Certainly before its blood is sprinkled the offering is included in the category of “the sacred items of the Lord,” and is subject to the *halakhot* of misuse.


###### Meilah 4a:10
[Meilah 4a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Meilah/r/4a:10)

אֶלָּא: לְעוֹלָם דְּזָרֵיק, וְכִי תַּנְיָא הָהִיא, בְּעוֹלָה. אִי בְּעוֹלָה, פְּשִׁיטָא, דְּגָבוֹהַּ הִיא כּוּלַּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggest an alternative reason for rejecting the suggestion: **Rather,** the *baraita* is **actually** referring to a case **where** the blood was **sprinkled. But** nevertheless, it does not support Rav Giddel’s opinion, as **when that** *baraita* **is taught,** it is referring **to a burnt offering.** A burnt offering is always subject to the *halakhot* of misuse even after its blood is sprinkled, as it is never permitted to the priests in consumption. The Gemara raises a difficulty: **If** the ruling of the *baraita* is stated **with regard to a burnt offering,** then it is **obvious** that it is still subject to the *halakhot* of misuse, **as it entirely** belongs **to the Most High,** i.e., the entire offering is burned on the altar and none of it is consumed by the owners or priests.