## Menachot Daf 14a

###### Menachot 14a:1
[Menachot 14a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/14a:1)

אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ תְּרֵי גּוּפֵי נִינְהוּ – מִי מִיצְטָרְפִי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But if you say** that Rabbi Yosei holds that the right and left thighs of an offering **are** considered **two** distinct **bodies,** and therefore *piggul* intent with regard to one does not render the other *piggul*, then in the case of the two loaves, **would** the intentions concerning both loaves **combine** to render them both *piggul*?


###### Menachot 14a:2
[Menachot 14a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/14a:2)

הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַכֶּבֶשׂ לֶאֱכוֹל חֲצִי זַיִת מֵחַלָּה זוֹ, וְכֵן חֲבֵירוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל חֲצִי זַיִת מֵחַלָּה זוֹ, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: אוֹמֵר אֲנִי שֶׁזֶּה כָּשֵׁר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Huna responds: One cannot infer anything from this *baraita* with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, as in accordance with **whose** opinion **is this** *baraita*? **It is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi, **as it is taught** in another *baraita*: With regard to **one who slaughters** one of **the lambs** brought as peace offerings on *Shavuot* with the intent **to consume half an olive-bulk from this loaf** the next day, **and similarly,** he slaughtered **the other** lamb with the intent **to consume half an olive-bulk from that** second **loaf** the next day, **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi **says: I say that this** offering is **valid,** as his intentions do not combine.


###### Menachot 14a:3
[Menachot 14a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/14a:3)

טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר ״חֲצִי חֲצִי״, אֲבָל אָמַר ״כְּזַיִת מִשְּׁתֵּיהֶן״ – מִצְטָרֵף.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Huna continues: It may be inferred that **the reason** why the priest’s intentions do not combine is **that** his intent was **said** with regard to **a half** and **a half,** i.e., he slaughtered each lamb with the intent to consume half an olive-bulk from one loaf the next day. **But** if he **said** during the slaughter of each of the lambs that he is slaughtering it with the intent to consume **an olive-bulk from both of them,** then the halves **combine** to render the offering *piggul*.


###### Menachot 14a:4
[Menachot 14a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/14a:4)

וְרַבִּי, אַלִּיבָּא דְּמַאן? אִי אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּנַן – אֲפִילּוּ בְּאַחַת מֵהֶן נָמֵי! אִי אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי – הָדַר קוּשְׁיַין לְדוּכְתֵּיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** as for **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi, who says that the two loaves are *piggul* only if he has intent with regard to an amount equal to an olive-bulk from both of them combined, **in accordance with whose** opinion is his statement? **If** it is **in accordance with** the opinion **of the Rabbis** of the mishna, who hold that *piggul* intent with regard to one loaf renders both loaves *piggul*, then **even** if his intent was **with regard to** only **one of them,** both loaves should be *piggul*. And **if** it is **in accordance with** the opinion **of Rabbi Yosei,** who holds that *piggul* intent with regard to one loaf does not render the second loaf *piggul*, then **our difficulty returns to its place:** If Rabbi Yosei holds that the right and left thighs are considered two distinct bodies, how can intentions with regard to two halves of an olive-bulk combine to render both loaves *piggul*?


###### Menachot 14a:5
[Menachot 14a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/14a:5)

לְעוֹלָם אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּנַן, וְלָא תֵּימָא ״עַד שֶׁיְּפַגֵּל בִּשְׁתֵּיהֶן״, אֶלָּא [אֵימָא] ״עַד שֶׁיְּפַגֵּל בִּשְׁנֵיהֶן״, וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּאַחַת מֵהֶן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara responds: **Actually,** Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s statement is **in accordance with** the opinion **of the Rabbis. And do not say** that the *baraita* states: It is not *piggul* **unless one has** the **intent of *piggul* with regard to both of them [*bishteihen*],** in the feminine form, whereby the *baraita* would be referring to the loaves. **Rather,** the *baraita* states: **With regard to both of them [*bishneihen*],** in the masculine form, i.e., unless he slaughters both lambs with *piggul* intent, **and** in such a case, **even** if his intent was with regard to only **one of the** loaves, the offering is *piggul*.


###### Menachot 14a:6
[Menachot 14a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/14a:6)

וּלְאַפּוֹקֵי מִדְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּאָמַר: מְפַגְּלִין בַּחֲצִי מַתִּיר, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּלָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara adds: **And** this *baraita* serves **to exclude** the opinion **of Rabbi Meir, who says** in the mishna on 16a: **One renders** an offering ***piggul*** by means of intent during the sacrifice **of half a permitting factor,** e.g., if one slaughtered one of the lambs with the intent to consume the two loaves the next day, the loaves are *piggul*. This *baraita* **teaches us that** this is **not** the *halakha*.


###### Menachot 14a:7
[Menachot 14a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/14a:7)

אִי הָכִי, מַאי ״לְעוֹלָם״? אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא בִּשְׁתֵּיהֶן וּבִשְׁנֵיהֶן, וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הִיא, וּלְאַפּוֹקֵי מִדְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר וּמִדְּרַבָּנַן קָאָתֵי – הַיְינוּ דְּקָאָמַר ״לְעוֹלָם״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **If so,** then **what** is the meaning of the emphasis in the *baraita*: There is **never** liability? **Granted,** this phrase is understandable **if you say** that the *baraita* means that the loaves are not *piggul* unless he has intent **with regard to both of the** loaves **and both of the** lambs, i.e., they are *piggul* only if he slaughters both lambs with the intention to partake of both loaves the next day. In that case the *baraita* **is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei, and it comes to exclude** the statements **of** both **Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis,** and **this is** the reason **that** the *baraita* **states:** There is **never** liability, to emphasize that Rabbi Yosei disagrees with both of these opinions.


###### Menachot 14a:8
[Menachot 14a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/14a:8)

אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ רַבָּנַן, וּלְאַפּוֹקֵי מִדְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, מַאי ״לְעוֹלָם״?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But if you say** that the *baraita* is in accordance with the opinion of **the Rabbis and** that it serves **to exclude** only the opinion **of Rabbi Meir,** for **what** reason does the *baraita* stress: There is **never** liability? The *tanna* would not use such a word to exclude merely one opinion. Rather, it must be that the *baraita* is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. If so, then the difficulty raised against Rav Huna, who says that *piggul* intent concerning the right thigh does not render the left one *piggul*, remains unresolved.


###### Menachot 14a:9
[Menachot 14a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/14a:9)

וְעוֹד, הָא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: תָּא שְׁמַע, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: פִּיגֵּל בְּדָבָר הַנַּעֲשֶׂה בַּחוּץ – פִּיגֵּל, בְּדָבָר הַנַּעֲשֶׂה בִּפְנִים – לֹא פִּיגֵּל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And furthermore, didn’t Rav Ashi say: Come** and **hear** a refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna from a *baraita*: **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi **says in the name of Rabbi Yosei** that if, while performing the sacrificial rites for the bulls or goats which are burned as an offering, the priest had an intention that can **render** the offering ***piggul* with regard to a matter that is performed outside** the Sanctuary, i.e., in the Temple courtyard, **he has rendered** the offering ***piggul*.** If his intention was **with regard to a matter that is performed inside** the Sanctuary or the Holy of Holies, **he has not rendered** the offering ***piggul*.**


###### Menachot 14a:10
[Menachot 14a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/14a:10)

כֵּיצַד? הָיָה עוֹמֵד בַּחוּץ וְאָמַר: ״הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט עַל מְנָת לְהַזּוֹת מִדָּמוֹ לְמָחָר״ – לֹא פִּיגֵּל, שֶׁמַּחְשָׁבָה בַּחוּץ בְּדָבָר הַנַּעֲשֶׂה בְּפָנִים. הָיָה עוֹמֵד בִּפְנִים וְאָמַר: ״הֲרֵינִי מַזֶּה עַל מְנָת לְהַקְטִיר אֵימוּרִין לְמָחָר וְלִשְׁפּוֹךְ שִׁירַיִים לְמָחָר״ – לֹא פִּיגֵּל, שֶׁמַּחְשָׁבָה בִּפְנִים בְּדָבָר הַנַּעֲשֶׂה בַּחוּץ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The *baraita* elaborates: **How so?** If **he was standing outside** when slaughtering the animal **and said: I hereby slaughter** the animal **with the intention of sprinkling its blood tomorrow** inside the Sanctuary, **he has not rendered** the offering ***piggul*.** The reason is **that** when one has **an intention outside with regard to a matter that is performed inside,** he has not rendered the offering *piggul*. Likewise, if he **was standing inside** when sprinkling, **and said: I hereby sprinkle** the blood of the sin offering **in order to burn** its **sacrificial portions** on the external altar **tomorrow and to pour out** its **remainder** on the base of the altar **tomorrow, he has not rendered** the offering ***piggul*, as** he had **an intention inside with regard to a matter that is performed outside.**


###### Menachot 14a:11
[Menachot 14a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/14a:11)

הָיָה עוֹמֵד בַּחוּץ, וְאָמַר: ״הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט עַל מְנָת לִשְׁפּוֹךְ שִׁירַיִים לְמָחָר וּלְהַקְטִיר אֵימוּרִין לְמָחָר״ – פִּיגֵּל, שֶׁמַּחְשָׁבָה בַּחוּץ בְּדָבָר הַנַּעֲשֶׂה בַּחוּץ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But** if **he was standing outside and said: I hereby slaughter** the animal **with the intention to pour out** the **remainder** of its blood **tomorrow, or to burn** its **sacrificial portions tomorrow, he has rendered** the offering ***piggul*, as** he had **an intention outside with regard to a matter that is performed outside.**


###### Menachot 14a:12
[Menachot 14a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/14a:12)

לִשְׁפּוֹךְ שִׁירַיִים, לְאִיפַּגּוֹלֵי מַאי? אִילֵימָא לְאִיפַּגּוֹלֵי דָּם – דָּם מִי מִיפַּגַּל? וְהָתְנַן: אֵלּוּ דְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין חַיָּיבִין עֲלֵיהֶן מִשּׁוּם פִּיגּוּל: הַקּוֹמֶץ, וְהַלְּבוֹנָה, וְהַקְּטוֹרֶת, וּמִנְחַת כֹּהֲנִים, וּמִנְחַת נְסָכִים, וּמִנְחַת כֹּהֵן מָשִׁיחַ, וְהַדָּם!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara analyzes this *baraita*: With regard to the case where one slaughtered the offering with the intent **to pour the remaining** blood the next day, **what could be rendered *piggul*? If we say** the **blood could be rendered *piggul*,** one can ask: **Does blood become *piggul*? But didn’t we learn** in a mishna (*Zevaḥim* 42b): **These are** the **items for which one is not liable** to receive *karet* **due to** the prohibition of ***piggul*: The handful; the frankincense; the incense; the meal offering of priests; the meal offering** accompanying the **libations** brought with an animal offering; **the meal offering of** the **anointed priest; and the blood?**


###### Menachot 14a:13
[Menachot 14a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/14a:13)

אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא לְאִפַּגּוֹלֵי בָּשָׂר, הַשְׁתָּא וּמָה הָתָם דְּלָא חַשֵּׁיב בֵּיהּ בְּבָשָׂר גּוּפֵיהּ, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי מִיפַּגַּל, הָכָא דְּחַשֵּׁיב בֵּיהּ בְּזֶבַח גּוּפֵיהּ, לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן דְּפִיגֵּל בְּיֶרֶךְ יָמִין פִּיגֵּל בְּיֶרֶךְ שְׂמֹאל?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** it is **obvious** that the *baraita* means that it is the **meat** of the offering that **could be rendered *piggul*. Now** consider: **And if there,** in the *baraita*, **where he did not have intent with regard to the meat itself,** as his intention was not to partake of the meat the next day but to pour the remaining blood the next day, and yet **Rabbi Yosei said** that the meat **is rendered *piggul*;** then **here, where he has intent** to partake of the right thigh the next day, which is part **of the offering itself,** is it **not all the more so that** if **he had intent of *piggul* with regard to the right thigh, he has rendered the left thigh *piggul*** as well?


###### Menachot 14a:14
[Menachot 14a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/14a:14)

וְעוֹד, הָאָמַר רָבִינָא: תָּא שְׁמַע, הַקּוֹמֵץ אֶת הַמִּנְחָה לֶאֱכוֹל שְׁיָרֶיהָ אוֹ לְהַקְטִיר קוּמְצָהּ לְמָחָר, מוֹדֶה רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בָּזוֹ שֶׁפִּיגֵּל וְחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו כָּרֵת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And furthermore, doesn’t Ravina say: Come** and **hear** a refutation of the statement of Rav Huna from the mishna (13a): In the case of **one who removes a handful from the meal offering** with the intent **to partake of its remainder or to burn its handful** on **the next day, Rabbi Yosei concedes in this** instance **that he has rendered** the offering ***piggul* and he is liable** to receive ***karet* for** partaking of **it.**


###### Menachot 14a:15
[Menachot 14a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/14a:15)

לְהַקְטִיר קוּמְצָהּ, לְאִיפַּגּוֹלֵי מַאי? אִילֵימָא לְאִיפַּגּוֹלֵי קוֹמֶץ, קוֹמֶץ מִי מִיפַּגַּל? וְהָתְנַן: אֵלּוּ דְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין חַיָּיבִין עֲלֵיהֶן מִשּׁוּם פִּיגּוּל: הַקּוֹמֶץ כּוּ׳! אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא לְאִיפַּגּוֹלֵי שִׁירַיִים. הַשְׁתָּא וּמָה הָתָם, דְּלָא חַשֵּׁיב בְּהוּ בְּשִׁירַיִים גּוּפֵיהּ,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Ravina continues: When one removes the handful with the intent **to burn its handful, what could be rendered *piggul*? If we say** that **the handful could be rendered *piggul*, does the handful become *piggul*? But didn’t we learn** in a mishna (*Zevaḥim* 42b): **These are** the **items for which one is not liable** to receive *karet* **due to** the prohibition of ***piggul*: The handful, etc. Rather,** it is **obvious** that the **remainder could be rendered *piggul*. Now** consider: **And if there,** in the mishna, **where he did not have intent with regard to** the **remainder itself,** i.e., to partake of the remainder the next day,