## Menachot Daf 56a

###### Menachot 56a:1
[Menachot 56a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/56a:1)

לְרַבּוֹת שְׂעִירֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה לִסְמִיכָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The term “of the goat” serves **to include** the **goats** brought as communal sin offerings for **idol worship in** the requirement of **placing hands** on the head of an offering.


###### Menachot 56a:2
[Menachot 56a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/56a:2)

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רָבִינָא: תִּינַח לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Ravina objects to this:** This **works out well according to** the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda,** who says that the offering of Nahshon was included in the requirement of placing hands on the head of the animal. But **according to** the opinion of **Rabbi Shimon, what is there to say?** Why should the Torah write the term “it,” since there is no reason to assume that it would require slaughter in the north?


###### Menachot 56a:3
[Menachot 56a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/56a:3)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ מָר זוּטְרָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב מָרִי לְרָבִינָא: לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה נָמֵי, מַאי דְּאִיתְרַבִּי – אִיתְרַבִּי, מַאי דְּלָא אִיתְרַבִּי – לָא אִיתְרַבִּי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina:** And **according to** the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda as well,** why not say that for **that which it was included,** i.e., placing hands on the head of an animal, **it was included; and** for **that which it was not included,** i.e., slaughter in the north, **it was not included.** Why would one think that the obligation to slaughter in the north applies to the offering of Nahshon merely because the requirement of placing hands applies to that offering?


###### Menachot 56a:4
[Menachot 56a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/56a:4)

וְכִי תֵּימָא, אִי לָא מַעֲטֵיהּ קְרָא, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא תֵּיתֵי בְּבִנְיַן אָב, סְמִיכָה גּוּפַהּ לִישְׁתּוֹק קְרָא מִינֵּיהּ וְתֵיתֵי בְּבִנְיַן אָב! אֶלָּא, שָׁעָה מִדּוֹרוֹת לָא יָלְפִינַן. הָכָא נָמֵי, שָׁעָה מִדּוֹרוֹת לָא יָלְפִינַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you would say** that **had the verse not excluded** the offerings of the princes **I would say** that one could **derive** the requirement for slaughter in the north **via a paradigm** from all other sin offerings, **if so,** one could also **derive** the requirement for **placing hands** on the head of an animal **itself via** the same **paradigm. Rather,** the reason that the requirement of placing hands cannot be derived via a paradigm is that **we do not learn** the requirements of the sin offering of Nahshon, which was for the **time** of the inauguration of the Tabernacle alone, **from** the requirements of sin offerings applicable to all **generations. So too,** the requirement of slaughter in the north cannot be derived via a paradigm because **we do not learn** the requirements of the sin offering of Nahshon, which was for the **time** of the inauguration of the Tabernacle alone, **from** the requirement of sin offerings applicable to all **generations.**


###### Menachot 56a:5
[Menachot 56a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/56a:5)

אֶלָּא, ״אוֹתוֹ״ טָעוּן צָפוֹן, וְאֵין הַשּׁוֹחֵט עוֹמֵד בַּצָּפוֹן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that **it** must be slaughtered **in the north** of the Temple courtyard, **but the one who slaughters** it does **not** need to stand **in the north** when he slaughters. The offering would be valid even if he were to stand in the south of the courtyard and use a long knife to slaughter the animal that is positioned in the north.


###### Menachot 56a:6
[Menachot 56a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/56a:6)

מִדְּרַבִּי אֲחִיָּיה נָפְקָא! דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי אֲחִיָּיה אוֹמֵר: ״וְשָׁחַט אֹתוֹ עַל יֶרֶךְ הַמִּזְבֵּחַ צָפוֹנָה״, מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges this: The *halakha* of the one who slaughters has already been **derived from** the statement **of Rabbi Aḥiyya, as it is taught** in a *baraita*: **Rabbi Aḥiyya says:** The verse states with regard to the burnt offering: **“And he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward** before God” (Leviticus 1:11). **Why** must **the verse state** the exclusionary term “it”?


###### Menachot 56a:7
[Menachot 56a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/56a:7)

לְפִי שֶׁמָּצִינוּ בִּמְקַבֵּל, שֶׁעוֹמֵד בַּצָּפוֹן וּמְקַבֵּל בַּצָּפוֹן, וְאִם עָמַד בְּדָרוֹם וְקִיבֵּל בַּצָּפוֹן – פָּסוּל, יָכוֹל אַף זֶה כֵּן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אֹתוֹ״ – אוֹתוֹ בַּצָּפוֹן, וְלֹא הַשּׁוֹחֵט צָרִיךְ לִהְיוֹת עוֹמֵד בַּצָּפוֹן!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
He explains: **Since we have found** that the priest **stands in the north and collects** the blood from the neck of the animal **in the north, and if he stood in the south and collected** the blood **in the north** the offering is **disqualified,** one **might** have thought that this is **so also** with regard to **this** one who slaughters the offering. Therefore, **the verse states:** “And he shall slaughter **it,”** to teach that **it,** the animal, must be **in the north, but the one who slaughters** does **not** have to be standing **in the north** of the Temple courtyard when he slaughters the animal. The question returns: What is derived from the exclusionary term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king?


###### Menachot 56a:8
[Menachot 56a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/56a:8)

אֶלָּא, אוֹתוֹ בַּצָּפוֹן, וְאֵין בֶּן עוֹף בַּצָּפוֹן. סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: לֵיתֵי בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר מִבֶּן צֹאן – וּמָה בֶּן צֹאן שֶׁלָּא קָבַע לוֹ כֹּהֵן קָבַע לוֹ צָפוֹן, בֶּן עוֹף שֶׁקָּבַע לוֹ כֹּהֵן – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁנִּקְבַּע לוֹ צָפוֹן?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **Rather,** the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that **it,** a goat brought as a sin offering, must be slaughtered **in the north, but a bird** brought as an offering does **not** need to be killed **in the north.** It might **enter your mind to say: Let it be derived** that a bird must be killed in the north by **an *a fortiori*** inference **from** the *halakha* of **a sheep,** as follows: **Just as** is the case for **a sheep** brought as a burnt offering, **that** the Torah **did not fix** that **its** slaughter must be performed by **a priest,** yet nevertheless it **fixed** that **its** slaughter must be in the **north,** with regard to **a bird** brought as an offering, for **which** the Torah **did fix** that **its** slaughter must be performed by **a priest, is it not logical that** the Torah **should** also **fix its** slaughter in the **north?** Therefore, the verse states “it,” to exclude a bird from the requirement of being killed in the north.


###### Menachot 56a:9
[Menachot 56a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/56a:9)

מָה לְבֶן צֹאן, שֶׁכֵּן קָבַע לוֹ כְּלִי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara questions the logical inference. One cannot derive the *halakha* of a bird offering from the *halakha* of a sheep offering, as **what** is notable **about a sheep offering?** It is notable **in that** the Torah **fixed** the requirement that **it** be slaughtered with **a utensil,** i.e., a knife. By contrast, a bird is killed by the priest pinching the nape of its neck with his fingernail, without a utensil. Therefore, the term “it” cannot serve to counter this derivation. If so, there is no reason to think that a bird should also have to be killed in the north, and the term “it” is not necessary to exclude this possibility.


###### Menachot 56a:10
[Menachot 56a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/56a:10)

אֶלָּא: ״אוֹתוֹ״ בַּצָּפוֹן, וְאֵין פֶּסַח בַּצָּפוֹן. פֶּסַח מִדְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב נָפְקָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: **Rather,** the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that **it,** the goat of the king, is slaughtered **in the north, but** the **Paschal offering** is **not** slaughtered **in the north.** The Gemara raises a difficulty: The *halakha* that the **Paschal offering** need not be slaughtered in the north is not derived from the term: “It,” but rather it is **derived as** stated by **Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.**


###### Menachot 56a:11
[Menachot 56a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/56a:11)

דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: יָכוֹל יְהֵא הַפֶּסַח טָעוּן צָפוֹן? וְדִין הוּא, וּמָה עוֹלָה שֶׁלָּא קָבַע לָהּ זְמַן בִּשְׁחִיטָתָהּ קָבַע לָהּ צָפוֹן, פֶּסַח שֶׁקָּבַע לוֹ זְמַן לִשְׁחִיטָתוֹ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁקָּבַע לוֹ צָפוֹן!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**As it is taught** in a *baraita*: **Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says:** One **might** have thought that **a Paschal offering requires** slaughter in the **north. And this** can be derived through **a logical inference: Just as** in the case of **a burnt offering,** for **which** the Torah **did not fix a time for its slaughter** yet **fixed** that **it** requires slaughter in the **north,** with regard to **a Paschal offering,** for **which** the Torah **fixed a time for its slaughter,** i.e., it must be slaughtered in the afternoon of the fourteenth day of Nisan, **is it not logical that** the Torah **would fix** that **it** must be slaughtered in the **north?** Therefore, the verse states “it,” to exclude the Paschal offering from the requirement of slaughter in the north.


###### Menachot 56a:12
[Menachot 56a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/56a:12)

מָה לְעוֹלָה, שֶׁכֵּן כָּלִיל!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara questions the logical inference. One cannot derive the *halakha* of a Paschal offering from the *halakha* of a burnt offering, as **what** is notable **about a burnt offering?** It is notable **in that** the Torah teaches that **it is entirely** burned on the altar. This is not so with regard to a Paschal offering.


###### Menachot 56a:13
[Menachot 56a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/56a:13)

מֵחַטָּאת – מָה לְחַטָּאת שֶׁכֵּן מְכַפֶּרֶת עַל חַיָּיבֵי כָרֵיתוֹת!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara continues: If you would suggest learning a logical inference **from** the *halakha* of **a sin offering,** which is not entirely burned upon the altar yet is slaughtered only in the north, this too can be refuted. As **what** is notable **about a sin offering?** It is notable **in that it** has the power to **atone for** those sins **liable for** punishment by **excision from the World-to-Come [*karet*],** which is not so with regard to a Paschal offering.


###### Menachot 56a:14
[Menachot 56a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/56a:14)

מֵאָשָׁם – מָה לְאָשָׁם שֶׁכֵּן קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים, מִכּוּלְּהוּ נָמֵי שֶׁכֵּן קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara continues: If you would suggest learning a logical inference **from** the *halakha* of **a guilt offering,** which is not entirely burned, does not atone for those sins liable for punishment by *karet*, and is slaughtered only in the north, this too can be refuted. As **what** is notable **about a guilt offering?** It is notable **in that** it is **an offering of the most sacred order,** which is not so with regard to a Paschal offering. The Gemara adds: Having noted this distinction between a guilt offering and a Paschal offering, one can say that for **all of** the three offerings the *halakha* of a Paschal offering cannot be derived **from** them **either, since** each of them is **an offering of the most sacred order.**


###### Menachot 56a:15
[Menachot 56a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/56a:15)

אֶלָּא לְעוֹלָם כִּדְקָאָמְרִינַן מֵעִיקָּרָא, ״אוֹתוֹ״ בַּצָּפוֹן, וְאֵין הַשּׁוֹחֵט בַּצָּפוֹן. וּדְקָא קַשְׁיָא לָךְ מִדְּרַבִּי אֲחִיָּיה נָפְקָא – דְּרַבִּי אֲחִיָּיה לָאו לְמַעוֹטֵי שׁוֹחֵט בַּצָּפוֹן הוּא דַּאֲתָא, אֶלָּא הָכִי קָאָמַר: אֵין הַשּׁוֹחֵט בְּצָפוֹן, אֲבָל מְקַבֵּל בַּצָּפוֹן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara returns to the earlier inference: **Rather,** the term “it” teaches **as we said initially: It,** i.e., the animal, must be standing **in the north, but** the **one who slaughters** the animal does **not** have to stand **in the north. And that** which is **difficult for you,** that **we derive** this *halakha* **from** the statement **of Rabbi Aḥiyya,** is in fact not difficult. The derivation **of Rabbi Aḥiyya** from the term “it” **does not come to exclude** one who **slaughters** from the requirement to slaughter **in the north,** since that is known already from the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king. **Rather, this is what** Rabbi Aḥiyya **is saying:** The **one who slaughters** the animal does **not** have to stand **in the north, but** by inference, the one who **collects** the blood from the neck of the animal must stand **in the north.**


###### Menachot 56a:16
[Menachot 56a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/56a:16)

מְקַבֵּל מִ״לָּקַח״ ״וְלָקַח״ נָפְקָא, ״לָקַח״ ״וְלָקַח״ לָא מַשְׁמַע לֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara questions this inference: The *halakha* that the one who **collects** the blood from the neck of the animal must stand in the north is derived **from** the fact that the Torah could have written: The priest **shall take,** and instead writes: **“And** the priest **shall take”** (Leviticus 4:34). The Gemara explains: This *tanna* **does not learn** anything from this distinction between: The priest **shall take,** and: **“And** the priest **shall take.”** Since he does not agree with this derivation, he must therefore derive the requirement to collect the blood while standing in the north from a different verse.


###### Menachot 56a:17
[Menachot 56a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/56a:17)

וְחַיָּיב עַל לִישָׁתָהּ, וְעַל עֲרִיכָתָהּ, וְעַל אֲפִיָּיתָהּ. אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: אֲפָאָהּ – לוֹקֶה שְׁתַּיִם, אַחַת עַל עֲרִיכָתָהּ, וְאַחַת עַל אֲפִיָּיתָהּ. וְהָא אָמְרַתְּ: מָה אֲפִיָּיה מְיוּחֶדֶת שֶׁהִיא מַעֲשֶׂה יְחִידִי וְחַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָהּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches: **And one is liable** to be flogged **for kneading** the meal offering, **and for shaping it, and for baking it,** if the meal offering becomes leaven. **Rav Pappa said:** If one **baked** a meal offering as leaven he **is flogged** with **two** sets of lashes, **one for shaping** the dough **and one for baking it.** The Gemara raises a difficulty: **But you said** in the *baraita*: **Just as** the act of baking is **notable** in **that it is a single action and one is liable** to receive lashes **for it by itself;** this indicates that one receives one set of lashes for baking a meal offering as leavened bread, not two.


###### Menachot 56a:18
[Menachot 56a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/56a:18)

לָא קַשְׁיָא, הָא דַּעֲרַךָ הוּא וַאֲפָה הוּא, הָא דַּעֲרַךָ חַבְרֵיהּ וִיהַיב לֵיהּ וַאֲפָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: This is **not difficult,** as **this** statement of the *baraita*, i.e., that one receives a single set of lashes for baking, is referring to a case **where he shaped** the dough **and he,** the same person, also **baked** it. Since he already incurred liability to receive lashes for shaping the dough before he baked it, he is not liable again for shaping when he bakes it. **That** statement of Rav Pappa, that one who bakes the dough is liable to receive two sets of lashes, is referring to a situation **where another** person **shaped** the dough **and gave** the shaped dough **to him, and he baked** it. Although the one who shaped it is liable to receive lashes for the act of shaping, nevertheless, the one who bakes it is liable to receive two sets of lashes, as his act of baking also completed the shaping of the dough.


###### Menachot 56a:19
[Menachot 56a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/56a:19)

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: בְּכוֹר שֶׁאֲחָזוֹ דָּם, מַקִּיזִין אוֹתוֹ אֶת הַדָּם בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין עוֹשִׂין בּוֹ מוּם, וְאֵין מַקִּיזִין אֶת הַדָּם בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁעוֹשִׂין בּוֹ מוּם, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara continues to discuss the leavening of a meal offering. **The Sages taught** in a *baraita* (*Tosefta*, *Bekhorot* 3:6): In the case of an unblemished **firstborn** kosher **animal** whose **blood** circulation is **constricted,** a condition that can be healed only through bloodletting, **one may let** the animal’s **blood** by cutting it **in a place where** the incision **does not cause** a permanent **blemish. But one may not let** the animal’s **blood** by cutting it **in a place where** the incision **causes** a permanent **blemish,** as it is prohibited to intentionally cause a blemish in a firstborn animal; this is **the statement of Rabbi Meir.**


###### Menachot 56a:20
[Menachot 56a:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Menachot/r/56a:20)

וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: יַקִּיז, אַף בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁעוֹשִׂין בּוֹ מוּם, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִשְׁחוֹט עַל אוֹתוֹ מוּם. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And the Rabbis say: One may even let** the animal’s blood by cutting it **in a place where** the incision **causes** a permanent **blemish, provided that he does not slaughter** the animal **on** the basis **of that blemish,** even though in general, a firstborn animal may be slaughtered once it develops a permanent blemish. The Rabbis maintain that in this case, since he caused the blemish himself, he may not slaughter it until it develops a different, unrelated blemish. **Rabbi Shimon says:**