## Mishneh Torah, Divorce Chapter 9

###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:1
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:1)

הַמְגָרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ לְאַחַר זְמַן קָבוּעַ הֲרֵי זוֹ מְגֹרֶשֶׁת כְּשֶׁיַּגִּיעַ הַזְּמַן שֶׁקָּבַע. וַהֲרֵי זֶה דּוֹמֶה לִתְנַאי וְאֵינוֹ תְּנַאי. דּוֹמֶה לִתְנַאי שֶׁהִיא מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת כְּשֶׁיַּגִּיעַ הַזְּמַן שֶׁקָּבַע. וְאֵינוֹ תְּנַאי שֶׁהַמְגָרֵשׁ עַל תְּנַאי הֲרֵי גֵּרֵשׁ וְזֶה עֲדַיִן לֹא גֵּרֵשׁ עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ אוֹתוֹ הַזְּמַן. לְפִיכָךְ הַמְגָרֵשׁ עַל תְּנַאי צָרִיךְ לִכְפֹּל תְּנָאוֹ וְזֶה אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לִכְפֹּל דְּבָרוֹ וְלֹא לִשְׁאָר מִשְׁפְּטֵי הַתְּנָאִין שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
[When a man] divorces his wife and [asserts that the divorce] will not take effect until a specific time passes, the divorce takes effect when that time arrives. Thus, this resembles [a *get* given on] a conditional basis, and yet it is not a conditional *get*.
It resembles [a *get* given on] a conditional basis because the divorce takes effect when the specified time arrives [as in the case of a conditional *get*, which is completed when the condition is fulfilled]. Nevertheless, it is not considered a conditional *get* because a person who divorces [his wife] conditionally has already performed the divorce, and in this instance, the man has not divorced her until the time arrives.
For this reason, a person who gives a conditional *get* must restate the condition [in both a positive and negative form], while this person does not have to restate his words. Nor must he comply with the other requirements of conditional agreements that we have explained.¹.

footnotes:
¹ See the notes on Chapter 8, Halachah 1.


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:2
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:2)

כֵּיצַד. הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשְׁתּוֹ הֲרֵי זֶה גִּטֵּךְ וְלֹא תִּתְגָּרְשִׁי בּוֹ אֶלָּא לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם אֵינָהּ מְגֹרֶשֶׁת אֶלָּא לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם. וְאִם מֵת הַבַּעַל אוֹ אָבַד הַגֵּט אוֹ נִשְׂרַף בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים אֵינָהּ מְגֹרֶשֶׁת:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
What is implied? [When a husband] tells his wife: "This is your *get*, but the divorce does not take effect until 30 days pass," she is not divorced until after the passage of 30 days. If her husband dies, or the *get* is lost or consumed by fire in the interim, she is not divorced.² is destroyed, she is not divorced because it is the *get* that serves as the medium of divorce, and at the time when the *get* must take effect, it no longer exists.

footnotes:
² If the husband dies she is not divorced, because a divorce must take effect before death. If the get


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:3
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:3)

הָלְכָה וְהִנִּיחָתוֹ בְּצִדֵּי רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים וְנִגְנַב אוֹ אָבַד מִשָּׁם לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם הֲרֵי זוֹ מְגֹרֶשֶׁת הוֹאִיל וְהָיָה הַגֵּט קַיָּם בַּיּוֹם שֶׁמִּתְגָּרֶשֶׁת בּוֹ וְיִחֲדָה אוֹתוֹ בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁאֵינוֹ רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים. שֶׁצִּדֵּי רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים אֵינָן כִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
[When the woman] went and placed [the *get*] in [a place] at the side of the public domain,³ 17:9.) and after 30 days passed it was stolen or lost, the divorce is effective. Since the *get* existed on the day when it took effect, and it was set aside in a designated place that is not public domain [it can serve as the medium for the divorce].⁴, the *Kessef Mishneh* and others contrast the Rambam's ruling here, that the divorce is not retroactively effective from the time the husband gave the *get*, to his ruling in *Hilchot Mechirah* 2:9. That source states that a sale can be effective when made with the stipulation that it take effect after 30 days, only when the stipulation is that it take effect retroactively. The *Maggid Mishneh* differentiates between the two instances, explaining that a sale requires an act of contract to effect a transfer, and that act took place when the sale was originally made, not 30 days afterwards. In contrast, with regard to a *get*, the fundamental aspect of the divorce is effected by the writing of the *get*. [The governing principle is that the area at] the sides of the public domain is not the same as the public domain itself.⁵ been placed by the woman in the public domain itself, it would not be effective even if it existed when the time specified by the husband arrived. Since it left the woman's domain entirely, the giving of the *get* originally performed by the husband is no longer considered significant. And, as stated at the beginning of these laws, one of the requirements of a divorce is that the *get* be given to the woman by her husband.

footnotes:
³ The public domain was a marketplace with pillars on either side. At the side of the pillars, there was space that though ownerless, could be used to acquire property, because it was not common for people to walk in that space. (See Hilchot Gezelah Va'Avedah
⁴ The Maggid Mishneh
⁵ Had the get


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:4
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:4)

וְכֵן אִם תָּלָה הַגֵּרוּשִׁין בְּמַעֲשֶׂה דִּינוֹ כְּדִין מְגָרֵשׁ אַחַר זְמַן. כֵּיצַד. כְּגוֹן שֶׁאָמַר לְאִשָּׁה הֲרֵי זֶה גִּטֵּךְ וְלֹא תִּתְגָּרְשִׁי בּוֹ עַד שֶׁתִּתְּנִי לִי מָאתַיִם זוּז הֲרֵי זוֹ מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת אַחַר שֶׁתִּתֵּן. וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לִכְפֹּל תְּנָאוֹ וְלֹא לִשְׁאָר מִשְׁפְּטֵי הַתְּנָאִין שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ. שֶׁהֲרֵי לֹא גֵּרֵשׁ עַל תְּנַאי אֶלָּא עֲדַיִן לֹא גֵּרֵשׁ זֶה אֶלָּא תָּלָה הַגֵּרוּשִׁין בַּעֲשִׂיַּת כָּךְ וְכָךְ וְאַחַר כָּךְ תִּתְגָּרֵשׁ:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
Similarly, if the husband makes the divorce dependent on an action,⁶ the same rules that govern a *get* that takes effect after a specific time apply. For example, [a husband] said to [his] wife: "This is your *get*, but the divorce does not take effect until you give me 200 *zuz*." After [the woman] gives [the money], the divorce takes effect.⁷ 3:3).
In this instance [as well], there is no need to restate the condition [in both a positive and negative form], nor to comply with the other requirements of conditional agreements that we have explained. For this person has not divorced [his wife] conditionally - he has not yet divorced her at all. Instead, he made the divorce dependent on a specific action, and after [that action is completed], the divorce will take effect.

footnotes:
⁶ I.e., in this instance as well, there is a resemblance to the laws of a conditional divorce. Nevertheless, since different wording is used, the laws vary.
⁷ Moreover, the action specified by the husband may be something that does not require anything to be done by his wife. For example, he may tell her that the divorce will take effect after the first rainfall (Jerusalem Talmud, Kiddushin


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:5
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:5)

וּמַה בֵּין הַמְגָרֵשׁ עַל תְּנַאי לְזֶה שֶׁקָּבַע זְמַן לְגֵרוּשִׁין אוֹ תְּלָאָן בְּמַעֲשֶׂה. שֶׁהַמְגָרֵשׁ עַל תְּנַאי יֵשׁ שָׁם גֵּרוּשִׁין וְאֵינָן גּוֹמְרִין עַד שֶׁיִּתְקַיֵּם הַתְּנַאי. לְפִיכָךְ כְּשֶׁיִּתְקַיֵּם הַתְּנַאי נִתְגָּרְשָׁה אִם הָיָה הַגֵּט קַיָּם אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ בִּרְשׁוּתָהּ וְאֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה לַחֲזֹר וְלִטְּלוֹ אוֹ לִהְיוֹתוֹ בִּרְשׁוּתָהּ אַחַר שֶׁנִּתְקַיֵּם הַתְּנַאי שֶׁהֲרֵי הִגִּיעַ לְיָדָהּ תְּחִלָּה בְּתוֹרַת גֵּרוּשִׁין. וְאִם נִשֵּׂאת קֹדֶם שֶׁיִּתְקַיֵּם הַתְּנַאי לֹא תֵּצֵא כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ. אֲבָל הַתּוֹלֶה גֵּרוּשִׁין בִּזְמַן אוֹ בְּמַעֲשֶׂה לֹא הִגִּיעַ גֵּט לְיָדָהּ בְּתוֹרַת גֵּרוּשִׁין אֶלָּא בְּתוֹרַת פִּקָּדוֹן עַד הַזְמֵן שֶׁקָּבַע אוֹ עַד שֶׁתַּעֲשֶׂה הַמַּעֲשֶׂה. לְפִיכָךְ כְּשֶׁהִגִּיעַ הַזְּמַן צְרִיכָה לִהְיוֹת הַגֵּט בִּרְשׁוּתָהּ אוֹ תַּחֲזֹר וְתִטְּלֶנּוּ אוֹ שֶׁיִּהְיֶה בַּמָּקוֹם שֶׁיִּחֲדָה אוֹתוֹ בּוֹ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ רְשׁוּתָהּ כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ וְאַחַר כָּךְ תִּתְגָּרֵשׁ בּוֹ. וְאִם נִשֵּׂאת קֹדֶם שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ הַזְּמַן שֶׁקָּבַע אוֹ קֹדֶם שֶׁתַּעֲשֶׂה הַמַּעֲשֶׂה שֶׁתָּלָה בּוֹ הַגֵּרוּשִׁין תֵּצֵא וְהַוָּלָד מַמְזֵר שֶׁעֲדַיִן הִיא אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ גְּמוּרָה וְאֵין כָּאן שֵׁם גֵּרוּשִׁין:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
What is the difference between a conditional divorce and a divorce that will take effect only after a fixed time, or a divorce dependent on an action? With regard to a conditional divorce, the divorce is a fact; it is, however, not completed until the condition is fulfilled. Therefore, when the condition is fulfilled, the divorce takes effect as long as the *get* exists, even if it is not in the woman's possession. When the condition is fulfilled, there is no need for [the woman] to pick up [the *get*] or take possession, for it was given to her for the purpose of divorce. If she married before the condition was fulfilled, she need not leave [her second husband], as explained.⁸
With regard to a divorce that will take effect only after a fixed time or a divorce dependent on an action, by contrast, she was not given the *get* for the [immediate] purpose of divorce. Instead, it is considered to be an entrusted object until the specified time arrives or she performs the action. Therefore, it is necessary that the *get* be in her possession at that time, that she take [possession of it], or that it be in a place that she designated for it even though it is not in her domain, as we have explained.⁹ is not in the woman's possession at this time, the divorce is not effective according to the Rambam. Nevertheless, other authorities have a different conception of these laws, and according to them, the status of the divorce would be doubtful (*Maggid Mishneh; Beit Shmuel* 146:3). Only then, is she divorced by virtue [of this *get*].
If she marries before the specified time arrives, or before she performs the action on which the divorce is dependent, she must leave her second husband,¹⁰ and any child [born of their union] is considered illegitimate. For she is a married woman, and the divorce is not [yet] effective.

footnotes:
⁸ Chapter 8, Halachah 1. See the notes on that halachah.
⁹ Halachah 3. If the get
¹⁰ For their relations are considered adulterous.


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:6
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:6)

הַנּוֹתֵן גֵּט בְּיַד אִשְׁתּוֹ וְאָמַר לָהּ אִם לֹא תִּתְּנִי לִי מָאתַיִם זוּז אֵין זֶה גֵּט אוֹ אֵין אַתְּ מְגֹרֶשֶׁת הֲרֵי זֶה לֹא גֵּרֵשׁ כְּלָל וְאֵין כָּאן גֵּט לֹא עַל תְּנַאי וְלֹא תָּלוּי בְּמַעֲשֶׂה. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
When [a man] gives his wife a *get* and tells her: "If you do not give me 200 *zuz*, this *get* is not effective," or "...you are not divorced," he is not considered to have performed a divorce at all.¹¹," or "You are divorced...." Hence, he is not considered to have given the *get* for the sake of divorce. Although such an intent could be deduced from his words, since his statements were not explicit, they are of no consequence. Indeed, making such a statement is less effective than not saying anything at all (*Maggid Mishneh; Kiryat Melech Rav*). For the *get* was not given on a conditional basis, nor was it made dependent on an action. The same [ruling applies] in all similar situations.

footnotes:
¹¹ For he did not preface his statements by saying: "This is your get


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:7
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:7)

הָרוֹצֶה לְגָרֵשׁ עַל תְּנַאי וְיִהְיֶה עִנְיַן תְּנָאוֹ שֶׁלֹּא תִּתְגָּרֵשׁ עַד זְמַן פְּלוֹנִי הֲרֵי זֶה מוֹצִיא עִנְיָן זֶה בִּלְשׁוֹן תְּנַאי וְיִתְלֶה הַתְּנַאי בְּבִיאָתוֹ בִּזְמַן קָבוּעַ אוֹ בַּהֲלִיכָתוֹ. כֵּיצַד. כְּגוֹן שֶׁיֹּאמַר לָהּ אִם לֹא בָּאתִי מִכָּאן וְעַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט וְאִם בָּאתִי בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם לֹא יִהְיֶה גֵּט וְנוֹתֵן הַגֵּט בְּיָדָהּ. אוֹ יֹאמַר לָהּ הֲרֵי זֶה גִּטֵּךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁלֹּא אָבוֹא לִמְדִינָה זוֹ עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
When a person would like to give a conditional divorce, with the condition being that the divorce not take effect until a particular time, he should express the concept in a conditional statement, making the condition dependent on his departure or return at a specific time.¹² not take effect until a specific time, but does not want the restrictions mentioned in the previous halachah to apply. This is not merely a theoretical situation. Such *gittin* were given frequently in previous generations when a man undertook an overseas journey and wished to spare his wife from having to remain unmarried if he was killed, kidnapped by pirates or in other ways prevented from returning against his will.
What is implied? He tells her: "If I do not return between the present time and 30 days, this *get* is effective. If I do return within 30 days, this *get* is not effective." He [then] gives her the *get*. Alternatively, he should tell her: "This is your *get* on condition that I do not return to this country within 30 days." The same [ruling applies] in all similar situations.

footnotes:
¹² I.e., he desires that the get


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:8
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:8)

הִתְנָה עָלֶיהָ שֶׁיִּהְיֶה גֵּט אִם לֹא בָּא עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם לִמְדִינָה זוֹ וְהָיָה בָּא בַּדֶּרֶךְ בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם וְחָלָה אוֹ עִכְּבוֹ נָהָר וְלֹא בָּא עַד אַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט. אֲפִלּוּ עוֹמֵד וְצוֹוֵחַ הֲרֵי אֲנִי אָנוּס שֶׁאֵין אֹנֶס בְּגִטִּין. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁגִּלָּה דַּעְתּוֹ שֶׁאֵין רְצוֹנוֹ לְגָרֵשׁ:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
When a person divorces [his wife] on the condition that he not return to this country within 30 days, and he set out to return within 30 days, but became ill or was prevented [from returning by a flooding] river and did not return until after 30 days, the *get* is effective. Even if he protests, "I am being held back by forces beyond my control" [the *get* is effective].¹³ 30a cites an example of a man who divorced his wife on condition that he not return within 30 days. A river washed away the bridge leading to his city. Although he stood on the river banks and called to his townsmen: "See, I have returned," our Sages ruled that he is not considered to have returned, and they considered the divorce binding.
[The rationale is that the claim,] "I was prevented by forces beyond my control," is not accepted with regard to *gittin*,¹⁴ 2b).
The *Maggid Mishneh* quotes the opinion of *Tosafot* (*Ketubot* 2b) and others, who state that this principle applies only with regard to events beyond mortal control that one could possibly foresee - e.g., illness or flood. It does not apply with regard to events beyond a person's control that are totally unlikely - e.g., earthquakes. The *Maggid Mishneh* cites statements by the Rambam in *Hilchot Mechirah*, Chapter 19, which indicate that he would also accept this restriction.
The *Maggid Mishneh's* premise is accepted by the *Shulchan Aruch* (*Even HaEzer* 144:1). It appears that the determination of what is an event beyond a person's control that is totally unlikely is dependent on the sociological conditions of the age. For example, the Ramah rules that being held as a captive is not a totally unlikely occurrence. even if the husband makes it evident that he does not desire that the divorce take effect.

footnotes:
¹³ Gittin
¹⁴ According to Scriptural law, a person who is prevented from fulfilling a condition by forces beyond his control is not considered as having failed to fulfill it. Nevertheless, our Sages ruled that the laws of divorce are an exception to this principle, because modest women might presume that their husbands were prevented from fulfilling their condition by forces beyond their control and never remarry (Ketubot


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:9
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:9)

הִתְנָה עָלֶיהָ שֶׁתִּתְגָּרֵשׁ כְּשֶׁיַּעֲבֹר מִנֶּגֶד פָּנֶיהָ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם וְהָיָה הוֹלֵךְ וּבָא הוֹלֵךְ וּבָא וְלֹא נִתְיַחֵד עִמָּהּ כְּשֶׁיֵּלֵךְ וְיִשְׁהֶה שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם תִּהְיֶה מְגֹרֶשֶׁת. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהָיָה הוֹלֵךְ וּבָא בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם הוֹאִיל וְלֹא נִתְיַחֵד עִמָּהּ הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט כָּשֵׁר. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים בְּשֶׁהִתְנָה וְאָמַר הֲרֵי הִיא נֶאֱמֶנֶת עָלַי לוֹמַר שֶׁלֹּא פִּיַּסְתִּיהָ. אֲבָל אִם לֹא הֶאֱמִינָהּ חוֹשְׁשִׁין שֶׁמָּא פִּיְּסָהּ כְּשֶׁהָיָה הוֹלֵךְ וּבָא וּמָחֲלָה לוֹ וְחָזַר וּבָטַל הַגֵּט כְּשֶׁפִּיְּסָהּ. וּמִפְּנֵי חֲשָׁשׁ זֶה יִהְיֶה הַגֵּט פָּסוּל אַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם. וְכֵן הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה הֲרֵי זֶה גִּטֵּךְ לְאַחַר שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ וְהָיָה עִמָּהּ בַּמְּדִינָה חוֹשְׁשִׁין שֶׁמָּא פִּיְּסָהּ עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר נֶאֱמֶנֶת עָלַי שֶׁלֹּא פִּיַּסְתִּי:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
[The following rules apply when a man gives a] divorce on the condition¹⁵. that it become effective if 30 days pass without [his seeing his wife's] face. If he repeatedly came [and appeared before her], but never entered into privacy with her, and then 30 days [passed without his seeing her], the *get* is effective.¹⁶ Although he came [and appeared before her] within 30 days [after the *get* was given], since he did not enter into privacy with her,¹⁷ would be nullified. See Chapter 3, Halachah 5, Chapter 8, Halachah 2. [once the condition was fulfilled,] the *get* is effective.
When does the above apply? When he made the condition and said: "I accept her word with regard to [whether or] not I appeased her."¹⁸ would be effective after the condition is fulfilled. If, however, he did not accept her word, we suspect that perhaps he placated her when he came and visited her, she was willing to forego [her desire to be with him], and he nullified the *get*.¹⁹ because he was going away on a journey and knew that she would not desire to be alone. If he was able to appease her and she was willing to remain alone for 30 days, he is able to nullify the *get*. Usually, once a *get* is given "on condition that...," it cannot be nullified once it has been given. Nevertheless, in this instance, since the condition was made for the sake of the woman, if she is willing to forego seeing her husband, the husband may nullify the *get* (*Maggid Mishneh*). For this reason, the *get* is unacceptable [even] after 30 days [pass without the husband seeing her].²⁰ is binding. Our Sages, nevertheless, disqualified the *get* for the reasons stated above.
Similarly, when a man tells a woman: "This is your *get* and [it becomes effective] after twelve months pass," if he lives in the same city as she does, we suspect that he appeased her, unless he said: "I accept her word that I did not appease her."

footnotes:
¹⁵ As will be explained, this law applies when the husband stated "on condition that..." when giving the get
¹⁶ Since ultimately the condition was fulfilled.
¹⁷ If he entered into privacy with her, the get
¹⁸ In such an instance, if the woman were to say that she never agreed to her husband's spending more than 30 days away from her, the get
¹⁹ The husband gave his wife the get
²⁰ I.e., according to Scriptural law, since the condition was fulfilled, and there is no evidence that the couple resolved their differences, the get


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:10
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:10)

וְכֵן כָּל הַתְּנָאִין שֶׁהֵן תְּלוּיִין בִּרְצוֹנָהּ וְאִם רָצָת וּמָחֲלָה אוֹתָן לְבַעְלָהּ בָּטֵל הַגֵּט חוֹשְׁשִׁין לָהּ שֶׁמָּא פִּיֵּס עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר נֶאֱמֶנֶת עָלַי. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים בְּמִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת מִן הַנִּשּׂוּאִין שֶׁלִּבּוֹ גַּס בָּהּ אֲבָל בְּמִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת מִן הָאֵרוּסִין אֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין לוֹ שֶׁמָּא פִּיֵּס:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
A similar [principle applies with regard to] all conditions that are dependent on her will, and the *get* would be nullified if she was willing to forego these conditions in favor of her husband. We suspect that perhaps he appeased her,²¹ unless he said: "I accept her word...."
When does the above apply? When the woman is divorced after *nisu'in*, for he is familiar with her.²² When, however, [a husband] divorces [his wife] after [merely] consecrating her, we do not suspect that he appeased her.

footnotes:
²¹ Hence, the divorce is unacceptable.
²² And we assume that because of their familiarity, he knows how to appease her, and she is more willing to accept his overtures.


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:11
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:11)

הֲרֵי זֶה גִּטֵּךְ מֵעַכְשָׁו אִם לֹא בָּאתִי מִכָּאן וְעַד שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ אֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין שֶׁמָּא בַּסֵּתֶר בָּא שֶׁאֵין דֶּרֶךְ בְּנֵי אָדָם לָבוֹא בְּצִנְעָה. וְאִם תָּם הַזְּמַן שֶׁקָּבַע וְלֹא בָּא הֲרֵי זוֹ מְגֹרֶשֶׁת. מֵת בְּתוֹךְ י״‎ב חדֶשׁ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר שֶׁיָּבוֹא וַהֲרֵי הִיא מְגֹרֶשֶׁת לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא בִּמְקוֹם יָבָם עַד אַחַר שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ כְּשֶׁיִּתְקַיֵּם הַתְּנַאי:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
[When a man gives his wife a *get* and tells her:] "This is your *get* [and it is effective] from the present time onward if I do not return within twelve months," we do not suspect that perhaps he returned in secrecy, for people do not generally come in secrecy. [Therefore,] if the time period he specified passes without his coming, the divorce is effective.²³ 76b. The Ra'avad interprets that passage more stringently and requires the husband to have accepted his wife's statements as to whether or not he came as binding. Otherwise, we suspect that he came in secrecy. The *Shulchan Aruch* (*Even HaEzer* 144:7) follows the Rambam's view, but states that *a priori*, it is customary to include the condition mentioned by the Ra'avad.
If he dies within the twelve months, although the divorce [will become] effective, for there is no way that he can come, if she would have been obligated to perform the rite of *yibbum*, she should not marry until the twelve months pass and the condition is fulfilled.²⁴ first.

footnotes:
²³ The Rambam's decision is based on his interpretation of Gittin
²⁴ If she desires to marry within the twelve months, she must undergo the rite of chalitzah


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:12
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:12)

בָּרִיא שֶׁהִתְנָה שֶׁיִּהְיֶה זֶה גֵּט אִם מַתִּי. אוֹ חוֹלֶה שֶׁהִתְנָה שֶׁיִּהְיֶה זֶה גֵּט אִם מַתִּי מֵחלִי זֶה לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. שֶׁמַּשְׁמָעוּת אִם מַתִּי לְאַחַר מִיתָה וּמַשְׁמָעוֹ מֵעַתָּה. לְפִיכָךְ אִם אָמַר אִם מַתִּי הֲרֵי זֶה כְּאוֹמֵר לְאַחַר מוֹתִי וְאֵין גֵּט לְאַחַר מִיתָה:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
When a healthy person [divorces his wife] on the condition that the *get* take effect if he dies, and when a sick person [divorces his wife] on the condition that the *get* take effect if he dies from the illness afflicting him,²⁵ (*Even HaEzer* 145:8) quotes the Rashba, who states that even if a sick person does not specify that he die from the illness afflicting him, we assume that this is his intent. their statements are of no consequence.²⁶ would be to free his wife of the obligation of *yibbum* or *chalitzah*. Similarly, the subsequent halachot refer to *gittin* given for this purpose. The expression "if I die" implies [that it takes effect] after his death. [Alternatively,] the intent is that [it take effect] retroactively [if he dies]. [Because of the doubt involved,] if [a man] uses the expression "If I die...," it is considered as if he said "after my death." [The *get* is therefore void, because] there is no concept of divorce after a person's death.²⁷ indicates that the husband desires that the *get* take effect retroactively. The *Shulchan Aruch* (*Even HaEzer* 145:1) quotes the Rambam's view, but mentions a minority opinion that takes the Ra'avad's view into consideration.

footnotes:
²⁵ The Shulchan Aruch
²⁶ I.e., the advantage of such a get
²⁷ The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam's ruling. He maintains that the date of the get


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:13
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:13)

אָמַר לָהּ הֲרֵי זֶה גִּטֵּךְ מֵעַכְשָׁו אִם מַתִּי אוֹ מֵהַיּוֹם אִם מַתִּי הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט וּכְשֶׁיָּמוּת תִּהְיֶה מְגֹרֶשֶׁת:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
If, [however, the husband] tells her: "This is your *get*. If I die, [it is effective retroactively] from the present time," or "...If I die, [it is effective retroactively] from the present day,"²⁸ quote Rabbenu Tam as stating that it is preferable for the person to say: "from the present time," rather than "from the present day," lest he die before the conclusion of the day. The *Shulchan Aruch* (*Even HaEzer* 145:2) quotes this suggestion. the *get* is valid. When he dies, [his wife] is divorced.

footnotes:
²⁸ The Hagahot Maimoniot


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:14
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:14)

אָמַר לָהּ הֲרֵי זֶה גִּטֵּךְ מֵעַכְשָׁו אוֹ מֵהַיּוֹם לְאַחַר מִיתָתִי וּמֵת הֲרֵי זוֹ סָפֵק מְגֹרֶשֶׁת שֶׁמָּא אַחַר שֶׁאָמַר מֵעַכְשָׁו חָזַר בּוֹ מִלְּשׁוֹן מֵעַכְשָׁו וְסָמְכָה דַּעְתּוֹ עַל לְאַחַר מִיתָה וְאֵין גֵּט לְאַחַר מִיתָה:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
[If a husband] says: "This is your *get*. If I die, [it is effective retroactively] from the present time - or from the present day - after my death," when [the husband] dies, the status of his wife's divorce is in doubt.²⁹ before marrying, and may not perform the rite of *yibbum*. As stated in *Hilchot Ishut* 18:25, such a woman is not entitled to receive support from her husband's estate after his death. [We suspect that] perhaps, after saying "from the present time," he changed his mind and [did not desire that the *get* become effective] from the present time, and instead take effect after his death. And there is no concept of divorce after a person's death.

footnotes:
²⁹ Therefore, if childless, she must perform the rite of chalitzah


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:15
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:15)

הֲרֵי זֶה גִּטֵּךְ לִכְשֶׁתֵּצֵא חַמָּה מִנַּרְתֵּקָהּ וּמֵת בַּלַּיְלָה אֵינוֹ גֵּט. עַל מְנָת שֶׁתִּזְרַח חַמָּה וּמֵת בַּלַּיְלָה הֲרֵי זוֹ מְגֹרֶשֶׁת וּכְשֶׁתִּזְרַח חַמָּה יִתְקַיֵּם הַתְּנַאי. הִתְנָה עָלֶיהָ שֶׁאִם זָרְחָה חַמָּה יִהְיֶה גֵּט וְאִם לֹא זָרְחָה לֹא יִהְיֶה גֵּט וּמֵת בַּלַּיְלָה אֵינוֹ גֵּט שֶׁהֲרֵי לֹא נִתְקַיֵּם הַתְּנַאי עַד שֶׁמֵּת וְאֵין גֵּט לְאַחַר מִיתָה:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
[If a husband] says: "This is your *get*. [It becomes effective] when the sun emerges from its shield," it is not effective if he dies that night.³⁰ does not become effective until the morning. Since he died beforehand, a *get* cannot be effective after death. [If he gave the *get*] on the condition that the sun shine and he dies that night, the *get* is effective, for when the sun shines [on the following day], the condition that he established becomes fulfilled.³¹ given "on the condition that" becomes effective retroactively from the time it was originally given, once the condition is fulfilled.
If [the husband gives a *get* and] establishes a condition: "If the sun shines, the *get* is effective. But if it does not shine, it is not effective," [the *get*] is not effective if he dies at night. For the condition was not fulfilled until after he died,³² given according to the rules of conditional agreements is not effective until the condition is fulfilled. and there is no concept of divorce after a person's death.

footnotes:
³⁰ For the get
³¹ For a get
³² A get


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:16
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:16)

שְׁכִיב מֵרַע שֶׁכָּתַב גֵּט לְאִשְׁתּוֹ וְגֵרֵשׁ וְעָמַד אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לַחֲזֹר בּוֹ שֶׁאֵין גִּטּוֹ כְּמַתְּנָתוֹ. שֶׁאִם תֹּאמַר יַחֲזֹר בּוֹ יֹאמְרוּ גִּטּוֹ לְאַחַר מִיתָה יְגָרֵשׁ כְּמוֹ מַתְּנָתוֹ שֶׁאֵינָהּ קוֹנָה אֶלָּא לְאַחַר מִיתָה:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
When a person who is mortally ill has a *get* written for his wife and divorces her and then recovers, he cannot retract the divorce. A divorce [performed by a person in such a state] is not [governed by] the same laws as a present he gives.³³ 8:14, when a person who is mortally ill gives away all of his property as a present and then recovers, the present is automatically retracted, for we assume that his intent was solely to distribute his property after his death. [The rationale for this distinction is] that if he were given the prerogative of retracting, the divorce would appear to take effect after death, in the same way that a present he gives is not legally transferred until after death.³⁴

footnotes:
³³ As stated in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah
³⁴ Thus, the two laws are in direct contradiction. A present given by a dying man does not take effect until after he dies, and a divorce that he grants cannot take effect after he dies.


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:17
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:17)

הֲרֵי זֶה גִּטֵּךְ מֵהַיּוֹם אִם מַתִּי מֵחלִי זֶה וְנָפַל עָלָיו בַּיִת אוֹ נְשָׁכוֹ נָחָשׁ אוֹ טְרָפוֹ אֲרִי וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה וּמֵת אֵינוֹ גֵּט:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
[If a husband says:] "This is your *get*. [It is effective retroactively] from the present day if I die from this illness," and his house collapses upon him, he is bit by a snake, devoured by a lion or dies because of other similar causes, the divorce is not effective.³⁵ 73a).

footnotes:
³⁵ For the condition that he stated was not fulfilled (Gittin


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:18
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:18)

אָמַר לָהּ אִם לֹא יַעֲמֹד מֵחלִי זֶה וְנָפַל עָלָיו בַּיִת אוֹ נְשָׁכוֹ נָחָשׁ אוֹ טְרָפוֹ אֲרִי הֲרֵי זוֹ סָפֵק מְגֹרֶשֶׁת. הֲרֵי זֶה גִּטֵּךְ מֵעַכְשָׁו אִם מַתִּי מֵחלִי זֶה וְעָמַד וְהָלַךְ בַּשּׁוּק וְחָלָה וּמֵת אוֹמְדִין אוֹתוֹ אִם מֵחֲמַת הַחלִי הָרִאשׁוֹן מֵת הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט וְאִם לָאו אֵינוֹ גֵּט. וְאִם נִתַּק מֵחלִי לְחלִי וְלֹא עָמַד בַּשּׁוּק הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט וְאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ אֹמֶד:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
[If, by contrast,] he tells her: "...if I do not arise from this sickness," and his house collapses upon him, he is bit by a snake or devoured by a lion, the status of the divorce is in doubt.³⁶ on the condition that he die from the illness afflicting him, and this was not the case (*Gittin* 73a).
[The following rules apply when a husband tells his wife:] "Here is your *get*. [It is effective retroactively] from the present day if I die from this illness," and then rises [from his sickbed], walks in the marketplace,³⁷ 8:26. and afterwards falls ill and dies. We make an assessment. If he died from the first illness, the divorce is effective. If not, it is not effective. If he progresses from one illness to another illness,³⁸ 145:14, who states that, according to the Rambam, for the divorce to be effective the man must still be afflicted with the first illness when he dies. Note the contrast to *Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah* 8:27. and does not arise [and walk] in the marketplace, the divorce is effective. There is no need to make an assessment.

footnotes:
³⁶ On the one hand, he did not arise from his sickbed. On the other hand, there is reason to assume that his intent was that he is giving the get
³⁷ This applies even if he walks in the marketplace without any support. Since he did not regain his health entirely, it is necessary to determine whether or not he died from the first illness. Note the contrast to Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah
³⁸ Note the Beit Shmuel


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:19
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:19)

וּבְכָל אֵלּוּ הַתְּנָאִין כָּל הַיָּמִים שֶׁמִּנְּתִינַת הַגֵּט עַד שֶׁיָּמוּת וְיִתְקַיֵּם הַתְּנַאי הֲרֵי הִיא מְגֹרֶשֶׁת לְכָל דָּבָר. וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא תִּתְיַחֵד עִמּוֹ כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
With regard to all the conditions [mentioned above], during the days between the giving of the *get* and his death [with its consequent] fulfillment of the condition, she is considered to be a divorced woman with regard to all matters,³⁹ provided he does not enter into privacy with her, as explained.⁴⁰ beforehand.

footnotes:
³⁹ I.e., he has none of the privileges of a husband - e.g., he is not entitled to her earnings, he may not nullify her vows, and if he is a priest, he may not become impure because of her in the event of her death. With regard to paying for the woman's support, most authorities maintain that the husband is liable. There is no explicit statement from the Rambam regarding this issue.
⁴⁰ In such an instance, we suspect that the couple may have engaged in marital relations, and that the husband nullified the get


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:20
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:20)

חוֹלֶה שֶׁרָצָה לְגָרֵשׁ אִשְׁתּוֹ עַל תְּנַאי כְּשֶׁיָּמוּת כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא תִּפּל לִפְנֵי יָבָם וְאִם עָמַד לֹא תִּהְיֶה מְגֹרֶשֶׁת וְלֹא רָצָה לְגָרְשָׁהּ מֵעַכְשָׁו כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא תִּטָּרֵף דַּעְתּוֹ. כָּךְ הוּא כּוֹתֵב בַּגֵּט אַחַר שֶׁכּוֹתֵב הַתֹּרֶף אוֹ אוֹמֵר לָהּ כְּשֶׁנּוֹתֵן הַגֵּט. אִם לֹא מַתִּי לֹא יִהְיֶה גֵּט וְאִם מַתִּי יִהְיֶה גֵּט וְאִם לֹא מַתִּי לֹא יִהְיֶה גֵּט. כְּדֵי שֶׁתִּהְיֶה תְּנַאי כָּפוּל וְהֵן קֹדֶם לְלָאו וְלֹא יִפְתַּח פִּיו תְּחִלָּה לְפֻרְעָנוּת. וְאִם מֵת תִּהְיֶה מְגֹרֶשֶׁת כְּשֶׁיָּמוּת. וְהוּא שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ הַגֵּט לְיָדָהּ קֹדֶם מִיתָה:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
[The following rules apply when] a sick person desires to divorce his wife conditionally, so that if he dies she will not be obligated to perform the rite of *yibbum*, but if he recovers, the divorce will not be effective; he does not desire that the *get* take effect [retroactively] from the time he gives it, lest the matter be overly disturbing for him.
He should write the following in the *get* after writing the essential portion; alternatively, he should make these statements when he gives [his wife] the *get*: "If I do not die, this *get* will not be effective. If I die, this *get* will be effective. If I do not die, this *get* will not be effective." In this manner, the conditional factor is repeated. The positive factor is stated before the negative factor,⁴¹. and the person's opening remarks do not speak of misfortune.
[If a *get* is given with such a condition,] the divorce will take effect when [the husband] dies,⁴² questions the Rambam's ruling, noting that from his previous decisions, it appears that unless the man says that the *get* will take effect retroactively *me'achshav*, "from this time onward," the *get* is not effective, because it does not take effect until after the man's death. Apparently, the Rambam maintains that the restatement of the condition resolves that difficulty, but this concept is not accepted by many other authorities. When stating this law, the *Shulchan Aruch* (*Even HaEzer* 145:5) quotes the Rambam's wording, but adds the word *me'achshav*. provided that the *get* reaches the woman before his death.

footnotes:
⁴¹ I.e., the requirement is not that the positive factor be stated first, but that it be stated before the negative factor. This is accomplished by restating the condition that would negate the get
⁴² The Maggid Mishneh


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:21
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:21)

בַּעַל שֶׁאָמַר לְאֶחָד זְכֵה בְּגֵט זֶה לְאִשְׁתִּי כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא תִּפּל לִפְנֵי יָבָם וְנָתַן הַגֵּט לְיָדוֹ וּמֵת הַבַּעַל קֹדֶם שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ הַגֵּט לְיָדָהּ הֲרֵי זוֹ סָפֵק מְגֹרֶשֶׁת. שֶׁרֹב הַנָּשִׁים זְכוּת הוּא לָהֶן שֶׁלֹּא יִפְּלוּ לִפְנֵי יָבָם. וּלְפִיכָךְ תִּהְיֶה סְפֵק מְגֹרֶשֶׁת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הִגִּיעַ גֵּט לְיָדָהּ הוֹאִיל וְזָכָה לָהּ בּוֹ אַחֵר:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
When a husband tells a colleague:⁴³. The husband appointed him as her agent, because he felt that she would not desire to marry her *yavam*. According to Torah law, one may perform an action on a person's behalf without his knowledge if it is to his advantage - e.g., one may take possession of an ownerless object on behalf of a colleague without asking him. Hence, it is possible to assume that the agent can act on behalf of the woman without her knowledge (*Yevamot* 118b). "Acquire this *get* on behalf of my wife, so that she will not be required to fulfill the rite of *yibbum*," and gives him the *get*, but the husband dies before the *get* reaches [the woman], the status of the divorce is in doubt. [Although there are times when a woman would be willing to marry the *yavam*,] it is to the advantage of most women not to be required to fulfill the rite of *yibbum*. Therefore, even though the *get* did not reach the woman, since another person acquired it on her behalf, the status of the divorce is in doubt.

footnotes:
⁴³ I.e., the colleague was not appointed by the wife to serve as an agent to receive the get


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:22
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:22](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:22)

אָמַר לָעֵדִים לְאַחַר שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ כִּתְבוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר לָהֶם כִּתְבוּ וּתְנוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי לְאַחַר י״‎ב חֹדֶשׁ. הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ כּוֹתְבִין וְנוֹתְנִין לָהּ אַחַר הַזְּמַן שֶׁקָּבַע. וְאִם כְּתָבוּהוּ בְּתוֹךְ הַזְּמַן אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנְּתָנוּהוּ לָהּ לְאַחַר זְמַן שֶׁאָמַר אֵינוֹ גֵּט. כְּתָבוּהוּ אַחַר זְמַן שֶׁאָמַר וּמֵת קֹדֶם שֶׁיִּנָּתֵן לָהּ אֵינוֹ גֵּט. וְאִם לֹא נוֹדַע אִם מִיתָה קָדְמָה לִנְתִינַת הַגֵּט אוֹ נְתִינַת הַגֵּט קָדְמָה לְמִיתָה הֲרֵי זוֹ סָפֵק מְגֹרֶשֶׁת:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
When [a man] tells witnesses: "Write a *get* for my wife after twelve months," or "Write a *get* for my wife and give it to her after twelve months," they should write [the *get*] and give it to her after the time he specified. If they write it within the time he specified,⁴⁴ 76b). it is void, even if they do not give it to the woman until afterwards.
If they write it after the time he specified, but [the husband] dies before they give it to her, it is void. If it is not known whether he died before the *get* was given, or the *get* was given before he died, the status of the divorce is in doubt.

footnotes:
⁴⁴ Because by writing it within this time, they deviated from the instructions with which they were charged (Gittin


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:23
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:23](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:23)

אָמַר לָהֶן כִּתְבוּ וּתְנוּ לְאִשְׁתִּי גֵּט אַחַר הַשָּׁבוּעַ. אֵין כּוֹתְבִין אֶלָּא עַד שָׁנָה אַחַר הַשָּׁבוּעַ. אָמַר לָהֶן לְאַחַר שָׁנָה אֵין כּוֹתְבִין [אֶלָּא] עַד לְאַחַר חֹדֶשׁ מִשָּׁנָה שְׁנִיָּה. אָמַר לָהֶן לְאַחַר הַחֹדֶשׁ (אֵין) כּוֹתְבִין עַד לְאַחַר הַשַּׁבָּת מֵחֹדֶשׁ שֵׁנִי. אָמַר לְאַחַר שַׁבָּת (אֵין) כּוֹתְבִין לְאַחַר הַשַּׁבָּת עַד סוֹף יוֹם שְׁלִישִׁי. אָמַר לָהֶן כִּתְבוּ וּתְנוּ לָהּ קֹדֶם הַשַּׁבָּת כּוֹתְבִין מִיּוֹם רְבִיעִי וְעַד סוֹף יוֹם שִׁשִּׁי וְנוֹתְנִין לָהּ:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
[If a husband] instructs [agents]: "Write a *get* for my wife and give it to her after the Sabbatical cycle," they must write it within the first year after the conclusion of the Sabbatical cycle.⁴⁵ may be written immediately after the time specified and should not be written after a prolonged period has elapsed from that time. If he told them: "...after a year," they must write it during the first month of the coming year.
If he told them: "...after a month," they must write it during the first week of the coming month. If he told them: "...after the Sabbath," they must write it before the end of Tuesday. If he told them: "...before the Sabbath," they must write it between Wednesday and the end of Friday.

footnotes:
⁴⁵ I.e., although the wording of the Hebrew original could possibly be interpreted otherwise, the commentaries agree that the Rambam's intent is that the get


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:24
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:24](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:24)

הֲרֵי שֶׁאֵחֲרוּ אַחַר הַזְּמַן שֶׁאָמַר וְאַחַר כָּךְ כָּתְבוּ וְנָתְנוּ לָהּ כְּגוֹן שֶׁאָמַר לָהֶן לְאַחַר הַחֹדֶשׁ וְכָתְבוּ וְנָתְנוּ לָהּ לְאַחַר שְׁתֵּי שַׁבָּתוֹת מֵחֹדֶשׁ שֵׁנִי הֲרֵי זֶה פָּסוּל:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
If they delayed and did not write and give the *get* at the time he specified - e.g., he told them "after a month," and they wrote the *get* and gave it to her after two weeks had passed in the second month, the *get* is unacceptable.⁴⁶ is unacceptable because the husband's words also imply a restriction, that the *get* should be written directly afterwards and not after a prolonged period. Indeed, for this reason, Rabbenu Nissim [and the *Shulchan Aruch* (*Even HaEzer* 144:6)] rule that in such a situation, the status of the divorce is in doubt. In defense of the Rambam's ruling, the commentaries explain that even though the husband's intent may have been that the *get* be given immediately, since the wording he used could be interpreted to mean after a prolonged period, the *get* is acceptable according to Scriptural law.

footnotes:
⁴⁶ The get


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:25
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:25](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:25)

נִתְיַחֵד עִמָּהּ אַחַר שֶׁאָמַר לָהֶן לִכְתֹּב וְלַחְתֹּם וְלִתֵּן לָהּ הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ לֹא יִכְתְּבוּ. וְקַל וָחֹמֶר הַדְּבָרִים אִם הַגֵּט שֶׁנָּתַן לָהּ לְיָדָהּ כְּשֶׁנִּתְיַחֵד עִמָּהּ נִפְסַל הַגֵּט שֶׁמָּא בָּעַל. קַל וָחֹמֶר לָזֶה שֶׁלֹּא נִכְתַּב. וְאִם כְּתָבוֹ וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ אַחַר שֶׁנִּתְיַחֵד עִמָּהּ אֵינוֹ גֵּט:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
If [the husband] entered into privacy with [his wife] after he told [agents] to write [a *get*], sign it and give it to her, they should not write it. One can make an [obvious] inference. If a *get* that he gave her is disqualified⁴⁷ is in doubt." when he enters into privacy with her, lest they have engaged in marital relations, how much more so should a *get* that was not yet written [be left unwritten]. If [the agents] wrote the *get* and gave it to her after he entered into privacy with her, the *get* is void.⁴⁸ given by a husband after he entered into privacy with his wife, the Rambam rules that after the fact, the *get* is acceptable.
[It is possible to differentiate between the two instances, because in that halachah, the husband himself gave the woman the *get*. This is a greater indication that he did not nullify it (*Maggid Mishneh*). Even after that explanation, however, the Rambam's ruling in this halachah raises questions.]
When referring to this law, the *Shulchan Aruch* (*Even HaEzer* 149:7) accepts the ruling that at the outset, the witnesses should not have such a *get* written, but follows the ruling of the Ramban and the Rashba, who maintain that if they had the *get* written and gave it to the woman, the status of the divorce is in doubt.

footnotes:
⁴⁷ The Rambam is referring to his statements in Chapter 8, Halachah 2. There, however, he uses the expression, "the status of the get
⁴⁸ The commentaries question the Rambam's decision, explaining that although there is a possibility that the couple engaged in marital relations and the husband consecrated her at that time (see Chapter 10, Halachah 18), it is also possible that this did not take place. Indeed, in Chapter 3, Halachah 5, with reference to a get


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:26
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:26](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:26)

אָמַר לַעֲשָׂרָה כִּתְבוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי אֶחָד כּוֹתֵב עַל יְדֵי כֻּלָּם. כֻּלְּכֶם כִּתְבוּ כּוֹתֵב אֶחָד מֵהֶם בְּמַעֲמַד כֻּלָּם. הוֹלִיכוּ גֵּט זֶה לְאִשְׁתִּי מוֹלִיכוֹ אֶחָד מֵהֶן עַל יְדֵי כֻּלָּם. כֻּלְּכֶם הוֹלִיכוּ גֵּט זֶה לְאִשְׁתִּי מוֹלִיכוֹ אֶחָד מֵהֶן בְּמַעֲמַד כֻּלָּם:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
[If a man] tells ten people: "Write a *get* for my wife," one of them should write it on behalf of all of them. [If he tells them:] "All of you, write it," one should write it in the presence of all of them.
[If he tells them:] "Bring this *get* to my wife," one of them should bring it to her on behalf of all of them. [If he tells them:] "All of you, bring this *get* to my wife," one should bring it [to her] in the presence of all of them.⁴⁹

footnotes:
⁴⁹ This is the ruling according to Scriptural law. See, however, Halachah 28.


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:27
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:27](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:27)

אָמַר לַעֲשָׂרָה כִּתְבוּ גֵּט וְחִתְמוּ וּתְנוּ לְאִשְׁתִּי אֶחָד מֵהֶן כּוֹתֵב וּשְׁנַיִם מֵהֶן חוֹתְמִין וְאֶחָד מֵהֶן נוֹתְנוֹ לָהּ. וַאֲפִלּוּ הָיָה הַכּוֹתֵב אֶחָד מִשְּׁנֵי הָעֵדִים שֶׁחָתְמוּ בּוֹ וְהוּא הַשָּׁלִיחַ שֶׁנְּתָנוֹ לָהּ הֲרֵי זֶה כָּשֵׁר. אָמַר לָהֶן כֻּלְּכֶם חֲתֹמוּ כֻּלָּם חוֹתְמִין. וְאִם מְנָאָן בֵּין שֶׁמָּנָה כֻּלָּם בֵּין שֶׁמָּנָה מִקְצָתָן וְאָמַר לָהֶן חֲתֹמוּ הֲרֵי זֶה כְּאוֹמֵר לָהֶן כֻּלְּכֶם חֲתֹמוּ וּשְׁנַיִם שֶׁחוֹתְמִין בַּתְּחִלָּה הֵן מִשּׁוּם עֵדִים וְהַשְּׁאָר מִשּׁוּם תְּנַאי. לְפִיכָךְ אִם הָיוּ הַשְּׁאָר פְּסוּלִין אוֹ חָתְמוּ זֶה הַיּוֹם וְזֶה לְמָחָר אֲפִלּוּ לְיָמִים הַרְבֵּה הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט כָּשֵׁר. מֵת אֶחָד מֵהֶן קֹדֶם חֲתִימָה הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט בָּטֵל. הָיָה אֶחָד מִשְּׁנַיִם הָרִאשׁוֹנִים פָּסוּל הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט פָּסוּל. שֶׁמָּא יֹאמְרוּ עֵד פָּסוּל כָּשֵׁר בְּעֵדוּת שְׁאָר שְׁטָרוֹת בְּעֵת שֶׁיִּהְיוּ הָעֵדִים רַבִּים וְלֹא הִכְשִׁירוּהוּ בְּגֵט שֶׁעֵדָיו רַבִּים אֶלָּא מִפְּנֵי שֶׁעֵדֵי מְסִירָה הֵן הָעִקָּר:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
[If a man] tells ten people: "Write a *get*, sign it and give it to my wife," one of them should write it, two should sign it, and one should give it to her. It is acceptable even if one person writes it, he serves as one of the two witnesses who signs it, and he serves as the agent who gives it to her.⁵⁰. In his *Kessef Mishneh*, Rav Yosef Karo states that even the Rambam agrees that at the outset, a scribe should not sign as a witness. After the fact, however, the Rambam maintains that his signature does not disqualify the *get*. In his *Shulchan Aruch* (*Even HaEzer* 130:18), Rav Yosef Karo writes: "One should be careful not to have the scribe sign as a witness, because there are authorities who disqualify this."
If [the husband] tells them: "All of you sign it," they must all sign it. If the husband counted the people - whether he counted all of them or merely some of them⁵¹..." (*Chelkat Mechokek* 120:18). - and told them to sign it, it is considered as if he told all of them to sign it. The two who sign it at the outset act as witnesses,⁵². Other authorities do not make this requirement and maintain that it is only chronological precedence that is significant (*Beit Shmuel* 120:14). while the others [should sign it to complete] the stipulation [the husband] made.
Accordingly, if the remaining witnesses were unacceptable, or one signed it on the day the *get* was written and the others on subsequent days⁵³ on the day that it was written (Chapter 1, Halachah 25). - even several days after [the *get* was written],⁵⁴ (*Even HaEzer* 120:9) states that they may sign the *get* to fulfill the condition even after it was given to the woman. The Ramah adds that this may be done even after she has remarried. the *get* is acceptable.⁵⁵ and subsequent Ashkenazic authorities differ and maintain that for the *get* to be valid, all the witnesses must be acceptable. The *Shulchan Aruch* (*Even HaEzer* 120:10) mentions both views, but appears to favor that of the Rambam. The Ramah follows *Tosafot's* ruling.
If one of them died before signing it, the *get* is void.⁵⁶ were not fulfilled. If one of the first witnesses who signed it was unacceptable, the *get* is unacceptable, lest it be said that an unacceptable witness may sign other legal documents when many witnesses sign.⁵⁷ 5:6-7, which states that if persons who are unacceptable as witnesses signed a legal document with the intent of serving as witnesses, the document is disqualified, even if two acceptable witnesses signed it first. If, however, the persons who were unacceptable did not sign the document with the intent of serving as witnesses, the document is acceptable, even if the signature of the unacceptable person appears first. The only reason [our Sages] accepted [such signatures] with regard to a *get* signed by many witnesses is that the witnesses who observe the transfer are of fundamental importance.⁵⁸, it is the witnesses who observe the transfer who are of primary importance. Therefore, if the initial two signatures to the *get* are acceptable, we are not concerned with those who sign subsequently (*Maggid Mishneh; Kessef Mishneh, Hilchot Edut*).

footnotes:
⁵⁰ There are many authorities who object to this ruling, maintaining that the scribe cannot sign as a witness to the get
⁵¹ I.e., speaking to the people, he said: "One, two, three, four, write a get
⁵² According to the Rambam, it appears that not only must the signatures of the acceptable witnesses be first chronologically, but they must also appear first on the get
⁵³ The two witnesses whose signatures are required must sign the get
⁵⁴ The Shulchan Aruch
⁵⁵ Tosafot
⁵⁶ Because the instructions that the husband gave concerning the get
⁵⁷ See Hilchot Edut
⁵⁸ As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 15. With regard to other legal documents, the witnesses who sign the contract are of paramount importance, and they must all therefore be acceptable. The witnesses who observe its transfer are less significant. But with regard to gittin


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:28
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:28](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:28)

תִּקְּנוּ חֲכָמִים שֶׁהָאוֹמֵר לְרַבִּים לִכְתֹּב גֵּט אוֹ לַחְתֹּם אוֹ לְהוֹלִיךְ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתּוֹ. אִם לִכְתִיבָה אוֹמֵר לָהֶן כָּל אֶחָד מִכֶּם יִכְתֹּב גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי וְכֵן לְהוֹלָכָה כָּל אֶחָד מִכֶּם יוֹלִיךְ. וְאִם לַחֲתִימָה יֹאמַר לָהֶן כָּל שְׁנַיִם מִכֶּם יַחְתְּמוּ בְּגֵט זֶה וְיִתְּנוּ לְאִשְׁתִּי:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
Our Sages established the [following] rules with regard to a person who tells many people to write, sign, or bring a *get* for his wife.⁵⁹, and they not appreciate that they were all charged with this responsibility. Lest some of them fail to discharge this responsibility and thus cause the *get* to be void, our Sages required that whenever many people are instructed to be involved in a *get*, they all must take full participatory roles. With regard to writing, he should tell them: "Any one of you may write a *get* for my wife." Similarly, with regard to bringing [the *get*], [he should say]: "Any one of you may bring...." With regard to signing, he should tell them: "Any pair of you should sign this *get* and give it to my wife."

footnotes:
⁵⁹ These rules were instituted lest the the husband tell a group of people that they all should write, sign or bring a get


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:29
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:29](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:29)

וְלָמָּה אָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים עֵדֵי הַגֵּט אֵין חוֹתְמִין אֶלָּא זֶה בִּפְנֵי זֶה גְּזֵרָה שֶׁמָּא יֹאמַר לְרַבִּים כֻּלְּכֶם חֲתֹמוּ. אִם תֹּאמַר חוֹתְמִין זֶה שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי זֶה שֶׁמָּא יָעִידוּ שְׁנַיִם וְתִטּל הַגֵּט בְּיָדָהּ וְתַחְשֹׁב שֶׁכְּבָר הֵעִידוּ בּוֹ וַעֲדַיִן לֹא נִתְקַיֵּם הַתְּנַאי:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
Why did our Sages state that the witnesses to a *get* should sign only in each other's presence?⁶⁰ 10b. If the witnesses do not sign in each other's presence, the *get* is unacceptable (*Shulchan Aruch*, *Even HaEzer* 130:13). [This is] a decree, [instituted] lest a person tell many others: "All of you sign [as witnesses]." If it were possible for witnesses to sign outside the presence of the other witnesses, two witnesses might sign the *get*, and the woman might take it and think that it does not require any more witnesses, [when in fact] the condition that [the husband made] was not fulfilled.

footnotes:
⁶⁰ See Chapter 1, Halachah 24, based on Gittin


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:30
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:30](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:30)

אָמַר לִשְׁלֹשָׁה שְׁנַיִם מִכֶּם יִכְתְּבוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי וְיַחְתְּמוּ וְיִתְּנוּ לָהּ וְהָיָה בָּהֶן אָב וּבְנוֹ בֵּין שֶׁחָתַם הַבֵּן עִם הָאֶחָד בֵּין שֶׁחָתַם הָאָב עִם הָאֶחָד הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט כָּשֵׁר. שֶׁהָאָדָם עוֹשֶׂה הַבֵּן שָׁלִיחַ בִּמְקוֹם הָאָב:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
If [a man] tells three people, including a father and a son, "Two of you should write a *get* for my wife, sign it and give it to her," the *get* is acceptable whether the son signs with the other person or the father signs with the other person.⁶¹ [The son may serve in this capacity] because a person may appoint a son as an agent instead of his father.

footnotes:
⁶¹ The father and the son may not both sign as witnesses, because witnesses may not be related to each other.


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:31
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:31](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:31)

אָמַר לִשְׁנַיִם כִּתְבוּ וְחִתְמוּ וּתְנוּ לִפְלוֹנִי שֶׁיּוֹלִיךְ לְאִשְׁתִּי. אוֹ תְּנוּ לְשָׁלִיחַ שֶׁיּוֹלִיךְ לָהּ. אֶחָד מֵהֶן כּוֹתֵב וּשְׁנֵיהֶם חוֹתְמִין וְנוֹתְנִין לַשָּׁלִיחַ. וְאִם הוֹלִיכוּ הֵן בְּעַצְמָן וְנָתְנוּ לָהּ אֵינוֹ גֵּט שֶׁלֹּא עָשָׂה אוֹתָן שְׁלוּחִין לְגֵרוּשִׁין. כֵּיצַד יַעֲשׂוּ. יִטְּלוּ אוֹתוֹ מִמֶּנָּה וְיִתְּנוּהוּ לַשָּׁלִיחַ וְחוֹזֵר וְנוֹתְנוֹ לָהּ בִּפְנֵיהֶן אוֹ בִּפְנֵי אֲחֵרִים. וְרַבּוֹתַי הוֹרוּ בְּגֵט זֶה דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ נִרְאֶה מִפְּנֵי שִׁבּוּשׁ שֶׁהָיָה בַּנֻּסְחָאוֹת שֶׁלָּהֶן:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
When [a man] tells two [colleagues]: "Write [a *get*], sign it and give it to so and so to bring to my wife," or "...give it to [my] agent to bring to her," one of them should write it, and they should both sign it and give it to the agent. If they bring it to the woman themselves, the divorce is not effective, for they were not appointed as agents to effect the divorce.
What should they do [if in error they gave it to the woman]? They should take it back from her and give it to the agent, who should in turn give it back to the woman in their presence or in the presence of other [witnesses].
My teachers issued a ruling with regard to such a *get* that does not appear to be appropriate, because of a flaw that existed in the versions [of the Talmud] that they possessed.⁶² 63b. Significantly, the standard published texts of the Talmud available to us follow Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's version. The *Shulchan Aruch* (*Even HaEzer* 141:36) follows Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's conception and rules that the status of the divorce is in doubt. (See the notes of the *Beit Shmuel* 141:99, which explain the Rambam's interpretation.)

footnotes:
⁶² The Rambam is referring to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's interpretation of Gittin


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:32
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:32](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:32)

אָמַר לְסוֹפֵר כְּתֹב לִי גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי. כְּתָבוֹ וּנְתָנוֹ לַבַּעַל בְּלֹא עֵדִים וּנְטָלוֹ הַבַּעַל וּנְתָנוֹ לְשָׁלִיחַ וְאָמַר לוֹ תֵּן גֵּט זֶה לְאִשְׁתִּי בִּפְנֵי עֵדִים וְהָלַךְ הַשָּׁלִיחַ וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ בִּפְנֵי עֵדִים הֲרֵי זוֹ סְפֵק מְגֹרֶשֶׁת. שֶׁאֵין הַשָּׁלִיחַ נֶאֱמָן לְהַתִּיר הָעֶרְוָה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּא עֵד אֶחָד אֶלָּא מִפְּנֵי כְּתַב הָעֵדִים שֶׁחָתְמוּ עַל הַגֵּט שֶׁהֵן כְּמִי שֶׁנֶּחְקְרָה עֵדוּתָן בְּבֵית דִּין עַד שֶׁיִּהְיֶה שָׁם מְעַרְעֵר כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ שָׁם. וְאִם הָיוּ שָׁם שְׁנֵי עֵדִים שֶׁיָּעִידוּ שֶׁגֵּט זֶה הַבַּעַל נְתָנוֹ לַשָּׁלִיחַ לְגָרְשָׁהּ בּוֹ הֲרֵי זוֹ מְגֹרֶשֶׁת:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
[Our Sages ruled that] the status of a divorce is in doubt [in the following situation: A husband] tells a scribe: "Write me a *get* for my wife." [The scribe] wrote it and gave it to the husband, without this being observed by witnesses.⁶³ is not signed by witnesses. The husband took it, gave it to an agent,⁶⁴ and told him: "Give this *get* to my wife in the presence of witnesses." The agent [carried out the instructions] and gave it to [the woman] in the presence of witnesses.
[The rationale is] that since he is only a single witness, an agent's statements would not be accepted [as grounds] to permit a woman who was [previously] forbidden to marry, except for the fact [that his statements are supported by] the written statements of the witnesses who signed the *get*. [For the witnesses' statements] are considered as if they were testimony given in court until [the husband] lodges a protest, as we have explained.⁶⁵ 141:17, who asks why the Rambam distinguishes between this instance and an agent charged with consecrating a woman, whose word is accepted, as stated in *Hilchot Ishut* 3:15. The *Beit Shmuel* explains that the fact that the *get* is not signed detracts from the agent's credibility. For although a *get* is acceptable when it has not been signed, this is not desirable. Hence, we are more suspicious of the possibility of forgery. If there are two witnesses who observed the husband giving the *get* to the agent and instructing him to use it for the divorce, the divorce is binding.⁶⁶, the agent's actions are considered to be equivalent to those of the husband himself. Hence, just as a *get* given by the husband is acceptable after the fact if its transfer was observed by witnesses, even if the *get* was not signed, this same ruling applies when his agent gives the *get*.

footnotes:
⁶³ And thus the get
⁶⁴ According to the Rambam (Chapter 6, Halachah 4), the appointment of such an agent need not be observed by witnesses.
⁶⁵ See Chapter 7, Halachah 24. Note the question of the Beit Shmuel
⁶⁶ As long as there are witnesses who observe the transfer of the get


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:33
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:33](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:33)

הָאוֹמֵר לְשָׁלִיחַ תֵּן גֵּט זֶה לְאִשְׁתִּי בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר אֵינוֹ גֵּט. הֲרֵי הִיא בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר כָּשֵׁר מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמַּרְאֶה מָקוֹם הוּא לוֹ. אָמַר אַל תִּתְּנֵהוּ לָהּ אֶלָּא בַּבַּיִת וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ בָּעֲלִיָּה. אַל תִּתְּנֵהוּ לָהּ אֶלָּא בְּיָמִין וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ בִּשְׂמֹאל. תְּנֵהוּ לָהּ בְּיוֹם פְּלוֹנִי וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ בְּתוֹךְ הַזְּמַן אֵינוֹ גֵּט. אַל תִּתְּנֵהוּ לָהּ אֶלָּא בְּיוֹם פְּלוֹנִי וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ מִלְּפָנָיו אוֹ מֵאַחֲרָיו אֵינוֹ גֵּט שֶׁהֲרֵי הִקְפִּיד עַל עַצְמוֹ שֶׁל יוֹם. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
[When a husband] tells an agent: "Give this *get* to my wife in this and this place," the divorce is not effective if he gives it to her in another place.⁶⁷ must be given in that place. "...She is in this and this place," and the agent gave it to her in another place, [the *get*] is binding; he is merely pointing out the place.
Similarly, if he tells [the agent]: "Do not give it to her [anywhere] except in the house," and he gives it to her in the loft; "Do not give it to her except with your right hand," and he gives it to her with his left; "Give it to her on this and this day," and he gives it to her before that date; ⁶⁸ 141:63 and others rule that, in this instance, the *get* is binding if it is given after that date. Note, however, the *Mishneh LaMelech* who differs and rules that the divorce is disqualified by the Sages. the divorce is not effective. "Do not give it to her except on this and this day," the divorce is not effective if he gives it to the woman before or afterwards, for he indicated that he wanted the *get* to be given on that date. Similar rulings apply in all analogous situations.

footnotes:
⁶⁷ For the wording the husband used implies that he is stipulating that the get
⁶⁸ From the contrast with the following clause, the Beit Shmuel


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:34
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:34](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:34)

וְכֵן הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁאָמְרָה לִשְׁלוּחָהּ הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִּטִּי בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי וְקִבְּלוֹ לָהּ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר אֵינוֹ גֵּט. הָבֵא לִי גִּטִּי בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי וֶהֱבִיאוֹ לָהּ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר כָּשֵׁר:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
Similarly, when a woman tells her agent: "Receive my *get* for me in this and this place," and he receives it for her in another place, the divorce is not effective. [When she tells him:] "Bring me my *get* in this and this place," the *get* is acceptable if he brings it to her in another place.⁶⁹ from the agent in the place she receives it, the woman shows that she is not particular about where she receives it (*Maggid Mishneh* in his gloss on Chapter 6, Halachah 4). The Rambam's ruling indicates a slight textual difference from the popular version of *Gittin* 6:3, the source for this halachah. There is, however, no difference in principle between them.

footnotes:
⁶⁹ By accepting the get


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:35
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:35](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:35)

הָאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ הוֹלֵךְ גֵּט זֶה לְאִשְׁתִּי בֵּין שֶׁאָמַר לוֹ הוֹלֵךְ בֵּין שֶׁאָמַר לוֹ אַתְּ הוֹלֵךְ וְחָלָה אוֹ נֶאֱנַס מְשַׁלְּחוֹ בְּיַד אַחֵר. וְאִם אָמַר לוֹ טֹל מִמֶּנָּה חֵפֶץ פְּלוֹנִי וְתֵן לָהּ גֵּט זֶה הֲרֵי זֶה לֹא יְשַׁלְּחֶנּוּ בְּיַד אַחֵר. וְאִם שִׁלְּחוֹ בְּיַד אַחֵר וְיָצָאת הָאִשָּׁה לִקְרַאת הַשָּׁלִיחַ וְנָתְנָה הַחֵפֶץ תְּחִלָּה וְאַחַר כָּךְ נָתַן לָהּ הַגֵּט הֲרֵי זוֹ מְגֹרֶשֶׁת:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
When [a man] tells an agent: "Bring this *get* to my wife," the agent may send the *get* with another person if he becomes ill or is otherwise prevented [from bringing it to her] by forces beyond his control.⁷⁰ [This applies] regardless of whether he told him: "Bring it [to her]," or "You bring it [to her]."
If, however, [the husband] told [the agent]: "Take the following article from her and give her this *get*," the agent should not send the *get* via another individual.⁷¹ 29a) offers a different interpretation. (See *Beit Shmuel* 141:65.) If [the agent] did send [the *get*] via another individual, and the woman came out to greet the agent and she gave him the article, and afterwards he gave her the *get*, the divorce is binding.⁷² is acceptable, despite the fact that a person other than the one appointed by the husband gave the *get* to the woman.
Rabbenu Asher rules that even if the second agent takes the article before giving the woman the *get*, the divorce is not effective. Although Rabbenu Asher's ruling is also mentioned, the *Shulchan Aruch* (*Even HaEzer* 141:51) appears to follow the Rambam's decision.

footnotes:
⁷⁰ If, however, the agent is not prevented from discharging his agency, he should not charge another person with that responsibility. (See Chapter 7, Halachah 4 and notes.)
⁷¹ For it is likely that the principal would not desire that anyone other than the person he designated be given his article to guard. Rashi (Gittin
⁷² Since the second agent did not deviate from the husband's instructions, the get


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:36
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:36](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:36)

נָתַן לָהּ הַגֵּט תְּחִלָּה וְאַחַר כָּךְ נָתְנָה הַחֵפֶץ אֲפִלּוּ מִיַּד שָׁלִיחַ רִאשׁוֹן אֵינוֹ גֵּט שֶׁהֲרֵי עָבַר עַל דִּבְרֵי הַבַּעַל בְּדָבָר שֶׁסְּתָם בְּנֵי אָדָם מַקְפִּידִין עָלָיו. שֶׁהֲרֵי הַבַּעַל אָמַר לוֹ טֹל הַחֵפֶץ תְּחִלָּה וְתֵן לָהּ הַגֵּט וְהוּא נָתַן וְאַחַר כָּךְ נָטַל:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
If the agent - i.e., [either] the first [or the second] agent - gave the woman the *get* first and then she gave him the article, the divorce is not effective. [The rationale is] that [the agent] violated the husband's instructions with regard to a matter which, in general, would cause people to object.⁷³." Since the agent did not fulfill these instructions, the divorce is not valid. See the *Beit Shmuel* 141:66, who quotes opinions that state that if the husband's wording does not indicate that he definitely wants the agent to secure possession of the article before giving the *get*, the divorce is binding. For the husband told him: "Take the article first and then give her the *get*," and he gave [the *get*] first and then took [the article].

footnotes:
⁷³ I.e., the husband was in effect saying, "Make sure you get the article before you give her the get


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:37
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:37](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:37)

אָמַר לוֹ תֵּן לָהּ הַגֵּט וְטל מִמֶּנָּה חֵפֶץ פְּלוֹנִי הֲרֵי זֶה לֹא יְשַׁלְּחֶנּוּ בְּיַד אַחֵר שֶׁאֵין רְצוֹנוֹ שֶׁיִּהְיֶה פִּקְדוֹנוֹ בְּיַד אַחֵר. וְאִם שִׁלְּחוֹ בְּיַד אַחֵר הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט בֵּין שֶׁנָּתְנָה הַחֵפֶץ תְּחִלָּה בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא נָתְנָה אֶלָּא בַּסּוֹף:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
[If the husband] told the agent: "Give her the *get* and take this and this article from her," [the agent] should not send the *get* via another person, for [the principal] would not desire that his article be entrusted to a person [other than the one he appointed].
If, however, the agent sent it with another person, the divorce is binding. [This applies] regardless of whether she gave the article before [receiving the *get*] or afterwards.⁷⁴ first.
As mentioned in the *Maggid Mishneh*, the Ramban differs and maintains that for the divorce to be binding the woman must give the agent the article first.

footnotes:
⁷⁴ For in this instance, there is no obvious advantage to the principal in having the agent give the get


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:38
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:38](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:38)

נָתַן לְשָׁלִיחַ הַגֵּט וְאָמַר לוֹ לֹא תִּתְּנֵהוּ לָהּ אֶלָּא אַתָּה וּנְתָנוֹ לְאַחֵר וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ אֵינוֹ גֵּט. וְכֵן אִם אָמַר לוֹ אַל תִּתְּנֵהוּ לָהּ אַתָּה תְּנֵהוּ לִפְלוֹנִי וְהוּא יִתְּנֵהוּ לָהּ וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ הַשָּׁלִיחַ הָרִאשׁוֹן אֵינוֹ גֵּט. לְפִי שֶׁלֹּא עָשָׂהוּ שָׁלִיחַ לְגֵרוּשִׁין:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
[If the husband] gives an agent a *get* and tells him: "No one other than you should give it to her," the divorce is not effective, if the agent gives [the *get*] to another person who gives it to the woman.
Similarly, [if the husband] told the agent: "Do not give it to her yourself. Give it to so and so, and he will give it to her," the divorce is not effective if the first agent gives it to the woman. For he was not appointed as an agent to effect the divorce.


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:39
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:39](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:39)

נָתַן לוֹ הַגֵּט וְאָמַר לוֹ הוֹלֵךְ גֵּט זֶה לְאִשְׁתִּי. אָמַר לוֹ הַשָּׁלִיחַ אֵינִי מַכִּירָהּ. אָמַר לוֹ הַבַּעַל תְּנֵהוּ לִפְלוֹנִי הוּא מַכִּירָהּ. הֲרֵי זֶה שָׁלִיחַ שֶׁלֹּא נִתָּן לְגֵרוּשִׁין וְאֵינוֹ נוֹתֵן הַגֵּט אֶלָּא לִפְלוֹנִי שֶׁאָמַר הַבַּעַל וְאוֹתוֹ הַפְּלוֹנִי הוּא שָׁלִיחַ לְגֵרוּשִׁין הוּא שֶׁמּוֹלִיכוֹ לָהּ אוֹ מְשַׁלְּחוֹ בְּיַד אַחֵר אִם חָלָה אוֹ נֶאֱנַס:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
[A husband] gave [an agent] a *get* and told him: "Bring this *get* to my wife."
The agent told him: "I do not know who she is."
The husband replied: "Give it to so and so. He knows who she is."
The [first] agent has not been appointed as an agent to effect the divorce.⁷⁵, the divorce is not effective. As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 31, other opinions differ and maintain that in this instance, the status of the divorce is in doubt. All he can do is give the *get* to the person whom the husband designated. That person is the agent appointed to effect the divorce. He must bring [the *get* to the woman] or send it via another agent if he becomes ill or is prevented from doing so by forces beyond his control.

footnotes:
⁷⁵ According to the Rambam, if the first agent gives the woman the get


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:40
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:40](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:40)

נָתַן הַגֵּט לְשָׁלִיחַ וְאָמַר לוֹ לֹא תִּתְּנֵהוּ לָהּ עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם וְחָלָה אוֹ נֶאֱנַס בְּתוֹךְ הַשְּׁלֹשִׁים מְשַׁלְּחוֹ בְּיַד אַחֵר. שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ עַכְשָׁו שָׁלִיחַ לְגֵרוּשִׁין הוֹאִיל וּלְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם יִהְיֶה שְׁלִיחַ גֵּרוּשִׁין עוֹשֶׂה שָׁלִיחַ אַחֵר בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
When [a husband] gives an agent a *get* and tells him: "Do not give this *get* to my wife until after 30 days," [the agent] may send it to her via a second agent [whom he appoints] within the 30 days, if he becomes ill or is prevented from giving it to her by forces beyond his control.
[The rationale is that] even though at the time [he appoints the second agent] he is not charged with effecting the divorce, since he will function in that capacity after 30 days pass, he has the authority to appoint a second agent within the 30 days.⁷⁶ until the original 30 days have passed.
Rav Meir HaLevi states that we suspect that the first agent will not convey these instructions clearly to the second agent. Therefore, the first agent should entrust the *get* to the court, which will appoint a second agent after the 30 days have passed. Although the *Shulchan Aruch* (*Even HaEzer* 141:37) mentions this view, it appears that the Rambam's view is favored.

footnotes:
⁷⁶ Needless to say, the second agent should not give the woman the get


###### Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:41
[Mishneh Torah, Divorce 9:41](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Divorce/r/9:41)

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים בְּשֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בַּעְלָהּ עִמָּהּ בַּמְּדִינָה אוֹ שֶׁהָיְתָה מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת מִן הָאֵרוּסִין. אֲבָל אִם מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת מִן הַנִּשּׂוּאִין וּבַעְלָהּ עִמָּהּ בַּמְּדִינָה חוֹשְׁשִׁין לוֹ שֶׁמָּא פִּיֵּס. וְאֵינוֹ עוֹשֶׂה שָׁלִיחַ בְּתוֹךְ הַשְּׁלֹשִׁים אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן אָמַר נֶאֱמֶנֶת עָלַי שֶׁלֹּא פִּיַּסְתִּי. אֲבָל נוֹתֵן לָהּ הַגֵּט לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים וְחוֹשְׁשִׁין לָהּ כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר נֶאֱמֶנֶת עָלַי שֶׁלֹּא פִּיַּסְתִּי:

**Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007:**
When does the above apply? When the husband was not in the same city as his wife, or he was divorcing her after consecration,⁷⁷[but before the marriage bond has been consummated].
If, however, the marriage bond has been consummated, we suspect that perhaps the husband appeased her. Therefore, the agent should not appoint another agent within the 30 days unless the husband said: "I accept the word of my wife if she says that I did not appease her." After 30 days pass, [the agent] should give her the *get*. However, we suspect [that perhaps it was nullified], as explained,⁷⁸ unless [the husband] said, "I accept the word of my wife if she says that I did not appease her."

footnotes:
⁷⁷ See Halachot 10 and 11.
⁷⁸ See Halachah 9.