## Nazir Daf 12a

###### Nazir 12a:1
[Nazir 12a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/12a:1)

״צֵא וְקַדֵּשׁ לִי אִשָּׁה״ סְתָם — אָסוּר בְּכׇל הַנָּשִׁים שֶׁבָּעוֹלָם. חֲזָקָה שָׁלִיחַ עוֹשֶׂה שְׁלִיחוּתוֹ, וְכֵיוָן דְּלָא פָּרֵישׁ לֵיהּ, הָא לָא יָדַע הֵי נִיהוּ קַדֵּישׁ לֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Go out and betroth a woman for me, without specifying** a particular woman; from that moment onward the one who appointed the agent is **forbidden to all the women in the world** until he finds out which woman the agent betrothed. There is a **presumption** that **an agent performs his** assigned **agency** and that he has betrothed a woman for him, **and since** the agent **did not clarify to him** which woman he chose, **he** therefore **does not know which** woman **is the one betrothed to him.** If he now betroths another woman, it is possible that she is the daughter, sister, or mother of the one his agent betrothed on his behalf and is therefore forbidden to him.


###### Nazir 12a:2
[Nazir 12a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/12a:2)

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: קֵן סְתוּמָה שֶׁפָּרְחָה גּוֹזָל אֶחָד מֵהֶן לַאֲוִיר הָעוֹלָם, אוֹ שֶׁפָּרְחָה לְבֵין חַטָּאוֹת הַמֵּתוֹת, אוֹ שֶׁמֵּת אֶחָד מֵהֶן — יִקַּח זוּג לַשֵּׁנִי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Reish Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan** from a mishna (*Kinnim* 2:1): With regard to an impure person who comes to undergo his purification process, and for this purpose set aside **an unspecified nest,** meaning a pair of turtledoves or pigeons, to use for his offerings. One is to be a burnt-offering and one is to be a sin-offering, and he had not yet specified which bird will be used for which offering. If **one fledgling of the** pair **flew away** and escaped **to the** open **air of the world, or** if it **flew among** birds invalidated for **sin-offerings that** have been left to **die, or if one of them died,** in each of these cases the owner of the nest **purchases a partner for the second,** i.e., remaining, bird. At that point he may decide which is for a sin-offering and which is for a burnt-offering.


###### Nazir 12a:3
[Nazir 12a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/12a:3)

וְאִילּוּ קֵן מְפוֹרֶשֶׁת — אֵין לוֹ תַּקָּנָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But** if a fledgling flew away or died from **a specified nest,** after the owner had designated which bird would be used for which offering, and it is not known which bird escaped, **it has no** means of **remedy.** This is because he does not know whether the remaining fledgling is for a burnt-offering or a sin-offering.


###### Nazir 12a:4
[Nazir 12a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/12a:4)

וְאִילּוּ שְׁאָר קִינִּין בְּעָלְמָא מִיתַּקְּנָן. וְאַמַּאי? לֵימָא כׇּל חֲדָא וַחֲדָא דִּלְמָא הַאי נִיהוּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Reish Lakish infers: **But generally, other nests** belonging to other people are **fit;** there is no concern with regard to them. Reish Lakish states his objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: According to your opinion that there is a concern that each woman might be a relative of the woman the agent betrothed, **then why** should the *halakha* with regard to nests be so? **Let us** likewise **say** with regard to **each and every** fledgling bird in the world that **perhaps this is the one** that was consecrated and flew away. How can anyone ever use a bird for their own offering, as it may be the bird that flew away from someone else’s nest?


###### Nazir 12a:5
[Nazir 12a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/12a:5)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: קָאָמֵינָא אֲנָא אִשָּׁה דְּלָא נָיְידָא, וְאָמְרַתְּ לִי אַתְּ אִיסּוּרָא דְּנָיֵיד?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabbi Yoḥanan **said to** Reish Lakish: **I state** my opinion that there is a concern for other women only with regard to **a woman, who does not move** but is fixed in her home. An unidentified item is presumed to have the same legal status as the majority of items like it, and there is no concern that it may be forbidden, even if there are some forbidden items like it. However, if this unidentified item was fixed in its place, there is an equal presumption that it may belong to the class of similar permitted items or to the class of similar forbidden items. Consequently, all women in the world are forbidden to him, as there is an equal presumption that she may or may not be a relative of the woman that the agent betrothed to him. **And you speak to me** of **a prohibition that moves** and is not fixed. Since the fledgling bird is not fixed in one spot, the majority is followed and the minority is ignored.


###### Nazir 12a:6
[Nazir 12a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/12a:6)

וְכִי תֵּימָא: הָכָא נָמֵי נָיֵיד, אֵימוֹר בְּשׁוּקָא אַשְׁכַּח וְקַדֵּישׁ, הָתָם הָדְרָא לְנִיחוּתָא, גַּבֵּי קֵן מִי הָדְרָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you would say: Here too,** she **moves,** since it is possible to **say that** the agent **found** the woman **in the marketplace and betrothed her** there to the one who appointed the agent, so the prohibited woman was not in a fixed location? Nevertheless, **there** she eventually **returns to her** place of **rest,** i.e., her home, and is therefore considered to be fixed. Conversely, **with regard to a nest, does** the fledgling **return** to a fixed place? Since it does not, the assumption is that any bird has the status of the majority of birds in the world, which have not been consecrated as offerings.


###### Nazir 12a:7
[Nazir 12a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/12a:7)

אָמַר רָבָא: וּמוֹדֶה רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בְּאִשָּׁה שֶׁאֵין לָהּ לֹא בַּת, וְלֹא בַּת בַּת, וְלֹא בַּת בֵּן, וְלֹא אֵם, וְלֹא אֵם אֵם, וְלֹא אָחוֹת. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהָיְתָה לָהּ אָחוֹת וְנִתְגָּרְשָׁה לְאַחַר מִכָּאן, דְּהָהִיא שַׁרְיָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said: And Rabbi Yoḥanan concedes** that with regard to **a woman who does not have a daughter, nor a daughter of a daughter, nor a daughter of a son, nor a mother, nor a mother of a mother, nor a sister** who was single when he appointed the agent, that the one who appointed the agent may betroth her. There is no concern that the agent might have betrothed a relative that would now render such a woman forbidden. **And even though she had,** when he appointed the agent, a married **sister,** or daughter, or other female relative, **and she was later divorced,** Rabbi Yoḥanan concedes **that this** woman whom he wishes to now marry is **permitted.**


###### Nazir 12a:8
[Nazir 12a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/12a:8)

מַאי טַעְמָא — דִּבְהָהִיא שַׁעְתָּא דְּקָא אָמַר לֵיהּ, הֲוָה נְסִיבָן לְגַבְרֵי. כִּי מְשַׁוֵּי שָׁלִיחַ — בְּמִילְּתָא דְּקָיְימָא קַמֵּיהּ. בְּמִילְּתָא דְּלָא קָיְימָא קַמֵּיהּ — לָא מְשַׁוֵּי שָׁלִיחַ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**What is the reason** for this? It is **that at that moment, when he told** the agent to go betroth a woman on his behalf, these women **were married to men.** There is a principle that **when one appoints an agent,** he does so only **with regard to a matter present before him.** In other words, he instructs his agent to betroth a woman who is available at that time, but **he does not appoint an agent with regard to a matter that is not present before him.** Consequently, even if the agent betrothed one of the relatives of the woman after they were divorced, the betrothal would not take effect because he was not authorized to betroth them, and therefore the one who appointed the agent is permitted to the woman.


###### Nazir 12a:9
[Nazir 12a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/12a:9)

תְּנַן: ״הֲרֵינִי נָזִיר וְעָלַי לְגַלֵּחַ נָזִיר״, וְשָׁמַע חֲבֵירוֹ וְאָמַר: ״וַאֲנִי, וְעָלַי לְגַלֵּחַ נָזִיר״, אִם הָיוּ פִּקְחִין — מְגַלְּחִין זֶה אֶת זֶה, וְאִם לָאו — מְגַלְּחִין נְזִירִים אֲחֵרִים. בִּשְׁלָמָא בָּתְרָאָה — אִיכָּא קַדְמָאָה קַמֵּיהּ. אֶלָּא קַדְמָאָה — מִי אִיכָּא בָּתְרָאָה קַמֵּיהּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara now proceeds to raise a difficulty against this last argument from the mishna: **We learned** in the mishna that if one says: **I am hereby a nazirite and it is** incumbent **upon me to shave a nazirite, and another heard** him **and said: And I** am hereby a nazirite, **and it is** incumbent **upon me to shave a nazirite, if they are perspicacious they shave each other; and if not, they shave other nazirites.** According to the reasoning that one takes into account only that which is possible at the time, the following difficulty arises: **Granted, the last** person **has the first one before him** and may have had in mind to volunteer to pay for the other’s offerings; **but** with regard to **the first** person, **is the last one before him?** When the first one stated his vow, the other one was not yet a nazirite, and he could not have been taking him into account when he vowed to pay for the offerings of another. How can paying for the offerings of the second nazirite be considered a fulfillment of his vow?