## Nazir Daf 29a

###### Nazir 29a:1
[Nazir 29a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/29a:1)

אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: כְּדֵי לְחַנְּכוֹ בְּמִצְוֹת. אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ אִשָּׁה נָמֵי! סָבַר: אִישׁ חַיָּיב לְחַנֵּךְ בְּנוֹ בְּמִצְוֹת, וְאֵין הָאִשָּׁה חַיֶּיבֶת לְחַנֵּךְ אֶת בְּנָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
said that **Reish Lakish said:** The purpose is **in order to educate him in mitzvot,** to teach him how to observe the mitzva of naziriteship. The Gemara asks: **If so, even a woman as well** should be able to impose naziriteship on her son for educational purposes. The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish **holds** that **a man is obligated to educate his son in mitzvot, but a woman is not obligated to educate her son** in mitzvot.


###### Nazir 29a:2
[Nazir 29a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/29a:2)

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר: הֲלָכָה הִיא בְּנָזִיר, אַמְּטוּ לְהָכִי: בְּנוֹ — אִין, בִּתּוֹ — לָא. אֶלָּא לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, אֲפִילּוּ בִּתּוֹ! קָסָבַר: בְּנוֹ — חַיָּיב לְחַנְּכוֹ, בִּתּוֹ — אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב לְחַנְּכָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Granted, according to** the opinion of **Rabbi Yoḥanan,** who **said it is a *halakha*** transmitted to Moses from Sinai **with regard to a nazirite, for that reason** one can understand the ruling of the mishna, which indicates that for **his son, yes,** a father can vow that he should be a nazirite, but with regard to **his daughter, no,** he cannot do so, as a *halakha* learned by tradition cannot be questioned. **However, according to** the opinion of **Reish Lakish,** a father should **even** be able to impose naziriteship upon **his daughter** for the sake of her education. Why does the mishna specify a son? The Gemara answers that Reish Lakish **holds:** A father **is obligated to educate his son,** whereas **he is not obligated to educate his daughter,** and for this reason he cannot vow that she should be a nazirite.


###### Nazir 29a:3
[Nazir 29a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/29a:3)

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר: הֲלָכָה הִיא בְּנָזִיר, אַהָכִי: בִּנְזִירוּת — אִין, בִּנְדָרִים — לָא. אֶלָּא לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ — אֲפִילּוּ נְדָרִים נָמֵי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks another question: **Granted, according to** the opinion of **Rabbi Yoḥanan,** who **said** that **it is a *halakha* with regard to a nazirite, this is why** the mishna indicates that **with regard to naziriteship, yes,** a father can impose a vow upon his son, but **with regard to** other **vows, no,** he cannot do so. **However, according to** the opinion of **Reish Lakish,** who says it is for the son’s education, a father should **even** be able to impose regular **vows** upon him **as well.** Why does the mishna specify naziriteship?


###### Nazir 29a:4
[Nazir 29a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/29a:4)

לָא מִיבַּעְיָא קָאָמַר: לָא מִיבַּעְיָא בִּנְדָרִים, דְּלֵית לֵיהּ נִיוּוּל, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ בִּנְזִירוּת, דְּאִית לֵיהּ נִיוּוּל — אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי חַיָּיב לְחַנְּכוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: According to Reish Lakish the *tanna* of this mishna **is speaking** utilizing the style of: **It is not necessary,** as follows: **It is not necessary** to ask whether a father can impose regular **vows** of a mitzva **where there is no deprivation** of the son when he fulfills his father’s vow, **but even** with regard to **naziriteship, where there is deprivation** of his son, as the son must refrain from wine and shaving, **even so** the father **is obligated to educate him,** and therefore he can vow in this manner too.


###### Nazir 29a:5
[Nazir 29a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/29a:5)

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר: הֲלָכָה הִיא בְּנָזִיר, הַיְינוּ דְּקָתָנֵי: מִיחָה אוֹ שֶׁמִּיחוּהוּ קְרוֹבָיו.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks another question: **Granted, according to** the opinion of **Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said it is a *halakha*** transmitted to Moses from Sinai **with regard to a nazirite, this** explanation **is** consistent with **that which** the mishna **teaches:** If **he objected, or his relatives objected for him,** the naziriteship is canceled, as the transmitted *halakha* may be that the acquiescence of the relatives is necessary.


###### Nazir 29a:6
[Nazir 29a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/29a:6)

אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, כׇּל כְּמִינֵיהוֹן קְרוֹבִים דְּאָמְרִין לֵיהּ: לָא תַּיגְמְרֵיהּ מִצְוֹת?! קָסָבַר: כֹּל חִינּוּךְ דְּלָא חֲשִׁיב — לָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara continues its question: **However, according to** the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina,** who said that **Reish Lakish said** that this vow serves educational purposes, **is this** really **in the power of the relatives to say to** the father: **Do not teach him mitzvot?** The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish **holds** that with regard to **any education** that is **not important,** e.g., the optional mitzva of naziriteship, the son **is not amenable** to the suffering he must endure for this purpose, and therefore he or his relatives can object.


###### Nazir 29a:7
[Nazir 29a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/29a:7)

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר: הֲלָכָה הִיא בְּנָזִיר, מִשּׁוּם הָכִי מְגַלֵּחַ וְעָבֵיד הַקָּפָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises a further difficulty: **Granted, according to** the opinion of **Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said it is a *halakha* with regard to a nazirite,** it is **due to that** reason that the son must **shave** all of his hair at the conclusion of his naziriteship, despite the fact that **he** thereby **performs the rounding** of the corners of his head, in violation of the prohibition: “You shall not round the corners of your heads” (Leviticus 19:27). Since a *halakha* transmitted to Moses from Sinai has the status of Torah law, a minor nazirite shaves despite this prohibition.


###### Nazir 29a:8
[Nazir 29a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/29a:8)

אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ כְּדֵי לְחַנְּכוֹ בְּמִצְוֹת, הָא קָעָבֵיד הַקָּפָה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara continues its question: **However, according to** the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina,** who said that **Reish Lakish said** that the reason the vow of naziriteship takes effect is **in order to educate him in mitzvot,** and it applies only by rabbinic law, how does he explain the fact that this nazirite **performs the rounding** of the head? How does a naziriteship, which is by rabbinic law, override a Torah prohibition?


###### Nazir 29a:9
[Nazir 29a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/29a:9)

קָסָבַר: הַקָּפַת כׇּל הָרֹאשׁ מִדְּרַבָּנַן, וְחִינּוּךְ מִדְּרַבָּנַן. וְאָתֵי חִינּוּךְ דְּרַבָּנַן, וְדָחֵי הַקָּפָה דְּרַבָּנַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish **holds** that **the rounding of the entire head** is prohibited only **by rabbinic law,** as the Torah itself prohibited shaving only the corners of the head, **and the mitzva of education** also applies **by rabbinic law. And** therefore the mitzva of **education,** which is **by rabbinic law, comes and overrides** the prohibition against **rounding** the head, which likewise applies **by rabbinic law.**


###### Nazir 29a:10
[Nazir 29a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/29a:10)

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר: הֲלָכָה הִיא בְּנָזִיר, אַהָכִי מְגַלֵּחַ מַיְיתֵי קׇרְבָּן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara continues to ask along the same lines: **Granted, according to** the opinion of **Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said it is a *halakha* with regard to a nazirite, this is why** when he **shaves** at the conclusion of his naziriteship **he brings an offering,** as the *halakha* is that the minor is a nazirite in all regards, which means his offering is obligatory, like that of an adult nazirite.


###### Nazir 29a:11
[Nazir 29a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/29a:11)

אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, כְּדֵי לְחַנְּכוֹ בְּמִצְוֹת — הָא קָא מַיְיתֵי חוּלִּין לָעֲזָרָה! קָסָבַר: חוּלִּין בַּעֲזָרָה לָאו דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara continues its question: **However, according to** the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina,** who said that **Reish Lakish said** that the reason is **in order to educate him in mitzvot,** the minor’s offering is not a Torah obligation, which means **that he brings non-sacred** animals **into the Temple courtyard** for slaughter. The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish **holds** that the prohibition against slaughtering **non-sacred** animals **in the Temple courtyard** does **not** apply **by Torah law** but by rabbinic law, and therefore this prohibition is disregarded due to the importance of the son’s education.


###### Nazir 29a:12
[Nazir 29a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/29a:12)

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר: הֲלָכָה הִיא בְּנָזִיר, אַהָכִי כִּי מִיטַּמֵּא מַיְיתֵי קׇרְבַּן צִיפֳּרִין, וְאָכֵיל כֹּהֵן מְלִיקָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks yet another question: **Granted, according to** the opinion of **Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said it is a *halakha* with regard to a nazirite, this is why when** the son **becomes ritually impure he brings an offering of birds, and** the **priest** may **eat** the bird sin-offering that was killed by means of **pinching,** nipping the neck of the bird, rather than by regular slaughter. This permits a bird to be eaten only in the case of a proper bird offering.


###### Nazir 29a:13
[Nazir 29a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/29a:13)

אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, הָא קָאָכֵיל נְבֵילָה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara continues its question: **However, according to** the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina,** who said that **Reish Lakish said** that the reason the vow takes effect is to educate the son in mitzvot, in this case the priest **eats** an unslaughtered **animal carcass.** If the son is not obligated to bring the offering, the priest will be eating a bird that was killed in a manner that does not render it fit for consumption, which means it has the status of an unslaughtered carcass.


###### Nazir 29a:14
[Nazir 29a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/29a:14)

קָסָבַר כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דְּאֵין שְׁחִיטָה לָעוֹף מִן הַתּוֹרָה. וְחוּלִּין בַּעֲזָרָה לָאו דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish **holds in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda,** who holds **that slaughter of a bird is not** obligatory **by Torah law.** Rather, by Torah law birds are fit to be eaten no matter how they are killed, and it was the Sages who decreed that they must be slaughtered. **And** he also maintains that the prohibition against bringing **non-sacred** animals for slaughter **in the Temple courtyard** does **not** apply **by Torah law.** Consequently the rabbinic mitzva of education overrides these prohibitions, as they too are rabbinic.


###### Nazir 29a:15
[Nazir 29a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/29a:15)

וְסָבַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הָכִי? וְהָתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִן לְחַטַּאת הָעוֹף שֶׁהִיא בָּאָה עַל הַסָּפֵק שֶׁאֵינָהּ נֶאֱכֶלֶת — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְהַזָּב אֶת זוֹבוֹ לַזָּכָר וְלַנְּקֵבָה״, מַקִּישׁ נְקֵבָה לְזָכָר: מָה זָכָר מֵבִיא קׇרְבָּן עַל הַוַּדַּאי — אַף נְקֵבָה מְבִיאָה קׇרְבָּן עַל הַוַּדַּאי, וּמָה זָכָר מֵבִיא עַל הַסָּפֵק — אַף נְקֵבָה מְבִיאָה עַל הַסָּפֵק.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And does Rabbi Yosei hold this** opinion? **But isn’t it taught** in a *baraita* that **Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: From where** is it derived **that the bird sin-offering that comes due to uncertainty is not eaten? The verse states: “And they who have an issue, whether a male or a female”** (Leviticus 15:33), which **juxtaposes a female to a male: Just as a male brings an offering for a definite** sin, i.e., for a transgression he is sure he committed inadvertently, **so too, a female brings an offering for a definite** sin. **And just as a male brings** a provisional guilt-offering **for** his **uncertain** transgression, **so too, a female brings** an offering **for** her case of **uncertainty.**


###### Nazir 29a:16
[Nazir 29a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/29a:16)

וּמָה זָכָר, מִמִּין שֶׁהוּא מֵבִיא עַל הַוַּדַּאי מֵבִיא עַל הַסָּפֵק — אַף נְקֵבָה מִמִּין שֶׁהִיא מְבִיאָה עַל הַוַּדַּאי מְבִיאָה עַל הַסָּפֵק. אִי: מָה זָכָר מֵבִיא קׇרְבָּן וְנֶאֱכָל — אַף נְקֵבָה מְבִיאָה קׇרְבָּן וְנֶאֱכָל! אָמַרְתָּ:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** furthermore: **Just as a male brings** an animal **for** his **uncertain** transgression, a ram as a guilt-offering, **from** the same **type from** which **he brings a definite** sin-offering, an animal sin-offering, **so too, a female brings** the same type **for her** case of **uncertainty from** the same **type from** which **she brings for a definite** offering, i.e., a bird if she is a *zava* or gave birth. This leads to the following question: **If** so, one can continue this line of thought: **Just as a male brings an offering and** it **is eaten, so too, a female brings an offering and** it should be **eaten** when she sacrifices an offering for uncertain childbirth. With regard to this case **you say:**