## Nazir Daf 62b

###### Nazir 62b:1
[Nazir 62b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/62b:1)

**מַתְנִי׳** חוֹמֶר בָּעֲבָדִים מִבַּנָּשִׁים, שֶׁהוּא מֵפֵר נִדְרֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ, וְאֵינוֹ מֵפֵר נִדְרֵי עַבְדּוֹ. הֵפֵר לְאִשְׁתּוֹ — הֵפֵר עוֹלָמִית. הֵפֵר לְעַבְדּוֹ — יָצָא לְחֵירוּת וּמַשְׁלִים נְזִירוּתוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** The previous mishna taught that the naziriteship of women includes a stringency that does not apply to slaves. This mishna adds: There is a greater **stringency in** the case of **slaves than in** the case of **women, as** a man **can nullify the vows of his wife but he cannot nullify the vows of his slave,** despite the fact that he can prevent him from fulfilling them in practice. Similarly, if **he nullified** the naziriteship **of his wife it is permanently nullified,** and it remains nullified even if she is later divorced or widowed. Conversely, if **he nullified** the naziriteship **of his slave** by forcing him to violate the terms of his vow of naziriteship, when the slave **is emancipated he completes his naziriteship.**


###### Nazir 62b:2
[Nazir 62b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/62b:2)

**גְּמָ׳** תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: לְמָה רַבּוֹ כּוֹפוֹ? לִנְזִירוּת, אֲבָל לֹא לִנְדָרִים וְלַעֲרָכִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** **The Sages taught** (*Tosefta* 6:4): With regard **to what** matter can **his master force** a slave? **With regard to naziriteship. However,** he **cannot** force his slave in the case **of** other **vows and valuations.** This *baraita* is apparently saying that a master cannot prevent his slave from fulfilling the terms of a vow.


###### Nazir 62b:3
[Nazir 62b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/62b:3)

מַאי שְׁנָא גַּבֵּי נָזִיר — דְּאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא ״לֶאְסֹר אִסָּר עַל נַפְשׁוֹ״, בְּמִי שֶׁנַּפְשׁוֹ קְנוּיָה לוֹ — יָצָא עֶבֶד שֶׁאֵין נַפְשׁוֹ קְנוּיָה לוֹ. אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ גַּבֵּי נְדָרִים נָמֵי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What is different with regard to a nazirite** that a master can force his slave to transgress his naziriteship, **as the Merciful One states: “To bind his soul with a bond”** (Numbers 30:3), from which it is inferred that the Torah is referring only **to one whose soul is in his possession,** i.e., who is not owned by another; this **excludes a slave, whose soul is not in his possession** because he is under his master’s control. **If so,** then **even with regard to vows** that same *halakha* should apply **as well,** as that verse is written in the context of vows in general, not specifically vows of naziriteship. Why is a master unable to compel his slave to break a vow?


###### Nazir 62b:4
[Nazir 62b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/62b:4)

אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת, הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן: כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיָה אֶשְׁכּוֹל שֶׁל עֲנָבִים מוּנָּח לְפָנָיו. גַּבֵּי נְדָרִים, דְּכִי מִיתְּסַר בְּהַאי לָא מִיתְּסַר בְּאַחֲרִינֵי — לָא מָצֵי כָּפֵי לֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Sheshet said: With what are we dealing here?** With a case **where a cluster of grapes was placed before** the slave and he vowed not to derive benefit from it. **With regard to vows, when** he **is prohibited from** eating **this** cluster he **is not rendered prohibited from** eating **others;** therefore, the master **cannot force him** to eat it, as he has no reason to insist that the slave consume this particular cluster of grapes.


###### Nazir 62b:5
[Nazir 62b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/62b:5)

גַּבֵּי נְזִירוּת, דְּכִי מִיתְּסַר בְּהַאי אִיתְּסַר בְּכוּלְּהוּ — מָצֵי כָּפֵי לֵיהּ. וְגַבֵּי נְדָרִים, מִי לָא עָסְקִינַן דְּלֵיכָּא אֶלָּא הַאי אֶשְׁכּוֹל, דְּאִי לָא אָכֵיל לֵיהּ, חָלֵישׁ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
By contrast, **with regard to naziriteship, when** he **is prohibited from** eating **this** cluster he **is rendered prohibited from** consuming **all others;** therefore, the master **can force him** to eat. This is because the lack of food weakens the slave, who is the property of his master. The Gemara asks: **And with regard to vows, are we not dealing** even with a situation **where he has only this cluster** before him and he vows not to eat it, in **which** case **if he does not eat it he is weakened?** Why can’t the master compel him to eat the grapes in this case?


###### Nazir 62b:6
[Nazir 62b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/62b:6)

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיָה חַרְצָן מוּנָּח לְפָנָיו. גַּבֵּי נְדָרִים, בְּהַאי הוּא דְּמִיתְּסַר — לָא מָצֵי כָּפֵי לֵיהּ. גַּבֵּי נָזִיר, דְּאִיתְּסַר נָמֵי בְּאַחֲרֵינִי — מָצֵי כָּפֵי לֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, Rava said** that the difference between vows of naziriteship and other vows concerns a case **where there was a grape seed,** which provides only negligible nourishment, that was **placed before** the slave, and he vowed not to eat it. **With regard to vows,** concerning **which he is prohibited to** eat only **this** one seed, the master **cannot force him** to eat it, as refraining from eating a grape seed would not weaken him. **With regard to a nazirite, who is prohibited from** consuming **other** grape products **as well,** the master **can force him.**


###### Nazir 62b:7
[Nazir 62b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/62b:7)

וְגַבֵּי נְדָרִים, מִי לָא עָסְקִינַן דְּלֵיכָּא אֶלָּא הַאי חַרְצָן, דְּאִי לָא אָכֵיל לֵיהּ, חָלֵישׁ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara again asks: **And with regard to vows, are we not dealing** even with a situation **where he has only this grape seed** in front of him, in **which** case **if he does not eat it he would be weakened?** Why, then, can the master compel him to violate only his naziriteship vow but not a regular vow?


###### Nazir 62b:8
[Nazir 62b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/62b:8)

אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לְמָה רַבּוֹ צָרִיךְ לִכְפּוֹתוֹ — לִנְזִירוּת. וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לִכְפּוֹתוֹ לִנְדָרִים, וְאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לִכְפּוֹתוֹ לִשְׁבוּעָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, Abaye said** that the *baraita* does not in fact list cases in which a master can compel his slave to violate his vow, but rather means the following: **With regard to what** situation **is a master** who wants to negate his slave’s vow **required to force** his slave to violate his vow by stating explicitly that he does not want him to fulfill it? It is the case **of** a vow of **naziriteship. But he is not required to force him in** the case of other **vows and he is not required to force him in** the case of **an oath,** as these do not take effect at all.


###### Nazir 62b:9
[Nazir 62b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/62b:9)

מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״לְהָרַע אוֹ לְהֵיטִיב״, מָה הֲטָבָה רְשׁוּת — אַף הֲרָעָה רְשׁוּת. יָצָא לְהָרַע לַאֲחֵרִים — שֶׁאֵין הָרְשׁוּת בְּיָדוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**What is the reason** for this? It is **as the verse states** with regard to oaths: “Or if anyone swear clearly with his lips **to do evil, or to do good”** (Leviticus 5:4). **Just as** the **“good”** mentioned in this verse is referring to **a voluntary** action, **so too** the **“evil”** is **voluntary,** e.g., if he takes an oath not to derive benefit from an item. This **excludes** a slave, whose oath or vow **would cause evil to others, as it is not in his power** to affect his master adversely. Therefore, his statement is invalid. Here too, as the owner will suffer if his slave’s diet is restricted, a slave may not accept a vow or an oath upon himself.


###### Nazir 62b:10
[Nazir 62b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/62b:10)

**מַתְנִי׳** עָבַר מִכְּנֶגֶד פָּנָיו, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: לֹא יִשְׁתֶּה, וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: יִשְׁתֶּה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** In a case where a slave took a vow of naziriteship but was prevented by his master from fulfilling the terms of his vow, the Sages engaged in a dispute what the *halakha* would be if he permanently **left his** master’s **presence,** i.e., he ran away without being emancipated. **Rabbi Meir says: He may not drink** wine. Since the slave is free in practice, his vow goes into effect. **And Rabbi Yosei says: He may drink** wine, as he is not emancipated.


###### Nazir 62b:11
[Nazir 62b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/62b:11)

**גְּמָ׳** לֵימָא בְּדִשְׁמוּאֵל קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הַמַּפְקִיר עַבְדּוֹ יָצָא לְחֵירוּת, וְאֵין צָרִיךְ גֵּט שִׁיחְרוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** The Gemara suggests: **Shall we say** that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei **disagree with regard to** the following statement **of Shmuel? As Shmuel said:** With regard to one **who renounces ownership of his slave,** the slave **is emancipated, and he does not require a bill of manumission.** This *halakha* indicates that if a slave is free in practice, he no longer requires a bill of manumission but is automatically considered a freeman.


###### Nazir 62b:12
[Nazir 62b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/62b:12)

רַבִּי מֵאִיר אִית לֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי לֵית לֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: If so, should one say that **Rabbi Meir is of** the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion **of Shmuel,** and therefore the slave is obligated in naziriteship as soon as he runs away, like any other freed slave, and **Rabbi Yosei is of** the opinion that the ruling is **not** in accordance with the opinion **of Shmuel?**


###### Nazir 62b:13
[Nazir 62b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nazir/r/62b:13)

לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִית לְהוּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל. אֶלָּא: מַאן דְּאָמַר יִשְׁתֶּה, סָבַר: סוֹף סוֹף מִיהְדָּר הָדַר וְאָתֵי גַּבֵּיהּ, לִישְׁתֵּי חַמְרָא כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלָא לִיכְחוֹשׁ. וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר לֹא יִשְׁתֶּה, סָבַר: לֶיהֱוֵי לֵיהּ צַעְרָא כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלִיהְדַּר גַּבֵּיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: **No,** it is possible **that everyone is of** the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion **of Shmuel. Rather,** the mishna is referring to a case where the master refused to declare the runaway ownerless, and was intent on recovering him. Consequently, the slave is not in fact a freeman at all, and the *tanna’im* disagree with regard to the following: Rabbi Yosei, **the one who says** that **he may drink** wine, **maintains** that the slave **will ultimately return and come back to** his master, and therefore it is preferable for him **to drink wine so that he should not be weakened** by the time he returns. **And according to** Rabbi Meir, **the one who says** that **he may not drink** wine, he **maintains** that it is better that the slave **should suffer** by being deprived of wine, **so that he will return to** his master, as the desire to drink wine will spur him to return.