## Nedarim Daf 16b

###### Nedarim 16b:1
[Nedarim 16b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nedarim/r/16b:1)

**גְּמָ׳** ״חוֹמֶר״, מִכְּלָל דְּנֶדֶר הוּא. וְהָא ״מוּתָּר״ קָתָנֵי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** It is stated in the mishna: This is **a stringency** of oaths vis-à-vis vows. The Gemara presumes that the mishna is referring to the distinction stated in previous *mishnayot* between saying: An offering that I will not eat of yours, and saying: An oath that I will not eat of yours. The Gemara asks: Should it be derived **by inference that** the statement: An offering that I will not eat of yours, **is** a valid **vow** by rabbinic law, and it is merely less stringent than the corresponding oath, which takes effect by Torah law? **But doesn’t** the mishna **teach** that it is **permitted** for him to eat, implying that the vow does not take effect at all?


###### Nedarim 16b:2
[Nedarim 16b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nedarim/r/16b:2)

אַסֵּיפָא דְּאִידַּךְ בָּבָא קָתָנֵי. ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵינִי יָשֵׁן״, ״שֶׁאֵינִי מְדַבֵּר״, ״שֶׁאֵינִי מְהַלֵּךְ״ — אָסוּר. זֶה חוֹמֶר בַּשְּׁבוּעוֹת מִבַּנְּדָרִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: This **is taught with regard to the latter clause of the other section.** As opposed to a vow that is taken with regard to a matter that does not have actual substance, which takes effect only by rabbinic law, as articulated in the mishna (14b) and Gemara (15a), the subsequent mishna (15b) teaches that if someone says: **An oath that I will not sleep,** or: **That I will not speak,** or: **That I will not walk,** this activity is **forbidden** to him. It is concerning this contrast that the mishna says: **This is a stringency of oaths vis-à-vis vows.**


###### Nedarim 16b:3
[Nedarim 16b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nedarim/r/16b:3)

חוֹמֶר בַּנְּדָרִים מִבַּשְּׁבוּעוֹת כֵּיצַד כּוּ׳. רַב כָּהֲנָא מַתְנֵי: אָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר רַב. וְרַב טָבְיוֹמֵי מַתְנֵי: אָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל. מִנַּיִן שֶׁאֵין נִשְׁבָּעִין לַעֲבוֹר עַל הַמִּצְוֹת? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ״, ״דְּבָרוֹ לֹא יַחֵל״ — אֲבָל מֵיחֵל הוּא לְחֶפְצֵי שָׁמַיִם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ It is stated in the mishna that there is **a stringency of vows vis-à-vis oaths. How so?** Whereas a vow can override a mitzva, an oath cannot. **Rav Kahana teaches** that **Rav Giddel said** that **Rav said, and Rav Tavyumei teaches** the same statement with a different attribution, i.e., **Rav Giddel said** that **Shmuel** said: **From where** is it derived **that one cannot take an oath to transgress the mitzvot? The verse states: “He shall not profane his word”** (Numbers 30:3). It is inferred that **his word,** i.e., the prohibition he accepted upon himself, **he shall not profane. However, he may profane** it **for the desires of Heaven.** If he took an oath to act against the will of God, the oath does not take effect.


###### Nedarim 16b:4
[Nedarim 16b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nedarim/r/16b:4)

מַאי שְׁנָא נֶדֶר — דִּכְתִיב: ״אִישׁ כִּי יִדֹּר נֶדֶר לַה׳ ... לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ״. שְׁבוּעָה נָמֵי, הָא כְּתִיב: ״אוֹ הִשָּׁבַע שְׁבֻעָה לַה׳ לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ״!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What is different** about **a vow** that enables it to override mitzvot? Granted, **as it is written** in the Torah: **“When a man takes a vow to the Lord…he shall not profane his word”** (Numbers 30:3), which indicates that even with regard to matters that pertain to the Lord, i.e., mitzvot, one shall not profane his word, as the vow takes effect. However, with regard to **an oath it is also written** in the same verse: **“Or swears an oath” to God, “he shall not profane his word.”**


###### Nedarim 16b:5
[Nedarim 16b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nedarim/r/16b:5)

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הָא דְּאָמַר ״הֲנָאַת סוּכָּה עָלַי״, הָא דְּאָמַר ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֶהֱנֶה מִן הַסּוּכָּה״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Abaye said:** The distinction is not between oaths and vows per se, but rather between the phraseology in each case. How so? **This** case, in which the prohibition overrides the mitzva, is referring to one **who said: The benefit** derived **from a *sukka*** is hereby forbidden **to me.** Since the vow renders the *sukka* a forbidden object, it takes effect and overrides the mitzva, as one may not be fed what is forbidden to him, even if it is forbidden only to him. By contrast, **that** case, in which the prohibition does not take effect, is referring to one **who said:** I hereby take **an oath that I will not derive benefit from the *sukka*.** The oath does not take effect, as one is not entitled to take an oath to abstain from an act that he is obligated to perform.


###### Nedarim 16b:6
[Nedarim 16b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nedarim/r/16b:6)

אָמַר רָבָא: וְכִי מִצְוֹת לֵיהָנוֹת נִיתְּנוּ? אֶלָּא, אָמַר רָבָא: הָא דְּאָמַר ״יְשִׁיבַת סוּכָּה עָלַי״, וְהָא דְּאָמַר ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֵשֵׁב בַּסּוּכָּה״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said** in objection to the explanation of Abaye: **But were mitzvot given for** the purpose of **deriving benefit?** The performance of mitzvot is not considered benefit. Why then would performance of the mitzva with the *sukka* be considered deriving benefit? **Rather, Rava said** a different explanation: **This** case is referring to one **who said: Dwelling in a *sukka*** is hereby prohibited **to me, and that** case is referring to one **who said:** I hereby take **an oath that I will not dwell in a *sukka*.**


###### Nedarim 16b:7
[Nedarim 16b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Nedarim/r/16b:7)

וְשֶׁאֵין נִשְׁבָּעִין לַעֲבוֹר עַל הַמִּצְוֹת מֵהָכָא נָפְקָא לֵיהּ? מֵהָתָם נָפְקָא לֵיהּ, דְּתַנְיָא: יָכוֹל נִשְׁבַּע לְבַטֵּל אֶת הַמִּצְוָה וְלֹא בִּיטֵּל, יָכוֹל יְהֵא חַיָּיב —

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara asks: **And** is the principle **that one cannot take an oath to transgress the mitzvot derived from here,** i.e., the above verse? **It is derived from there,** i.e., another verse, **as it is taught** in a *baraita*: One **might** have thought that if one **takes an oath to nullify a mitzva and does not nullify it,** one **might** have thought that **he will be liable** for violating an oath on a statement.