## Or HaChaim on Leviticus Chapter 5

###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:1:1
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:1:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:1:1)

**כִּי תֶחֱטָא.** צָרִיךְ לָדַעַת לְאֵיזֶה עִנְיָן אָמַר ״כִּי תֶחֱטָא״, שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה לוֹ לוֹמַר אֶלָּא ״כִּי תִשְׁמַע קוֹל״ וְגוֹ׳, וְנִרְאֶה כִּי לֶהֱיוֹת שֶׁלֹּא הֻצְרַךְ זֶה לְהַשְׁבִּיעוֹ לָזֶה אָלָה לְצַד שֶׁלֹּא רָצָה לְהָעִיד עֵדוּת שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ לִזְכוּתוֹ, כִּי בַּתְּחִלָּה יִשְׁאַל מִמֶּנּוּ עֵדוּתוֹ בְּלֹא הַשְׁבָּעָה, וְעַל כְּפִירָתוֹ קוֹרֵא עָלָיו הַכָּתוּב ״כִּי תֶחֱטָא״, כִּי חֵטְא הוּא זֶה לְדַבֵּר שְׁקָרִים, וְאִם שָׁמְעָה קוֹל וְגוֹ׳ תִּתְחַיֵּב בְּקָרְבָּן. וּבָזֶה תִּתְיַשֵּׁב וָא״ו שֶׁל ״וְשָׁמְעָה״, שֶׁיּוֹרֶה שֶׁזּוּלַת זֶה הוּא הַחֵטְא הָרָשׁוּם בּוֹ חָטְאָה.

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
**כי תחטא, if one sins, etc.** Why did the Torah have to introduce this paragraph with the words ונפש כי תחטא ושמעה?, It would have sufficed to write ונפש כי תשמע. Perhaps the reason is that the person who is the subject of this paragraph is one who had previously denied knowing of testimony which could result in an accused's exoneration. When he does so a second time, he proves that he had already incriminated himself previously. The Torah alludes to this state of affairs by writing נפש כי תחטא, someone who has already sinned, etc. The fact that the potential witness had lied already previously is accounted as a sin. All of this is confirmed by the letter ו the beginning of the word ונפש, at the start of this paragraph.


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:1:2
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:1:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:1:2)

**עוֹד** יִתְבָּאֵר עַל דֶּרֶךְ מַה שֶׁאָמְרוּ בְּפֶרֶק שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת (שבועות ל.): וְחַיָּבִין עַל זְדוֹן הַשְּׁבוּעָה וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ עִם זְדוֹן הָעֵדוּת, וְאֵינָן חַיָּבִין עַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ, וּפֵרֵשׁ רַשִׁ״י: וְאֵין חַיָּבִין עַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ, אִם שׁוֹגְגִין הֵם לְגַמְרֵי, כִּסְבוּרִין שֶׁאֵין יוֹדְעִין לוֹ עֵדוּת וְכוּ׳. וְכָתַב הָרַמְבַּ״ם בְּפֶרֶק א׳ מֵהִלְכוֹת שְׁבוּעוֹת: כֵּיצַד שִׁגְגַת שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת, כְּגוֹן שֶׁנֶּעְלַם מִמֶּנּוּ שֶׁחַיָּבִין עָלֶיהָ קָרְבָּן וְיָדַע שֶׁשְּׁבוּעָה זוֹ אֲסוּרָה וְכוּ׳ וְשֶׁהִיא שֶׁקֶר, עַד כָּאן. הֲרֵי שֶׁהַשְּׁגָגָה שֶׁחַיָּב עָלֶיהָ הוּא שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ עַל כָּל פָּנִים שֶׁהִיא אֲסוּרָה וְשֶׁקֶר, וְהוּא אָמְרוֹ **נֶפֶשׁ כִּי תֶחֱטָא**, פֵּרוּשׁ, בֵּין בְּמֵזִיד בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג תַּכִּיר שֶׁחוֹטֵאת, לִשְׁלֹל אִם שָׁגְגָה שֶׁחָשְׁבָה שֶׁמֻּתָּר אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁכְחָה הָעֵדוּת, אֵינוֹ חַיָּב עַל שְׁבוּעָה זוֹ. וּבְאַגָּדַת אַנְשֵׁי אֱמֶת (זהר ויקרא יג:) נִדְרַשׁ פָּסוּק זֶה עַל הַנֶּפֶשׁ בִּירִידָתָהּ לָעוֹלָם עַל נָכוֹן.

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
We may also explain the wording based on *Shavuot* 30 where we learn of the culpability of someone who denied under oath that he knew testimony (concerning return of a loan being claimed by the creditor) and was aware that he would be guilty of offering a sin-offering even if he had denied testimony only inadvertently, but said person did not know that he had to bring a sin-offering for his perjury. If he did not know that he was culpable for the denial under oath of such testimony though he was aware that he lied, he is not guilty of such a sin-offering. Rashi explains that the Talmud means that only if the accused was unaware that he knew testimony that would help the creditor **and** was unaware of any penalty for withholding such testimony would he be free from bringing a sin-offering. Maimonides writes in chapter 1 of his *Hilchot Shavuot* that the definition of an inadvertent sin involving an oath concerning testimony is that the witness was unaware that refusal to testify to something one had knowledge of results in such a witness having to bring a sin-offering, whereas that same person is aware that his oath is sinful and that he perjures himself by swearing it. We note therefore that in order to be guilty of bringing the sin-offering the person had to be aware that his action was both forbidden and a lie. When the Torah writes: ונפש כי תחטא the meaning is that regardless of whether the denial was intentional or unintentional the culprit is aware that he commits a sin; the Torah thereby excludes a person who was unaware of the sin or had forgotten that he had witnessed what he is accused of having witnessed is not obligated to render the oath mentioned in our verse. The *Zohar* understands this verse as referring to the warnings issued by G'd to the soul which descends into this deceitful world when entering man's body.


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:1:3
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:1:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:1:3)

**וְשָׁמְעָה קוֹל אָלָה.** יִתְבָּאֵר עַל דֶּרֶךְ מַה שֶׁאָמְרוּ בְּרֵישׁ פֶּרֶק שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת (שבועות ל.) וְזֶה לְשׁוֹן הַמִּשְׁנָה: שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת וְכוּ׳ בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין, מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ וּמִפִּי אֲחֵרִים – אֵין חַיָּבִין עַד שֶׁיִּכְפְּרוּ בָהֶן בְּבֵית דִּין, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: בֵּין מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ בֵּין מִפִּי אֲחֵרִים – אֵינָם חַיָּבִין עַד שֶׁיִּכְפְּרוּ בָהֶן בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין, עַד כָּאן. הִנֵּה לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר כָּל שֶׁהִיא בְּבֵית דִּין אֵין צָרִיךְ שֶׁתִּהְיֶה הַשְּׁבוּעָה מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ, אֶלָּא בִּשְׁמִיעַת הָאֹזֶן לְבַד מִתְחַיֵּב. וְהוּא אָמְרוֹ **וְשָׁמְעָה קוֹל אָלָה**, פֵּרוּשׁ הֲגַם שֶׁלֹּא עָנָה אָמֵן.

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
**ושמעה קול אלה, when he heard a public imprecation,** this is explained by the following statement in the *Mishnah* on folio 30 in tractate *Shavuot:* "Culpability for this kind of oath exists both when the guilty party swore in the presence of the court or without the presence of a court provided he volunteered the oath. If, however, he merely denied such knowledge without swearing to his denial or saying "Amen," confirming what was put to him, he is not culpable until he had specifically denied his knowing testimony in the presence of a court. So far the view of Rabbi Meir. The other rabbis hold that there is no culpability for a false oath be it in the presence of a court or otherwise unless the perjurer had specifically denied his knowledge of testimony in the presence of a court in so many words, i.e. that he did not know of any testimony which would help the accused. From the above we note that in the view of Rabbi Meir culpability does not depend on what the accused actually said but on what he heard. Hearing a request to testify by the court and failing to do so brings in its wake culpability, i.e. ושמעה קול אלה, as long as he has **heard** the request to render an oath.


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:1:4
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:1:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:1:4)

וְלַחֲכָמִים, לִסְבָרַת הָרַאֲבַ״ד וְהָאַחֲרוֹנִים, כָּל שֶׁשָּׁמְעָה קוֹל אָלָה בֵּין בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין, אֲפִלּוּ לֹא עָנָה אָמֵן, כָּל שֶׁהָיְתָה הַכְּפִירָה בְּבֵית דִּין אֲפִלּוּ שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁעַת הַשְּׁבוּעָה, חַיָּב. וּלְדֶרֶךְ זֶה יְדֻיַּק הַכָּתוּב שֶׁבְּכָל הַצְּדָדִין הוּא תּוֹלֶה הַדָּבָר בִּשְׁמִיעַת קוֹל אָלָה וְאֵין צָרִיךְ בִּטּוּי שְׂפָתַיִם.

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
The view of the other rabbis is explained by the ראב"ד and later authorities as follows: If the perjurer heard the demand to testify regardless of whether this was in the presence of a court or not, he is culpable if he denied knowledge even if he did not say "Amen," as long as his denial occurred in the presence of a court even at a different time than that when the demand to render an oath was made upon him. Again, the determining factor in his guilt is the fact that he failed to respond to a request to testify which he had **heard** with his ears.


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:1:5
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:1:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:1:5)

**וְרַמְבַּ״ם** זַ״ל, הֲגַם שֶׁפָּסַק כַּחֲכָמִים שֶׁצָּרִיךְ שֶׁיִּהְיֶה הַכְּפִירָה בְּבֵית דִּין, אַף עַל פִּי כֵן חִלֵּק, שֶׁאִם הָיְתָה הַשְּׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין צָרִיךְ שֶׁיַּעֲנֶה אָמֵן, כַּמְּבֹאָר בִּדְבָרָיו בְּפֶרֶק ט׳ הֲלָכָה א׳, וּבְפֶרֶק י׳ הֲלָכָה י״ז. אִם כֵּן סוֹבֵר שֶׁכָּל שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין לֹא מְהַנֵּי מִפִּי אֲחֵרִים אֶלָּא מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ, אוֹ מִפִּי אֲחֵרִים וְעָנָה אָמֵן שֶׁהוּא כְּמוֹצִיא שְׁבוּעָה מִפִּיו, וּכְמוֹ מַה שֶׁכָּתַב בִּתְחִלַּת פֶּרֶק ב׳ מֵהִלְכוֹת שְׁבוּעוֹת. וְהִשִּׂיגוֹ הָרַאֲבַ״ד פֶּרֶק ט׳ הֲלָכָה י׳, כִּי אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, וְעוֹד בֵּין לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר בֵּין לַחֲכָמִים מַה צֹרֶךְ שֶׁיִּהְיֶה הַבֵּית דִּין בִּשְׁעַת הַשְּׁבוּעָה, וַהֲלֹא אֵין מַקְפִּידִין וְכוּ׳ אֶלָּא עַל הַכְּפִירָה, עַד כָּאן. וְהַכֶּסֶף מִשְׁנֶה כָּתַב שֶׁלֹּא יָדַע מִנַּיִן לוֹ לָרַמְבַּ״ם חִלּוּק זֶה.

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
Although Maimonides rules in accordance with the view expressed by the majority of the rabbis that the denial must have occurred in the presence of a court in order for the perjurer to be culpable, he disagrees by saying that in order to be culpable in the absence of a court the accused must have at least said "Amen." (compare his rulings in chapter 9 ruling 1 and in chapter 10 ruling 17). This means that he holds that a denial in the absence of a court does not result in culpability unless the potential witness had uttered the word "Amen" in response to a statement suggesting that he had no knowledge of such testimony. ראב"ד disagrees with Maimonides claiming that one cannot rule according to Rabbi Meir. Furthermore, it is not clear why either according to Rabbi Meir or according to the other rabbis it should matter that the court is present at the time the potential witness denies under oath that he has any such knowledge as he is accused of having. Thus far the words of the ראב"ד. The author of כסף משנה adds that he has no idea about Maimonides' source for distinguishing between a denial in the presence of the court and a similar denial in the absence of a court.


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:1:6
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:1:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:1:6)

**וְלִי** נִרְאֶה כִּי לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבָּנָן אֶלָּא בְּנִשְׁבַּע מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ חוּץ לְבֵית דִּין וְלֹא הָיְתָה הַכְּפִירָה בְּבֵית דִּין כָּל עִקָּר, דִּלְרַבִּי מֵאִיר חַיָּב מִשּׁוּם דְּיָלֵיף מִשְּׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן, וְדוּן מִנַּהּ וּמִנַּהּ, כְּשֵׁם שֶׁשָּׁם מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ חַיָּב, וּמִנַּהּ אֲפִלּוּ שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין חַיָּב, גַּם שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת כְּמוֹ כֵן, וְרַבָּנָן סוֹבְרִים דּוּן מִנַּהּ וְאוֹקֵי בְּאַתְרָהּ כָּאָמוּר שָׁם (שבועות לא.), אֲבָל בְּנִשְׁבַּע מִפִּי אֲחֵרִים שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין וְהָיְתָה הַכְּפִירָה בְּבֵית דִּין אֵין מַחְלֹקֶת לָהֶם בָּזֶה, וּמַשְׁמַע דִּלְכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא חַיָּב.

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
I believe that Rabbi Meir and the other rabbis disagreed only in a situation in which the potential witness volunteered his oath outside the confines of a court and did not deny any knowledge in the presence of the court at all. According to Rabbi Meir he would be guilty of perjury seeing Rabbi Meir derives this from a different kind of oath called שבועת הפקדון. Just as someone who denies having received money or objects on trust and he does so at his own behest he is guilty of perjury even if such an oath did not take place in the presence of a court. The other rabbis adhere to the principle known as דון מינה ואוקי באתרא, that one may derive the **essential** parts of one legislation and apply it to a different type of legislation without applying **all** the details pertaining to the legislation which serves as the source of the exegesis. [The principle is explained by Rashi in *Shevuot* 31. Ed.] In situations where the supposed witness is challenged to testify by third parties but not in the presence of a court, and the supposed witness declares that he does not know any such testimony, he does not have to bring a sin-offering even if he subsequently admits before a court that he had lied. When such a lie had occurred in front of a court and is subsequently retracted, the liar is guilty of the sin-offering according to all the rabbis.


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:1:7
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:1:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:1:7)

**אֶלָּא** דְּטַעְמוֹ שֶׁל הָרַמְבַּ״ם שֶׁהִצְרִיךְ בְּכָל שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁהָיְתָה שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין לִהְיוֹת מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ, הוּא מִמָּה דִּתְנַן (שבועות לא:) וְזֶה לְשׁוֹנָם: שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת כֵּיצַד? אָמַר לִשְׁנַיִם בּוֹאוּ וְהָעִידוּנִי, שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִין לְךָ עֵדוּת, אוֹ שֶׁאָמְרוּ אֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִין, מַשְׁבִּיעַ אֲנִי עֲלֵיכֶם וְאָמְרוּ אָמֵן – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ חַיָּבִין. הִשְׁבִּיעַ עֲלֵיהֶם חָמֵשׁ פְּעָמִים חוּץ לְבֵית דִּין וּבָאוּ לְבֵית דִּין וְהוֹדוּ – פְּטוּרִים, כָּפְרוּ – חַיָּבִין עַל כָּל וְכוּ׳, עַד כָּאן. הֲרֵי דְּקָתָנֵי בְּפֵרוּשׁ ״וְאָמַר אָמֵן״, מַנִּי מַתְנִיתִין? אִי רַבִּי מֵאִיר וּמַיְרֵי שֶׁלֹּא הָיְתָה הַכְּפִירָה בְּבֵית דִּין, אִם כֵּן הֲוָה לֵיהּ מַחְלֹקֶת וְאַחַר כָּךְ סְתָם, שֶׁבַּמִּשְׁנָה שֶׁקָּדְמָה כָּתַב רַבִּי מַחְלֹקֶת רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבָּנָן, וּבְמִשְׁנָה זוֹ שֶׁלְּאַחֲרֶיהָ כָּתַב סְתָם כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר. וּמִמָּה שֶׁמָּצִינוּ שֶׁרַמְבַּ״ם הִצְרִיךְ הַכְּפִירָה בְּבֵית דִּין אֲפִלּוּ נִשְׁבַּע מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ, אִם כֵּן מְפָרֵשׁ מַתְנִיתִין כְּרַבָּנָן, וְקָתָנֵי ״וְאָמַר אָמֵן״, וּבְמַאי? שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵית דִּין, שֶׁאִם בִּפְנֵי בֵית דִּין לְכָל הַסְּבָרוֹת אֵין צָרִיךְ שֶׁיֹּאמַר אָמֵן. אִם כֵּן הֲרֵי לְךָ שֶׁלְּדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים צָרִיךְ שֶׁיֹּאמַר אָמֵן שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵית דִּין.

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
Maimonides holds that any oath which is not sworn to in the presence of a court needs to be initiated by the person who swears it in order for him to be guilty of perjury and the sin-offering which is required. He derives this rule from the following words in the *Mishnah* quoted in *Shevuot* 31: "What is meant by the term שבועת העדות, "an oath concerning testimony?" If a party said to two others: "please testify on my behalf that you have been witnesses to a certain occurrence;" if the two people in question reply: "we swear we have no such knowledge," or if they simply say: "we do not know anything about the matter you want us to testify to (without volunteering an oath)" and the first party challenges them to confirm this on oath and they confirm it by saying "Amen," they are guilty of perjury. If the person demanding such an oath repeated his request five times but never in the presence of a court, and received a negative answer each time and both parties subsequently come to court where the ones who had denied their knowledge five times now admit that they did have knowledge, they are not guilty concerning their previous denials. If they deny their knowledge also in front of the court and are subsequently found to have lied, they are guilty of a sin-offering for every previous denial separately. Thus far the *Mishnah*. We note that according to the text of the *Mishnah* the witnesses had said "Amen." Who is the author of that *Mishnah?* If it is Rabbi Meir and there was no subsequent denial in the presence of a court we would have a disagreement between Rabbi Meir and the other rabbis in the previous *Mishnah* followed by this *Mishnah* in which all rabbis are agreed. We are entitled to view this anonymous *Mishnah* as reflecting the opinion of Rabbi Meir, seeing he is not quoted as diagreeing. Seeing that Maimonides demanded that the perjurer must have first denied his knowledge in front of a court before becoming liable for the sin-offering even if his original denial had been at his own initiative, it is clear that he interpreted the *Mishnah* according to the consensus of the Rabbis. The *Mishnah* spoke of the perjurers having said "Amen." When did they do so? When they were not in the presence of a court, for if they had denied their knowledge in front of the court they would have been guilty of perjury according to all opinions even without having uttered the word "Amen" as confirmation of an oath. It emerges that according to the view of the majority of rabbis the word "Amen" is the minimum required for such potential witnesses to become guilty of perjury when not in the presence of a court. [At any rate our author has succeeded in demonstrating that Maimonides did not rule according to a minority view so that the complaint of ראב"ד is not in place. Ed.]


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:1:8
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:1:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:1:8)

וְהַתּוֹסָפוֹת כָּתְבוּ שֶׁטַּעַם שֶׁאָמַר ״וְאָמְרוּ אָמֵן״ הִיא לְקַצֵּר, וְאִין הָכֵי נַמֵּי אִם אָמְרוּ ״אֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִים לְךָ עֵדוּת״, וְאֵין כֵּן דַּעַת רַמְבַּ״ם, אֶלָּא כָּל שֶׁהַשְּׁבוּעָה חוּץ לְבֵית דִּין צָרִיךְ שֶׁיֹּאמַר אָמֵן דְּהַיְנוּ מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ. וְהַטַּעַם הוּא כִּי לֹא אָמַר הַכָּתוּב ״וְשָׁמְעָה קוֹל״ הֲגַם שֶׁלֹּא אָמַר הוּא מִפִּיו אֶלָּא בְּבֵית דִּין שֶׁבּוֹ מְדַבֵּר הַכָּתוּב, דִּכְתִיב ״אִם לֹא יַגִּיד״, אֲבָל שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵית דִּין צָרִיךְ שֶׁיּוֹצִיא מִפִּיו.

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
Tossaphot, aware of an imprecision in the text of the *Mishnah*, state that this is due to the *Mishnah's* attempt to be brief; this is true if we were to assume that the alternative would have been for the perjurers to have said: "we do not know of any testimony we can offer on your behalf." Maimonides does not agree with this but holds that any oath sworn outside a court must be volunteered, i.e. the perjurer must have recited the substance of his oath with his own words. His reason is that the Torah discusses an occurrence in front of a court as we know from the words אם לוא יגיד, "if he will not reveal it." Only in such a situation is it enough for the perjurer to have merely heard the demand to testify, i.e. ושמעה קול for him to become guilty without uttering the substance of what he denies.


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:1:9
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:1:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:1:9)

**וַהֲגַם** שֶׁאָמְרוּ שָׁם (שבועות לב.) וְזֶה לְשׁוֹנָם: מְנָלַן שֶׁאַכְּפִירָה בְּבֵית דִּין הוּא דְּמִחַיְּבֵי, אֲחוּץ לֹא מִחַיְּבֵי? אָמַר אַבַּיֵי אָמַר קְרָא ״אִם לֹא יַגִּיד״ וְגוֹ׳, לֹא אָמַרְתִּי אֶלָּא בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁאִם מַגִּיד זֶה מִתְחַיְּבִין. אָמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא: אִי הָכֵי, אֵימָא שְׁבוּעָה גּוּפָא בְּבֵית דִּין אִין, שֶׁלֹּא בְּבֵית דִּין לֹא? לֹא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דְּתַנְיָא: ״לְאַחַת׳״ – לְחַיֵּב עַל כָּל אַחַת. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ בְּבֵית דִּין, מִי מִחַיַּב עַל כָּל אַחַת? וְהָתְנַן: הִשְׁבִּיעַ עֲלֵיהֶן חָמֵשׁ פְּעָמִים בִּפְנֵי בֵית דִּין וְכָפְרוּ – אֵין חַיָּבִין אֶלָּא אַחַת וְכוּ׳, אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ שְׁבוּעָה חוּץ לְבֵית דִּין, כְּפִירָה בְּבֵית דִּין. מַשְׁמַע כִּי הַשְּׁבוּעָה שֶׁיֶּשְׁנָהּ בְּבֵית דִּין הִיא עַצְמָהּ אֲשֶׁר תִּהְיֶה חוּץ לְבֵית דִּין וּמִתְחַיֵּב עָלֶיהָ, וְאִם כֵּן אֲפִלּוּ הִשְׁבִּיעוּהוּ אֲחֵרִים, לֹא שְׁנָא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין לֹא שְׁנָא שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין.

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
*Shevuot* 32 asks: "whence do we know that the denial of the witnesses's knowledge must have occurred in the presence of the court so that he would **only** then be guilty for such denial (perjury)?" Abbaye answered there that we derive this from the words ואם לוא יגיד, "if he refuses to testify," and that these words only make sense in a setting in which one normally testifies, i.e. a court. Rabbi Papa counters that if we were to accept the exegetical comment by Abbaye we would come to the conclusion that even an oath freely volunteered but not within the confines of a court would not be subject to the laws of perjury seeing that it was not sworn at a place defined as one designated to hear testimony? This argument is rejected in light of a *Baraitha* which interprets the word לאחת, "one of" in 5,4 to mean that the party who has become guilty of perjury is liable for each violation separately. If we were to assume that any oath must be sworn only in front of a court in order for one to become guilty of perjury, why would we have to be told that if the perjurer perjured himself five times in the presence of a court (on the same subject) he needs to bring only a single sin-offering? It follows that an oath may be **sworn** to also outside a court, whereas the **denial** must have taken place in front of a court for the perjurer to be liable. All this teaches that the oath which is sworn in the presence of the court is identical to the one sworn outside the court, and that one is certainly liable for perjury if one had sworn falsely outside the court. Having accepted this, it makes no difference if the party who is the subject in our verse was sworn by others in the presence of the court or elsewhere.


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:1:10
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:1:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:1:10)

לִכְשֶׁנַּעֲמֹד עַל אֲמִתָּתָן שֶׁל דְּבָרִים מִשָּׁם דֶּגֶל עַמּוּד דִּינוֹ שֶׁל רַמְבַּ״ם זַ״ל, כִּי מִמַּה שֶׁמּוֹכִיחַ מִדְּתַנְיָא ״לְאַחַת״ לְחַיֵּב עַל כָּל אַחַת. וְקָשֶׁה, וַהֲלֹא ״לְאַחַת״ כְּתוּבָה בִּשְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי וְאָנוּ עוֹסְקִים בִּשְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת, וְאֵינָהּ דוֹמָה שְׁבוּעָה זוֹ לְזוֹ. וּבְהֶכְרֵחַ לוֹמַר כִּי אֵינוֹ מוֹכִיחַ אֶלָּא לִשְׁבוּעָה מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ שֶׁלָּמְדוּהָ שֶׁיֶּשְׁנָהּ בִּשְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת מִשְּׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי בִּגְזֵרָה שָׁוָה דְּ״תֶחֱטָא תֶחֱטָא״ כָּאָמוּר שָׁם, וְלָזֶה מוֹכִיחַ שַׁפִּיר לִשְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת בְּנִשְׁבָּע מִפִּיו הַנִּלְמָד מִמֶּנָּה, אֲבָל הִשְׁבִּיעוּהוּ אֲחֵרִים שֶׁהִיא שְׁבוּעָה הַמֻּזְכֶּרֶת בְּפָרָשַׁת שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת, דַּוְקָא בְּבֵית דִּין הוּא שֶׁחַיָּב עָלֶיהָ כִּי אֵין מוֹכִיחַ כְּלוּם מִ״לְאַחַת״, וְאָנוּ חוֹזְרִים לְמַה שֶׁדִּיֵּק רַב פָּפָּא ״בְּבֵית דִּין אִין, שֶׁלֹּא בְּבֵית דִּין לֹא״, וְלֹא דָּחָה אַבַּיֵי לְדִבְרֵי רַב פָּפָּא אֶלָּא לְמַה שֶׁדִּקְדֵּק בִּדְבָרָיו ״שְׁבוּעָה וְכוּ׳ שֶׁלֹּא בְּבֵית דִּין לֹא״ שֶׁמַּשְׁמַע שֶׁאֵין חִיּוּב שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת אֶלָּא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין, לָזֶה שָׁלַל זֶה מִדַּעְתּוֹ, וּלְעוֹלָם מִפִּי אֲחֵרִים דַּוְקָא בְּבֵית דִּין וּכְדַעַת רַמְבַּ״ם.

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
This is important if we want to understand Maimonides' source for his ruling. The use of the word לאחת which we quoted to mean that the perjurer is liable for every previous denial is really problematical; after all, 5,4 speaks of שבועת בטוי [undertakings by a person on oath to either do something or not do something. Ed.]. How can we apply the rules which pertain to such an oath to the type of oath discussed in 5,1? The two types of oath are so dissimilar that we would need an exegetical instrument to permit us to derive הלכות applicable to the one kind of oath to the other! We are forced to conclude that the only situation in which the two oaths are comparable is when the שבועת העדות, the oath concerning testimony, has been entered into voluntarily just as the שבועת בטוי discussed in 5,4. In the case where the potential witness only responded to a challenge to deny his knowledge on oath there is no way we can derive a הלכה applicable to שבועת בטוי as applicable also to שבועת העדות. This is why Maimonides derives culpability in the case of שבועת העדות only when such denial occurred in the presence of the court. He saw no way of proving culpability of שבועת העדות which was imposed by the creditor on the supposed witnesses by comparison to culpability of the person who swore a שבועת בטוי. Let us now return to Rabbi Papa's suggestion that if we were to use Abbaye's interpretation of the words לוא יגיד, we would have to conclude that **every oath** has to be sworn in the presence of a court in order for someone to legally incriminate himself as guilty of perjury! We do not find that Abbaye rejected Rabbi Papa's conclusion! He only rejected Rabbi Papa's exegetical proof. This means that Abbaye agreed with Rabbi Papa that culpability for שבועת העדות, the denial of knowledge as a witness which is the result of the creditor initiating the formula of the oath, must have occurred in the presence of a court in order for the perjurer having to offer a sin-offering. Thus Abbaye's view is identical with the ruling of Maimonides.


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:1:11
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:1:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:1:11)

**נִמְצֵינוּ** אוֹמְרִים לְדֶרֶךְ זֶה כִּי אָמְרוֹ **וְשָׁמְעָה קוֹל אָלָה** הוּא שֶׁהִשְׁבִּיעוּהוּ, וַהֲגַם שֶׁלֹּא עָנָה אָמֵן, וְדַוְקָא בְּבֵית דִּין כְּמוֹ שֶׁדִּיֵּק ״אִם לֹא יַגִּיד״. וְאִם הוֹצִיא שְׁבוּעָה מִפִּיו יִתְחַיֵּב גַּם כֵּן עַל פְּרָט הַשְּׁבוּעָה שֶׁחָלָה עָלָיו בְּדִין זֶה מִגְּזֵרָה שָׁוָה דְּ״תֶחֱטָא תֶחֱטָא״ דִּשְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי, וּבִתְנַאי שֶׁתִּהְיֶה הַכְּפִירָה בְּבֵית דִּין. וּמַה שֶׁמַּסִּיק בַּגְּמָרָא (שבועות לב.) ״שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ שְׁבוּעָה חוּץ לְבֵית דִּין״, פֵּרוּשׁ, יֶשְׁנָהּ לִשְׁבוּעָה חוּץ לְבֵית דִּין וּכְגוֹן שְׁבוּעָה מִפִּיו.

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
According to all the foregoing we may interpret the words ושמעה קול אלה as referring to the perjurer having denied knowledge of what he had been invited to confirm even if he did not say "Amen." This must have taken place in the presence of a court as we derived from the words אם לוא יגיד. In the event he denied his knowledge by uttering an oath, he would also be liable for another aspect of this oath, the one that we derive from the גזרה שוה of the word תחטא occurring both here and in connection with the שבועת פקדון, (5,21) an oath in which one swears not to have been guilty of carelessness or other trespass involving an object entrusted to one to keep on behalf a third party, providing the denial occurred in court. As to the conclusion of the Talmud on *Shevuot* 32 that oaths may be sworn outside the court and result in the penalty for perjury, this refers to that kind of oath, i.e. someone denying that he had dealt treacherously with his fellow man's property while in fact having done so. [The unnecessary repetition of the word תחטא in those two paragraphs is the exegetical basis for learning across from one kind of oath to another. Ed.].


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:1:12
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:1:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:1:12)

**וּמֵעַתָּה** הִרְוַחְנוּ פְּשַׁט הַכָּתוּב לְדַעַת רַמְבָּ״ם עַל נָכוֹן, שֶׁמְּדַבֵּר הַכָּתוּב בִּמְצִיאוּת אֶחָד, וְהוּא שֶׁמַּשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתוֹ בְּבֵית דִּין וְלֹא הִגִּיד בְּבֵית דִּין, וּשְׁנֵי דְּבָרִים אֵלּוּ לְעִכּוּב, בֵּין הַהַשְׁבָּעָה מִפִּי אֲחֵרִים צְרִיכָה לִהְיוֹת בְּבֵית דִּין וְחוּץ לְבֵית דִּין לֹא, הֲגַם שֶׁהָיְתָה הַכְּפִירָה בְּבֵית דִּין בִּזְמַן אַחֵר, וְכֵן הַכְּפִירָה גַּם כֵּן צְרִיכָה לִהְיוֹת בְּבֵית דִּין, וְזוּלַת זֶה הֲגַם שֶׁנִּשְׁבַּע מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ שֶׁלָּמְדוּהוּ מִ״תֶּחֱטָא תֶּחֱטָא״ מִשְּׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי אֵינוֹ חַיָּב. וְהֵיכָא שֶׁהָיְתָה הַכְּפִירָה בְּבֵית דִּין וְהַשְּׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין לָמְדִינַן מִשְּׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי אִם נִשְׁבַּע בְּפִיו חַיָּב, וְהַמַּשְׂכִּיל יָבִין שֶׁדִּינוֹ שֶׁל רַמְבָּ״ם מֵאִיר, וְהַכָּתוּב מְסַיְּעוֹ, וְהָאוֹמֵר שֶׁשְּׁבוּעָה מִפִּי אֲחֵרִים תּוֹעִיל שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין עָלָיו לְהָבִיא רְאָיָה, כִּי לִמּוּד ״לְאַחַת״ אֵינָהּ אֶלָּא לְנִשְׁבַּע מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ אוֹ הִשְׁבִּיעוּהוּ אֲחֵרִים וְאָמַר אָמֵן, דְּהַיְנוּ מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ:

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
We have now completely understood the way Maimonides interprets our verse. Our verse speaks of a single scenario namely that the creditor beseeches the witness to testify on his behalf in court and the (so-called) witness refuses to respond while in court. Both the two requirements mentioned in our verse are mandatory in order for the witness to become guilty of the sin-offering. 1) The attempt to make the witness deny on oath must occur in court, whereas if the denial occurred outside the court it does not result in a sin-offering even if at a different time the same witness had denied this in court. 2) The denial has to take place while the party denying is in court. If that were not the case the liar would not even be guilty of the sin-offering if he had **volunteered** a false oath outside the court as we derive from the comparison with the שבועת פקדון and the words תחטא that he would not be guilty. In the event that the denial occurred in the court whereas the oath had been sworn outside the court, we derive from the comparison with שבועת בטוי that if the perjurer had uttered the words of the oath himself that he is culpable for swearing a false oath. Anyone studying this carefully will agree that Maimonides' ruling is most illuminating and is fully supported by the text of our paragraph.


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:7:1
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:7:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:7:1)

**וְאִם לֹא תַגִּיעַ יָדוֹ וְגוֹ׳.** פֵּרוּשׁ, הֲגַם שֶׁהִגִּיעָה יָדוֹ לְיוֹתֵר מִשְּׁתֵּי תּוֹרִים וּשְׁנֵי בְּנֵי יוֹנָה, כָּל עוֹד שֶׁלֹּא הִשִּׂיג יָדוֹ דֵּי שֶׂה חָסֵר אִסָּר אוֹ חָסֵר פּוּנְדְּיוֹן, הֲרֵי זֶה מֵבִיא קָרְבַּן עָנִי.

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
**ואם לא תגיע ידו די שה, if he is unable to afford a lamb, etc.** This means that the individual in question can afford to present more than the two turtle-doves which are the next cheaper sin-offering and burnt offering the Torah demands of him. As long as he is not able to afford a lamb as his sin-offering, he is allowed to offer the bird-offerings designated for a needy person.


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:7:2
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:7:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:7:2)

וּבְתוֹרַת כֹּהֲנִים דָּרְשׁוּ **יָדוֹ** – אֵין אוֹמְרִים לוֹ לִלְווֹת וְאֵין אוֹמְרִים לוֹ עֲסוֹק בְּאוּמָנוּתוֹ וְכוּ׳, הַטַּעַם מִשּׁוּם דַּחֲבִיבָה מִצְוָה בִּשְׁעָתָהּ, וּכְמַאֲמָרָם זִכְרוֹנָם לִבְרָכָה (תורת כהנים כאן; פסחים סח.) בַּפָּסוּק ״וְאִם לֹא תַשִּׂיג יָדוֹ דֵּי שֶׂה״, יֵשׁ לוֹ שֶׂה וְאֵין לוֹ צְרָכָיו, מִנַּיִן שֶׁיָּבִיא קָרְבַּן עָנִי? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר **דֵּי שֶׂה**, פֵּרוּשׁ, הָיָה לוֹ לְאָדָם זֶה שֶׂה אֲבָל הוּא לוֹ לִצְרָכָיו שֶׁל זֶה הָאָדָם, כְּמוֹ שֶׁתֹּאמַר הָיָה לוֹ אוֹ לִכְסוּתוֹ אוֹ לְמִחְיָתוֹ, הֲרֵי הוּא כְּאִלּוּ אֵין לוֹ, וְהוּא שֶׁדִּקְדֵּק לוֹמַר ״דֵּי שֶׂה״ פֵּרוּשׁ בְּיָדוֹ לְהָבִיא שֶׂה, וְזֶה הֲגַם שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ הַשֶּׂה אֵין בְּכֹחוֹ לַהֲבִיאוֹ כִּי הוּא צָרִיךְ לוֹ.

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
The word ידו is interpreted by *Torat Kohanim* to mean that the individual in question does not have to borrow money to enable him to purchase a lamb for his sin-offering. Neither do we tell such a person to work harder in order to earn the money necessary to purchase the lamb. The reason for this is the principle חביבה מצוה לשעתה, it is important to perform a commandment at the time it is due rather than to perform it somewhat later but in a more perfect manner (based on *Pessachim* 68). *Torat Kohanim* describes the alternatives as follows: "the meaning of the words "if his means do not suffice for a lamb" is that even if the individual in question **owned** a lamb but he did not have the wherewithal for his elementary needs, i.e. for clothing, food or shelter, he is considered as if he did not have a lamb to offer. *Torat Kohanim* derives this from the expression די שה, "sufficient to afford to offer a lamb."


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:7:3
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:7:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:7:3)

וְרָאִיתִי לְרַבֵּינוּ הִלֵּל שֶׁפֵּרֵשׁ ״צְרָכָיו״ – פֵּרוּשׁ, שֶׁל שֶׂה שֶׁאֵין לוֹ, שֶׁהַדִּין הוּא שֶׁהוּא צָרִיךְ לְהִטַּפֵּל בּוֹ לַהֲבִיאוֹ לָעֲזָרָה. וְזֶה דֹּחַק, כִּי מַה טֹרַח בָּזֶה יוֹתֵר מֵהֲבָאַת תּוֹרִים וּבְנֵי יוֹנָה? וְאִם עַל גֹּדֶל הַכֶּבֶשׂ – יוֹלִיךְ בְּיָדוֹ מָעוֹת לַמִּקְדָּשׁ וְשָׁם יִקְנֶה. וְאִם לְצַד שֶׁהַשֶּׂה צָרִיךְ סְמִיכָה, וַהֲלֹא סְמִיכָה אֵינָהּ מְעַכֶּבֶת, וְלָמָּה יִבְטַל קָרְבָּנוֹ בִּשְׁבִיל הַסְּמִיכָה וְיָבִיא קָרְבַּן עָנִי? וְאָנוּ שָׁנִינוּ בְּסוֹף מַסֶּכֶת נְגָעִים (נגעים פי״ד מי״ב): עָשִׁיר שֶׁהִקְרִיב קָרְבַּן עָנִי לֹא יָצָא. וַהֲגַם שֶׁבְּמַסֶּכֶת נְגָעִים שָׁנוּ לָהּ, הוּא הַדִּין לְכָל קָרְבַּן עוֹלֶה וְיוֹרֵד, וְכֵן מוּכָח בְּדִבְרֵי רַמְבַּ״ם פֶּרֶק י׳ מֵהִלְכוֹת שְׁגָגוֹת. אֲבָל הַסְּמִיכָה אֵינָהּ אֶלָּא שְׁיָרֵי מִצְוָה, וְאִם לֹא סָמַךְ כִּפֵּר, כְּאָמְרָם בְּרֵישׁ זְבָחִים (זבחים ו:).

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
I have seen a comment by Rabbeynu Hillel who defines "his needs" as referring to the lamb for the offering which this individual does not possess. *Halachah* demands that the owner of the lamb personally bring it to the courtyard of the Temple, etc. This explanation seems rather forced seeing it does not take more effort or time to bring a lamb to the Temple than it takes to take two turtle-doves to the Temple. If the Rabbi referred to the effort to bring a relatively sizable lamb to the Temple, let him bring the money instead and purchase it from the Temple-treasury. If Rabbeynu Hilel referred to the need to perform סמיכה on the lamb, something that need not be performed on the birds, this too is no argument as the performance of סמיכה is an initial requirement only; the requirement is not mandatory so that failure to perform it would invalidate the offering. Why should such an individual rather not bring the offering required of him and instead bring the offering designated for a needy person? We have learned at the end of tractate *Nega-im* (14,12) that if a well-to-do person offered the sin-offering designated for a poor person he has not fulfilled his obligation. The same applies to all the offerings commonly known as קרבן עולה ויורד, offerings which vary in value with the economic situation that the person who has to offer a sin-offering finds himself in. Maimonides also rules this way in *Hilchot Shega-got* chapter 10. The requirement of placing one's weight on the lamb is only meant to enhance the commandment and does not in any way interfere with the atonement value of the offering for the sinner in question as we know from *Zevachim* 6.


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:7:4
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:7:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:7:4)

**שׁוּב** רָאִיתִי שֶׁדָּרְשׁוּ בְּתוֹרַת כֹּהֲנִים בְּפָרָשַׁת יוֹלֶדֶת ״אִם לֹא תִמְצָא יָדָהּ״ וְגוֹ׳, יֵשׁ לָהּ שֶׂה וְאֵין לָהּ צְרָכָיו מִנַּיִן שֶׁתָּבִיא קָרְבַּן עָנִי? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״דֵּי שֶׂה״, עַד כָּאן. הִנֵּה דְּרָשָׁה זוֹ צְרִיכָה לְעִנְיַן נְסָכִים, כִּי הַנְּסָכִים מְעַכְּבִין וְקָרְבַּן יוֹלֶדֶת עוֹלָה הוּא שֶׁטָּעוּן נְסָכִים. וּמֵעַתָּה רִבּוּי זֶה שֶׁרִבָּה הַכָּתוּב בְּפָרָשָׁה זוֹ שֶׁל חַטָּאת מַה הוּא? אִם לִסְמִיכָה, קָשֶׁה לָמָּה אִצְטְרִיךְ לוֹמַר ״דֵּי שֶׂה״ בְּעוֹלָה, וַהֲלֹא קַל וָחוֹמֶר הוּא – אִם בְּחַטָּאת שֶׁאֵין צְרָכֶיהָ מְעַכְּבִין מִכָּל שֶׁכֵּן שֶׁיָּבִיא קָרְבַּן עָנִי בִּשְׁבִילָהּ, עוֹלָה שֶׁצּוֹרְכֶיהָ מְעַכְּבִין מִכָּל שֶׁכֵּן שֶׁיָּבִיא קָרְבַּן עָנִי! אֶלָּא וַדַּאי נִרְאֶה כְּמוֹ שֶׁכָּתַבְתִּי, וְכֵן רָאִיתִי שֶׁהִסְכִּים הָרַב בַּעַל קָרְבַּן אַהֲרֹן.

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
*Torat Kohanim* interprets the words "if she cannot afford a lamb" in Leviticus 12,8 where the need for a woman who gave birth to bring a sin-offering is discussed, as follows: "If she owns a lamb but does not have her basic needs, how do I know that she need only bring the offering designated for a poor person?" Answer: "The Torah writes די שה, sufficient for a lamb." The reason *Torat Kohanim* had to use these words there in the same sense as in Leviticus 12,8 is that one of the offerings of a mother who has given birth is a burnt-offering and such burnt-offering requires to be accompanied by a drink-offering נסכים. This drink-offering is mandatory. Had the Torah not written די שה in that verse I could not have derived this meaning from our verse where we discussed an offering that is purely a sin-offering. As a result of such considerations, why did the Torah not merely write these words in Leviticus 12,8 and I would have applied them here also? There was no need to tell us that the sinner may forego the need for סמיכה, as we could have applied a קל וחומד, an inference from minor to major; if in the case of a sin-offering which does not involve a mandatory drink-offering, a person who owns a lamb but does not have money for his basic needs is allowed to bring the sin-offering applicable to a poor person in its place, then a mother who finds hereself in a similar economic situation and who would have to find the means for an additional drink-offering most certainly would be allowed to offer a poor person's offering instead, and I would not need additional superfluous words for such exegesis. I believe therefore that I was right. As long as the sinner has more than enough for two birds but not enough for a lamb, he is entitled to bring the offering designated for a poor person. *Korban Aharon* supports my interpretation.


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:10:1
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:10:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:10:1)

**מֵחַטָּאתוֹ אֲשֶׁר חָטָא.** טַעַם שֶׁבְּקָרְבַּן עָשִׁיר אָמַר (פסוק ו) ״מֵחַטָּאתוֹ״, וּבְקָרְבַּן עָנִי אָמַר ״מֵחַטָּאתוֹ אֲשֶׁר חָטָא״, יִתְבָּאֵר עַל פִּי מַה שֶׁפֵּרֵשׁ בְּתוֹרַת כֹּהֲנִים (ויקרא ה:יג) בְּקָרְבַּן דַּלֵּי דַּלּוּת: יָכוֹל הַחֲמוּרִים שֶׁבָּהֶם יִהְיוּ בְּכִשְׂבָּה וּשְׂעִירָה, הַקַּלִּים יִהְיוּ בְּתוֹרִים וּבְנֵי יוֹנָה, הַקַּלִּים שֶׁבַּקַּלִּים יִהְיוּ בַּעֲשִׂירִית הָאֵיפָה, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״מֵאַחַת מֵאֵלֶּה״ לְהַשְׁווֹת הַקַּלִּים לַחֲמוּרִים וכו׳ ע״כ. פֵּרוּשׁ, לְפִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ בְּפָרָשָׁה זוֹ שְׁלֹשָׁה מִינֵי חַטָּאוֹת: טוּמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ עֹנֶשׁ כָּרֵת – זוֹ חֲמוּרָה מִכֻּלָּן, וּשְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת שֶׁחַיָּב עַל זְדוֹנָהּ וְשִׁגְגָתָהּ – זוֹ קַלָּה מִשֶּׁלְּפָנֶיהָ וַחֲמוּרָה מִשֶּׁלְּאַחֲרֶיהָ שֶׁהִיא שְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ חַיָּב אֶלָּא עַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ, יָכוֹל הַחֲמוּרִים וכו׳.

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
**מחטאתו אשר הטא, concerning the sin which he committed, etc.** In connection with the offering by a rich man the Torah writes: מחטאתו, whereas when describing the parallel offering by a poor man the Torah writes: מחטאתו אשר חטא. Why the difference between these descriptions? *Torat Kohanim* item 343, elaborating on verse 13 which deals with the sin-offering to be brought by the poorest of the poor, claims that I might have thought that the value of the various sin-offerings was determined by the relative severity of the sin it was to atone for; in order to disabuse us of such thinking the Torah wrote מאחת מאלה, that either kind of sin-offering could atone for either kind of sin and that what determined the kind of sin-offering was only the economic situation of the sinner. The reason for this comment is the fact that this paragraph deals with three distinctly different kinds of sins for which sin-offerings have to be brought. We have the sin of someone who is ritually impure introducing impurity into the Temple precincts (5,2), a sin which carries the *Karet* penalty if committed intentionally. This is the most severe sin for which a sin-offering is acceptable. We have the sin (5,1) of perjury committed by someone who withholds relevant testimony on behalf of a fellow Jew, a sin which is punishable by a sin-offering either if committed inadvertently or if committed intentionally. This sin is less severe than the one which preceded it, though it is more severe than the one involving שבועת בטוי an undertaking accompanied by an oath to do or not to do something and the failure to honour one's undertaking. This sin is listed in the Torah (5,5) after the שבועת העדות as it is relatively minor. Violation of שבועת בטוי is punishable by a sin-offering only if it occurred inadvertently. As a result of these distinctions I could have thought that different sins require sin-offerings of different value in relation to the severity of the sin. Therefore the Torah tells us in verse 13 that the value of the sin-offering is not related to the nature of the sin but to the ability of the sinner to afford the offering in question.


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:10:2
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:10:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:10:2)

קָשֶׁה, אֵיךְ יָכוֹל אָדָם לוֹמַר כֵּן, וְהַכָּתוּב אוֹמֵר ״וְאִם לֹא תַגִּיעַ״ וְגוֹ׳, מַשְׁמַע שֶׁבִּמְצִיאוּת עַצְמוֹ שֶׁחַיָּב כִּשְׂבָּה וּשְׂעִירָה הוּא מְדַבֵּר. וְכֵן ״אִם לֹא תַשִּׂיג יָדוֹ״ וְגוֹ׳ שֶׁבְּדַלֵּי דַלּוּת. וְרָאִיתִי לְהָרַב רַבִּי אֵלִיָּהוּ מִזְרָחִי שֶׁפֵּרֵשׁ ״וְאִם לֹא תַגִּיעַ״ – שֶׁלֹּא נָגְעָה יָדוֹ בְּמַעַל שֶׁחַיָּב בַּעֲבוּרוֹ כִּשְׂבָּה וְכוּ׳, אֶלָּא לְמַעַל קַל מִמֶּנּוּ הַמֻּזְכָּר בַּפָּרָשָׁה, יָבִיא שְׁתֵּי תּוֹרִים וְגוֹ׳, וְאִם (לֹא) הִשִּׂיג יָדוֹ בְּמַעַל שֶׁחַיָּב לְהָבִיא בַּעֲבוּרוֹ שְׁנֵי בְּנֵי יוֹנָה וְגוֹ׳ עַד כָּאן. וּלְדֶרֶךְ זֶה יִתְיַשֵּׁב אָמְרוֹ **מֵחַטָּאתוֹ אֲשֶׁר חָטָא**, לְצַד שֶׁחֲלוּקָּה זוֹ הִיא חֲלוּקַּת הַקַּלִּים שֶׁהִיא שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת, כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא תִטְעֶה שֶׁאֵין קָרְבָּן זֶה שֶׁל עוֹף אֶלָּא לְחֵטְא זֶה הַקַּל, אֲבָל לְחָמוּר מִמֶּנּוּ, שֶׁהוּא טֻמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו, אֵין עוֹף בָּא אֲפִלּוּ בַּעֲנִיּוּת, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״מֵחַטָּאתוֹ אֲשֶׁר חָטָא״, שְׁתֵּי חַטָּאוֹת נֶאֶמְרוּ, אֶחָד לִשְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת, וְאֶחָד לְטֻמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו שֶׁלֹּא תִטְעֶה בּוֹ כַּנִּזְכָּר, וְחָזַר הַכָּתוּב בְּפָרָשַׁת דַּלֵּי דַלּוּת וְרִבָּה אֲפִלּוּ לְעִנְיַן עֲשִׂירִית הָאֵיפָה שֶׁיֶּשְׁנָהּ בְּכָל הַשָּׁלֹשׁ. אֶלָּא שֶׁנִּרְאֶה בְּעֵינַי פֵּרוּשׁ הָרא״ם זִכְרוֹנוֹ לִבְרָכָה דָּחוּק בְּיוֹתֵר, כִּי אֵיךְ יְקַבֵּל הַדַּעַת לְפָרֵשׁ אָמְרוֹ ״אִם לֹא תַשִּׂיג יָדוֹ״ שֶׁהַכַּוָּנָה הִיא לְחֵטְא יוֹתֵר, כְּמוֹ זָר נֶחְשָׁב הָעִנְיָן.

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
The hypothesis that we could have misunderstood the intent of the Torah unless the Torah had written the words מאחת מאלה in verse 13 is baffling. After all, the Torah had spoken specifically of the sinner's inability to afford a certain kind of offering in our verse! This made it abundantly clear that the kind of sin-offering to be brought was not determined by the kind of sin but by the economic status of the sinner! Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi suggests in his commentary on verse 13, that the words מחטאתו אשר חטא were needed to prevent us from misinterpreting the words ואם לא תגיע ידו to mean that if the sinner's "hand" had not "touched" i.e. been guilty of committing a trespass involving the need to offer a sheep as a sin-offering, but had been guilty only of a minor trespass, that such a sinner has to bring the sin-offering consisting of two turtle-doves. If the sinner had not even been guilty of a sin severe enough to require a sin-offering consisting of two turtle-doves, then he has to bring only a sin-offering consisting of a meal-offering." The words מחטאתו אשר חטא were written after the Torah discussed a lesser of the three categories of sin mentioned in our paragraph i.e. שבועת העדות, so that we would not err and think that the sin-offering consisting of turtle-doves is applicable only for atonement of the sin of שבועת העדות, but not to any of the categories of sin dealt with in this paragraph. Rabbi Mizrachi elaborates with further examples which we need not repeat here. I believe that his approach is very forced, seeing it is hard to imagine someone misinterpreting the words ואם לא תשיג ידו as referring to a greater sin.


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:10:3
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:10:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:10:3)

**וְאוּלַי** נוּכַל לְפָרֵשׁ כַּוָּנַת הַתַּנָּא עַל זֶה הַדֶּרֶךְ, שֶׁאִם לֹא אָמַר הַכָּתוּב ״מֵאַחַת מֵאֵלֶּה״ הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר הַחֲמוּרִים שֶׁבָּהֶם שֶׁהוּא טֻמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו קָרְבָּנָם קָבוּעַ בְּכִשְׂבָּה, וּמַה שֶׁאָמַר הַכָּתוּב: וְאִם לֹא תַגִּיעַ יָדוֹ דֵי שֶׂה וְהֵבִיא תוֹרִים וּבְנֵי יוֹנָה – לֹא לַכֹּל הוּא אוֹמֵר אֶלָּא לַקָּרְבָּן הַקַּל שֶׁבְּכֻלָּן הוּא שֶׁהֵקֵל בְּכַפָּרָתוֹ, שֶׁהֲגַם שֶׁבְּעָשְׁרוֹ חִיְּבוֹ כִּשְׂבָּה, בְּעָנְיוֹ אִם לֹא תַגִּיעַ יָדוֹ לְכִשְׂבָּה יָבִיא תּוֹרִים, וְהַבָּא לוֹמַר שֶׁיּוֹעִיל גַּם לֶחָמוּר עָלָיו לְהָבִיא רְאָיָה. וְגַם אָמְרוֹ: וְאִם לֹא תַשִּׂיג יָדוֹ לִשְׁתֵּי תוֹרִים וְגוֹ׳ יָבִיא עֲשִׂירִית הָאֵיפָה – הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר עַל הַקַּל שֶׁבַּקַּלּוֹת הוּא אוֹמֵר שֶׁיּוֹעִיל קָרְבָּן זֶה שֶׁהוּא שְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי, וְלֹא עַל שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת שֶׁהִיא חֲמוּרָה, וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר טֻמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו שֶׁלֹּא יָקֵל בּוֹ ה׳ לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו בַּעֲשִׂירִית הָאֵיפָה. וְהָיִיתִי דָן לְחַזֵּק זֶה מִמַּה שֶׁמָּצִינוּ שֶׁקָּבַע ה׳ קָרְבַּן כִּשְׂבָּה וּשְׂעִירָה לְכָל הַשְּׁגָגוֹת, כָּאָמוּר בַּפָּרָשָׁה שֶׁלְּפָנֶיהָ, לָמָּה יִגָּרַע כָּרֵת זֶה שֶׁל טֻמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו? הָא וַדַּאי לֹא בָּא קָרְבַּן עוֹלֶה וְיוֹרֵד אֶלָּא עַל הַקַּלִּין. וְהוּא עַל סֵדֶר זֶה: הֶעָשִׁיר יָבִיא עַל כֻּלָּן כִּשְׂבָּה וּשְׂעִירָה, הַדַּל הֵקֵל בּוֹ הַכָּתוּב לְהָבִיא תּוֹרִים וּבְנֵי יוֹנָה עַל שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת, אֲבָל עַל טֻמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו לֹא יָצָא מִכְּלַל הַחַטָּאוֹת שֶׁחִיֵּב בַּפָּרָשָׁה שֶׁלְּפָנֶיהָ, דִּכְתִיב ״נֶפֶשׁ וְגוֹ׳ כִּי תֶחֱטָא בִשְׁגָגָה״, דַּלֵּי דַּלּוּת הֵקֵל בּוֹ הַכָּתוּב לְהָבִיא עֲשִׂירִית הָאֵיפָה עַל שְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי, אֲבָל עַל שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת שֶׁהִיא חֲמוּרָה לֹא יָבִיא עֲשִׂירִית הָאֵיפָה. וְזֶה הוּא עִקַּר הַטָּעוּת שֶׁהָיִיתִי טוֹעֶה בָּעִנְיָן, דְּתַלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״מֵאַחַת מֵאֵלֶּה״ – הֲרֵי הִשְׁוָה הַכָּתוּב אֶת כֻּלָּן לְהָבִיא אֲפִלּוּ עַל טֻמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו עֲשִׂירִית הָאֵיפָה, וּמִכָּל שֶׁכֵּן תּוֹרִים וּבְנֵי יוֹנָה, וְהוּא כַּוָּנַת הַתַּנָּא שֶׁאָמַר ״יָכוֹל״. אֶלָּא מַה שֶׁאָמַר בַּחֲלוּקַת הַשְׁוָאַת קַלִּים לַחֲמוּרִים, כְּדֵי נַסְבַּהּ, וְאֵין עִקַּר הַטָּעוּת שֶׁעָלָיו בָּא הַכָּתוּב אֶלָּא חֲלוּקּוֹת הַשְׁוָאַת חֲמוּרִים לְקַלִּים.

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
Perhaps *Torat Kohanim* was prompted by the following consideration: If the Torah had not written the words מאחת מאלה, I would have thought that if someone committed the most severe of the sins listed in this paragraph, the bringing of impurity into the precincts of the Tabernacle, the only kind of sin-offering acceptable from such a sinner would be a four-legged animal, a ewe. As to the line in verse 7: "if he cannot afford a lamb he should bring two turtle-doves, etc," this alternative does not apply except in the case where he was guilty of the lesser offence such as שבועת העדות which, because of the relatively milder nature of the sin, requires less in the way of atonement. If someone were to argue that the Torah's concession to the sinner extended even to a poor man guilty of bringing a sin-offering consisting of a sheep for a more serious offence, let him prove his case! Similarly, when the Torah wrote in verse 11 ואם לא תשיג ידו לשתי תורים, that if the sinner cannot afford two turtle-doves that he should bring a meal-offering as his sin-offering, I would have assumed that the Torah made this concession in a case where the sinner was guilty of only the least severe of the sins mentioned in this paragraph, the sin of שבועת בטוי. I would not have assumed that such a meal-offering could serve as a sin-offering for the sin of שבועת העדות which is more severe than שבועת בטוי. It would most certainly not suffice to achieve atonement for the severe sin of bringing impurity into the confines of the Holy Tabernacle. I would have been confirmed in this attitude by the fact that in all the sins listed by the Torah up to now where sin-offerings are called for the Torah never offered the concession of a bird or meal-offering replacing a sin-offering consisting of a four-legged animal. I would have reasoned "why should the Torah deal so leniently with someone guilty of a sin which carries the *Karet* penalty?" I would have assumed that the inexpensive sin-offering was certainly acceptable only for the lesser sins. I would have reasoned as follows: The wealthy person has to bring a four-legged animal as his sin-offering regardless of the relative severity or mildness of his sin. The Torah made a concession to the poor if he happened to have been guilty of the sin of שבועת העדות, in which case he could bring the turtle-doves. If he had been guilty of the sin of bringing impurity into the Tabernacle however, the Torah did not exempt him from the rule applicable to sin-offerings in נפש כי תחטא בשגגה, described in chapter four. If a person is destitute and committed only the sin of שבועת בטוי, the Torah relents and allows him to offer a sin-offering consisting only of a meal-offering. If that same destitute person was guilty of the sin of שבועת העדות, which is more severe, he cannot absolve his guilt by offering only a meal-offering as his sin-offering. This is the major error I could have made unless the Torah had written the words מאחת מאלה in verse 13. By means of these two words the Torah placed all the sins in the same category to teach us that the meal-offering as a sin-offering is acceptable to G'd provided the sinner is so destitute that he cannot even afford to bring two turtle-doves. This is what the author of *Torat Kohanim* had in mind when he wrote: "I could have thought, etc." When he wrote that "we would have made a division in comparing the mild sins to the severe sins," this is an error; the text there should have read: "the severe sins to the milder sins."


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:10:4
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:10:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:10:4)

**עוֹד** נִרְאֶה לְפָרֵשׁ דִּבְרֵי הַתַּנָּא עַל זֶה הַדֶּרֶךְ, לְפִי שֶׁסִּדֵּר הַכָּתוּב שָׁלֹשׁ מִינֵי חַטָּאוֹת, וְרוֹאַנִי כִּי יֵשׁ בָּהֶם שָׁלֹשׁ הַדְרָגוֹת, וּבָא לְסַדֵּר הַחַטָּאוֹת הַצְּרִיכִין לְכַפָּרָה. הִתְחִיל בֶּחָמוּר שֶׁבְּכֻלָּן וְאָמַר ״יָבִיא כִּשְׂבָּה״, וְאִם לֹא תַשִּׂיג יָדוֹ יָבִיא קָרְבָּן הַשַּׁיָּךְ לְמַה שֶׁלְּפָנָיו שֶׁהוּא שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת – ״שְׁתֵּי תוֹרִים וְגוֹ׳ אוֹ שְׁנֵי בְּנֵי יוֹנָה״, שֶׁהוּא בָּא עַל שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת בֵּין בַּעֲשִׁירוּת בֵּין בַּעֲנִיּוּת, וְעַל טֻמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו בָּא בְּדַלּוּת וְלֹא בַּעֲשִׁירוּת. וְאָמְרוֹ ״וְאִם לֹא תַשִּׂיג יָדוֹ״, פֵּרוּשׁ, עַל שְׁבוּעוֹת הָעֵדוּת הוּא אוֹמֵר שֶׁקָּבוּעַ לוֹ תּוֹרִים וּבְנֵי יוֹנָה, אִם לֹא תַשִּׂיג יָדוֹ הֲרֵי זֶה מֵבִיא קָרְבָּן הַקָּבוּעַ לִשְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי.

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
Another method of explaining the words of the *Torat Kohanim* is by remembering that the paragraph deals with three separate sins and I notice that the Torah also describes three different kinds of sin-offerings. I would assume that the Torah arranged the list of the sin-offerings in keeping with the type of sins they are to atone for. The Torah therefore commences with the sin-offering to be offered in respect of the most severe of these three sins by saying that the sinner has to offer a female sheep. In the event that the sinner in question could not afford that, he should bring the kind of offering that would be appropriate for the sin mentioned by the Torah prior to this one, i.e. the sin of שבועת העדות. The sin-offering should consist of two birds regardless of the sinner's economic situation, whereas the sin-offering consisting of such birds would be acceptable as atonement for the sin of bringing impurity into the Temple only if the sinner was poor. The words ואם לא תשיג ידו, "if he cannot afford even a bird-offering" in verse 11 apply to the sin-offering if one was guilty of שבועת העדות, for which the regular sin-offering consists of two turtle-doves. If the sinner could not afford this, he would be allowed to bring the sin-offering appropriate for the next milder sin, i.e. שבועת בטוי.


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:10:5
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:10:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:10:5)

נִמְצֵאתָ אוֹמֵר: עַל שְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי מֵבִיא עֲשִׂירִית הָאֵיפָה קְבוּעָה וַאֲפִלּוּ עָשִׁיר, עַל שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת בְּעָשְׁרוֹ יָבִיא תּוֹרִים וּבְנֵי יוֹנָה וּבְעָנְיוֹ יָבִיא עֲשִׂירִית הָאֵיפָה, עַל טֻמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו עָשִׁיר יָבִיא כִּשְׂבָּה אוֹ שְׂעִירָה, בְּעָנְיוֹ יָבִיא תּוֹרִים וּבְנֵי יוֹנָה אֲבָל לֹא עֲשִׂירִית הָאֵיפָה, וְהוּא מַאֲמַר הַתַּנָּא: ״הַחֲמוּרִים שֶׁבָּהֶם יִהְיוּ בְּכִשְׂבָּה״, פֵּרוּשׁ – הֵם הוּא שֶׁיָּבִיאוּ כִּשְׂבָּה וְלֹא הַקַּלִּים שֶׁהֵם שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת וּשְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי וַאֲפִלּוּ בְּעָשְׁרָם. וְלֹא חָשׁ הַתַּנָּא עָלֶיךָ שֶׁתִּטְעֶה שֶׁיִּהְיוּ בְּכִשְׂבָּה לְבַד וְלֹא בְּתוֹרִים וּבְנֵי יוֹנָה, שֶׁהֲרֵי תְּבָרְךָ בְּצִדְּךָ ״וְאִם לֹא תַגִּיעַ יָדוֹ״, אֶלָּא לוֹמַר שֶׁאֵין הַקַּלִּים בְּכִשְׂבָּה. וְאָמְרוֹ ״הַקַּלִּים בְּעוֹף״, פֵּרוּשׁ – הֵם יָבִיאוּ וְלֹא קַל שֶׁבַּקַּלִּים שֶׁהֵם בַּעֲלֵי שְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי יָבִיאוּ עוֹף אֶלָּא עֲשִׂירִית הָאֵיפָה. וְלֹא חָשׁ עָלֶיךָ לִטְעוֹת שֶׁאֵין מֵבִיא עַל שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת עֲשִׂירִית בְּעֹנִי, שֶׁהֲרֵי כְּתִיב ״וְאִם לֹא תַשִּׂיג״ וְגוֹ׳.

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
As a result of such reasoning the sin-offering appropriate to atone for שבועת בטוי would be the least expensive one, a meal-offering, even if the offender were a wealthy individual. Similarly, a wealthy individual would be allowed to bring only a bird-offering for the sin of שבועת העדות even if he were well to-do. If he were especially poor however, he would only have to bring the meal-offering. If someone were guilty of bringing impurity into the Tabernacle and he is well to-do, he will have to bring a sheep or goat; if he is poor he would bring turtle-doves but not a meal-offering. This is what the author of *Torat Kohanim* meant when he wrote that the serious ones would be atoned for by a sheep. He meant that only in respect of the serious sins were sheep required as the sin-offering. No sheep as a sin-offering would be called for in respect of minor sins such as the two types of oaths even if the people who had committed these offences were wealthy individuals. *Torat Kohanim* did not worry that you might misinterpret what the Torah wrote and think that only a sheep or goat would be acceptable as atonement for the sin of impurity seeing that the Torah had written in the verse following the requirement to offer a sheep: "if he is unable to afford a sheep, etc. (compare verses 6 and 7)." However, the Torah had to tell us that whereas the less serious offences (the oaths) did not require a sheep or goat as a sin-offering, they did require bird-offerings. The bird-offerings themselves are required only for the sin of שבועת העדות, whereas the sin of שבועת בטוי can be atoned for by a sin-offering consisting of a meal-offering. *Torat Kohanim* also did not worry that someone might think that it would not be acceptable under any circumstances to try and atone for the sin of שביעת העדות with a meal-offering, seeing the Torah wrote immediately following the requirement to offer the bird-offerings: "if he is unable to afford this he may bring a meal-offering as his sin-offering" (compare verses 10 and 11).


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:10:6
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:10:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:10:6)

נִמְצֵאתָ אוֹמֵר שֶׁאֵין כִּשְׂבָּה אֶלָּא בֶּחָמוּר וְלֹא בִּשְׁנֵי קַלִּים, וְאֵין עוֹף בַּקַּל שֶׁבַּקַּלִּים אֶלָּא בַּקַּל. וְאָמְרוֹ הַקַּלִּים שֶׁבַּקַּלִּים יִהְיוּ בַּעֲשִׂירִית הָאֵיפָה, פֵּרוּשׁ, וְלֹא הֶחָמוּר שֶׁהוּא טֻמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו בַּעֲשִׂירִית הָאֵיפָה. וְלֹא חָשׁ עָלֶיךָ לִטְעוֹת שֶׁבָּא לִשְׁלוֹל שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת שֶׁהֲרֵי בְּהֶדְיָא כְּתִיב ״וְאִם לֹא תַשִּׂיג״ סָמוּךְ לוֹ. גַּם אֵין לוֹמַר שֶׁבָּא לִשְׁלוֹל שֶׁאֵין קַל שֶׁבַּקַּלִּים בְּתוֹרִים וּבְנֵי יוֹנָה וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר בְּכִשְׂבָּה, שֶׁהֲרֵי דָּבָר זֶה הוּא מַה שֶׁפֵּרֵשׁ בְּאָמְרוֹ הַחֲמוּרִים שֶׁבָּהֶם בְּכִשְׂבָּה לִשְׁלוֹל הַקַּלִּים וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר קַלֵּי קַלִּים, וּמֵעוֹפוֹת גַּם כֵּן הוּא מַה שֶׁמִּעֵט בְּאָמְרוֹ הַקַּלִּים בְּעוֹפוֹת לִשְׁלוֹל קַלֵּי קַלִּים מֵעוֹפוֹת. נִמְצֵאתָ אוֹמֵר שְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי אֵינָהּ אֶלָּא בַּעֲשִׂירִית הָאֵיפָה וְלֹא בְּתוֹרִים וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר בְּכִשְׂבָּה, וּשְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא בְּתוֹרִים וּבְנֵי יוֹנָה וּבְעֹנִי בַּעֲשִׂירִית הָאֵיפָה וְלֹא בְּכִשְׂבָּה, וְטֻמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו אֵינָהּ כָּל עִקָּר בַּעֲשִׂירִית הָאֵיפָה אֶלָּא בְּעוֹשֶׁר כִּשְׂבָּה וּבְעֹנִי תּוֹרִים וּבְנֵי יוֹנָה, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״מֵאַחַת מֵאֵלֶּה״, פֵּרוּשׁ, מֵהַשְּׁלֹשָׁה חַטָּאוֹת הָאֲמוּרוֹת, יָבִיא עֲשִׂירִית הָאֵיפָה עַל כָּל אַחַת מֵהַשְּׁלֹשָׁה, וְהִשְׁווּ גַּם קַלִּים לַחֲמוּרִים מֵאָמְרוֹ ״מֵאַחַת מֵאֵלֶּה״ עַל זֶה הַדֶּרֶךְ ״עַל חַטָּאתוֹ אֲשֶׁר חָטָא מֵאַחַת״, פֵּרוּשׁ, מֵאַחַת שֶׁתִּהְיֶה לֹא עַל הַקַּלִּים לְבַד אֶלָּא עַל כֻּלָּן. ״מֵאֵלֶּה״ חָזַר וְהִשְׁוָה אוֹתָם פַּעַם שְׁנִיָּה לוֹמַר כִּי אֵלֶּה שָׁוִים הֵם לְהָבִיא קָרְבַּן כִּשְׂבָּה גַּם עַל הַקַּלָּה שֶׁבַּקַּלּוֹת בְּעָשְׁרוֹ. אוֹ סוֹבֵר הַתַּנָּא כִּי מֵאָמְרוֹ ״אַחַת מֵאֵלֶּה״ הִשְׁוָה אוֹתָם לְכָל מַה שֶׁבָּזֶה יֵשׁ בָּזֶה. וְאֵין לוֹמַר שֶׁסּוֹבֵר הַתַּנָּא כֵּיוָן שֶׁהִשְׁוָה הַכָּתוּב הֶחָמוּר לַקַּל בַּעֲשִׂירִית הָאֵיפָה מִכָּל שֶׁכֵּן הַקַּל בְּכִשְׂבָּה, זֶה אֵינוֹ, כִּי אָנוּ עַל הַחִיּוּב אָנוּ דָּנִים לְחַיְּבוֹ וּמִנַּיִן לָנוּ לְחַיְּבוֹ.

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
As a result of all these considerations you would have concluded that 1) a sheep is only called for if the most severe of the three sins mentioned in this paragraph had been committed; 2) a bird-offering is called for in case the sin was relatively mild, but not in case it was the mildest of the three; 3) the appropriate sin-offering for the mildest of the three offences is the meal-offering. The most severe sin could not be atoned for by a mere meal-offering under any circumstances.


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:10:7
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:10:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:10:7)

**עוֹד** נִרְאֶה לוֹמַר, כִּי הַתַּנָּא דּוֹרֵשׁ הַשְׁוָאַת קַלִּים לַחֲמוּרִים שֶׁיָּבִיאוּ כִּשְׂבָּה, מִמַּה שֶׁאָמַר הַכָּתוּב בִּתְחִלַּת הַפָּרָשָׁה (ויקרא ה:ה) ״וְהָיָה כִי יֶאְשַׁם לְאַחַת מֵאֵלֶּה וְגוֹ׳ וְהֵבִיא אֶת אֲשָׁמוֹ וְגוֹ׳ כִּשְׂבָּה״, הֲרֵי שֶׁהִשְׁוָה אוֹתָן קַלִּין לַחֲמוּרִים, וְכָאן הִשְׁוָה חֲמוּרִים לַקַּלִּים. וַהֲגַם שֶׁקָּבַע הַדְּרָשָׁה מִפָּסוּק אֶחָד, סָמַךְ עַל פָּסוּק אַחֵר לָבֹא לְהַקְשׁוֹת, וְקָבַע שְׁנֵי הַחֲלוּקּוֹת בְּמָקוֹם אֶחָד, וְכֵן דֶּרֶךְ הַתַּנָּא.

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
[At this point the author devotes several pages to demonstrate why every line in the *Torat Kohanim* is justified. The interested reader is referred to the original somewhat tedious presentation. Ed.]


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:10:8
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:10:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:10:8)

**וּבָזֶה** אֵין אָנוּ צְרִיכִין לְדָחְקוֹ שֶׁל רא״ם שֶׁאָמַר כִּי פָּסוּק רִאשׁוֹן בָּא לְהַשְׁווֹתָם לְוִידּוּי הָאָמוּר שָׁם, שֶׁזֶּה דּוֹחַק, כִּי כְּשֶׁהִשְׁוָה אוֹתָם הַכָּתוּב וְאָמַר ״וְהִתְוַדָּה וְהֵבִיא אֶת אֲשָׁמוֹ״, מִנַּיִן תִּמְצָא לְחַלֵּק וְלוֹמַר שֶׁלֹּא הִשְׁוָה אֶלָּא לִסְמוֹךְ מַמָּשׁ, כִּי בַּמֶּה חִלֵּק הַכָּתוּב לְמַאֲמַר ״וְהֵבִיא אֶת אֲשָׁמוֹ״? אַדְרַבָּה, וָא״ו סָמְכֵיהּ.


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:10:9
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:10:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:10:9)

**וּמֵעַתָּה** נָבוֹא לְדַיֵּק אָמְרוֹ ״מֵחַטָּאתוֹ אֲשֶׁר חָטָא״ עַל זֶה הַדֶּרֶךְ, שֶׁלֹּא תֹּאמַר שֶׁאֵין קָרְבָּן זֶה שֶׁל עוֹף בָּא אֶלָּא עַל הַקַּל, שֶׁהוּא שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת, אֲבָל הֶחָמוּר שֶׁהוּא טֻמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו לֹא, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״אֲשֶׁר חָטָא״ לְרַבּוֹת חֵטְא חָמוּר, וּכְשֶׁהִזְכִּיר פָּרָשַׁת דַּלֵּי דַּלּוּת רִבָּה גַּם כֵּן עֲשִׂירִית הָאֵיפָה בְּכֻלָּן, מֵאָמְרוֹ ״מֵאַחַת מֵאֵלֶּה״, וַאֲפִלּוּ בְּטֻמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו.


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:10:10
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:10:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:10:10)

**וְאִם** תֹּאמַר, יַשְׁמִיעֵנוּ בְּקָרְבַּן דַּלֵּי דַּלּוּת שֶׁיֶּשְׁנוֹ בֶּחָמוּר וּמִכָּל שֶׁכֵּן קָרְבַּן דַּלּוּת. נִרְאֶה לוֹמַר כִּי לְצַד שֶׁבְּדַלֵּי דַּלּוּת אָמַר ״וְאִם לֹא תַשִּׂיג יָדוֹ לִשְׁתֵּי תוֹרִים״ וְלֹא אָמַר כְּאָמְרוֹ בְּפָרָשַׁת דַּלּוּת ״וְאִם לֹא תַגִּיעַ יָדוֹ דֵּי שֶׂה״, וְדָרְשׁוּ בְּתוֹרַת כֹּהֲנִים אֲפִלּוּ יֵשׁ לוֹ שֶׂה אִם אֵין לוֹ צְרָכָיו, הֲרֵי זֶה מֵבִיא קָרְבַּן עָנִי, וּפֵרַשְׁנוּהוּ לְמַעְלָה:


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:10:11
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:10:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:10:11)

**וְהִנֵּה** דְּרָשַׁת הַתַּנָּא הָיָה מִמַּה שֶׁלֹּא אָמַר כְּמוֹ שֶׁאָמַר כָּאן ״וְאִם לֹא (תַגִּיעַ) [תַשִּׂיג] יָדוֹ לִשְׁתֵּי תוֹרִים״, וְכֵן פֵּרֵשׁ בַּעַל קָרְבַּן אַהֲרֹן, וּפָשׁוּט הוּא. אִם כֵּן כָּאן שֶׁלֹּא אָמַר הַכָּתוּב ״דֵּי שְׁתֵּי תוֹרִים״, הַדְּבָרִים מוֹכִיחִים כִּי אִם יֵשׁ לוֹ הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב לְהָבִיא, אֲפִלּוּ הוּא צָרִיךְ לָהֶם. וּמֵעַתָּה הֻצְרַךְ הַכָּתוּב לְרַבּוֹת בְּעוֹף שֶׁיָּבִיא לֶחָמוּר שֶׁהוּא טֻמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו, הֲגַם שֶׁהָיָה לוֹ כֶּבֶשׂ, אִם הוּא צָרִיךְ לוֹ, וְהָבֵן:


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:10:12
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:10:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:10:12)

**גַּם** מַה שֶׁפֵּרֵשׁ רַבֵּינוּ הִלֵּל ״וְאֵין לוֹ צְרָכָיו״, שֶׁל שֶׂה קָאָמַר, יֻצְדְּקוּ דְּבָרֵינוּ, כִּי הִשְׁמִיעָנוּ שֶׁיִּפָּטֵר בָּזֶה גַּם לַחֲמוּרוֹת שֶׁהוּא טֻמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ [וְקָדָשָׁיו], מַה שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה נִשְׁמָע זֶה מִקָּרְבַּן עֲשִׂירִית הָאֵיפָה.


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:21:1
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:21:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:21:1)

**נֶפֶשׁ כִּי תֶחֱטָא וּמָעֲלָה וְגוֹ׳.** צָרִיךְ לָדַעַת לָמָּה אָמַר כִּי תֶחֱטָא, וְאֵין לָנוּ לְפָרֵשׁ כָּאן כִּי הַחֵטְא הוּא הַהַכְחָשָׁה, שֶׁהֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר ״וְכִחֵשׁ בַּעֲמִיתוֹ״. עוֹד אָמְרוֹ ״מַעַל בַּה׳״ מַה שֶׁלֹּא אָמַר בְּכָל הַחַטָּאוֹת. עוֹד אָמְרוֹ ״וְכִחֵשׁ בַּעֲמִיתוֹ״ שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר ״בַּעֲמִיתוֹ״. גַּם שִׁעוּר הַתֵּבָה אֵינוֹ מְדֻקְדָּק.

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
**נפש כי תחטא, ומעלה מעל בשם, If someone sin and commit a trespass against the Lord, etc.** Why did the Torah have to write the words כי תחטא here? It cannot mean that the sin referred to is a denial of the sin by the sinner seeing that the Torah already wrote וכחש בעמיתו, that the sinner denied having committed the trespass, i.e. having exploited his labourer by failing to pay him. Besides, why does the Torah in this instance describe the sinner as מעל בשם, "having committed a trespass against the Lord," words which have not appeared in any of the previous examples of sins committed? Why did the Torah have to add the word בעמיתו when writing וכחש בעמיתו? The meaning of the word is not clear.


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:21:2
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:21:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:21:2)

**וְאוּלַי** כִּי יוֹדִיעַ הַכָּתוּב שְׁלֹשָׁה עַנְפֵי רֶשַׁע שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה בַּעַל עֲבֵרָה זוֹ. הָאֶחָד נְטִילַת דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ, הוּא עֲנַף הַגָּזֵל. שֵׁנִי – ״וּמָעֲלָה מַעַל בַּה׳״, פֵּרוּשׁ בַּה׳ כִּבְיָכוֹל עָשָׂה הַמַּעַל, פֵּרוּשׁ לְשׁוֹן שִׁנּוּי, כִּי הוּא שָׁפַט עַל פִּי הַמַּעֲשִׂים וְזִכָּה לָזֶה שֶׁיִּהְיֶה לוֹ מָמוֹן, וּכְשֶׁזֶּה בָּא וְגוֹזְלוֹ נִמְצָא שֶׁגּוֹרֵם מְעִילָה בַּה׳ שֶׁשִּׁנָּה עָלָיו אֶת הַדִּין, שֶׁלֹּא עָמַד בְּיָדוֹ מִמַּה שֶׁהִגִּיעוֹ כְּפִי מִשְׁפַּט ה׳, וְנִמְצָא ה׳ כִּבְיָכוֹל נֶחְשָׁד שֶׁלֹּא עָשָׂה מִשְׁפַּט צֶדֶק. וְאוּלַי שֶׁכָּפַל לוֹמַר ״וּמָעֲלָה מַעַל״, וְלֹא הִסְפִּיק לוֹמַר ״וּמָעֲלָה בַּה׳״, נִתְכַּוֵּן לִכְלֹל גַּם כֵּן צַד הַגַּזְלָן, כִּי גַּם לְצִדּוֹ מָעַל בַּה׳ כִּבְיָכוֹל כִּי הוּא דָּנוֹ בְּחֶסְרוֹן הַלָּקוּחַ, וְהוּא נוֹטֵל מַה שֶׁלֹּא נִקְצַב עָלָיו בְּמִשְׁפְּטֵי ה׳. שְׁלִישִׁי – ״וְכִחֵשׁ בַּעֲמִיתוֹ״, פֵּרוּשׁ שֶׁמַּרְשִׁיעַ אֶת הַצַּדִּיק כְּשֶׁתּוֹבֵעַ מִמֶּנּוּ פִּקְדוֹנוֹ וְכוּ׳ וְהוּא אוֹמֵר לוֹ ״לֹא הָיוּ דְבָרִים מֵעוֹלָם״, וּמְשִׂימוֹ מְכַחֵשׁ, וְהוּא אָמְרוֹ ״וְכִחֵשׁ בַּעֲמִיתוֹ״, פֵּרוּשׁ מֵשִׂים הַכִּחוּשׁ בַּעֲמִיתוֹ, שֶׁהוּא הַנִּגְזָל מִמֶּנּוּ, מְשִׂימוֹ רָשָׁע, שֶׁתּוֹבֵעַ דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ וְאוֹמֵר לוֹ ״לָמָּה תְּשַׁקֵּר עָלַי״ וְיָרִיב עִמּוֹ. וְהִנֵּה שְׁנֵי דְּבָרִים אֵלּוּ אֵינָם אֶלָּא בְּפִקָּדוֹן אוֹ בִתְשׂוּמֶת יָד אוֹ בְגָזֵל כְּשֶׁגּוֹזֵל מִמֶּנּוּ אֶת שֶׁלּוֹ, אוֹ עוֹשֵׁק שְׂכַר שָׂכִיר, אֲבָל בְּמָצָא אֲבֵדָה אֵין בָּהּ כִּחֵשׁ בַּעֲמִיתוֹ, לָזֶה אָמַר הַכָּתוּב בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָהּ, ״אוֹ מָצָא אֲבֵדָה וְכִחֶשׁ בָּהּ״ וְגוֹ׳:

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
Perhaps the Torah wanted to inform us of three distinct wrongs committed by the sinner in question. 1) He appropriated to himself something which did not belong to him, i.e. an aspect of the sin of robbery. 2) ומעלה מעל בשם, the meaning of the words "against G'd" may imply that by trying to re-arrange the allocation of wealth to people other than those decreed by G'd, the sinner interfered with G'd's scheme of things. Hence the Torah describes him as having committed a trespass against G'd. By doing so, the sinner creates the impression that he denied G'd's justice and fairness in allocating wealth to different people at different times. It is even possible that the reason that the Torah repeats the expression, i.e. ומעלה מעל instead of merely saying ומעל includes the victim's impression of G'd's sense of justice and fairness. By the sinner having done what he did, he produces a feeling in the heart of the victim that G'd has allowed him to be victimised. This is an additional sin committed by the person described as guilty of "trespass." 3) The meaning of the words וכחש בעמיתו is that the sinner, i.e. the recipient of a loan who now denies to the lender that he had received it, accuses the righteous of being wicked when he makes it appear as if the lender was the liar. The exact meaning of the word בעמיתו is, that he puts his opposite number in the position of appearing to have stolen from the dishonest accuser. He has the nerve to challenge the person who extended a loan to him, and, instead of being grateful to him he makes him appear as a criminal. All of these three sins occur either when 1) someone has either received some deposit on trust, פקדון, or בתשומת יד, when he had a loan extended to him, the depositor not wanting a third party to know about it; or 2) when there is outright robbery, גזל;, or 3) עשק בעמיתו, when the sinner is guilty of withholding wages from his labourer and the like. When someone has found some object lost by a third party and denies it, the definition כחש בעמיתו does not apply, seeing he does not know who has lost it. This is the reason that the Torah wrote a separate verse to describe this example of wrongdoing.


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:21:3
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:21:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:21:3)

**עוֹד** יִרְמוֹז שְׁלֹשָׁה דְּבָרִים רָעִים הַגּוֹרֶמֶת הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַמֻּרְשַׁעַת. הָאֶחָד הִיא נֶחְסֶרֶת מֵאוֹרָהּ וּמִמַּעֲלָתָהּ, וְהוּא אָמְרוֹ ״נֶפֶשׁ כִּי תֶחֱטָא״ לְשׁוֹן חִסָּרוֹן בַּנֶּפֶשׁ עַצְמָהּ. שֵׁנִי – ״וּמָעֲלָה מַעַל בַּה׳״ עַל דֶּרֶךְ אָמְרוּ אַנְשֵׁי אֱמֶת כִּי אֵין לְךָ נֶפֶשׁ מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁאֵין שֶׁפַע נִשְׁמָתוֹ יוֹרֵד לָהּ לְהִתְקַיֵּם שֶׁזּוּלַת זֶה אֵין לָהּ חִיּוּת, זוּלַת הַנֶּפֶשׁ אֲשֶׁר עָלְתָה צַחֲנָתָהּ וּבָאְשָׁהּ בְּעָוֹן פְּלִילִי לָזֶה יִכָּרֵת מִמֶּנָּה הַשֶּׁפַע הָאֱלֹהִי, כְּאָמְרוֹ (בראשית יז:יד) ״וְנִכְרְתָה הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַהִיא״, וְדֶרֶךְ הַשֶּׁפַע בָּא דֶּרֶךְ שְׁנֵי חוּטִין דַּקִּים, דֶּרֶךְ שְׁנֵי נִקְבֵי הָאַף, וְהוּא דֶּרֶךְ מְקוֹם דְּבֵקוּת הַנֶּפֶשׁ עִם קוֹנָהּ, כְּאָמְרוֹ (דברים ד:ד) ״וְאַתֶּם הַדְּבֵקִים בַּה׳ אֱלֹהֵיכֶם״.

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
On the moral-ethical level, our paragraph also describes three negative effects on the soul of the sinner described here. 1) By accusing someone wrongly, the soul of the accuser loses some of its spiritual light; the expression נפש כי תחטא reflects this loss sustained by the soul itself. 2) the words ומעלה מעל בשם may be understood in kabbalistic terms. Every Jewish soul depends on continuous input from celestial forces called שפע נשמתו in order to sustain itself spiritually inside a body. The only soul which does not enjoy this continuous spiritual input is one whose נפש, the person it resides in, has become guilty of criminal sins which will result in its being deprived of the celestial spiritual input. This is what the Torah meant when it described the נפש being "cut off" in Genesis 17,14 as the consequence of a Jew ignoring the commandment to circumcise himself or be circumcised. The celestial spiritual input into our souls which we have described enters by means of two thin "threads" through a person's two nostrils as this is the area where the נפש is joined מקום דבקות, to its owner i.e. to G'd. This is what Moses meant when he said in Deut. 4,4: "all of you who have **cleaved** unto the Lord your G'd are alive as of this day."


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:21:4
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:21:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:21:4)

**וְהִנֵּה** בַּחֲטֹא הָאָדָם מֵהַחֲטָאִים כָּאֵלֶּה, הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַהִיא שׁוֹלְטִים בָּהּ וּבְשִׁפְעָהּ הַחִיצוֹנִים כַּיָּדוּעַ, וְנֶהֱנִים מֵהַשֶּׁפַע הָאֱלֹהִי הָרְשָׁעִים הָהֵם, וְזֶהוּ אָמְרוֹ ״וּמָעֲלָה מַעַל בַּה׳״, כִּבְיָכוֹל בָּאוֹר הַנִּמְשָׁךְ מִמֶּנּוּ, וְהוּא סוֹד הָרָמוּז בְּאָמְרוֹ (משלי כח:כד) ״גּוֹזֵל אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ וְגוֹ׳ חָבֵר הוּא לְאִישׁ מַשְׁחִית״, פֵּרוּשׁ לְצַד שֶׁמִּתְחַבֵּר לִבְחִינַת הָרַע הַנִּקְרָא אִישׁ מַשְׁחִית, וְהָבֵן:

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
If man commits the sins described in this paragraph his soul comes under the domination of the forces of evil. If the spiritual input from celestial sources were to continue, it would actually strengthen the forces of evil which have taken over in that person. When the Torah speaks of ומעלה מעל בשם, this describes such a process of strengthening him who trespassed against G'd. This is the mystical dimension of Proverbs 28,24: "Whoever robs his father and mother and says: 'it is no sin,' **is a companion of a destroyer**." Solomon means that inasmuch as this person makes common cause with evil, otherwise known as איש משחית, a destroyer, he has himself become a destroyer.


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:21:5
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:21:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:21:5)

**הַשְּׁלִישִׁי** כִּי גַּם לִכְלָלוּת הַקָּהָל הוּא גּוֹרֵם הַכְחָשָׁה, פֵּרוּשׁ לְצַד שֶׁכָּל יִשְׂרָאֵל כְּאֶחָד רָעַת אֶחָד תְּסוֹבֵב רַע לְכָל הַנֵּצֶר, וְהוּא אָמְרוֹ ״וְכִחֵשׁ בַּעֲמִיתוֹ״ שֶׁנַּעֲשֵׂית עֲמִיתוֹ כְּחוּשָׁה מִצִּדּוֹ רַחֲמָנָא לִצְּלָן, וְהוּא מַה שֶׁרָמוּז בַּפָּסוּק (משלי כח:כד) ״גּוֹזֵל אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ״ וְאָמְרוּ זִכְרוֹנָם לִבְרָכָה (ברכות לה:) אִמּוֹ זוֹ כְּנֶסֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל, כִּי בְּאֶמְצָעוּת אַנְשֵׁי חַיִל מִתְרַבֶּה בִּכְלָלוּת עַם ה׳ הַשָּׁלוֹם וְהַטּוֹב וְהַחַיִּים:

**Or Hachayim, trans. Eliyahu Munk:**
3) The denial of the truth by the individual in our paragraph impacts also on the community of Israel seeing that all of Israel are branches of one soul. If any branch of that soul becomes involved in evil this has repercussions on the entire people. This is the deeper meaning of the words וכחש בעמיתו, his denial extends to the members of his עם, his people. His people become כחש, "weak," through his sinful behaviour. This is exactly what Solomon referred to in the verse from Proverbs we have just quoted. *Berachot* 35 describes the word אמו in that verse as referring to the כנסת ישראל, the spiritual concept of the Jewish people, "mother Israel." The Jewish nation increases in spiritual power by means of its men of valour who contribute to it peace and harmony and who thereby assure it of life itself.


###### Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:21:6
[Or HaChaim on Leviticus 5:21:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Or%20HaChaim%20on%20Leviticus/r/5:21:6)

**חסלת פרשת ויקרא**