## Pesachim Daf 60a

###### Pesachim 60a:1
[Pesachim 60a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Pesachim/r/60a:1)

אוֹ דִילְמָא בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת תְּנַן, וַאֲפִילּוּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר דְּאָמַר תְּפוֹס לָשׁוֹן רִאשׁוֹן — הָנֵי מִילֵּי בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת, אֲבָל בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת — מוֹדֶה דְּמִיפְּסִיל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Or perhaps** the mishna meant to **teach** a case of **two rites.** During the first rite, one had a particular intent, and during the second rite he had a different intent. Then, **even** according to **Rabbi Meir, who said** that in general we **hold** one accountable for **the first expression, this** rule **applies** only **in one rite, but in two rites** even **he concedes that it disqualifies.** Since the second statement was made during a different rite, it too is significant.


###### Pesachim 60a:2
[Pesachim 60a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Pesachim/r/60a:2)

אָמְרִי: אַהֵיָיא? אִי נֵימָא אַשֶּׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ וְלִשְׁמוֹ, בֵּין בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת בֵּין בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת, בֵּין לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר בֵּין לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי — אִיפְּסִיל לֵיהּ מִקַּמָּיְיתָא, דְּהָא לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי נָמֵי, אַף בִּגְמַר דְּבָרָיו אָדָם נִתְפָּס אִית לֵיהּ. אֶלָּא: אַלִּשְׁמוֹ וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ — מַאי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**They said: To which** part of the mishna **does this** discussion refer? **If we say** that the discussion pertains to the case in the mishna of slaughtering an offering first **for a different purpose and** then **for its own purpose,** then **whether** these intentions are verbalized **during one rite or during two rites, whether according to** the opinion of **Rabbi Meir or according to** the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei,** the offering **is disqualified from the first** statement, **as also Rabbi Yosei holds that a person is held accountable even for the conclusion of his statement.** That does not mean that the final statement is primary but that it too has value and complements the previous one. Therefore, since one initially intended to offer the Paschal lamb for a different purpose, it was immediately disqualified. **Rather,** the question is concerning the case of slaughtering an animal first **for its own purpose and** then **for a different purpose; what** exactly are the parameters of that case?


###### Pesachim 60a:3
[Pesachim 60a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Pesachim/r/60a:3)

תָּא שְׁמַע: הַפֶּסַח שֶׁשְּׁחָטוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ, וְקִבֵּל וְהִלֵּךְ וְזָרַק שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִי נֵימָא כִּדְקָתָנֵי, לְמָה לִי עַד דִּמְחַשֵּׁב לְכוּלְּהוּ? מִקַּמָּיְיתָא אִיפְּסִיל לֵיהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara cites a series of sources in order to resolve this question. **Come** and **hear** a resolution to the question from what is taught in the mishna: **A Paschal lamb** that one **sacrificed for a different purpose, and he received** the blood, **and carried** it to the altar, **and sprinkled** it **for a different purpose,** is disqualified. This needs clarification: **What** exactly **are the circumstances? If we say** that the case is exactly **as it was taught,** that these four rites are all performed for a different purpose, **why do I need** to say that **he intended** to perform **all of them,** i.e., the slaughter, receiving of the blood, carrying the blood to the altar, and sprinkling it upon the altar, for a different purpose? The offering has been **disqualified from the first** improper intention during slaughter.


###### Pesachim 60a:4
[Pesachim 60a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Pesachim/r/60a:4)

אֶלָּא לָאו, הָכִי קָתָנֵי: הַפֶּסַח שֶׁשְּׁחָטוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ, אִי נָמֵי שְׁחָטוֹ לִשְׁמוֹ וְקִבֵּל וְהִלֵּךְ וְזָרַק שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ. אִי נָמֵי שְׁחָטוֹ וְקִבֵּל וְהִלֵּךְ לִשְׁמוֹ, וְזָרַק שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ. דְּהָוְיָא לַהּ שְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, is this not what** the mishna **is teaching: A Paschal lamb** that one **slaughtered for a different purpose, or alternatively,** he **slaughtered it for its own purpose, but received** the blood, **and carried** the blood, **and sprinkled** the blood **for a different purpose, or alternatively, he slaughtered it, and received** the blood, **and carried** the blood **for its own purpose, but sprinkled** the blood **for a different purpose,** in all these situations the offering is disqualified? If so, **it is** a case of different intentions in **two rites,** and the mishna can also be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.


###### Pesachim 60a:5
[Pesachim 60a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Pesachim/r/60a:5)

אֵימָא סֵיפָא: לִשְׁמוֹ וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ, הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִי נֵימָא בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת — הַיְינוּ רֵישָׁא! אֶלָּא לָאו, בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הִיא, דְּאָמַר: אַף בִּגְמַר דְּבָרָיו אָדָם נִתְפָּס.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: If so, **say the latter clause** of the mishna: **For its own purpose and for a different purpose.** The Gemara clarifies: **What are the circumstances? If we say** that one had these two intentions **during two** different **rites, that is** precisely the meaning of **the first clause** and there is no need to repeat it. **Rather, must we not** say that in this part of the mishna, one had both intentions **during one rite,** and the mishna is **according to** the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei, who said that a person is held accountable even for the conclusion of his statement?**


###### Pesachim 60a:6
[Pesachim 60a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Pesachim/r/60a:6)

לָא, לְעוֹלָם בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת, וְרֵישָׁא — דְּקָאֵי בִּשְׁחִיטָה וְקָא מְחַשֵּׁב בִּשְׁחִיטָה, אִי נָמֵי, קָאֵי בִּזְרִיקָה וְקָא מְחַשֵּׁב בִּזְרִיקָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
This proof is refuted: **No, actually** it is possible to explain that even the latter clause of the mishna is referring to a case in which one has conflicting intentions **during two** different **rites, and** the difference between the first clause and the latter clause of the mishna is as follows: **The first clause** is referring to a case in which **one is standing at** the time of **the slaughter and thinking about slaughtering** the animal as a different offering; **alternatively, he is standing** at the time of the **sprinkling** of the blood **and thinking about sprinkling** for a different purpose.


###### Pesachim 60a:7
[Pesachim 60a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Pesachim/r/60a:7)

סֵיפָא — דְּקָאֵי בִּשְׁחִיטָה וְקָחָשֵׁיב בִּזְרִיקָה, דְּאָמַר: הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַפֶּסַח לִשְׁמוֹ לִזְרוֹק דָּמוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ. וְקָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דִּמְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְהַיְינוּ בַּעְיָא דְּרַב פָּפָּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**The latter clause** of the mishna, on the other hand, is referring to a case in which **one is standing at** the time of **the slaughter and thinking about sprinkling** for a different purpose. For example, where **he said: I am hereby slaughtering the Paschal lamb for its own purpose,** but my intent is **to sprinkle its blood for a different purpose. And** the mishna **teaches us** a new *halakha*, **that one can intend from one rite to another rite,** meaning that one can disqualify an offering through an improper intention about an upcoming rite while performing an earlier rite. **And this was the question** raised **by Rav Pappa** on a different occasion. He asked if intent during one rite concerning the performance of a different rite can disqualify an offering.


###### Pesachim 60a:8
[Pesachim 60a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Pesachim/r/60a:8)

תָּא שְׁמַע: אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ וְלִשְׁמוֹ פָּסוּל. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִי נֵימָא בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת, הַשְׁתָּא לִשְׁמוֹ וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ אָמְרַתְּ פָּסוּל, שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ וְלִשְׁמוֹ מִיבַּעְיָא?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Since our question has not been resolved, it is necessary to bring another proof: **Come** and **hear** that which is taught in the last clause of the mishna: **Or for a different purpose and for its own purpose,** the offering **is disqualified.** The Gemara analyzes this statement: **What** exactly **are the circumstances? If we say** that it speaks **about two rites,** there is a difficulty: **Now** that **you** have already **said that** if the priest first performed a rite while intending that the offering be **for its own purpose, and** then performed a rite with the intention that it be **for a different purpose,** the Paschal lamb **is disqualified, is it necessary to say** that it is disqualified when the priest first performed a rite while intending that the offering be **for a different purpose, and** then performed a rite with the intention that it be **for its own purpose?** It is obvious that the offering is disqualified immediately with the first expression of intent.


###### Pesachim 60a:9
[Pesachim 60a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Pesachim/r/60a:9)

אֶלָּא לָאו, בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת. וּמִדְּסֵיפָא בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת — רֵישָׁא נָמֵי בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, isn’t** the mishna addressing a case in which the priest has two intentions **during one rite? And since the last clause** of the mishna talks **about one rite, the earlier clause** of the mishna must **also** speak **about one rite,** and the mishna is according to Rabbi Yosei.


###### Pesachim 60a:10
[Pesachim 60a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Pesachim/r/60a:10)

לָא, לְעוֹלָם בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת, וּבְדִין הוּא דְּלָא אִיצְטְרִיךְ לֵיהּ, וְאַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא לִשְׁמוֹ וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ, תְּנָא נָמֵי שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ וְלִשְׁמוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara refutes this proof: **No, actually** it is possible to explain that the last clause speaks **about two rites, and by right it was not necessary** to include this case, as it could have been inferred from the previous case. It was included for stylistic considerations: **Since** the mishna **taught** the case in which the rites are performed **for its own purpose and for a different purpose, it also taught** the case in which the rites are performed **for a different purpose and for its own purpose.**


###### Pesachim 60a:11
[Pesachim 60a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Pesachim/r/60a:11)

תָּא שְׁמַע: שְׁחָטוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לְאוֹכְלָיו, וְשֶׁלֹּא לִמְנוּיָו, לַעֲרֵלִים וְלִטְמֵאִין — פָּסוּל. הָכָא פְּשִׁיטָא בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת, וּמִדְּסֵיפָא בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת — רֵישָׁא נָמֵי בָּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara again attempts to bring a proof: **Come** and **hear** that which is taught in a different mishna: **If** one **slaughtered** the Paschal lamb with the intent that it be **for** those **who cannot eat it,** i.e., for people who physically cannot consume it; or **for** those who were **not registered for it,** i.e., for people who did not register in advance for this particular offering; or **for uncircumcised or ritually impure** people, whom the Torah forbids from consuming the Paschal lamb, **it is disqualified. Here,** in the mishna cited, **it is obvious** that one had this intent **during one rite,** as the mishna explicitly states that he had this intent during the slaughtering. **And since the latter clause,** which is the next mishna, speaks **about one rite, the first clause,** which is the current mishna, must **also** speak **about one rite,** and it is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.


###### Pesachim 60a:12
[Pesachim 60a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Pesachim/r/60a:12)

מִידֵּי אִירְיָא?! הָא כִּדְאִיתָא וְהָא כִּדְאִיתָא: סֵיפָא — בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת, רֵישָׁא — אִי בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת, אִי בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara refutes this proof. **Are** the two cases **comparable?** Need they be exactly parallel? Perhaps **this** case is **as it is, and that** case is **as it is. The latter clause,** the next mishna, speaks **about one rite,** whereas **the first clause,** the current mishna, speaks **either about one rite** and is not according to Rabbi Meir **or about two rites** and is even according to Rabbi Meir.


###### Pesachim 60a:13
[Pesachim 60a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Pesachim/r/60a:13)

תָּא שְׁמַע: לְאוֹכְלָיו וְשֶׁלֹּא לְאוֹכְלָיו — כָּשֵׁר. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִי נֵימָא בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת, וְטַעְמָא דְּחַשֵּׁיב בִּזְרִיקָה, דְּאֵין מַחְשְׁבֶת אוֹכְלִין בִּזְרִיקָה —

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara further proposes: **Come** and **hear** a solution based on what was taught later in that other mishna: If one slaughtered the Paschal lamb with the intent that it be **for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, it is valid.** This ruling must be clarified: **What** exactly **are the circumstances? If we say** that one had two intentions **during two** different **rites,** e.g., he slaughtered it for those who can eat it and sprinkled the blood for those who cannot eat it, **then the reason** that the sacrifice is valid **is that he had the** disqualifying **intention at** the time of the **sprinkling,** which does not invalidate the offering **because there is no intent concerning those who can eat it during the sprinkling.** That is, intent to feed the Paschal lamb to those who are unable to eat it invalidates the offering only during the slaughter but not during the sprinkling.


###### Pesachim 60a:14
[Pesachim 60a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Pesachim/r/60a:14)

הָא בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת, כְּגוֹן בִּשְׁחִיטָה דְּמַהְנְיָא בַּיהּ מַחְשְׁבֶת אוֹכְלִין — פָּסוּל, וְהָא קַיְימָא לַן מִקְצָת אוֹכְלִין לָא פָּסְלָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But** if one had both intentions **during one rite, such as the slaughter, during which intent with regard to those who will eat** the offering **is effective,** the sacrifice **is disqualified.** However, this conclusion is difficult, **for we maintain that** if only **some of those who are to eat** the Paschal lamb are unable to do so, such as in this case, the offering is **not disqualified.**